Virtue Epistemology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Cite this entry Search the SEP • Advanced Search • Tools • RSS FeedTable of Contents• What's New• Archives• Projected ContentsEditorial Information• About the SEP• Editorial Board• How to Cite the SEP• Special CharactersSupport the SEPContact the SEP ©Metaphysics Research Lab,CSLI,Stanford University  Open access to the SEP is made possible by a world-wide funding initiative. Please Read How You Can Help Keep the Encyclopedia FreeVirtue EpistemologyFirst published Fri Jul 9, 1999; substantive revision Wed Oct 6, 2004An approach in epistemology that applies the resources of virtue theoryto problems in the theory of knowledge. It is argued that by doing soit is possible to give informative accounts of knowledge, evidence, andother important epistemic concepts, while solving a wide range ofproblems that have plagued other approaches in the theory of knowledge.1. Introduction2. Virtue Perspectivism3. Responsibilism I4. Responsibilism II5. A Mixed Theory6. A Social/Genetic Approach7. A Neo-Aristotelian Theory8. The Scope of Virtue Epistemology9. The Nature of Knowledge10. The Value of Knowledge11. Skepticism12. ContextualismBibliographyOther Internet ResourcesRelated Entries1. IntroductionVirtue epistemology begins with the assumption that epistemology is anormative discipline. The main idea of virtue epistemology is tounderstand the kind of normativity involved on the model of virtuetheories in ethics. This main idea is best understood in terms of athesis about the direction of analysis. Just as virtue theories inethics try to understand the normative properties of actions in termsof the normative properties of moral agents, virtue epistemology triesto understand the normative properties of beliefs in terms of thenormative properties of cognitive agents. Hence virtue theories inethics have been described as person-based rather than act-based, andvirtue epistemology has been described as person-based rather thanbelief-based. For example, non-virtue theories might try to understand theepistemic justification of belief in terms of doing one's epistemicduty, believing according to the evidence, or using a reliable method.In each case the account of justified belief makes no reference to anynormative properties of persons. On the contrary, it would be naturalon such views to think of epistemic virtues as dispositions to believein the ways in question. Virtue epistemology changes this direction ofanalysis by understanding justified belief in terms of epistemicvirtues. For example, Ernest Sosa has argued that justified belief isbelief that is grounded in epistemic virtue. Similarly, Linda Zagzebskihas argued that knowledge is true belief arising out of acts ofintellectual virtue. Of course the next task is to give an informativeaccount of the cognitive virtues involved in such definitions.Depending on how this is done, we get further versions of virtueepistemology.A number of claims have been made on behalf of virtue epistemology.We have already seen that virtue epistemologists promise to define arange of important epistemic concepts by drawing on the resources ofvirtue theory. Beyond this, it has been claimed that virtueepistemology can overcome the debate between internalist andexternalist conceptions of justification, that it can solve problemspertaining to skepticism, that it can solve Gettier problems, and thatit can contribute to a unified theory of value across epistemology andethics. Recent interest in virtue epistemology began with a paper byErnest Sosa, where he claimed that a turn to virtue theory would allowa solution to the impass between foundationalist theories ofjustification and coherentist theories of justification. One way toorganize the literature is to begin with Sosa's paper and thedevelopment of his own version of virtue epistemology. We may then lookat various reactions to Sosa's seminal work. As we shall see, these maybe divided into two categories. While some critics have responded withobjections to the idea that we should turn to virtue theory inepistemology, another group has responded with objections that Sosadoes not go far enough in exploiting the various resources of virtuetheory.2. Virtue PerspectivismIn "The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in theTheory of Knowledge," Sosa suggested that virtue epistemology wouldallow a solution to the foundationalism-coherentism problematic inepistemology. We may think of foundationalism on the metaphor of apyramid: there is a structure to knowledge involving a nonsymmetricalrelation of support among levels, with one level having the specialstatus of a foundation which supports all the rest. In the mostplausible versions of foundationalism sensory experience plays animportant role in the foundation, providing a ground for observationalknowledge from which further knowledge can be inferred higher up in thestructure. Coherentism counters this account of knowledge with itsmetaphor of the raft: knowledge is a structure that floats free of anysecure anchor or tie. No part of knowledge is more fundamental than therest to the overall structure, all of the parts being held together bythe ties of logical relations. According to Sosa, both these accounts of knowledge have fatalflaws. The problem with coherentism is that it cannot account forknowledge at the periphery of a system of beliefs. This is becausecoherentism makes justification entirely a function of the logicalrelations among beliefs in the system, but perceptual beliefs have veryfew logical ties to the remainder. This makes it possible to generatecounterexamples to coherentism by means of the following recipe. First,take a perfectly coherent system of beliefs that seems to provide goodexamples of justified belief and knowledge. Second, replace oneperceptual belief in the system with its negation, while also makingany other slight changes that are necessary to preserve coherence. Thiswill have very little effect on the overall coherence of the system,since that is a function only of the logical relations among thesystem's beliefs. Accordingly, it will turn out to be the case that thenew "perceptual belief" is as coherent as the old one, and istherefore, according to coherentism, equally well justified. Thisresult is counter-intuitive, however, since the person's sensoryexperience has remained the same. Surely she is not justified inbelieving that she is not standing in front of a tree, for example, ifher sensory experience is as if she is standing in front of a tree.Examples like this one suggest that justification is a function of morethan