The Epistemology Page, by Keith DeRoseThe Epistemology Page.Keith DeRose,Yale UniversityDept. of PhilosophyMy goal is to pull together some resources in epistemology. I haveverylimited time for maintaining this page, so it is bound to be veryincomplete.Hopefully, though, there will be enough material here for the page tobesomewhat useful to those interested in epistemology.When I started using hit meters on this page, Ibecame aware of the fact that this page gets a lot of internet traffic,much of it apparently from surfers whoare referred here from Google searches, mainly on the term"epistemology."I suspect many of those surfers are looking for more basic informationthan I provide here. Indeed, many are probably seeking a fairlybasicanswer to the question "What is epistemology?", and/or basicintroductorymaterial on what the main topics in the field are, while this page isintended as a research aid for those who already have a pretty goodidea ofwhat epistemology is.So, for those looking for more basic information,see: WhatIs Epistemology? A Brief Introduction to the Topic.Also On-Line: Contextualismin Epistemology - A Bibliography. .Blog, hopelessly devoted toepistemology: CertainDoubts.Contents:1. Collections and anthologies2. Some Epistemology courses with Syllabi/InformationOn-Line3. Graduate Programs strong in epistemology (andepistemologists on the move)4. Some Epistemologists and Some of TheirEpistemologicalPublications (since 1995) A. C . F . H . K. M . R . T .5. Other Epistemology sites.1. Collections and anthologies (This section has gotten stale; I hope to update it in thenot-too-distant future. That or just delete it.) ..... ..... ..... ..... Here are some collections of papers in epistemology.-Philosophical Perspectives is an annual which is on adifferent topic every year; 2005 was epistemology's turn (vol.19). The many episemology papers in that volume appear to beavailable free to anyone here. A student who wanted to get up on the recent state ofepistemology would do well to start with this volume, findsometopics that interested her, and then trace the trail of citations backto find other literature on those topics. 1999 (vol. 13) was alsoan epistemology volume. To view the contents of that older volumeor to order, see Blackwell's site here,or you can order through Amazon.com by clicking here.-Another good entry to the field is the BlackwellGuide to Epistemology (1999). The editors of that volume,John Greco and Ernest Sosa, commisioned various epistemologists towriteseventeen "survey articles," each one on a major area ofepistemology. But in addition to describing the current state of each sub-field, eacharticle also sought to advance the topic. The description on theBlackwell web page: "Each essay in the volume incorporates backgroundmaterialserving to clarify the history and logic of the relevant topic; as wellas new material by a leading author in the field." (Barnes& Noble.com, Amazon.com)-Another collection of recent work in epistemology is theEpistemologyvolume (volume 5) of the Proceedingsof 20th World Congress of Philosophy.-Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa eds., ContemporaryDebates in Epistemology (Blackwell, 2005) is an excellentresource, consisting of "original essays on some of the most hotlydebated issues in the field. Is knowledge contextual? Can skepticism berefuted? Can beliefs be justified through coherence alone? Is justifiedbelief responsible belief?" (from Blackwell's description). Though I've read very little of the book yet, the line-up of issues andof contributors looks super. The following philosophers debatethe following issues:-Fred Dretske and John Hawthorne: "IsKnowledge Closed under Known Entailment?"-Earl Conee and Stewart Cohen: "IsKnowledge Contextual?"-Jonathan Vogel and Richard Fumerton:"Can Skepticism Be Refuted?"-Laurence BonJour and Michael Devitt:"Is There A Priori Knowledge?"-Peter Klein and Carl Ginet: "IsInfinitism the Solution to the Regress Problem?"-Catherine Z. Elgin and James VanCleve: "Can Beliefs Be Justified through Coherence Alone?"-James Pryor and Michael Williams: "IsThere Immediate Justification?"