Qualia (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Cite this entry Search the SEP • Advanced Search • Tools • RSS FeedTable of Contents• What's New• Archives• Projected ContentsEditorial Information• About the SEP• Editorial Board• How to Cite the SEP• Special CharactersSupport the SEPContact the SEP ©Metaphysics Research Lab,CSLI,Stanford University  Open access to the SEP is made possible by a world-wide funding initiative. Please Read How You Can Help Keep the Encyclopedia FreeQualiaFirst published Wed Aug 20, 1997; substantive revision Tue Jul 31, 2007Feelings and experiences vary widely. For example, I run my fingersover sandpaper, smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem tosee bright purple, become extremely angry. In each of these cases, I amthe subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjectivecharacter. There is something it is like for me to undergoeach state, some phenomenology that it has. Philosophers often use theterm ‘qualia’ (singular ‘quale’) to refer tothe introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives.In this standard, broad sense of the term, it is difficult to deny thatthere are qualia. Disagreement typically centers on which mental stateshave qualia, whether qualia are intrinsic qualities of their bearers,and how qualia relate to the physical world both inside and outside thehead. The status of qualia is hotly debated in philosophy largelybecause it is central to a proper understanding of the nature ofconsciousness. Qualia are at the very heart of the mind-body problem. The entry that follows is divided into eight sections. The firstdistinguishes various uses of the term‘qualia’. The second addresses the question of which mentalstates have qualia. The third section brings out some of the mainarguments for the view that qualia are irreducible and non-physical.The remaining sections focus on functionalism and qualia, theexplanatory gap, qualia and introspection, representational theories ofqualia, and finally the issue of qualia and simple minds.1. Other Uses of the Term ‘Qualia’2. Which Mental States Possess Qualia?3. Are Qualia Irreducible, Non-Physical Entities?4. Functionalism and Qualia5. Qualia and the Explanatory Gap6. Qualia and Introspection7. Representational Theories of Qualia8. Which Creatures Undergo States with Qualia?BibliographyOther Internet ResourcesRelated Entries1. Uses of the Term ‘Qualia’ Consider your visual experience as you stare at a bright turquoisecolor patch in a paint store. There is something it is like for yousubjectively to undergo that experience. What it is like to undergothe experience is very different from what it is like for you toexperience a dull brown color patch. This difference is a differencein what is often called "phenomenal character." The phenomenalcharacter of an experience is what it is like subjectively to undergothe experience. If you are told to focus your attention upon thephenomenal character of your experience, you will find that in doingso you are aware of certain qualities. These qualities — ones thatare accessible to you introspectively and that together make up thephenomenal character of the experience are standardly called‘qualia’.There are more restricted uses of the term‘qualia’. Consider a painting of a dalmatian. Viewers ofthe painting can apprehend not only its content (i.e., itsrepresenting a dalmatian) but also the colors, shapes, and spatialrelations obtaining among the blobs of paint on the canvas. It hassometimes been supposed that being aware or conscious of a visualexperience is like viewing an inner, non-physical picture orsense-datum. So, for example, on this conception, if I see adalmatian, I am subject to a mental picture-like representation of adalmatian (a sense-datum), introspection of which reveals to me bothits content and its intrinsic, non-representationational features(counterparts to the visual features of the blobs of paint on thecanvas). These intrinsic, non-representational features have beentaken by advocates of the sense-datum theory to be the soledeterminants of what it is like for me to have the experience. In asecond, more restricted sense of the term ‘qualia’, then,qualia are intrinsic, consciously accessible, non-representationalfeatures of sense-data and other non-physical phenomenal objects thatare responsible for their phenomenal character.There is another established sense of the term ‘qualia’,which is similar to the one just given but which does not demand ofqualia advocates that they endorse the sense-datum theory. Howeversensory experiences are ultimately analyzed — whether, for example,they are taken to involve relations to sensory objects or they areidentified with neural events or they are held to be physicallyirreducible events — many philosophers suppose that they haveintrinsic, consciously accessible features that arenon-representational and that are solely responsible for theirphenomenal character. These features, whatever their ultimate nature,physical or non-physical, are often dubbed ‘qualia’.In the case of visual experiences, for example, it is frequentlysupposed that there is a range of visual qualia, where these are takento be intrinsic features of visual experiences that (a) are accessibleto introspection, (b) can vary without any variation in therepresentational contents of the experiences, (c) are mentalcounterparts to some directly visible properties of objects (e.g.,color), and (d) are the sole determinants of the phenomenal characterof the experiences. Philosophers who hold or have held this viewinclude, for example, Nagel (1974), Peacocke (1983) and Block(1990).Other philosophers (e.g, Dennett 1987, 1991) use the term‘qualia’in a more restricted way so that qualia areintrinsic properties of experiences that are also ineffable,nonphysical, and ‘given’ to their subjects incorrigibly(without the possibility of error). Philosophers who deny that thereare qualia sometimes have in mind qualia, as the term is used in thismore restricted sense (or a similar one). Thus, announcements byphilosophers who declare themselves opposed to qualia need to betreated with some caution. One can agree that there are no qualia inthe last three senses I have explained, while still endorsing qualiain the standard first sense.In the rest of this entry, I shall use the term ‘qualia’in the standard, broad way I did at the beginning of the entry. So, Ishall take it for granted that there are qualia.2. Which Mental States Possess Qualia?The following would certainly be included on my