the relations among beliefs. Specifically, it is partly a functionof one's sensory experience.This gives the advantage to foundationalism, which allows a role forsensory experience in justified belief and knowledge. But an equallyproblematic dilemma arises for foundationalism, depending on how onethinks of foundationalism's epistemic principles. Suppose we agree thatthere is some true epistemic principle relating (i) a relevant sensoryexperience to (ii) one's justified belief that one is standing in frontof a tree. Is this to be understood as a fundmental principle aboutepistemic justification, or is it to be understood as an instance ofsome more general principle? If we say the former, then thefoundationalist is faced with a seemingly infinite multitude offundamental principles with no unifying ground. There would bedifferent fundamental principles for visual and auditory experience,for example, as well as possible principles for beings not like us atall, but capable of having their own kind of sensory knowledge. Themore attractive alternative is to think of the foundationalist'sprinciples as derived, but then we need an account of some deeper,unifying ground.This is the context in which Sosa suggests that virtue epistemologywill do the trick. Suppose we think of virtues in general asexcellences of character. A virtue is a stable and successfuldisposition: an innate ability or an acquired habit, that allows one toreliably achieve some good. An intellectual virtue will then be acognitive excellence: an innate ability or acquired habit that allowsone to reliably achieve some intellectual good, such as truth in arelevant matter. We may now think of justified belief as belief that isappropriately grounded in one's intellectual virtues, and we may thinkof knowledge as true belief that is so grounded. By adopting thisposition, we can see the foundationalist's epistemic principles asinstances of this more general account of justified belief andknowledge. The idea is that human beings possess intellectual virtuesthat involve sensory experience; i.e. stable and reliable dispositionsfor forming beliefs about the environment on the basis of experientialinputs. Such dispositions involve various sensory modalities such asvision and hearing. Other cognitive beings might be possessed ofanalogous dispositions, involving kinds of sensory experience unknownto humans. Accordingly, Sosa argues, virtue epistemology provides theunified account that was needed.The same idea accounts for the truth involved in coherentism aswell. Namely, coherence gives rise to justified belief and knowledgeprecisely because it is the manifestation of intellectual virtue. Inour world, and for beings like us, coherence increases reliability, andtherefore constitutes a kind of intellectual virtue in its own right.Moreover, coherence of a certain sort allows for reflective knowledgeas opposed to mere animal knowledge. According to Sosa, we rise to adifferent and superior kind of justification and knowledge when we areable to see our beliefs as deriving from intellectual virtues. Thisperspective on our virtues must itself derive from a second-orderintellectual virtue, one that allows us to reliably monitor and adjustour first-level cognitive dispositions (Sosa 1980). Notice that the above ideas involve the direction of analysis thesisdiscussed above. Traditional foundationalism and coherentism try toaccount for justified belief and knowledge solely by reference to theproperties of beliefs; i.e. their logical relations (coherentism) ortheir logical relations plus their relations to sensory experiences(traditional foundationalism). Sosa's version of virtue epistemologyaccounts for various kinds of justified belief and knowledge by firstdefining the notion of an intellectual virtue, and then by definingvarious normative properties of beliefs in terms of this morefundamental property of persons.Responses to Sosa have focussed on various objections to theposition outlined above, including the general claim that a turn tovirtue theory would be a fruitful approach in epistemology. A secondgroup of critics has endorsed Sosa's call for a turn to virtue theoryin epistemology, but have argued that he does not go far enough inexploiting the various resources that virtue theory offers.3. Responsibilism IOne early response to Sosa along this second line is by Lorraine Code,who argues for the centrality of epistemic responsibility inepistemology. Code agrees with Sosa's direction of analysis thesis,endorsing the idea that primary justification is best understood asattaching to stable dispositions to act in certain ways, whilesecondary justification accrues to particular acts because of theirsources in virtues. This approach, she argues, appropriately focusesepistemology on persons, their cognitive activities, and theirmembership in a community defined by social practices of enquiry. Theindividual knower is now recognized as part of a community, with allthe moral and intellectual obligations that this entails. However, Codeargues, redirecting epistemology in this way gives the notion ofepistemic responsibility central importance. Characterizing Sosa'sposition as a version of reliabilism, she argues that her own"responsibilism" constitutes a more adequate development of Sosa'sinitial insights. This is because, in part, the notion ofresponsibility emphasizes the active nature of the knower, as well asthe element of choice involved in the knower's activity. Whereas amerely passive recorder of experience can be described as reliable,only an active, creative agent can be assessed as responsible orirresponsible, as having fulfilled her obligations to fellow enquirers,etc. According to Code, then, Sosa is correct to call for a focus onintellectual virtues in epistemology, with the focus on agency andcommunity that this implies. But the natural way to develop thisinsight is to understand the intellectual virtues in terms of epistemicresponsibility. Code goes so far as to say that epistemicresponsibility is the central intellectual virtue, from which all otherintellectual virtues radiate. Another interesting feature of Code's view concerns some thesesabout the prospects for epistemology. Placing emphasis on virtue andresponsibility, she argues, has consequences for both how epistemologyshould be conducted and the kind of epistemological insights we shouldhope for. First, emphasizing the contextual and social dimensions ofknowledge introduces complexity into theorizing, and in such a way thatshows the usual examples and counter-examples in epistemology to beinadequate. Such examples under-describe the