-Bill Brewer and Alex Byrne: "DoesPerceptual Experience Have Conceptual Content?"-John Greco and Richard Feldman: "IsJustification Internal?"-Jonathan Kvanvig and Marian David: "IsTruth the Primary Epistemic Goal?"-Richard Foley and NicholasWolterstorff: "Is Justified Belief Responsible Belief?"-Vol. 10 (2000) of Philosophical Issues is on Skepticism.-Vol. 14 (2004) of PhilosophicalIssues is on epistemology generally.And here are some not-so-recent-but not-all-that-oldcollections: Philosophical Topics 23 (1995). Philosophical Perspectives 2 (1988). Philosophical Topics 14 (1986). Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1980).(OK, OK, I know that last one is now older than many current gradutatestudents. But one's standards for "not-all-that-old" get pretty lax as oneages. Hey, isn't it about time for Midwest Studies to do epistemologyagain?)The above were all collections of previously unpublishedpapers. The following are recent (you'll be hard-pressed to find graduatestudents youngerthan these collections) anthologies of previously publishedepistemologypapers. L. Alcoff, ed., Epistemology:The Big Questions (Blackwell Publishers, 1998). S. Bernecker, F. Dretske, ed., Knowledge:Readings in Contemporary Epistemology (Oxford UP, 2000). K. DeRose and T. Warfield, ed., Skepticism(Oxford UP, 1999). M. Huemer, ed., Epistemology:Contemporary Readings (Routledge, 2002) P. Ludlow, N. Martin, ed., Externalismand Self-Knowledge (CSLI Publications, 1998). H. Kornblith, ed., Epistemology:Internalism and Externalism (Blackwell Publishers, 2001). L. Pojman, Theoryof Knowledge: Classic and Contemporary Readings, 3rd ed.(Wadsworth,2003). E. Sosa, J. Kim, ed., Epistemology:An Anthology (Blackwell Publishers, 2000).Many teachers, looking for a single book of contemporary writings foranepistemology course, will find that Bernecker & Dretske and Sosa&Kim are their finalists. Comparing the table of contents of thosetwo anthologies (for the Bernecker & Dretske anthology, there is alink to the table of contents on the right side of the OUP page for thebook),the difference that leaps out first is that the Bernecker & Dretskecollection has three pieces by Dretske (plus one by Bernecker), butabsolutelyno Sosa, while the Sosa & Kim anthology contains two papers bySosa,but absolutely none by Dretske. But there are many otherdifferences. Each instructor should examine the tables of contents, and make her ownchoice. Those who want an all-in-one anthology for a generalepistemologycourse that contains historical as well as recent writings, in additionto Pojman's antholology, might also want to check out Huemer'scollection(follow the above link for a list of contents), which, despite itstitle,does include selections by Plato, Sextus, Descartes, Locke, Berkeley,Hume,Reid, Kant, Russell, Moore, Ayer, Carnap, Quine, and others.Finally, teachers of introductory epistemology classes often like toteach from an epistemology textbook. As it happens, I haven'ttaughta beginning epistemology class in quite a few years, and even when Ididteach such a course, I taught from an anthology, so I can't reallyspeakto which are the better textbooks. But here are some that havebeensuggested to me (hopefully, I'll be able to get links up to them soon):Robert Audi, Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction(Routledge,2003). Laurence BonJour, Epistemology:Classic Problems and Contemporary Responses (Rowman andLittlefield,2002). Jonathan Dancy, AnIntroduction to Contemporary Epistemology (Blackwell, 1985). Richard Feldman, Epistemology(Prentice Hall, 2003). Stephen Hetherington, Knowledge Puzzles: An Introduction toEpistemology(Westview Press, 1996). Charles Landesman, AnIntroduction to Epistemology (Blackwell, 1997). Keith Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge (Westview Press, 1990). Adam Morton, AGuide Through the Theory of Knowledge, 3rd ed. (Blackwell,2002). Louis P. Pojman, WhatCan We Know: An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, 2nded.,(Wadsworth, 2001). John Pollack, Joseph Cruz, ContemporaryTheories of Knowledge, 2nd Ed. (Rowman and Littlefield, 1999). Matthias