| TitleConditions on Understanding Language1Ernest LeporeRutgers UniversityPhilosophers in general are uncomfortable, if not downrightskeptical, about attributing semantic knowledge, particularly of a semantic theory,to ordinary speakers.2 Those who do not feel the pinch often adopta two-pronged defense: they rebut skeptics with an array of distinctions (andhedges), contending that the skeptics' confusions arise because they ignoresuch distinctions,3 and, at the same time, argue that attributingsuch knowledge provides the best available working empirical hypothesisto account for linguistic comprehension.4 Though skepticalarguments abound about the relevance of semantics in explicating linguistic comprehension,5a more acute challenge issues from Fodor and Schiffer: each offers an accountof language understanding that excludes metalinguistic (semantic)knowledge, and therefore, knowledge of semantic theory.6Both Fodor and Schiffer deny that there is any more tomastering a language than coming to have a capacity to go from what is heardto what is said:A theory of understanding for a language L would explain howone could have an auditory perception of the utterance of a novel sentence ofL and know what was said in the utterance of that sentence [Schiffer 1987,p.113, cf., also, p.262].I assume that language perception is constituted bynondemonstrative inferences from representations of certain effects of thespeaker's behavior (sounds that he produces, marks that he makes) torepresentations of certain of his intentional states, [in particular] acanonical representation of what the speaker said [Fodor 1984, pp.5-6].Fodor and Schiffer deny that knowledge (or any other kind ofepistemic/doxastic/psychological attitude) about the semantics of one's spoken language is causally relevant for effecting these transitions.[W]hen we understand the utterance of a sentence we do notfirst come to the belief that it means such-and-such and then have thatas our basis for thinking that the utterer was saying such-and-such [Schiffer1987, my emphasis, p.262].What really matters is this: For any perceptually analyzablelinguistic token there is a canonical description (DT) such that for somemental state there is a canonical description (DM) such that ``DTs causeDM's'' is true and counterfactual supporting [Fodor 1989, p.8]. On this view, understanding consists in being a template for acausal network between the perceived linguistic sounds and shapes, andsubsequent internal mental states. Understanding, adverting to jargon,consists in having a linguistic module in the mind. This module works (howeverit works) to set up a certain law-like covariation between instantiations ofcategories in the world and concepts in the mind.The translation algorithm [from English into Mentalese] mightwell consist of operations that deliver Mentalese expressions under syntacticdescriptions as output given English expressions under syntactic descriptionsas input with no semantics coming in anywhere except, of course, thatif it's a good translation, then semantic properties will be preserved [Fodor1990, my emphasis, pp.187-8].Schiffer concurs: no internally represented semantics isrequired for the use of a public language even if it has a semantics[Schiffer 1987, p.116]. This is the lesson of Schiffer's Harveycounter-example [Schiffer 1987, pp.192-207].Harvey thinks in Mentalese...and his language processing usesnot an internally represented [meaning theory] of English but rather aninternally represented translation manual from English toMentalese...Such a theory assigns no semantic values to the expressions ofeither language and in no sense determines a grammar (i.e., a meaning theory)for either language [Schiffer 1987, emphasis in the original, p.192f; p.262;cf., also, Schiffer 1994, p.304].Since Schiffer contests the need for an internally representedcompositional semantic, whether any epistemic relationship between aspeaker and this semantics need exist cannot even arise. So, if theFodor\Schiffer account, translationism, merely to label it,7is correct, then the semanticist's is not, as Fodor likes to say, the onlygame in town.8But how could translationism be right? Isn't it obviousspeakers of Italian, for example, know semantic facts like (1)? 1. ``Sta nevicando'' means that it's snowing.Translationists can agree that (1) is a truth Italianspeakers know. But why, they wonder, must such knowledge be invoked inorder to understand Italian? (1) is true only because speakers of Italian use``Sta nevicando'' to communicate (``encode'' or ``express'') the thought thatit's snowing [Schiffer, 1993, 1994, pp.303-04].9 So, if someoneknows that (1), this must be because he knows his words can express thisthought. From this it does not follow that such knowledge is (or needbe) utilized in understanding ``Sta nevicando''. This is all Fodormeans when he writes he is ``Gricean in spirit though certainly not indetail'' [Fodor 1975, pp.103-104; see, also, 1987, p.50; and Schiffer 1982,p.120; 1994, p.323]. Fodor -- and even Schiffer now -- are Gricean onlyinasmuch as both hold that whatever semantic properties natural