relevant epistemiccircumstances, leaving out such relevant considerations as history,social role, conflicting obligations, etc. To show how such factors areindeed relevant, it is necessary to replace these thin examples withthickly descriptive narrative. Only stories that tie a whole lifetogether provide an adequate context for epistemic evaluations,precisely because the factors that govern such evaluations are thatrich and complex.Moreover, Code argues, thick narratives are essential forunderstanding the very nature of intellectual virtue. Echoing a pointby Alasdair MacIntyre, Code argues that an adequate understanding ofwhat it is to be virtuous requires placing virtuous selves in theunity of a narrative. A consequence of this is that we should notexpect to describe tidy conditions for justification andknowledge. The relevant criteria for epistemic evaluation are toovaried and complex for that, and so any simple theory of knowledgewill distort rather than adequately capture those criteria. This doesnot mean, however, that insight into the nature and conditions ofjustification and knowledge is impossible. Rather, such insight is tobe gained by narrative history rather than theory construction of thetraditional sort (Code 1987).4. Responsibilism IIFollowing Sosa, Code tends to think of intellectual virtues as broadcognitive faculties or abilities pertaining to some subject matter. Inthis respect both authors are following Aristotle, who names intuition,science, wisdom and prudence as intellectual virtues. For example, forAristotle intuition is the ability to know first principles, whilescience is the ability to deduce further truths from these. JamesMontmarquet has developed the notion of an intellectual virtue in adifferent direction, conceiving them on the model of Aristotle's moralvirtues. Rather than thinking of intellectual virtues as cognitivefaculties or abilities, he conceives them as personality traits, suchas impartiality and intellectual courage. In sum, intellectual virtuesare personality traits that a person who desires the truth would wantto have. Like Code, Montmarquet criticizes Sosa's position for notsufficiently exploiting the resources of virtue theory in ethics. Alsolike Code, he criticizes Sosa's emphasis on the reliability ofintellectual virtues, and wants to replace this with an emphasis onresponsibility and other concepts related to agency. According toMontmarquet, it is a mistake to characterize the intellectual virtuesas reliable in the sense of truth-conducive. This is because we canimagine possible worlds, such as Descartes' demon world, where thebeliefs of epistemically virtuous people are almost entirely false.Alternatively, we can imagine worlds where the intellectually lazy andcareless have mostly true beliefs. Suppose we were to somehow discoverthat ours was such a world. Would we then revise our opinions aboutwhich traits count as intellectual virtues and which as vices?Montmarquet argues that we would not. Traits like intellectual courageand carefulness are virtues even if we are unfortunate enough to be thevictims of a Cartesian deceiver, and traits like laziness andcarelessness are vices even if, contrary to appearances, they turn outto be reliable. But then reliability cannot be a distinctive mark ofthe intellectual virtues.A different approach is to characterize the virtues in terms of adesire for truth. According to Montmarquet, the central intellectualvirtue is epistemic conscientiousness. To be conscientious in thissense is to be motivated to arrive at truth and to avoid error; it isto have an appropriate desire for the truth. Here there is a parallelwith moral conscientiousness, where a morally conscientious person issomeone who tries her best to do what is right. This notion ofepistemic conscientiousness is closely related to that of epistemicresponsibility, or perhaps identical with it. Hence with Code,Montmarquet makes epistemic responsibility rather than reliabilitycentral to his understanding of intellectual virtue.According to Montmarquet, then, epistemic conscientiousness is thecentral intellectual virtue. However, intellectual virtue cannot beunderstood solely in terms of a desire for truth, since one's desirefor truth must be appropriately regulated. We must thereforecountenance additional regulative virtues, which constitute ways ofbeing conscientious. Montmarquet classifies these under three maincategories. "Virtues of impartiality" include such personality traitsas openness to the ideas of others, willingness to exchange ideas, anda lively sense of one's own fallibility. "Virtues of intellectualsobriety" oppose the excitement and rashness of the overlyenthusiastic. Finally, "virtues of intellectual courage" include awillingness to conceive and examine alternatives to popular ideas,perseverance in the face of opposition from others, and determinationto see an inquiry through to the end.Montmarquet suggests that we can use the above account ofintellectual virtue to define an important sense of subjectivejustification. Specifically,S is subjectively justified in believingp insofar as S is epistemically virtuous in believingp. This is not the kind of justification that turns true belief intoknowledge. This is because Gettier cases show that a person can bejustified in believing something in this sense, but still lack the kindof objective relation to the truth required for knowledge.Nevertheless, Montmarquet argues, the above sense of justification isimportant regarding a different issue. Namely, Montmarquet is concernedwith the problem of morally evaluating actions. More specifically, heis concerned with the problem of blaming persons for actions which,from their own point of view, are morally justified. Often enough, themorally outrageous actions of tyrants, racists and terrorists seemperfectly reasonable, even necessary, in the context of their distortedbelief system. In order to find the actions blameworthy in such cases,it would seem that we have to find the beliefs blameworthy as well. Inother words, we need some account of "doxastic responsibility," or thekind of responsibility for belief that can ground responsibility foractions. The above account of subjective justification, Montmarquetargues, provides what we are looking for. Precisely because itunderstands justification in terms of intellectually virtuous behavior,the account allows a plausible sense in which justified (andunjustified) belief is under a person's control. This, in turn, makesthe relevant beliefs to be appropriate objects of blame and praise. One objection to this sort of view is that judgements ofresponsibility