Steup, AnIntroduction to Contemporary Epistemology (Prentice-Hall, 1996).2. Some Epistemology courses withSyllabi/ Helpful Information On-Line: G. Axtell University of Nevada, Reno Phil440/640. Theory of Knowledge Fall 2007 M. Bergmann Purdue University Phil.432 Theory ofKnowledge Spring 2006 T. Black University of Utah Phil.5300/6300. Epistemology Spring 2003 D. Braun University of Rochester Phil.516. Selected Topics in Philosophyof Language: Knowing That, Knowing Who, and Context Fall 2005 J. Comesaña University of Wisconsin,Madison Phil. 903. Epistemology Seminar:Skepticism and The Semantics of Knowledge Attributions Fall 2006 T. Cross, K. DeRose Yale University Phil. 702. Safety and Sensitivity ofBeliefs Spring 2006 K. DeRose Yale University Phil. 270. Basic UndergraduateEpistemology Course Spring 2008 K. DeRose Yale University Phil. 704. Basic Graduate EpistemologyCourse Spring 2008 K. DeRose Yale University Phil.441/641 Epistemology Spring 1999 K. DeRose Yale University Phil. 704 Contextualism vs.Invariantism in Epistemology Spring 2004 K. DeRose Yale University Phil. 300. Skepticism Fall 2006 C.E.M. Dunlap University of Michigan, Flint Phil. 482 Contemporary Issues inEpistemology Spring 2005? C. Elgin Harvard University Phil. 159 Epistemology Fall 2005 R. Feldman Universtiy of Rochester Phil.243/443 Theory of Knowledge Fall 2002 B. Fitelson University of California,Berkeley Phil. 122 Theory of Knowledge Spring 2007 B. Fitelson University of California,Berkeley Phil.148. Probability and Induction Spring 2005 B. Fitelson University of California,Berkeley Phil.290-1 Confirmation (grad seminar) Fall 2007 B. Fitelson and S. Roush University of California,Berkeley Phil.290. Williamson's Knowledge and Its Limits Fall 2006 T. Gendler Cornell University Phil.361. Contemporary Epistemology Spring 2005 P. Greenough University of St. Andrews Phil.PY4606. Contemporary Epistemology Fall 2005 P. Greenough University of St. Andrews PY3001 Epistemology Fall 2003 P. Greenough University of St. Andrews PY5102 Current Issues, Epistemology Spring 2004 G. Harman Princeton University Phil.539 Theory of Knowledge Spring 2003 T. Horgan University of Arizona Phil.441 Theory of Knowledge Spring 2004 M. Huemer University of Colorado,Boulder Phil.3340 (pdfdoc) Epistemology Fall 2006 T. Kelly Princeton University Phil.513 (pdf doc) Rationality and Objectivity Spring 2006 J. Kvanvig University of Missouri Phil4300 (pdf doc) Epistemology Winter 2006 J. Lackey Northern Illinois University Phil. 311(pdf doc) Problems of Knowledge Fall 2006 J. Lackey Northern Illinois University Phil. 511(pdf doc) Epistemology Spring 2005 L. Loeb University of Michigan Phil.389 History of Philosophy: 17thand 18th Centuries [Historycourse, butwith lots of epistemology] Winter 2003 W. Lycan University of North Carolina,Chapel Hill Phil.477 Skepticism and Contextualism;Virtue Epistemology Spring 2002 J. Lyons University of Arkansas Phil.4203/5203 (pdf doc) Theory of Knowledge Fall 2006 J. Pryor Harvard University Phil.253 A Priori Knowledge Fall 2000 J. Pryor Princeton University Phil.313 Theory of Knowledge Spring 2004 J. Pryor New York University G83.1101 Advanced Introduction toEpistemology Fall 2007 B. Rives Union College Phil.367 Skepticism Fall 2005 J. Stanley University of Michigan(Stanley is now at Rutgers) Phil.530(word doc) Theory of Knowledge(skepticism, closure, contextualism, etc.) Spring 2004 M. Tooley University of Colorado,Boulder Phil.3340 Epistemology Fall 2001 .3. Graduate Programs Strong in Epistemology (and epistemologists on themove)>From time to time I am asked, mostly by philosopherswho have anundergraduatestudent who is interested in going on to do graduate work inphilosophy,which are the best departments to go to for epistemology. Forwhatit's worth, here are my thoughts on the subject.First of all, instead of asking me, you should check out BrianLeiter's PhilosophicalGourmet Report, which is a good resource for anyone interested ingraduate work in philosophy. Particularly helpful is Leiter's "Breakdownof Programs by Specialties" which, for many particular areas ofphilosophy,including epistemology,ranks