own list. (1)Perceptual experiences, for example, experiences of the sort involvedin seeing green, hearing loud trumpets, tasting liquorice, smellingthe sea air, handling a piece of fur. (2) Bodily sensations, forexample, feeling a twinge of pain, feeling an itch, feeling hungry,having a stomach ache, feeling hot, feeling dizzy. Think here also ofexperiences such as those present during orgasm or while runningflat-out. (3) Felt reactions or passions or emotions, for example,feeling delight, lust, fear, love, feeling grief, jealousy,regret. (4) Felt moods, for example, feeling elated, depressed, calm,bored, tense, miserable. (For more here, see Haugeland 1985,pp. 230-235).Should we include any other mental states on the list? GalenStrawson has claimed (1994) that there are such things as theexperience of understanding a sentence, theexperience of suddenly thinking of something, of suddenlyremembering something, and so on. Moreover, in his view, experiences ofthese sorts are not reducible to associated sensory experiences and/orimages. Strawson's position here seems to be that thought-experience isa distinctive experience in its own right. He says, for example: "Eachsensory modality is an experiential modality, and thought experience(in which understanding-experience may be included) is an experientialmodality to be reckoned alongside the other experiential modalities"(p. 196). On Strawson's view, then, some thoughts have qualia. (This is also the position of Horgan and Tienson (2002).) This view is controversial. One response is to claim that thephenomenal aspects of understanding derive largely from linguistic (orverbal) images, which have the phonological and syntactic structure ofitems in the subject's native language. These images frequently evencome complete with details of stress and intonation. As we read, it issometimes phenomenally as if we are speaking to ourselves. (Likewisewhen we consciously think about something without reading). We often"hear" an inner voice. Depending upon the content of the passage, wemay also undergo a variety of emotions and feelings. We may feeltense, bored, excited, uneasy, angry. Once all thesereactions are removed, together with the images of an inner voice andthe visual sensations produced by reading, some would say (myselfincluded) that no phenomenology remains.In any event, images and sensations of the above sorts are notalways present in thought. They are not essential to thought.Consider, for example, the thoughts involved in everyday visualrecognition (or the thoughts of creatures without a naturallanguage).What about desires, for example, my desire for a week's holiday inVenice? It is certainly true that in some cases, there is an associatedphenomenal character. Often when we strongly desire something, weexperience a feeling of being "pulled" or "tugged". There may also beaccompanying images in various modalities.Should we include such propositional attitudes as feeling angrythat the house has been burgled or seeing that thecomputer is missing on the list? These seem best treated as hybridor complex states, one component of which is essentially a phenomenalstate and the other (a judgment or belief) is not. Thus, in both cases,there is a constituent experience that is the real bearer of therelevant quale or qualia.3. Are Qualia Irreducible, Non-Physical Entities?The literature on qualia is filled with thought-experiments of one sortor another. Perhaps the most famous of these is the case of Mary, thebrilliant color scientist. Mary, so the story goes (Jackson 1982), isimprisoned in a black and white room. Never having been permitted toleave it, she acquires information about the world outside from theblack and white books her captors have made available to her, from theblack and white television sets attached to external cameras, and fromthe black and white monitor screens hooked up to banks of computers. Astime passes, Mary acquires more and more information about the physicalaspects of color and color vision. (For a real life case of a visualscientist (Knut Nordby) who is an achromotope, see Sacks 1996, Chapter1.) Eventually, Mary becomes the world's leading authority on thesematters. Indeed she comes to know all the physical factspertinent to everyday colors and color vision. Still, she wonders to herself: What do people in the outside worldexperience when they see the various colors? What is itlike for them to see red or green? One day her captors releaseher. She is free at last to see things with their real colors (and freetoo to scrub off the awful black and white paint that covers her body).She steps outside her room into a garden full of flowers. "So, that iswhat it is like to experience red," she exclaims, as she sees a redrose. "And that," she adds, looking down at the grass, "is what it islike to experience green."Mary here seems to make some important discoveries. She seems tofind out things she did not know before. How can that be, if, as seemspossible, at least in principle, she has all the physical informationthere is to have about color and color vision — if she knows all thepertinent physical facts?One possible explanation is that that there is a realm ofsubjective, phenomenal qualities associated with color, qualities theintrinsic nature of which Mary comes to discover upon her release, asshe herself undergoes the various new color experiences. Before sheleft her room, she only knew the objective, physical basis of thosesubjective qualities, their causes and effects, and various relationsof similarity and difference. She had no knowledge of the subjectivequalities in themselves.This explanation is not available to the physicalist. If what it islike for someone to experience red is one and the same as some physicalquality, then Mary already knows that while in her room.Likewise, for experiences of the other colors. For Mary knows all thepertinent physical facts. What, then, can the physicalist say?Some physicalists respond that knowing what it is like is know-howand nothing more. Mary acquires certain abilities, specifically in thecase of red, the ability to recognize red things by sight alone, theability to imagine a red expanse, the ability to remember theexperience of red. She does not come to know any newinformation, any new facts about color, any new qualities. This is theview of David Lewis (1990) and Lawrence Nemirow (1990).The Ability Hypothesis, as it is often called, is more resilientthan many philosophers suppose (see Tye 2000, Chapter One). But it hasdifficulty in properly