are inappropriate in the cognitive domain. The idea isthat judgements of praise and blame presuppose voluntary control, andthat we lack such control over our beliefs. Montmarquet responds tothis objection by distinguishing between a weak and a strong sense ofvoluntary control. Roughly, a belief is voluntary in the weak sense ifit is formed in circumstances which do not interfere with virtuousbelief formation. This kind of voluntariness amounts to freedom frominterference or coercion. A belief is voluntary in the strong sense(again roughly) if it is subject to one's will. Montmarquet's strategyis to concede that responsibility requires weak voluntary control, butto argue that we often have this kind of control over our beliefs.Second, he concedes that we do not typically have strong voluntarycontrol over our beliefs, but argues that responsibility does notrequire it.The analogy with action is instructive. One can be appropriatelyblamed for negligent actions and inadvertent actions, and even in caseswhere there is no actual choice regarding the action in question. Incases of action as well as belief, strong voluntary control is notnecessary for responsibility. On the other hand, praise or blame wouldbe inappropriate in cases where action is coerced. However, many of ourbeliefs satisfy the relevant "no coercion condition," and so are weaklyvoluntary in that sense (Montmarquet 1993).5. A Mixed TheoryGreco has argued that intellectual virtue is closely tied to epistemicresponsibility, but without rejecting Sosa's position that the virtuesare reliable, or truth-conducive. The main idea is that an adequateaccount of knowledge ought to contain both a responsibility conditionand a reliability condition. Moreover, a virtue account can explain howthe two are tied together. In cases of knowledge, objective reliabilityis grounded in epistemically responsible action. The way this works is as follows. First, we can give an account ofsubjective justification in terms of epistemic responsibility:S is subjectively justified in believingp if and only if S's believing p isepistemically responsible.The notion of responsibility, in turn, can be understood in terms ofthe dispositions S manifests when S is thinkingconscientiously, or is motivated to believe the truth. Such motivationneed not be self-conscious, or even univocal. Rather, it is meant tospecify the kind of default position that people are usually in, andto oppose this to the alternative motivations involved in such thingsas wishful thinking, pig-headedness and attention grabbing. Thissuggests the following account of subjective justification.S is subjectively justified in believingp if and only if S's believing p resultsfrom the dispositions that S manifests when S ismotivated to believe the truth.Finally, this kind of subjective justification gives rise to objectivereliability when things go well: S knows p only in cases where (a)S is subjectively justified in believing p, and (b)as a result of this S is objectively reliable in believingp.One feature of the above account is that it understands both justifiedbelief and knowledge in terms of the dispositions that make up S'scognitive character. In other words, it makes the notion of virtuouscharacter primary, and then gives accounts of justified belief andknowledge in terms of this. Accordingly, we can define virtuouscharacter in terms of proper motivation and reliability as thesenotions are understood above, and then given the following (partial)account of knowledge. S knows p only in cases whereS's believing p results from a virtuous cognitivecharacter. (Greco 2000)6. A Social/Genetic ApproachJonathan Kvanvig has argued for a more radical departure fromtraditional epistemological concerns. According to Kvanvig,traditional epistemology is dominated by an "individualistic" and"synchronic" conception of knowledge. Accordingly, one of the mostimportant tasks from the traditional perspective is to specify theconditions under which an individual S knows a propositionp at a particular time t. Kvanvig argues that thisperspective should be abandoned in favor of a new social/geneticapproach. Whereas the traditional perspective focuses on questionsabout justified belief and knowledge of individuals at particulartimes, a new genetic epistemology would focus on the cognitive life ofthe mind as it develops within a social context. From the newperspective, questions concerning individuals are replaced withquestions concerning the group, and questions concerning knowledge ata particular time are abandoned for questions about cognitivedevelopment and learning. Kvanvig argues that there are at least twoways in which the virtues would be central within the newperspective. First, the virtues are essential to understanding thecognitive life of the mind, particularly the development and learningwhich takes place over time through mimicking and imitation ofvirtuous agents. Second, in a social/genetic approach the virtueswould play a central role in the characterization of cognitiveideals. For example, what makes a certain structuring of informationsuperior, Kvanvig argues, is that it is the kind of structuring that aperson of intellectual virtue would come to possess in the appropriatecircumstances (Kvanvig 1992).7. A Neo-Aristotelian TheoryWe have seen that both Code and Montmarquet argue for a closer affinitybetween virtue epistemology and Aristotle's theory of the moralvirtues. For example, Montmarquet thinks of the intellectual virtues asepistemically relevant personality traits, and both authors emphasizethe close connection between virtue, agency and responsibility. Themost detailed and systematic presentation of a neo-Aristotelian view,however, is due to Linda Zagzebski. She argues for a unified account ofthe intellectual and moral virtues, modeled on Aristotle's account ofthe moral virtues. Her view should be characterize as"neo-Aristotelian" rather than "Aristotelian," because Aristotle didnot hold that the moral and intellectual virtues are unified in thisway. First, Zagzebski endorses the "direction of analysis thesis"characterized above. The distinctive feature of a virtue theory inethics, she argues, is that it analyzes right action in terms ofvirtuous character, rather than the other way around.By a pure virtue theory I mean a theory that makes theconcept of a right act derivative from the concept of a virtue or someinner state of a person that is a component of virtue. This is a pointboth about conceptual priority and about moral ontology. In a purevirtue theory the concept of a right act is defined in terms of theconcept of a virtue or a component