departments by how strong they are in that area. Thesespecialty rankings are determined by a survey of experts in thefield. (The names of the evaluators for epistemology are listedright below the epistemology rankings.) Programs are placed in"groups" based on whether their mean score in epistemology is closer to5, 4.5, 4, 3.5, or 3. Hereare the top 7 programs in epistemology, according to the PGR: Rutgers is listed all byitself in Group 1, with a mean of 5; New York University andOxfordform Group 2, with mean scores of 4.5; and in Group 3, with mean scoresof 4, we find (listedalphabetically)Princeton, U of NotreDame, the Universityof St. Andrews/Universityof Stirling JointProgram, and Yale. Followthe "epistemology" link above to see the many departments inGroups 4 and 5. Below are very brief descriptions of the sevendepartments in the first three Groups, and some general advice onchoosing programs in epistemology. "Updates" report changes thatwere not taken into account in the latest PGR. Boasting several very prominent epistemologists on its faculty, Rutgersis well-chosen as the top program in epistemology. AlvinGoldman, Peter Klein, Ernest Sosa, Jason Stanley, and Stephen Stichconstitute avery formidable line-up of senior epistemologists. Additionally,and importantly, Rutgers also has several excellent faculty memberswho,though epistemology is not their main area of research, have done or dogood work in the area: Brian Loar, Barry Loewer, and BrianMcLaughlin. A graduate student could easilyput together anoutstandingdissertationcommittee for a wide variety of dissertation topics in epistemology atRutgers.NYU's epistemology team is anchored by three excellent seniorepistemologists, PaulBogghossian, Richard Foley, and James Pryor. Foley isservingas a Dean at NYU, as well asbeing a member of the philosophy department, so there is no doubt verystiffcompetitionfor his time and energy. (A look at Foley's recent publishingrecord, however, shows that he has remained very active in hisepistemological writing, despite his duties as Dean.) NYU alsohas Crispin Wright listed ontheir web page as a "regular visitor,"but he probably shouldn't count too much because my PGR survey has himlisted as only quarter-time at NYU. [Update, 8/1/07: CrispinWright hasnow accepted an offer to work full-time at NYU. This is a bigboost to NYU in epistemology.] Importantly, NYU also hassome otheroutstandingphilosophers who, though epistemology might not be among their currentmainarea of research, would be very good to work with there. PeterUnger, though he now works mainly in other areas, used to beprimarilyan epistemologist (and an excellent one, too: there's a reason why Ipicked 1975 as the year since which Williamson's KAIL is the bestepistemology book: I'd pick Unger's '75 skeptical treatise, Ignorance, as the best book inepistemology since I-don't-know(!)-when). Andthere areseveralother faculty members at NYU whom I think it would be very exciting towork with in epistemology. Hartry Field's important work oftentakeshim deeply into epistemological territory, and he could be an excellentguide to some of this territory. And, though they don't listepistemologyas one of their areas (at least on NYU's faculty web page), StephenSchifferand Thomas Nagel have each done some fairly recent work there.Oxford University features Timothy Williamson, one of theworld's top epistemologists and authorof Knowledge and Its Limits(Oxford UP,2000), one of the best and most important books in epistemology inrecent years. (In fact, in my view, that's a bit of anunderstatement: I'm on record as saying KAIL is the best book in epistemology tocome out since 1975.) Recently joining Williamson is JohnHawthorne, much of whose recent important work has been inepistemology. Also at Oxford is Ralph Wedgwood who haswritten some excellent papersin epistemology, and several other faculty who have episemology as anarea of interest. (Update 4/1/07: It has been announced thatScott Sturgeon has accepted an offer to come to Oxford. This is areal boost to Oxford epistemology. It's hard to say whether itwould result in Oxford moving up out of its