accounting for our knowledge of what it is liketo undergo experiences of determinate hues while we are undergoingthem. For example, I can know what it is like to experience red-17, asI stare at a rose of that color. Of course, I don't know the hue asred-17. My conception of it is likely just that shade of red.But I certainly know what it is like to experience the hue while it ispresent. Unfortunately, I lack the abilities Lewis cites and so doesMary even after she leaves her cell. She is not able to recognizethings that are red-17 as red-17 by sight. Given the way human memoryworks and the limitations on it, she lacks the concept red-17. She hasno mental template that is sufficiently fine-grained to permit her toidentify the experience of red-17 when it comes again. Presented withtwo items, one red-17 and the other red-18, in a series of tests, shecannot say with any accuracy which experience her earlier experience ofthe rose matches. Sometimes she picks one; at other times she picks theother. Nor is she able afterwards to imagine things as having hue,red-17, or as having that very shade of red the rose had; and forprecisely the same reason.The Ability Hypothesis appears to be in trouble. An alternativephysicalist proposal is that Mary in her room lacks certainphenomenal concepts, certain ways of thinking about ormentally representing color experiences and colors. Once she leaves theroom, she acquires these new modes of thought as she experiences thevarious colors. Even so, the qualities the new concepts pick out areones she knew in a different way in her room, for they are physical orfunctional qualities like all others.One problem this approach faces is that it seems to imply that Marydoes not really make a new discovery when she says, "So, that is whatit is like to experience red." Upon reflection, however, it is far fromobvious that this is really a consequence. For it is widely acceptedthat concepts or modes of presentation are involved in theindividuation of thought-contents, given one sense of the term‘content’ — the sense in which thought-content is whateverinformation that-clauses provide that suffices for the purposes of eventhe most demanding rationalizing explanation. In this sense, what Ithink, when I think that Cicero was an orator, is not what I think whenI think that Tully was an orator. This is precisely why it is possibleto discover that Cicero is Tully. The thought that Cicero was an oratordiffers from the thought that Tully was an orator not at the level oftruth-conditions — the same singular proposition is partlyconstitutive of the content of both — but at the level of concepts ormode of presentation. The one thought exercises the conceptCicero; the other the concept Tully. The conceptshave the same reference, but they present the referent in differentways and thus the two thoughts can play different roles inrationalizing explanation.It appears then that there is no difficulty in holding both thatMary comes to know some new things upon her release, while alreadyknowing all the pertinent real-world physical facts, even though thenew experiences she undergoes and their introspectible qualities arewholly physical. In an ordinary, everyday sense, Mary's knowledgeincreases. And that, it may be contended, is all the physicalist needsto answer the Knowledge Argument. (The term ‘fact’, Ishould add, is itself ambiguous. Sometimes it is used to pick outreal-world states of affairs alone; sometimes it is used for suchstates of affairs under certain conceptualizations. When I speak of thephysical facts above, I should be taken to refer either to physicalstates of affairs alone or to those states of affairs under purelyphysical conceptualizations. For more on ‘fact’, see Tye1995.)Some philosophers insist that the difference between the old and thenew concepts in this case is such that there must be a difference inthe world between the properties these concepts stand for or denote(Jackson 1993, Chalmers 1996). Some of these properties Mary knew inher cell; others she becomes cognizant of only upon her release. Thisis necessary for Mary to make a real discovery: she must come toassociate with the experience of red new qualities she did notassociate with it in her room. The physicalist is committed to denyingthis claim; for the new qualities would have to be non-physical.The issues here are complex. What the physicalist really needs tosettle the issue is a theory of phenomenal concepts (a theory, thatis, of the allegedly special concepts that are deployed from the firstperson point of view when we recognize our experiences as being ofsuch-and-such subjective types) which is itself compatible withphysicalism. There are proposals on offer (see, for example, Hill1991, Loar 1990, Levine 2000, Sturgeon 2000, Perry 2001, Papineau2002, Tye, 2003), but there is as yet no agreement as to the form sucha theory should take, and some philosophers contend that a propertheory of phenomenal concepts shows that no satisfactory answer can begiven by the physicalist to the example of Mary's Room (Chalmers1999). Another possibility is that the very idea of a phenomenalconcept, conceived of as a concept very different in how it functionsfrom concepts applied elsewhere, is itself confused. On this view,physicalists who have appealed to phenomenal concepts to handle theexample of Mary's Room have been barking up the wrong tree (Tyeforthcoming). Another famous anti-reductionist thought-experiment concerningqualia appeals to the possibility of zombies. A philosophical zombie isa molecule by molecule duplicate of a sentient creature, a normalhuman-being, for example, but who differs from that creature in lackingany phenomenal consciousness. For me, as I lie on the beach,happily drinking some wine and watching the waves, I undergo a varietyof visual, olfactory, and gustatory experiences. But my zombie twinexperiences nothing at all. He has no phenomenal consciousness. Sincemy twin is an exact physical duplicate of me, his inner psychologicalstates will be functionally isomorphic with my own (assuminghe is located in an identical environment). Whatever physical stimulusis applied, he will process the stimulus in the same way as I do, andproduce exactly the same behavioral responses. Indeed, on theassumption that non-phenomenal psychological states are functionalstates (that is, states definable in terms of their role or function inmediating between stimuli and behavior), my zombie twin has just thesame beliefs, thoughts, and desires as I do. He differs from me onlywith respect