of virtue such as motivation.Furthermore, the property of rightness is something that emerges fromthe inner traits of persons. (Zagzebski 1996, 79)An epistemology modeled on this kind of ethical theory, then, wouldanalyze justification and other important normative properties ofbelief in terms of intellectual virtue. Moreover, Zagzebski argues, wecan give a unified account of moral and intellectual virtue based on anAristotelian model of the moral virtues. In fact, she argues,intellectual virtues are best understood as a subset of the moralvirtues. According to Aristotle, the moral virtues are acquired traits ofcharacter that involve both a motivational component and a reliablesuccess component. For example, moral courage is the virtue accordingto which a person is characteristically motivated to risk danger whensomething of value is at stake, and is reliably successful at doing so.Likewise, we can understand benevolence as the virtue according towhich a person is motivated to bring about the well-being of others,and is reliably successful at doing so. Intellectual virtues have ananalogous structure, Zagzebski argues. Just as all moral virtues can beunderstood in terms of a general motivation for the good, allintellectual virtues may be understood in terms of a general motivationfor knowledge and other kinds of high-quality cognitive contact withreality. Individual intellectual virtues can then be specified in termsof more specific motivations that are related to the general motivationfor knowledge. For example, open-mindedness is the virtue according towhich a person is motivated to be receptive to new ideas, and isreliably successful at achieving the end of this motivation.Intellectual courage is the virtue according to which a person ismotivated to be perservering in her own ideas, and is reliablysuccessful at doing this.Understanding the intellectual virtues this way, we can go on todefine a number of important deontic properties of belief. Eachdefinition, Zagzebski argues, is parallel to a definition for ananalogous deontic property of actions.A justified belief is what a person who is motivated byintellectual virtue, and who has the understanding of his cognitivesituation a virtuous person would have, might believe in likecircumstances.An unjustified belief is what a person who is motivated byintellectual virtue, and who has the understanding of his cognitivesituation a virtuous person would have, would not believe in likecircumstances.A belief of epistemic duty is what a person who is motivated byintellectual virtue, and who has the understanding of his cognitivesituation a virtuous person would have, would believe in likecircumstances.As with the moral virtues, it is possible for a conflict among theintellectual virtues to arise. Thus the intellectually courageous thingto do might conflict with the intellectually humble thing to do. Thisproblem is solved by introducing the mediating virtue of phronesis, orpractical wisdom. The practically wise person is able to weigh thedemands of all the relevant virtues is a given situation, so as todirect her cognitive activity appropriately. Accordingly we get thefollowing definitions of "all things considered" justification. A justified belief, all things considered, is what aperson with phronesis might believe in like circumstances.An unjustified belief, all things considered, is what a personwith phronesis would not believe in like circumstances.A belief is a duty, all things considered, just in case it iswhat a person with phronesis would believe in likecircumstances.Finally, Zagzebski argues that we can give a definition of knowledge byfirst defining an "act of intellectual virtue". An act of intellectual virtue A is an act that arisesfrom the motivational component of A, is something a person with virtueA would (probably) do in the circumstances, is successful in achievingthe end of the A motivation, and is such that the agent acquires a truebelief (cognitive contact with reality) through these features of theact.We may then define knowledge as follows: Knowledge is a state of true belief (cognitive contactwith reality) arising out of acts of intellectualvirtue.Since the truth condition is redundant, we may say alternatively: Knowledge is a state of belief arising out of acts ofintellectual virtue.8. The Scope of Virtue EpistemologyWe have seen that a number of authors endorse a turn to virtue theoryin epistemology. Moreover, these same authors have variously invokedAristotle, Aquinas, Reid, Dewey and Peirce as early adherents of avirtue approach. This gives rise to the question of the scope of virtueepistemology. In fact, there has been some controversy about this inthe contemporary literature. Kvanvig has argued that early versions of reliabilism, includingthose of David Armstrong, Alvin Goldman and Robert Nozick, are bestunderstood as versions of virtue epistemology. Although these viewsmake explicit reference to reliable processes and reliable methods,Kvanvig argues that they are most charitably understood as concernedwith reliable cognitive character. As such, they are implicit versionsof virtue epistemology. Sosa has made similar arguments regarding AlvinPlantinga's view, and Greco has argued that any view that makesjustification or knowledge a function of agent reliability therebycounts as a version of virtue epistemology.Against this, Code and Zagzebski argue that reliabilist views failto exploit the most valuable resources of virtue theory. Moreover,Plantinga has explicitly rejected the virtue label, arguing that thefoundational concept for his view is proper function rather thanintellectual virtue. These disputes are not merely semantic. Rather,they reflect disagreements over what is truly of value in virtuetheory. Put another way, they are disputes about what aspects of virtuetheory, if any, are doing valuable work in various accounts ofjustification, knowledge and other important epistemic notions.However such disputes are resolved, we have seen that there is oneway of characterizing virtue epistemology so that a broad range ofviews count as versions of the position. Specifically, we mayunderstand virtue epistemology primarily as a thesis about thedirection of analysis: that the normative properties of beliefs are tobe defined in terms of the normative properties of agents, rather thanthe other way around. If we understand the position this way, then abroad range of views will count as versions of virtue epistemology. Wemay then understand further disputes among them as concerning thenature of the intellectual virtues. In other words, different versionsof virtue epistemology