languageexpressions have they inherent from (a language of) thought, Mentalese. So,contra Dummett [1978, p.97], translationists maintain that semantic knowledgeabout language is inconsequential; it plays no causal (and therefore,no rationalizing) role in linguistic competence.10Still, aren't translationists postponing the inevitable?Suppose, as Harman believes, English speakers think ``in English''. Wouldn'tit follow that understanding requires invoking knowledge about the semanticsfor English expressions? It would not. Even if one's lingua mentis isone's own public language, pace Fodor [1975, p.79ff] and Schiffer[1987, p.187], understanding still involves only the capacity to maketransitions from what is heard to what is said, regardless of which languagewe think in. As Harman puts it, ``[w]ords are used to communicate thoughtsthat would ordinarily be thought in those or similar words'' [Harman 1975,p.271]. So, if we think ``in English'', then when someone who understandsEnglish hears an individual A utter ``It's snowing'', into her ``belief-box''will go an English sentence to the effect ``A said that it's snowing''.11No assumptions about the semantic properties of A's words need be invoked,much less knowledge about these properties?But, one might wonder, how can merely tokening an English sentencein one's belief-box suffice for understanding? Mustn't we understand theseinternalized English sentences as well? Harman replies that we don'tunderstand thoughts; we merely have or entertain them. Schiffer puts the pointthis way: ``...understanding a [language of] thought is simply a matter ofthinking in it'' [Schiffer, 1994, p.322]. We don't say he's thinking it'sraining but doesn't understand his thought. This could only mean he is unclearin his conception of rain or some such thing. So, nothing needbe known in order to understand thought. Translationism, in short, maintains: i. Understanding a natural language involves nothingmore than having a (perceptual) capacity to hook up the natural languageexpressions with symbols of (the language of) thought. ii. This skill requires no metalinguistic (semantic) knowledge?My aim in this paper is to refute (i)-(ii).12 Before embarking, I'd like to say more than a few words about how thechallenge of translationism illuminates anew what most philosophers argued wasa misguided research program.Structural Semantics - A Misguided Research Program?In the 1960's and early 1970's, Fodor (along with Katz andPostal) practiced structural semantics (hereafter SS). SS theoristscountenance properties and relations like synonymy, antonomy, meaningfulness,anomaly, logical entailment and equivalence, redundancy and ambiguity as agood initial conception of the range of semantics. Shunning details, SStheorists proceed by translating (or mapping) natural language expressionsinto (sequences or a set of) expressions of another language. There is nouniformity among them about the nature of this language or about how thesetranslations or mappings are to be effected, but I beg no interestingquestions by restricting attention to Katz and Fodor's SS proposal [1963]. Theculmination of the various mapping rules and other apparatus within theKatz/Fodor framework results in theorems like (2): 2. ``Sta nevicando'' in Italian translates (or ismapped) into the language Semantic Markerese as S.Mappings like (2) are constrained, and this is the raisond'etre for them as well as for semantic markers, such that synonymousexpressions of a language L translate into the same (sequence or set of)expressions of Semantic Markerese, ambiguous expressions of L translate intodifferent expressions of Semantic Markerese, anomalous expressions of Ltranslate into no expression of Semantic Markerese at all and so on.Once they surmised what SS was about, dissenting semanticistscould not get into print fast enough to explain to Fodor and Katz just howconfused they were about semantics. Davidson [1967, 1973], Vermazen [1967],Lewis [1972], Cresswell [1978], Partee [1975], among many others, each arguedthat since SS theories do not articulate relations between expressions and theworld they cannot provide an account of the truth conditions for suchsentences, and therefore, SS theories are not really semantic. Critics chargedthat the phenomena SS concerns itself with represent only a small portion ofthe full domain of semantics and, SS, they argued, cannot accommodate thisfull domain. As David Lewis put it:...we can know the Markerese translation of an Englishsentence without knowing the first thing about the meaning of the Englishsentence; namely, the conditions under which it would be true. Semantics withno truth conditions is no semantics [1972:169-170].Critics protested that even if an SS for Italian assigned aninterpretation to every Italian sentence it would not specify what anyexpression of Italian means. On a Davidsonian conception, an adequatesemantic theory for L must not only ascribe meanings to expressions of L, itmust also ascribe them in a way that enables someone who knows the theory tounderstand these expressions. SS fails on this account because in the overallpicture of SS there