tie with NYU and into a tiefor first with Rutgers.)The St. Andrews/Stirlingjoint program is becoming an exciting place for epistemology. Crispin Wright, who is mostly at St. Andrews (though he's also aquarter-time visitor at NYU), is the cental figure in epistemologythere, but he is joined by several other epistemologists, many of themyounger philosophers associated with the Arché center. Jessica Brown will also be joining St. Andrews as an Archéprofessor in January 2007. Stirling adds strength to theepistemology component of the joint program, especially in the personof Duncan Pritchard, who has been publishing up a storm inepistemology. (Update 4/1/07: It has been announced that DuncanPritchard has accepted an offer from the University of Edinburgh, andso will be leaving Stirling. Update, 8/1/07: As mentioned above,it has now been announced thatWright is leaving St. Andrews to accept a full-time appointment atNYU. He will still be involved with the Arche Center, itis reported. But this move very significantly hurts St.Andrews in epistemology -- probably by more than it helps NYU.) Notre Dame's epistemologyteam is anchored by Alvin Plantinga, whose old (1980s) work inreligious epistemology proved to be provocative and important, andwhose more recent trilogy of books in epistemology -- Warrant: The Current Debate (1993),Warrant and Proper Function(1993), and Warranted ChristianBelief (2000)-- constitute one of the major achievments in the field inrecent years. Joining Plantinga recently is RobertAudi, an epistemologistwho has done alot of important work in the area, and an exciting team ofconsiderably younger tenured epistemologists: Marian David, MichaelDepaul, Leopold Stubenberg, and Ted Warfield.Princeton's place inepistemology is secured mainly by the presence of Gilbert Harman, oneof the most accomplished figures in epistemology. Harmanis joined by the up-and-coming Tom Kelly. Though untenured atthis point, Kelly is an excellent young epistemologist with somefirst-ratepapers to his name already. (Update 9/28/07: I have just heardthe good news that Kelly has now been given tenure at Princeton.) Yale is my owndepartment, so there is danger of bias here. Otherepistemologists at Yale are GeorgeBealer, much of whose important work has been in epistemology,especially on a priori knowledge, and Tamar Gendler, co-editor (alongwith John Hawthorne) ofthe prestigious Oxford Studies inEpistemology, much of whose interestingepistemological work to date is in areas of overlap betweenepistemology and other areas of philosophy (e.g., philosophy of mind,the theory of modality, philosophy of science). For the most part, and unsurprisingly, the top departments inepistemology tend to also be among the top programs overall inphilosophy. Consider the programs that were in the last PGR's top7 (Groups 1-3) in epistemology. Rutgers, NYU, Oxford, andPrinceton are allgoodenough overall that they arguably constitute the top 4 philosophydepartmentsin theEnglish-speaking world, and are certainly at least not too far fromthat; St. Andrews/Stirling is several slots behind them, Notre Damejust a bit further down, and Yale just a few more slotsdown. For prospective epistemology students, that's both goodnews andbad. Good because it's important to go to a programwith good over-all strength, and not just one good in your own area ofspecialization. Bad because, being among the top overallprograms,they are no doubt highly selective in admissions and therefore tough toget into. (Going just by over-all ranking -- and I don't havemuch else to go by here -- St. Andrews/Stirling, Notre Dame and Yalemightbe considerably easier to get into than the other four.) Prospectivestudents interested in epistemology aretherefore well-advised to also look into other programs strong inepistemology; see the list of strong programs in the PGR, following theabove links.But in choosing a program for epistemology, whether it's one of the"top 7" mentioned above, or one of the Group 4 or Group 5 programslisted in the PGR, or one of the programs that didn't make the lists,much will depend, of course, on howwellyour approach, style, and