to experience. For him, there is nothing it is like tostare at the waves or to sip wine.The hypothesis that there can be philosophical zombies is notnormally the hypothesis that such zombies are nomicallypossible, that their existence is consistent with the actual laws ofnature. Rather the suggestion is that zombie replicas of this sort areat least imaginable and hence metaphysically possible.Philosophical zombies pose a serious threat to any sort ofphysicalist view of qualia. To begin with, if zombie replicas aremetaphysically possible, then there is a simple argument that seems toshow that phenomenal states are not identical with internal, objective,physical states. Suppose objective, physical state P can occurwithout phenomenal state S in some appropriate zombie replica(in the metaphysical sense of ‘can’ noted above).Intuitively S cannot occur without S. Pain, forexample, cannot be felt without pain. So, P has a modalproperty S lacks, namely the property of possiblyoccurring without S. So, by Leibniz’ Law (the law that foranything x and for anything y, if x isidentical with y then x and y shareall the same properties), S is not identical withP.Secondly, if a person microphysically identical with me, located inan identical environment (both present and past), can lack anyphenomenal experiences, then facts pertaining to experience andfeeling, facts about qualia, are not necessarily fixed or determined bythe objective microphysical facts. And this the physicalist cannotallow, even if she concedes that phenomenally conscious states are notstrictly identical with internal, objective, physical states. For thephysicalist, whatever her stripe, must at least believe that themicrophysical facts determine all the facts, that any world that wasexactly like ours in all microphysical respects (down to thesmallest detail, to the position of every single boson, for example)would have to be like our world in all respects (having identicalmountains, lakes, glaciers, trees, rocks, sentient creatures, cities,and so on).One well-known physicalist reply to the case of zombies (Loar 1990)is to grant that they are conceptually possible, or at least that thereis no obvious contradiction in the idea of a zombie, whiledenying that zombies are metaphysically possible. Since theanti-physicalist argument requires metaphysical possibility — mereconceptual possibility will not suffice — it now collapses. Thatconceptual possibility is too weak for the anti-physicalist's purposes(at least without further qualification and argument) is shown by thefact that it is conceptually possible that I am not Michael Tye (that Iam an impostor or someone misinformed about his past) even though,given the actual facts, it is metaphysically impossible.4. Functionalism and QualiaFunctionalism is the view that individual qualia have functionalnatures, that the phenomenal character of, e.g., pain is one and thesame as the property of playing such-and-such a causal orteleofunctional role in mediating between physical inputs (e.g., bodydamage) and physical outputs (e.g., withdrawal behavior). On this view(Lycan 1987), qualia are multiply physically realizable. Inner statesthat are physically very different may nonetheless feel the same. Whatis crucial to what it is like is functional role, not underlyinghardware. There are two famous objections to functionalist theories of qualia:the Inverted Spectrum and the Absent Qualia Hypothesis. The first movein the former objection consists in claiming that you might see redwhen I see green and vice-versa; likewise for the other colors so thatour color experiences are phenomenally inverted. This does not sufficeto create trouble for the functionalist yet. For you and I are surelyrepresentationally different here: for example, you have a visualexperience that represents red when I have one that represents green.And that representational difference brings with it a difference in ourpatterns of causal interactions with external things (and thereby afunctional difference).This reply can be handled by the advocate of inverted qualia byswitching to a case in which we both have visual experiences with thesame representational contents on the same occasions while stilldiffering phenomenally. Whether such cases are really metaphysicallypossible is open to dispute, however. Certainly, those philosophers whoare representationalists about qualia (see Section 7) would deny theirpossibility. Indeed, it is not even clear that such cases areconceptually possible (Harrison 1973, Hardin 1993, Tye 1995). Butleaving this to one side, it is far from obvious that there would nothave to be some salient fine-grained functional differences between us,notwithstanding our gross functional identity.Consider a computational example. For any two numerical inputs,M and N, a given computer always produces as outputsthe product of M and N. There is a second computerthat does exactly the same thing. In this way, they are functionallyidentical. Does it follow that they are running exactly the sameprogram? Of course, not! There are all sorts of programs that willmultiply together two numbers. These programs can differ dramatically.At one gross level the machines are functionally identical, but atlower levels the machines can be functionally different.In the case of you and me, then, the opponent of inverted qualia canclaim that, even if we are functionally identical at a coarse level -we both call red things ‘red’, we both believe that thosethings are red on the basis of our experiences, we both are caused toundergo such experiences by viewing red things, etc. - there arenecessarily fine-grained differences in our internal functionalorganization. And that is why our experiences are phenomenallydifferent.Some philosophers will no doubt respond that it is still imaginablethat you and I are functionally identical in all relevantrespects yet phenomenally different. But this claim presents a problemat least for those philosophers who oppose functionalism but who acceptphysicalism. For it is just as easy to imagine that there are invertedqualia in molecule-by-molecule duplicates (in the same external,physical settings) as it is to imagine inverted qualia in functionalduplicates. If the former duplicates are really metaphysicallyimpossible, as the physicalist is committed to claiming, why not thelatter? Some further convincing argument needs to be given that the twocases are disanalogous. As yet, to my mind, no such argument has beenpresented. (Of course, this response does not apply to thosephilosophers