are three languages: the natural language, the languageof Semantic Markers, and the translating (or mapping) language, which may beSemantic Markerese, the natural language, or some other language [Davidson1973, p.129]. Since SS proceeds by correlating the first two languages usingthe third, one can understand its mappings, for example, (2), knowing only thetranslating (or mapping) language and not the other two. We can know that (2),perhaps on the basis of what Katz and Fodor tell us, without knowing whateither ``Sta nevicando'' or its Semantic Markerese translation S means.If someone understands Semantic Markerese, he no doubt canutilize (2) to understand the Italian sentence; but this is because he bringsto bear two things he knows (2) does not state, namely, that SemanticMarkerese is a language he understands and whatever information he has invirtue of which he understands S. It is this latter information an adequatesemantics must characterize.Fodor's RevengeShortly after the assault on SS by practically the entirephilosophical community, Fodor ceased doing semantics. Most philosophersthought, certainly I did, he had acceded to his critics. However, in 1975,Fodor wrote he saw little difference, if any, between specifying meaning bytranslation and specifying it with truth-conditions:We're all in Sweeney's boat; we've all gotta use words when wetalk. Since words are not, as it were, self-illuminating like globes on aChristmas tree, there is no way in which a semantic theory can guarantee thata given individual will find its formulas intelligible...So the sense in whichwe can ``know the Markerese translation of an English sentence withoutknowing...the conditions under which it would be true'' is prettyuninteresting [Fodor 1975, pp.120-21].In a critical response, I argued either Fodor misunderstoodLewis' objection against SS or the nature of truth-conditional semantics[Lepore & Loewer 1981]. I took Fodor to be misconstruing Lewis as sayingthat one must understand the language in which the canonical representation isexpressed before one can utilize a semantic theory to determine what therepresented sentences means and that's a problem every semanticist faces. Thiscertainly is correct, but Lewis' point is not this obvious one. Instead, he isarguing that someone who understands a translation and knows it to be trueneed not understand the sentence of the translated language. We cannotunderstand (3) or (1) unless we understand English. But knowledge that (1),unlike knowledge that (3), requires no familiarity with English. Simply notethat whereas (1) and (3) are grammatical, (4) is not: 3. ``Sta nevicando'' in Italian translates ``It issnowing'' in English.*4. ``Sta nevicando'' in Italian means that it is snowing inEnglish.One need know no more English to know that (1) than Galileoknew for us truthfully to say that he said the earth moves.With respect to the question whether language mastery requiressemantic knowledge, none of this shows any more than that a semantics thatspecifies truth-conditions for sentences of a language L may serve tocharacterize (at least partially) knowledge sufficient for understanding L,while a semantics that specifies translation from L into another language bymapping structural descriptions of L into structural descriptions of thelatter cannot (unless we add the assumption that the latter language isknown). The conjectural inference from knowledge of truth conditions (partly) sufficesto understand L to knowledge of truth conditions (partly) constitutesthis understanding may seem natural, perhaps even good science, but Fodor, forone, balks. What's wrong with translationism, he asks?Fodor's current skepticism about the utility of semantics fornatural languages to account for linguistic comprehension is more thancongenial with his early commitment to SS. He has repudiated much of theoriginal SS program: its commitment to an analytic/synthetic distinction[Fodor and Lepore 1992]; its commitment to certain views about lexicaldecomposition [Fodor, Fodor, and Garrett 1975; Fodor, Garrett, Walker, andParkes 1980]. But his early commitment to SS is of a piece with his denyingthe cogency of semantics for natural languages, at least qua theory of understanding.Once Fodor gave up on the idea that understanding requiresknowledge of a semantic theory, he began to see the semanticist's emphasis onnatural language as sweeping all the interesting philosophical questions aboutcontent under the rug. For example, what bestows intentional (i.e.,contentful) states on a cognitive system. Semantic theories, whether of the SSor truth-conditional variety, are useless here. Since natural languages,according to Fodor, merely shadow real intentionality, (philosophical)explication of semantic properties must focus on the mind, in fact, on thesemantic properties of symbols of the mind. But explicating the semanticproperties of thought, according to Fodor, is a metaphysical enterprise.Metaphysical questions merit metaphysical answers; not epistemic orpsychological ones. How does this make Fodor unrepentant? A truth-conditionalaccount is no better than the original SS