disagree over what kind of agent character isessentially involved in justification, knowledge and other importantepistemic notions.9. The Nature of KnowledgeIn very general terms, knowledge is non-accidentally true belief.Different theories of knowledge try to spell out "non-accidentally" indifferent ways. In this regard, a number of virtue theorists haveconverged on a common idea: that in cases of knowledge, Sbelieves the truth not by accident, but because S's belief isthe result of intellectual virtue. Here are some statements of thethesis in question.We have reached the view that knowledge is true belief out ofintellectual virtue, belief that turns out right by reason of thevirtue and not just by coincidence. (Sosa 1991, 277)[In cases of knowledge] the person derives epistemic credit… that she would not be due had she only accidentally happenedupon a true belief… . The difference that makes a valuedifference here is the variation in the degree to which a person'sabilities, powers, and skills are causally responsible for theoutcome, believing truly that p. (Riggs 2002, 93-4)[In cases of knowledge] the person is successful in acceptingwhat is true because she accepts what she does in a trustworthy way inthe particular case. Her trustworthiness explains her success inaccepting what is true… . Her trustworthiness and the reliabilityof it explains her success in the particular case. (Lehrer 2000, 223)Again, to say that someone knows is to say that his believing thetruth can be credited to him. It is to say that the person got thingsright due to his own abilities, efforts and actions, rather than dueto dumb luck, or blind chance, or something else. (Greco 2003,111) Each of these passages articulates a common theme: that knowledge istrue belief grounded in the intellectual virtues of the knower. Moreexactly, in cases of knowledge S believes the truth becauseS believes out of intellectual virtue. A second theme ofthese passages is that the knower deserves credit for arriving at thetruth. These two themes are closely related. For plausibly, a persondeserves credit (of a special sort) for a success just in case thatsuccess is grounded in virtue.Virtue theory, therefore, provides the resources for an interestingaccount of the way that knowledge is non-accidentally true belief. Incases of knowledge, the person deserves credit for believing thetruth, just because her believing the truth can be put down to her ownabilities (or virtues), rather than to dumb luck, or blind chance, orsomething else. Moreover, these relationships among success, virtue and credit areinstances of a more general phenomena. For example, Aristotle heldthat a person deserves moral credit for an act just in case the actderives from virtuous moral character. Likewise, we give credit foran athletic success just in case that success derives from theplayer's athletic abilities. Accordingly, a virtue theory canunderstand epistemic evaluation as one instance of a more general andfamiliar sort of evaluation.10. The Value of KnowledgeAristotle tells us that all human beings desire to know. That is,human beings value knowledge over mere belief, and even over mere truebelief. But why should this be so? Why should knowledge be morevaluable than true belief, especially if true belief serves just aswell for action? Zagzebski has argued that an adequate account ofknowledge must explain this special value of knowledge. That is, anadequate account must explain why knowledge is more valuable than truebelief. The present account of the nature of knowledge naturallysuggests a position regarding the value of knowledge. In short,success through virtue is more valuable than success by accident.Once again we can turn to Aristotle, who makes a distinction betweena) achieving some end by luck or accident, and b) achieving the endthrough the exercise of one's abilities or virtues. It is only thelatter kind of action, Aristotle argues, that is both intrinsicallyvaluable and constitutive of human flourishing. "Human good," hewrites, "turns out to be activity of soul exhibiting excellence."(Nicomachean Ethics, I.7) Aristotle is here concerned withintellectual virtue as well as moral virtue: his position is that thesuccessful exercise of one's intellectual virtues is bothintrinsically good and constitutive of human flourishing. If this iscorrect then there is a clear difference in value between knowledgeand mere true belief. In cases of knowledge, we achieve the truththrough the exercise of our own cognitive abilities or powers, whichare a kind of intellectual virtue.Moreover, we can extend the point to include other kinds ofintellectual virtue as well. It is plausible, for example, that thesuccessful exercise of intellectual courage is also intrinsicallygood, and also constitutive of the best intellectual life. And thereis a long tradition that says the same about wisdom and the same aboutunderstanding. This suggests that there are a plurality ofintellectual virtues, and their successful exercise gives rise to aplurality of epistemic goods. The best intellectual life —intellectual flourishing, so to speak — is rich with all ofthese (Greco 2004, Riggs 2002, Sosa 2002, Zagzebski 1996).11. SkepticismAs we saw in Section 2, virtue epistemology was originally put forwardby Sosa as an answer to the regress problem. According to a familiarskeptical argument, all knowledge must be grounded in good reasons,and this threatens to require an infinite (and impossible) regress ofreasons. A virtue approach, argued Sosa, explains why not allknowledge requires grounding in reasons. In short, knowledge is truebelief grounded in intellectual virtue, and not all intellectualvirtues involve grounding in reasons. On this view, some virtues arevirtues of reasoning. That is, some intellectual excellences aredispositions to infer conclusions from premises already believed. Butnot all intellectual excellences are like that. For example, goodmemory and accurate perception are intellectual excellences, but donot involve inference from believed premises. On the contrary,perception in healthy human beings reliably produces belief on thebasis of perceptual experience. Likewise, memory in healthy humanbeings reliably and non-inferentially produces beliefs about the past.Sound reasoning (of various sorts) is also a reliable source ofbelief, and this explains why sound reasoning is an intellectualvirtue. But a virtue theory need not privilege some virtues overothers-knowledge is true belief grounded in the intellectual virtuesof the knower, reasoning or otherwise. (Sosa 1980)A different skeptical problem concerns our ability to rule