who take the view that qualia are irreducible,non-physical entities. However, these philosophers have other severeproblems of their own. In particular, they face the problem ofphenomenal causation. Given the causal closure of the physical, how canqualia make any difference? For more here, see Tye 1995, Chalmers1996).The absent qualia hypothesis is the hypothesis that functionalduplicates of sentient creatures are possible, duplicates that entirelylack qualia. For example, one writer (Block (1980)) asks us to supposethat a billion Chinese people are each given a two-way radio with whichto communicate with one another and with an artificial (brainless)body. The movements of the body are controlled by the radio signals,and the signals themselves are made in accordance with instructions theChinese people receive from a vast display in the sky which is visibleto all of them. The instructions are such that the participatingChinese people function like individual neurons, and the radio linkslike synapses, so that together the Chinese people duplicate the causalorganization of a human brain. Whether or not this system, if it wereever actualized, would actually undergo any feelings andexperiences, it seems coherent to suppose that it might not. But ifthis is a real metaphysical possibility, then qualia do not havefunctional essences.One standard functionalist reply to cases like the China-body systemis to bite the bullet and to argue that however strange it seems, theChina-body system could not fail to undergo qualia. The oddness ofthis view derives, according to some functionalists (Lycan 1987), fromour relative size. We are each so much smaller than the China-bodysystem that we fail to see the forest for the trees. Just as acreature the size of a neuron trapped inside a human head might wellbe wrongly convinced that there could not be consciousness there, sowe too draw the wrong conclusion as we contemplate the China-bodysystem. It has also been argued (e.g., by Shoemaker 1975) that anysystem that was a full functional duplicate of one of us would have tobe subject to all the same beliefs, including beliefs about its owninternal states. Thus the China-Body system would have to believe thatit experiences pain; and if it had beliefs of this sort, then it couldnot fail to be the subject of some experiences (and hence some stateswith phenomenal character). If this reply is successful (for anupdated version of this reply and a new related thought experiment,see Tye 2006), what it shows is that the property of having somephenomenal character or other has a functional essence. But it doesnot show that individual qualia are functional in nature. Thus onecould accept that absent qualia are impossible while also holding thatinverted spectra are possible (see, e.g., Shoemaker 1975).5. Qualia and the Explanatory GapOur grasp of what it is like to undergo phenomenal states is suppliedto us by introspection. We also have an admittedly incomplete grasp ofwhat goes on objectively in the brain and the body. But there is, itseems, a vast chasm between the two. It is very hard to see how thischasm in our understanding could ever be bridged. For no matter howdeeply we probe into the physical structure of neurons and the chemicaltransactions which occur when they fire, no matter how much objectiveinformation we come to acquire, we still seem to be left with somethingthat we cannot explain, namely, why and how such-and-such objective,physical changes, whatever they might be, generate so-and-so subjectivefeeling, or any subjective feeling at all. This is the famous "explanatory gap" for qualia (Levine 1983, 2000).Some say that the explanatory gap is unbridgeable and that the properconclusion to draw from it is that there is a corresponding gap in theworld. Experiences and feelings have irreducibly subjective,non-physical qualities (Jackson 1993; Chalmers 1996,2005). Others takeessentially the same position on the gap while insisting that this doesnot detract from a purely physicalist view of experiences and feelings.What it shows rather is that some physical qualities or states areirreducibly subjective entities (Searle 1992). Others hold that theexplanatory gap may one day be bridged but we currently lack theconcepts to bring the subjective and objective perspectives together.On this view, it may turn out that qualia are physical, but wecurrently have no clear conception as to how they could be (Nagel1974). Still others adamantly insist that the explanatory gap is, inprinciple, bridgeable but not by us or by any creatures like us.Experiences and feelings are as much a part of the physical, naturalworld as life, digestion, DNA, or lightning. It is just that with theconcepts we have and the concepts we are capable of forming, we arecognitively closed to a full, bridging explanation by the verystructure of our minds (McGinn 1991).Another view that has been gaining adherents of late is that thereis a real, unbridgeable gap, but it has no consequences for the natureof consciousness and physicalist or functionalist theories thereof. Onthis view, there is nothing in the gap that should lead us to anybifurcation in the world between experiences and feelings onthe one hand and physical or functional phenomena on the other. Therearen't two sorts of natural phenomena: the irreducibly subjective andthe objective. The explanatory gap derives from the special characterof phenomenal concepts. These concepts mislead us intothinking that the gap is deeper and more troublesome than it reallyis.On one version of this view, phenomenal concepts are just indexicalconcepts applied to phenomenal states via introspection (see Lycan1996). On an alternative version of the view, phenomenal concepts arevery special, first-person concepts different in kind from all others(see Tye 2003). This response to the explanatory gap obviously bearsaffinities to the second physicalist response I sketched in Section 3to the Knowledge Argument. Unfortunately, if the appeal to phenomenalconcepts by the physicalist is misguided (as I now think), then itcannot be used to handle the gap.There is no general agreement on how the gap is generated and whatit shows.6. Qualia and IntrospectionIn the past, philosophers have often appealed directly to introspectionon behalf of the view that qualia are intrinsic, non-intentionalfeatures of experiences. Recently, a number of philosophers haveclaimed that introspection reveals no such qualities (Harman 1990,Dretske 1995, Tye 1995, 2000). Suppose you are facing a white wall, onwhich