translation account notbecause both employ language, but rather because both leave unansweredinteresting metaphysical questions about intentionality. Philosophers qua semanticistsfor natural language need not, nor should they be expected to, answer thesequestions. Fodor concurs. He concludes that semantics for natural languages,worse than boring, is worthless. This is his real challenge. Translationistschallenge semanticists to supply a purpose for their endeavor. The rest ofthis paper assumes this challenge by advancing considerations that incline meto conclude that (a) and (b): a. Understanding a natural language requiresmetalinguistic knowledge. b. This metalinguistic knowledge must be semantic, andso cannot be merely translational.Understanding and RationalizationMaria utters to Massimo ``Sta nevicando''. Becausetranslationism is compatible with Massimo believing Maria said it'ssnowing without his believing anything about the (causal) connectionbetween what he heard and what he believes she said, it seems equallycompatible with Massimo believing Maria said that it's snowing that Massimofoster only false beliefs about what Maria's words mean. But how, then,can the capacity to make correct transitions from what is heard to what issaid alone suffice for linguistic competence? How can someone who has onlyfalse beliefs about what the expressions of a language L mean belinguistically competent with L? At least one author seems to think it'spossible. Richard writes that someone ``might hold a false theory aboutcompetence, but still himself count as competent'' [1992, p.45]. If ``falsetheory'' means false beliefs about what words mean, then I disagree unless by``count'' Richard means that the individual might never be exposed, somethingof no philosophical significance. So, is semantic skepticism compatible with translationism?Translationists, because going Gricean is an option, can sayit is not. By virtue of being linguistically competent in their sense and byvirtue of knowing what thoughts words express or encode, translationism canfrustrate semantic skepticism. But this concedes nothing to those who insistsemantic knowledge is partly constitutive of linguistic competence,since semantic knowledge, on this account, is of no consequence. So,even though it were impossible to be linguistically competent withouthaving true beliefs about what one's words mean, nothing follows about thecausal efficacy of these beliefs in rendering the transitions translationistsidentify as constitutive of understanding. Even if intuition inclines onetoward authority about what one's words mean (perhaps because we haveauthority about what our thoughts are, according to translationism), no one isinclined to endow speakers with authority about the causal ancestry of theirbeliefs, in particular, their beliefs about what another says when he speaks(or even the causal history of beliefs about what their words mean). This,unfortunately, is really bad news for philosophers/cognitive scientists whohope to frustrate translationism on empirical grounds [e.g., Segal 1994,pp.116-17]. Even if the best psychological account available of linguisticcomprehension attributes rich semantic knowledge to competent speakers, thiscannot establish that translationism is false, since it too can attribute suchknowledge. To defeat translationism, we must establish that semanticinformation has repercussions for understanding. Neither theimpossibility of semantic skepticism nor empirical science can establishanything so strong. I will take a different tack.What I want to argue is that translationism is inconsistentwith Massimo having reasons for his new belief? Like Dummett, Iwant to maintain that ``any adequate account of language must describe it as a rationalactivity'' [1978, p.104, my emphasis]. Though Dummett's target is ``acausal theory such as Quine appears to envisage, representing [languagemastery] as a complex of conditioned responses'' [1978, p.104], I want to castmy net wider to encompass translationism, a position, unlike Quine's,thoroughly cognitive. To this end I must show that the rationalizationsspeakers qua speakers have cannot be underwritten by translationism.Why should the sort of rationalizing linguistic comprehensioncarries require ascribing metalinguistic (semantic) knowledge to speakers? Whyisn't it secured already by the reliable connections between heardutterances and beliefs about what is said translationism presumes? Thecapacity for language comprehension produces correct internal states on thebasis of what is heard; so, why aren't such states justified on this basis alone?Someone's belief being justified and his having another beliefwhich rationalizes his belief are distinct. Many perceptual beliefs arejustified directly by experiences on which they are based, and in principle abelief can be justified simply by being the result of a reliable beliefforming mechanism. One's belief that one is currently in pain is clearly notjustified on the basis of other beliefs one has. The only explanatory story weare in a position to give is one which invokes a mechanism that connectsreliably one's being