outalternatives to what we claim to know. Consider Descartes' beliefthat he is sitting by the fire in a dressing gown. Presumably he hasthis belief because this is how things are presented to him by hissenses. However, Descartes reasons, things could appear to him justas they do even if he were in fact not sitting by the fire, but wasinstead sleeping, or mad, or the victim of an evil deceiver. Thepoint is not that these other things might well be true, or that theyought to be taken seriously as real possibilities. Rather, it is thatDescartes cannot rule these possibilities out. And if he cannot rulethem out, then he cannot know that he is sitting by the fire. What is worse, Descartes's reasoning seems to generalize. Ingeneral, I cannot know anything about the world unless I can know thatvarious skeptical possibilities are false. But since I cannot knowthat, it follows that I do not know anything about the world. Moreformally, for any claim about the world p and skepticalhypothesis h,1. K(p) => K(not-h)2. not-K(not-h)Therefore,3. not-K(p)An ingenious response to this skeptical argument invokes the idea thatknowledge attributions are sensitive to context. Specifically,context determines how high the standards for knowledge claims areset. Using this idea, the contextualist concedes that the skepticalargument is sound and the conclusion true in "philosophical" contexts,or contexts where the standards for knowledge claims are set very highby the skeptic. On the other hand, premise 2 of the argument is falsein ordinary contexts. That is, in everyday life the standards forknowledge claims are set much lower, and so ordinary knowledge claimsabout the world are true.Sosa argues that no such concession to the skeptic is necessary. OnSosa's view, S knows that p just in case (roughly)S's belief is virtuously formed and thereby "safe," where abelief that p is safe just in case S would believethat p only if p were true. As Sosa points out, onplausible interpretations of the relevant subjunctive conditional, ourbeliefs about the world typically are safe, and so qualify asknowledge (Sosa 1999, 2000).To see this, we need to make a short digression to consider the truthconditions for subjunctive conditionals. Imagine that Jones is a manof modest means, but who loves modern art. Now consider the followingsubjunctive conditional: Jones would buy an original Picasso only ifhe were rich. We think that the conditional is true because we thinkthat Jones wants to own an original Picasso, but that only rich peoplebuy original Picassos. We can imagine circumstances where Jones wouldindeed buy a Picasso, but in these imagined circumstances Jones isrich. Notice that the conditional is true even though we can imaginescenarios where original Picassos are dirt cheap and where nearlyanyone could buy one. But this kind of scenario is not relevant forjudging the truth of the conditional. Rather, we judge the truth ofthe conditional by imagining circumstances that are relatively closeto the way things actually stand, and by judging how things would goin those sorts of circumstances. Again, consider the followingsubjunctive conditional: Jones would have an opportunity to walk onthe moon only if he were an astronaut. The conditional is true, eventhough we can imagine very different circumstances where even ordinaryfolk have the opportunity to walk on the moon. Now consider Descartes's belief that he is sitting by the fire.Descartes's belief is safe, in that he would believe that he issitting by the fire only if it were true that he is. Put another way,if Descartes were not sitting by the fire-if he were in the next roompouring a drink, for example-- he would not believe that he wassitting by the fire. What is more, our beliefs that skepticalhypotheses are false are also safe. I believe that I am not adisembodied brain in a vat, deceived by a computer-generatedhallucination. And my belief that I am not is safe in the relevantsense: in any circumstances that are relatively similar to the waythings are, if I believe that I am not a brain in a vat, I am not. Inthe language of possible world semantics: in the actual world and inclose possible worlds where I believe that I am not a brain in a vat,I am not a brain in a vat. This is so even if there are far offworlds where I am a brain in a vat and believe that I am not. Sincethat sort of world is not close to the actual world, it is notrelevant for fixing the truth of the subjunctive conditional inquestion. Sosa's idea that knowledge is safe belief accords well with avirtue-theoretic approach to knowledge. This is because theintellectual virtues (as here understood) are abilities to judge whatis true. And, in general, whether one has an ability is a function ofone's success rate across close possible worlds. In other words, tosay that someone has an ability to achieve X is to say thatshe would be successful in achieving X in a range ofsituations relatively similar to those in which she typically findsherself. But then possibilities that do not occur in typicalsituations are irrelevant for determining whether a person has someability in question. For example, it does not count against BarryBonds's ability to hit baseballs that he cannot hit them if they arethrown two-hundred miles per hour. Likewise, it does not countagainst our perceptual abilities that we cannot discriminate realtables and chairs from computer-generated hallucinations ordemon-induced dreams. The fact that we would be deceived in skepticalscenarios is irrelevant to whether we have the cognitive virtues (orabilities) required for knowledge (Greco 2000). 12. ContextualismIf all this is right, then embracing contextualism about knowledgeattributions is not necessary to answer the skeptic. Nevertheless, avirtue-theoretic approach in epistemology is consistent withcontextualism. For example, a virtue epistemologist might hold thatknowledge requires agent reliability, and that the degree ofreliability required for knowledge changes with context. Likewise, itis open for a virtue epistemologist to hold that the range ofreliability required for knowledge changes. On this view, theintellectual virtues are defined in terms of success across closepossible worlds, as above, and context determines how far out intopossibility space one's success must extend.Finally, the position that knowledge is true belief resulting fromintellectual virtue implies that knowledge attributions are sensitiveto context in a different way. Recall the account of knowledgereviewed in Section 9: that in cases of knowledge, S believes thetruth because S believes out of intellectual virtue. How are we