you see a bright red, round patch of paint. Suppose you areattending closely to the color and shape of the patch as well as thebackground. Now turn your attention from what you see out there in theworld before you to your visual experience. Focus upon yourawareness of the patch as opposed to the patch of whichyou are aware. Do you find yourself suddenly acquainted with newqualities, qualities that are intrinsic to your visual experience inthe way that redness and roundness are qualities intrinsic to the patchof paint? According to some philosophers, the answer to this questionis a resounding ‘No’. As you look at the patch, you areaware of certain features out there in the world. When you turn yourattention inwards to your experience of those features, you are awarethat you are having an experience of a certain sort but youaware of the very same features; no new features of yourexperience are revealed. In this way, your visual experience istransparent or diaphanous. When you try to examine it, you see rightthough it, as it were, to the qualities you were experiencing all alongin being a subject of the experience, qualities your experience isof. This point holds good even if you are hallucinating and there is noreal patch of paint on the wall before you. Still you have anexperience of there being a patch of paint out there with acertain color and shape. It's just that this time your experience is amisrepresentation. And if you turn your attention inwards to yourexperience, you will ‘see’ right through it again to thosevery same qualities.These observations suggest that qualia, conceived of as theimmediately ‘felt’ qualities of experiences ofwhich we are cognizant when we attend to them introspectively, do notreally exist. The qualities of which we are aware are not qualitiesof experiences at all, but rather qualities that, if they arequalities of anything, are qualities of things in the world (as in thecase of perceptual experiences) or of regions of our bodies (as in thecase of bodily sensations). This is not to say that experiences do nothave qualia. The point is that qualia are not qualities ofexperiences. This claim, which will be developed further in the nextsection, is controversial and some philosophers deny outright thethesis of transparency with respect to qualia (see Block1991). According to Block, qualia are not presented to us inintrospection as intrinsic, non-intentional properties of ourexperiences. Still it does not follow from this that we are notintrospectively acquainted with such properties. For we do know on thebasis of introspection what it is like to undergo a visual experienceof blue, say. So, if what a state is like is a matter of whichintrinsic, non-intentional properties it tokens, then obviously we areintrospectively aware of properties of this sort (in the de re senseof ‘of’). On this view, whether qualia are properties ofexperiences (in particular, intrinsic, non-intentional properties) isa theoretical matter. Introspection does not settle the matter one wayor the other.7. Representational Theories of QualiaTalk of the ways things look and feel is intensional. If I have a redafter-image as a result of a flashbulb going off, the spot I‘see’ in front of the photographer's face looks red, eventhough there is no such spot. If I live in a world in which all andonly things that are purple are poisonous, it is still the case that anobject that looks purple to me does not thereby look poisonous (in thephenomenal sense of ‘looks’). If I feel a pain in a leg, Ineed not even have a leg. My pain might be a pain in a phantom limb.Facts such as these have been taken to provide further support for thecontention that some sort of representational account is appropriatefor qualia. If qualia are not qualities of experiences, as some philosophersmaintain on the basis of an appeal to introspection, and the onlyqualities revealed in introspection are qualities represented byexperiences (qualities that, in the perceptual case, if they belong toanything, belong to external things), the obvious representationalproposal is that qualia are really representational contents ofexperiences into which the represented qualities enter. This would alsoexplain why we talk of experiences *having* qualia or *having* aphenomenal character. For the representational content of an experienceis something the experience has; just as meaning is something a wordhas. Moreover, just as the meaning of a word is not a quality the wordpossesses, so the phenomenal character of an experience is not aquality the experience possesses.If qualia are representational contents, just which contents arethese? Obviously there can be differences in the representationalcontents of experiences without any phenomenal difference. If you and Isee a telescope from the same viewing angle, for example, then even ifI do not recognize it as a telescope and you do (so that ourexperiences differ representationally at this level), the way thetelescope looks to both of us is likely pretty much the same (in thephenomenal sense of ‘looks’). Likewise, if a child isviewing the same item from the same vantage point, her experience willlikely be pretty similar to yours and mine too. Phenomenally, ourexperiences are all very much alike, notwithstanding certainhigher-level representational differences. This, according to somerepresentationalists, is because we all have experiences that representto us the same 3-D surfaces, edges, colors, and surface-shapes plus amyriad of other surface details.The representation we share here has a content much like that of the2 1/2-D sketch posited by David Marr in his famous theory of vision(1982) to which further shape and color information has been appended(for details, see Tye 1995). This content is plausibly viewed asnonconceptual. It forms the output of the early, largely modularsensory processing and the input to one or another system ofhigher-level cognitive processing. Representationalists sometimes claimthat it is here at this level of content that qualia are to be found(see Dretske 1995, Tye 1995, 2000; for an opposing representationalview, see McDowell 1994).One worry for this view is that if qualia are to be handled in termsof representational content, then there had better be a content thatis shared by veridical visual experiences and their hallucinatorycounterparts. Disjunctivists have disputed the supposition that thereis a common content (see, e.g., Hinton 1973, Martin 1997, Snowdon1990). Perhaps veridical experiences have only singular contents andhallucinatory