particular interests match up with thefaculty at thevariousprograms. On that score, you might do well to read some of thepublishedpapers of the relevant faculty, and find someone whose work interestsyou. As a start, you can check out the depatments' and individuals' websites,to which I've provided some links (in this section, for some of thedepartments [for other departments, you can use my list of links to philosophyprograms with PhD programs],and below for many of the individual epistemologists). Unfortunately, you will find that, believe it or not, very manyphilosophers, including very many from departments with graduateprograms, don't even bother to posttheir CVs or a reasonably complete list of publicationson-line! Still, many do, and one can get quite a bit of helpful informationon-line. Hope this is of some help, future colleagues in epistemology. Remember that it's just one epistemologist's opinion. Talk toyouradivsors about it.Epistemologistson the Move. Significant moves ofepistemologists have already occurred since the latest PGR cameout. Allof the following have been announced since thesurveys on which the 06-08 PGR was based were taken, and so weren'tfigured into the PGR's epistemology rankings:DavidChristensen: University of Vermont --> Brown UniversityKennethWinkler (specializes in the history of early modern phil., butoften works on the epistemology of the period): Wellesley College--> Yale UniversityScottSturgeon: Birkbeck College --> Oxford UniversityJonathanSchaffer: UMass, Amherst --> Australian National UniversityDuncanPritchard: University of Stirling --> University of EdinburghBrian Weatherson:Cornell University --> Rutgers UniversityCrispinWright: St. Andrews --> New York University JonathanVogel: University of California, Davis --> Amherst CollegeJenniferLackey, Baron Reed: Northern Illinois University -->Northwestern University.4. Some Epistemologists and Some of Their EpistemologicalPublications(since 1995) .... .... .... .... This list is far from exhaustive. I addpublicationsand epistemologists willy-nilly as I come across them or as they'resuggestedto me. (So if an epistemology paper of yours isn't listed, or ifyou're an epistemologist who isn't listed, don't conclude that I'velooked at your paper, or at you, but judged them or you unworthy to beincluded in this index. It may well even be that I did see yourpaper and loved it, but didn't have my computer handy at the time, andthen didn't remember you & your paper when I did get around torevising this page.) Still, many havee-mailed to tell me that theyfind this list very helpful, despite its limitations. Perhaps the most valuable aspect of the list are the linksto various epistemologists' homepages, where you can often find a muchmore complete description of their epistemological (and other) work(includingpre-1995 papers). A few epistemologists are listedwithoutany papers listed below their names. This is because I'm notawareof any epistemology they've published since 1995. In each suchcase,they've done important epistemology in the past, so it was worthprovidinga link to their home page, where one can often find references to thosegolden oldies.A . C . F . H. K . M . R . T Fred Adams,University of Deleware "Tracking Theories of Knowledge," Veritas 50 (2005), no. 4: 11-35. with M. Clarke, "Resurrecting the Tracking Theories," AustralasianJournal of Philosophy 83 (2005): 207-221. "Knowledge," in Floridi, ed., TheBlackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Information and Computing(Blackwell, 2004), pp. 228-236. with M. Clarke, "Toward Saving Nozick from Kripke," in W.Loffler andP. Weingartner, eds., Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth InternationalWittgenstein Symposium (Kirchberg: The Austrian WittgensteinSociety,2003). "Epistemology," in McHenry, Yagisawa, eds., Reflections on Philosophy, 2ndEdition (Longman Press, 2003), pp. 81-101. "Epistemic Engineering Audi-Style," in J. Heil, ed., Rationality, Morality, and Self-Interest:Essays Honoring Mark Carl Overvold (Rowman & Littlefield,1993), pp. 49-58. JonathanAdler, Brooklyn College and the CUNY Graduate Center "Withdrawal