in pain with one's believing one is. Translationists seelinguistic comprehension in the same light [Fodor 1984].13 What's on offer is reliabilism [Dretske 1981; Goldman 1986;Nozick 1981]. Beliefs about what's said count as justified just in caseprocesses that produce them tend, in the ``relevant'' set of counterfactuals,to be truth inducing. There is indeed a lawlike correlation between an Italianspeaker's beliefs about what is said and the heard utterances that bring them about.Also, no ``KK principle'' is invoked; being justified that pdoes not entail being justified that you are justified that p. Thisreliabilist feature serves translationism well. If someone's belief fixationprocesses may be reliable and constitute justification even though he does notrealize they do, then translationists can deny speakers require specialmetalinguistic knowledge about the connection between what's uttered andwhat's said in order to secure whatever justification linguistic comprehension requires.Much has been written, pro and con, about reliabilism, but inthis context it's viability is not relevant. We want to know Massimo's reasonfor his belief that Maria said it's snowing when he heard her utter ``Stanevicando''. That he has a certain faculty that, cateris paribus,delivers him from heard Italian utterances to true beliefs about what is saidfails to reveal his reason. If Massimo knew he was so constituted, by virtueof learning Italian, that he reliably acquires true beliefs about what's saidwhen he hears Italian utterances, then Massimo would have a reason for hisbelief. But drawing on such knowledge here is illegitimate. It undercutsreliabilism's appeal by resurrecting the KK principle.14So, does Massimo have a reason for his belief even ifhe lacks beliefs about Italian? Imagine, as is consistent with translationism,that Massimo is clueless about why he believes (correctly, let'ssuppose) that p when he hears Maria utter something Italian. Nothing in his headjustifies his belief. Massimo's condition is mildly pathological. Poor dupe,running around the world telling all he meets what others said but alwayslacking reasons for such attributions. Massimo can no better explainhis belief that Maria said it's snowing than to say ``I don't know why Ibelieve this. I just do. Didn't Maria say `Sta nevicando'?'' But someone whounderstood not one word of Italian and happened to find himself believingMaria said that it's raining could make the same case for himself. Massimo isnot unlike someone who perpetuates ghastly deeds, but literally has (or shouldI say, can have) no idea why he persists. No degree of prodding or assistancecould bring him to reconstruct reasons for his behavior. Just as we wouldwithhold agency from him, we should withhold linguistic comprehension fromclueless Massimo.Diagnoses: Even if reliabilism secures some sort ofjustification, it does not secure one sufficient to underwrite linguisticcomprehension. If Massimo believes Maria said it's snowing when he hears herutter ``Sta nevicando'', we expect him to have beliefs about Maria's utterancethat play a rationalizing role. If such rationalization isintegral to language understanding, where could it spring from if not fromknowledge (or belief or other propositional attitudes) about the sounds andshapes of the language itself.15Massimo, in our imagined scenario, really is clueless. He hasno idea why he believes Maria said it's snowing when he heard her utter ``Stanevicando''. So, even though he makes the transition, he has no reason¾conscious,unconscious, tacit, explicit, implicit, or any other sort. I am claimingthat if one understands a language, he must have reasons that rationalize histransitions. To echo Davidson, ``nothing can count as a reason forholding a belief except another belief'' [1986, my emphasis, p.123]. I know noargument that defends this position tout court, but it seems right inthe case of language comprehension. What about linguistic comprehensionprovides reason for the belief that it's snowing when this understandingcombines with the belief that Maria uttered ``Sta nevicando''? Additionalbeliefs or knowledge Massimo has about Maria's utterance that non-speakerslack. In short, if translationism is right, it behooves us to ask aboutanother's reason for what he believes on the basis of linguistic shapes andsounds (he believes) he perceives. But then nothing less than appeal toother mental states about what he perceives can rationalize the belief.Suppose I'm right both about the failure of reliabilism todeliver required rationalizations for beliefs about what's said and supposeeven further that such rationalizations require intervening attitudes aboutwords heard. Question: why can't the translationist rebut, ``OK, but why isn'tthis just the denial of semantical skepticism, something I've alreadyconceded?'' Answer: what I'm assuming is that rationalizations for beliefsparallel rationalizations for actions, that is, both require causallyefficacious intervening attitudes. So, a belief that p (partly) rationalizes abelief that q only if the belief that p is (partly) causally responsible forthe belief that