tounderstand the "because" here? The most plausible way is in terms ofexplanatory salience: In cases of knowledge, the fact that S believesthe truth is explained by the fact that S believes out of intellectualvirtue. But plausibly, explanatory salience is at least partly afunction of context. And this implies that knowledge attributions aresensitive to context along that dimension as well (Greco 2004).BibliographyWorks CitedCode, L., 1987, Epistemic Responsibility, Hanover:University Press of New England and Brown University Press.Greco, J., 2004,"Knowledge as Credit for True Belief," in DePauland Zagzebski.Greco, J., 2000, Putting Skeptics in Their Place, NewYork: Cambridge University Press.Greco, J., 1999, "Agent Reliabilism," in J. Tomberlin, ed.,Philosophical Perspectives, 13, Epistemology, Atascadero:Ridgeview.Kvanvig, J., 1992, The Intellectual Virtues and the Life ofthe Mind, Savage, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield.Lehrer, K., 2000, Theory of Knowledge, 2nd edition,Boulder: Westview Press.Montmarquet, J., 1993, Epistemic Virtue and DoxasticResponsibility, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.Riggs, W., 2002, "Reliability and the Value of Knowledge,"Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 64: 79-96.Sosa, E., 2002, "The Place of Truth in Epistemology," in DePauland Zagzebski.Sosa, E., 2000, "Skepticism and Contextualism," PhilosophicalIssues, 10: 1-18.Sosa, E., 1999, "How Must Knowledge be Modally Related to What isKnown?", Philosophical Topics, 26: 373-384.Sosa, E., 1991, Knowledge in Perspective, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.Sosa, E., 1980, "The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versusFoundations in the Theory of Knowledge," Midwest Studies inPhilosophy, V: 3-25. Reprinted in Sosa 1991.Zagzebski, L., 1996, Virtues of the Mind, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press. Collections Axtell, G., (ed.), 2000, Knowledge, Belief and Character:Readings in Virtue Epistemology, Lanham: Rowman andLittlefield.Brady, M. S. and Pritchard, D. H., (eds.), 2003, Moral andEpistemic Virtues, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Brady, M. S. and Pritchard, D. 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Other Important Works Axtell, G., 1996, "Epistemic-Virtue Talk: The Reemergence ofAmerican Axiology?," The Journal of Speculative Philosophy10:172-198.Axtell, G., 1997, "Recent Work in Virtue Epistemology,"American Philosophical Quarterly 34: 410-430.Axtell, G., 1998, "The Role of the Intellectual Virtues in theReunification of Epistemology," The Monist 81: 488-508.Battaly, H. D., "What is Virtue Epistemology?", 20th WorldCongress of Philosophy. [Available online]Bloomfield, P., 2000, "Virtue Epistemology and the Epistemology ofVirtue," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60:23-43.BonJour, L. and Sosa, E., 2003, Epistemic Justification:Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues, Malden, MA:Blackwell.Code, L., 1984, "Toward a ‘Responsibilist’Epistemology," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research XVL:29-50.Driver, J., 1989, "The Virtues of Ignorance," Journal ofPhilosophy: 373-84.Goldman, A. I., 1992, "Epistemic Folkways and ScientificEpistemology," in A. I. Goldman, Liaisons: Philosophy Meets theCognitive and Social Sciences, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Greco, J., 1993, "Virtues and Vices of Virtue Epistemology,"Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23: 413-432.Greco, J., 1994, "Virtue Epistemology and the Relevant Sense of"Relevant Possibility’," Southern Journal of PhilosophyXXXII: 61-77.Greco, J., 2002 "Virtues in Epistemology" in P. Moser, ed.,Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, New York: Oxford UniversityPress.Greco, J., ed., 2003, Sosa and his Critics, Oxford:Blackwell.Grimm, S., 2001, "Ernest Sosa, Knowledge and Understanding"Philosophical Studies 106, 3: 171-191.Hibbs, T. S., 2001, "Aquinas, Virtues and Recent Epistemology,"Review of Metaphysics 52,3: 171-191.Hookway, C., 1993, "Mimicking Foundationalism: on Sentiment andSelf-control," European Journal of Philosophy 1,2:156-174.Hookway, C., 1994, "Cognitive Virtues and Epistemic Evaluations,"International Journal of Philosophical Studies 2,2:211-227.Kvanvig, J., 2003, The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit ofUnderstanding, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,Montmarquet, J., 1987, "Epistemic Virtue," Mind 96:482-497.Plantinga, A., 1993, Warrant and Proper Function, Oxford:Oxford University Press.Plantinga, A., 1993, "Why We Need Proper Function," Nous27, 1: 66-82Pritchard, D. H., forthcoming, Epistemic Luck, Oxford:Oxford University Press.Pritchard, D. H., 2005, 'Virtue Epistemology and the Acquisitionof Knowledge', Philosophical Explorations 8.Riggs, W., 1998, "What Are the 'Chances' of Being Justified?"The Monist, 81: 452-472. Riggs, W., 2002, "Beyond Truth and Falsehood: The Real Value ofKnowing that P," Philosophical Studies, 107: 87-108.Sosa, E., 1985, "The Coherence of Virtue and the Virtue ofCoherence: Justification in Epistemology," Synthese 64: 3-28.Reprinted in Sosa 1991.Sosa, E., 1993, "Proper Functionalism and Virtue Epistemology,"Nous 27, 1: 51-65.Sosa, E., 1997, "How to Resolve the Pyrrhonian Problematic: ALesson form Descartes," Philosophical Studies 85.Sosa, E., 1999, "How must Knowledge be Modally Related to what isKnown?" in Philosophical Topics 26, 1 & 2: 373-384.Sosa, E., 1999, "How to Defeat Opposition to Moore,"Philosophical Perspectives, 13: 141-55.Sosa, E., 2003, "Beyond Internal Foundations to External Virtues,"in BonJour and Sosa 2003.Taliaferro, C., 2001, "The Virtues of Embodiment,"Philosophy 76: 111-125.Woods, J., 1998, Epistemology: Becoming IntellectuallyVirtuous, Grand Rapids: Intervarsity Press.Zagzebski, L., 1997, "Virtue in Ethics and Epistemology,"American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 71 (Supp):1-17.Zagzebski, L., 1998, "Virtue Epistemology" in Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy, New York: Routledge.Zagzebski, L., 1999, "What is Knowledge?", in J. Greco andE. Sosa, eds., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, Oxford:Blackwell.Other Internet ResourcesVirtue Epistemology, entry in the Internet Encyclopedia of PhilosophyRelated Entries justification, epistemic: coherentist theories of | justification, epistemic: foundationalist theories of | justification, epistemic: internalist vs. externalist conceptions of | skepticism Copyright © 2004 byJohn Greco<greco@fordham.edu> |
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