experiences have gappy contents or no content atall.An alternative possibility is that qualia are properties representedby experiences. On this view, there need be no common content sharedby veridical experiences and their hallucinatory counterparts. Itsuffices that the same properties be represented. Of course, such aview requires that a further account be provided of what it is thatmakes a property represented by an experience a quale.Some philosophers try to ground qualia in modes of representationdeployed by experiences within their representational contents. On oneversion of this view, visual experiences not only represent theexternal world but also represent themselves (for a recent collectionof essays elaboarating this view, see Kriegel and Williford 2006). Forexample, my current visual experience of a red object not onlyrepresents the object as red (this is my focal awareness) but alsorepresents itself as red (this is normally a kind of peripheralawareness I have of my experience). When I introspect, the experiencealone provides me with awareness of itself — no higher orderthought is necessary. What the experience is like for me is supposedlyits redness, where this is a mode of representation my experience usesto represent real world redness.This view is incompatible with the phenomenon of transparency (seesection 6) and it is very close to the classic qualiaphile view,according to which when the subject introspects, she is aware of thetoken experience and its phenomenal properties. The new twist is thatthis awareness uses the token experience itself and one of itscontents. Representationalists about qualia are often also externalists aboutrepresentational content (but not always — see, for example,Chalmers 2004). On this view, what a given experience represents ismetaphysically determined at least, in part, by factors in theexternal environment. Thus, it is usually held, microphysical twinscan differ with respect to the representational contents of theirexperiences. If these differences in content are of the right sortthen, according to the wide representationalist, microphysical twinscannot fail to differ with respect to the phenomenalcharacter of their experiences. What makes for a difference inrepresentational content in microphysical duplicates is some externaldifference, some connection between the subjects and items in theirrespective environments. The generic connection is sometimes called‘tracking’, though there is no general agreement as to inwhat exactly tracking consists.On wide representationalism, qualia (like meanings) ain't in thehead. The classic, Cartesian-based picture of experience and itsrelation to the world is thus turned upside down. Qualia are notintrinsic qualities of inner ideas of which their subjects aredirectly aware, qualities that are necessarily shared by internalduplicates however different their environments may be. Rather, theyare representational contents certain inner states possess, contentswhose nature is fixed at least in part by certain external relationsbetween individuals and their environments (Byrne and Tye 2006; for anopposing but still representationalist view, see Pautz 2006).Representationalism, as I have presented it so far, is an identitythesis with respect to qualia: qualia are supposedly one and the sameas certain representational contents. Sometimes it is heldinstead that qualia are one and the same as certain representationalproperties of experiences; and sometimes it is is argued thatthese representational properties are themselves irreducible (Siewert1998). There is also a weaker version of representationalism, accordingto which it is metaphysically necessary that experiences exactly alikewith respect to their representational contents are exactly alike withrespect to their qualia. Obviously, this supervenience thesis leavesopen the further question as to the essential nature of qualia.Objections to representationalism often take the form of putativecounter-examples. One class of these consists of cases in which, it isclaimed, experiences have the same representational content butdifferent phenomenal character. Christopher Peacocke adduces examplesof this sort in his 1983. According to some (e.g., Block 1990,Shoemaker forthcoming), the Inverted Spectrum also supplies an examplethat falls into this category. Another class is made up of problemcases in which allegedly experiences have different representationalcontents (of the relevant sort) but the same phenomenal character. NedBlock's Inverted Earth example (1990) is of this type. The latter casesonly threaten strong representationalism, the former are intended torefute representationalism in both its strong and weaker forms.Counter-examples are also sometimes given in which supposedlyexperience of one sort or another is present but in which there is nostate with representational content. Swampman (Davidson 1986) — themolecule by molecule replica of one of us , formed accidentally by thechemical reaction that occurs in a swamp when a partially submerged logis hit by lightning — is one such counter-example, according to somephilosophers. But there are more mundane cases. Consider the exogenousfeeling of depression. That, it may seem, has no representationalcontent. Cases of the third sort, depending upon how they areelucidated further, can pose a challenge to either strong or weakerversions of representationalism.I lack the space to go through all these objections. I shall discussbriefly just one: Inverted Earth. Inverted Earth is an imaginaryplanet, on which things have complementary colors to the colors oftheir counterparts on Earth. The sky is yellow, grass is red, ripetomatoes are green, and so on. The inhabitants of Inverted Earthundergo psychological attitudes and experiences with invertedintentional contents relative to those of people on Earth. They thinkthat the sky is yellow, see that grass is red, etc. However, they callthe sky ‘blue’, grass ‘green’, ripe tomatoes‘red’, etc. just as we do. Indeed, in all respectsconsistent with the alterations just described, Inverted Earth is asmuch like Earth as possible.In Block's original version of the tale, mad scientists insertcolor-inverting lenses in your eyes and take you to Inverted Earth,where you are substituted for your Inverted Earth twin or doppelganger.Upon awakening, you are aware of no difference, since the invertinglenses neutralize the inverted colors. You think that you are stillwhere you were before. What it is like for you when you see the sky oranything else