q. Needless to say, this isn't uncontrovertial.16There is an important feature of my discussion I have notflagged. Not all that long ago, Chomsky spent too much time defending thepsychological/epistemic status of grammatical theories he postulated toaccount for linguistic comprehension. My argument against translationismcircumvents these hairy issues. It's insignificant for the purposes of thisdebate what the nature of the relationship is between a speaker and whatevermetalinguistic information is essential for understanding. If I'm right, thenthere must be a relationship. Whether it amounts to tacit or implicitor explicit knowledge, or whether the relationship is not knowing but``cognizing'', or whether it is a completely different doxastic relationshipis irrelevant. What's essential is, if I'm right, there must be some suchepistemic/psychological/doxastic relationship toward semantic information thatstands between the heard utterance and the acquired belief about what is saidif the latter is not be an unrationalized psychological state. We can leaveopen its nature. 17Why Semantic Knowledge?Suppose translationism is wrong. It doesn't follow thatknowledge about meaning must be invoked to account for transitions fromheard utterances to beliefs about what's said. Take Schiffer's story. Whydoesn't it suffice to say that what underwrites Harvey's understanding hislanguage is his knowing a translation manual from his public languageinto his language of thought?A translation manual from L to L' is a finitely axiomatizabletheory that correlates words and structures of L with words and structures ofL' so as to entail theorems that correlate L sentences with their synonyms inL'. Such a theory assigns no semantic values to the expressions of eitherlanguage and in no sense determines [a meaning theory] for eitherlanguage...Harvey works in the following way. His internally representedtranslation manual determines a function that maps each English sentence ontoits Mentalese synonym, and he is so ``programmed'' that when he has anauditory perception of an utterance of a, then straight-away there enters hisbelief box the Mentalese translation of ``The speaker in uttering `a' saidthat a''... [Schiffer, 1993, p.244].It's easy to get snowed by Schiffer's technical jargon and bywhat appear to be merely heuristic devices, for example, appeals to Mentalese,translation manuals, the belief-box, talk about translating public languagesentences into Mentalese. We want to know Massimo's reason for his belief thatMaria said it's snowing when he believes she utters ``Sta nevicando''.According to Schiffer, Massimo understands Maria's utterance if he is causedto believe Maria said that it's snowing (i.e., token in his belief-box asentence of Mentalese which expresses what ``Maria said that it's snowing''does in English) when he hears her utter ``Sta nevicando''. If an epistemicrelationship toward some internal psychological state is required forlinguistic comprehension, why can't it be knowledge of the correct mappingfrom the Mentalese counterpart of ``Maria uttered `Sta nevicando''' to aMentalese counterpart of ``Maria said that it's snowing''?If this is possible, using L does not require knowing anythingabout an internally represented meaning theory for L. So, the inferencethat knowledge of meaning is required for language comprehension is still notsanctioned. However, elevating Schiffer's suggestion to an object of knowledgedoesn't work; seeing that it doesn't shows why an adequate account oflinguistic comprehension requires reference to connections between languagementioned and language used, i.e., semantic information.Schiffer's choices are between a function that maps structuraldescriptions of Italian expressions into structural descriptions of Mentaleseexpressions, in which case it is a translation manual (and Davidson'stranslation argument kicks in); or a function that maps structuraldescriptions of Italian expressions, that is, language mentioned, e.g., Mariauttered ``Sta nevicando,'' into language used, that is, that Maria saidthat it's snowing. Everything turns on how we understand the locution acertain sentence is tokened in Massimo's belief-box.18Massimo hears Maria utter a certain sentence; he knows whatshe uttered translates into a certain Mentalese sentence; whatever correspondsin his lingua mentis to ``Maria said that'' concatenates with thistranslation and the entire product goes in his belief-box. That suffices forhim to understand Maria's language. What I'm doubting is that we can specifythis knowledge in a way that both avoids the standard translation argument anddoes not itself draw upon semantic information, i.e., meaning, truth, orsatisfaction conditions.The standard Fodorian reply that, for Mentalese, questionsabout understanding cannot arise won't work here. It may be illegitimate toask in virtue of knowing what does someone understand one's mentalese? [Cf.,Lycan 1984, p.237f.] But that is not our question. We're asking, in virtue ofwhat knowledge does one understand his public language? The suggestionthat it is in virtue of knowing a translation manual from, say, Italian, intoMentalese won't work if the mapping is from structural descriptions intostructural descriptions. But suppose it maps structural descriptions into,say, well, what? It cannot be propositions or states of affairs. That would beentirely useless to Massimo; what about a sentence used in the language ofthought or a sentence-in-use in the language of thought. I want toargue that a ``translation manual'' in this sense determines a meaning theory, that is, a semantic theory.Suppose a function F in effect maps a set S of structuraldescriptions of sentences of L into a set P of sentences (notstructural descriptions) of L' such that F(s) (in S) = p (in P) iff (if Xassertively utters s in L, then X says that p). Then F determines a semantictheory for L.19T is a truth theory for a language L in a metalanguage L' ifffor every structural description s of a sentence of L, T implies a truesentence of L' such that:s is true in L iff p(where p is replaced by a sentence of L', and each stranslates whatever replaces p). F determines an adequate truth theory T for Lin L' iff for any structural descriptions s1 and s2of sentences of L, F(s1) = F(s2) only if T implies (forsome sentence p of L') (a) and (b): a. s1 is true in L iff p b. s2 is true in L iff pBut F(s1) = F(s2) only if there is somep in L' such that both s1 and s2 ``translate'' p. But this establishes thatsome truth theory for L implies (a) and (b).If F were merely a translation manual in a traditional sense,this result could not follow. That's what Davidson's translation argumentestablishes. That ``Sta necicando'' translates ``It's snowing'' cannotdetermine that ``Sta nevicando'' is true iff it's snowing. The disquotationprinciple behind this inference is not innocent. It assumes that ``It'ssnowing'' is true iff it's snowing. In the current context that assumption isquestion begging since it's exactly what I'm trying to defend.None of this establishes, of course, that knowledge of Fprovides the rationalization I claim (partly) constitutes linguisticcomprehension, merely that it determines something that could providethis warrant. That I know p, and p determines something q such that if I knewthat q, my belief that r would be rationalized does not imply that knowing palone rationalizes my belief that r. Moreover, even if knowledge of a semantictheory for L suffices for understanding L, it's still open whether knowledgeof non-semantic mechanisms might suffice for understanding L as well. So, Ihave not established that semantic knowledge is necessary. And, so I have notestablished that semantic theoretical knowledge is necessary since it isconsistent with what I argued that one need not know any more than the meaningtheorems that issue from an adequate semantic theory. Massimo belief thatMaria said it's snowing is justified if he merely believes ``Sta nevicando''means that it's snowing and Maria assertively uttered ``Sta nevicando''. Thathe need also know that an object a satisfies ``neve'' iffit's snow in order for the transition to be justified requires furtherargument. These are rather significant loose ends; I believe they can be tiedup. I'll leave that for another occasion.ConclusionSo, where are we? We began with what I still think is thegreatest challenge to those of us who find semantics for natural language notonly interesting but valuable, viz., how to refute translationism? Tothis end I argued that translationism leaves speaker's beliefs about whatothers say unrationalized. Going externalist about rationalization, asreliabilism recommends, seems misguided, at least to me. Internalist accountsboth invoke attitudes about the words we hear and treats those attitudes ascausally responsible in effecting beliefs about what's said. Traditionaltranslation manuals mapping structural descriptions into structuraldescriptions are no help here; and any ``translation'' manual that takes wordsmentioned into words used (or words-in-use) sneaks in just the semanticinformation we are trying to redeem. There are obviously many missing stepsand many of the steps taken lack anything like an ironclad defense, but Ihope, at least, the dialectic is sufficiently precise. Let me end on adifferent note.The most common reason for resisting the idea that speakershave semantic (theoretical) knowledge is that such knowledge is not ``withinthe ken of plain folk'' [Schiffer 1987, pp.255-261]; not something of which wehave ``conscious access'' [Foster 1975, p.2]; not something we can ``literallycredit'' to speakers [Dummett 1974, p.110]. Nothing I'm recommending requiresMassimo to have explicit representations or be able to consciouslyreconstruct pieces of practical reasoning from perceived sounds toextra-linguistic belief [Lepore 1982; Higginbotham 1983; 1987; George 1989].Massimo may be unequipped, incapable, or unskilled. But if his beliefs aboutwhat's said are rationalized , it makes sense for us to articulate hisreasons. My argument, if any good, establishes that some relationship towardmetalinguistic states or information about one's language is required forlinguistic comprehension. 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