is just what it was like on earth. But after enough timehas passed, after you have become sufficiently embedded in the languageand physical environment of Inverted Earth, your intentional contentswill come to match those of the other inhabitants. You will come tobelieve that the sky is yellow, for example, just as they do.Similarly, you will come to have a visual experience that representsthe sky as yellow. For the experiential state you now undergo, as youview the sky, is the one that, in you, now normally tracks yellowthings. So, the later you will come to be subject to inner states thatare intentionally inverted relative to the inner states of the earlieryou, while the phenomenal aspects of your experiences will remainunchanged. It follows that strong representationalism of theexternalist sort is false.Perhaps the simplest reply that the strong representationalist canmake with respect to this objection is to deny that there really is anychange in normal tracking with respect to color, at least as far asyour experiences go. "Normal", after all, has both teleological andnonteleological senses. If what an experience normally tracks is whatnature designed it to track, what it has as its biological purpose totrack, then shifting environments from Earth to Inverted Earth willmake no difference to normal tracking and hence no difference to therepresentational contents of your experiences. The sensory state thatnature designed in your species to track blue in the setting in whichyour species evolved will continue to do just that even if throughtime, on Inverted Earth, in that alien environment, it is usuallycaused in you by looking at yellow things.The suggestion that tracking is teleological in character, at leastfor the case of basic experiences, goes naturally with the plausibleview that states like feeling pain or having a visual sensation of redare phylogenetically fixed (Dretske 1995). However, it encountersserious difficulties with respect to the Swampman case mentioned above.On a cladistic conception of species, Swampman is not human. Indeed,lacking any evolutionary history, he belongs to no species at all. Hisinner states play no teleological role. Nature did not design any ofthem to do anything. So, if phenomenal character is a certain sort ofteleo-representational content, then Swampman has no experiences and noqualia. This, for many philosophers, is very difficult tobelieve.There are alternative replies available to the strongrepresentationalist (see Lycan 1996, Tye 2000) in connection with theInverted Earth problem. These involve either denying that qualia doremain constant with the switch to Inverted Earth or arguing that anon-teleological account of sensory content may be elaborated, underwhich qualia stay the same.8. Which Creatures Undergo States with Qualia? Do frogs have qualia? Or fish? What about honey bees? Somewhere downthe phylogenetic scale phenomenal consciousness ceases. But where? Itis sometimes supposed that once we begin to reflect upon much simplerbeings than ourselves — snails, for example — we are left withnothing physical or structural that we could plausibly take to help usdetermine whether they are phenomenally conscious (Papineau 1994).There is really no way of our knowing if spiders are subjectto states with qualia, as they spin their webs, or if fish undergo anyphenomenal experiences, as they swim about in the sea. Representationalism has the beginnings of an answer to the abovequestions. If what it is for a state to have phenomenal character is(very roughly) that it be a state that i)carries information aboutcertain features, internal or external, and ii) is such that thisinformation stands ready and available to make a direct difference tobeliefs and desires (or belief- and desire-like states), then creaturesthat are incapable of reasoning, of changing their behavior in light ofassessments they make, based upon information provided to them bysensory stimulation of one sort or another, are not phenomenallyconscious. Tropistic organisms, on this view, feel and experiencenothing. They have no qualia. They are full-fledged unconsciousautomata or zombies, rather as blindsight subjects are restrictedunconscious automata or partial zombies with respect to a range ofvisual stimuli.Consider, for example, the case of plants. There are many differentsorts of plant behavior. Some plants climb, others eat flies, stillothers catapult out seeds. Many plants close their leaves at night. Theimmediate cause of these activities is something internal to theplants. Seeds are ejected because of the hydration or dehydration ofthe cell walls in seed pods. Leaves are closed because of watermovement in the stems and petioles of the leaves, itself induced bychanges in the temperature and light. These inner events or states aresurely not phenomenal. There is nothing it is like to be a Venus FlyTrap or a Morning-Glory.The behavior of plants is inflexible. It is genetically determinedand, therefore, not modifiable by learning. Natural selection hasfavored the behavior, since historically it has been beneficial to theplant species. But it need not be now. If, for example, flies start tocarry on their wings some substance that sickens Venus Fly Traps forseveral days afterwards, this will not have any effect on the plantbehavior with respect to flies. Each Venus Fly trap will continue tosnap at flies as long as it has the strength to do so.Plants do not learn from experience. They do not acquire beliefs andchange them in light of things that happen to them. Nor do they haveany desires. To be sure, we sometimes speak as if they do. We say thatthe wilting daffodils are just begging to be watered. But we recognizefull well that this is a harmless facon de parler. What we mean is thatthe daffodils need water. There is here no goal-directedbehavior, no purpose, nothing that is the result of any learning, nodesire for water.Plants, on the representational view, are not subject to any qualia.Nothing that goes on inside them is poised to make a direct differenceto what they believe or desire, since they have no beliefs ordesires.Reasoning of the above sort can be used to make a case that eventhough qualia do not extend to plants and paramecia, qualia are verywidely distributed in nature (see Tye 1997, 2000). 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Chalmers, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999.Related Entries consciousness | consciousness: representational theories of | |
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