and Contextualism," Analysis 66 (2006): 280-285. "Reliabilist Justification (or Knowledge) as a GoodTruth-Ratio," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (2005): 445-458. "Diversity, Social Inquiries, and Epistemic Virtues," Veritas 50 (2005), no. 4: 37-52. "Reconciling Open-Mindedness and Belief ," Theory and Research in Education 2(2004): 127-142. "The Revisability Paradox," PhilosophicalForum 34 (2003): 383-389. Belief's Own Ethics,MIT Press, 2002. "Akratic Believing?," Philosophical Studies 110 (2002):1-27. with M. Levin, "Is the Generality Problem too General?", Philosophyand Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 87-97. "The Ethics of Belief: Off the Wrong Track," MidwestStudies inPhilosophy23 (1999): 267-285. "Constrained Belief and the Reactive Attitudes," PhilosophyandPhenomenologicalResearch 57 (1997): 891-905. "An Overlooked Argument for Epistemic Conservatism," Analysis56(1996): 80-84. "Transmitting Knowledge," Noûs 30 (1996): 99-111. ScottAikin, Vanderbilt University "Modest Evidentialism," forthcoming, International Philosophical Quarterly. "Contrastive Self Attribution of Belief," forthcoming, Social Epistemology. "Who Is Afraid of Epistemology's Regress Problem?", PhilosophicalStudies 126 (2005): 191-217. Linda Alcoff,SyracuseUniversity ed., Epistemology: The Big Questions (Blackwell, 1999). "On Judging Epistemic Credibility: Is Social IdentityRelevant?", PhilosophicExchange 29 (1999): 73-89. Real Knowing: New Versions of the Coherence Theory ofKnowledge(Cornell UP, 1996). "Is the Feminist Critique of Reason Rational?", PhilosophicExchange26 (1996): 59-79. RobertF. Almeder, Georgia State University "Recent Work on Error," Philosophia 27 (1999): 3-58. Harmless Naturalism: The Limits of Science and the NatureofPhilosophy(Open Court, 1998). "Carnap and Quine on Empiricism," History of PhilosophyQuarterly14 (1997): 349-364. "Dretske's Dreadful Question" (pp. 449-457) and "ExternalismandJustification"(pp. 465-469), Philosophia 24 (1995). MarcAlspector-Kelly, Western Michigan University "Knowledge Externalism," PacificPhilosophical Quarterly 87 (2006): 289-300. "Seeing the Unobservable: van Fraassen and the Limits ofExperience", Synthese 140 (2004): 331-353. "Stroud’s Carnap”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64(March 2002): pp. 276-302. William P.Alston,Syracuse University (emeritus) "Perception and Representation," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research70 (2005): 253-289. "Religious Experience Justifies Religious Belief," in M.Peterson, ed., Contemporary Debatesin Philosophy of Religion (Blackwell, 2004), pp. 135-145. "Sellars and the 'Myth of the Given'," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research65 (2002): 69-86. "Back to the Theory of Appearing," PhilosophicalPerspectives13(1999): 181-203. "Perceptual Knowledge," in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., TheBlackwellGuide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 223-242. "What is Distinctive About the Epistemology of ReligiousBelief?" Proceedingsof the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (PhilosophyDocumentationCenter, 1999); Vol. IV, Philosophies of Religion, Art, and Creativity. "Chisholm on the Epistemology of Perception," in L. Hahn, ed., The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm(Open-Court 1997). "Belief, Acceptance, and Religious Faith," in J. Jordan, ed., Faith, Freedom, and Rationality:Philosophy of Religion Today (Rowman and Littlefield, 1996). D.M. Armstrong, University of Sydney "The Scope and Limits of Human Knowledge," Australasian Journal of Philosophy84 (2006): 159-166. "A Naturalist Program: Epistemology and Ontology," ProceedingsandAddressesof the American Philosophical Association 73 (1999): 77-89. RobertAudi,Universityof Notre Dame "The Epistemic Authority of Testimony and the Ethics ofBelief,"in A. Chignell and A.Dole, ed., God and the Ethics ofBelief: New Essays in Philosophy of Religion (CambridgeUP, 2005), pp. 175-201. "Intellectual Virtue and Epistemic Power," in J. Greco, ed., Ernest Sosa and His Critics(Blackwell, 2004), pp. 3-16. The Architecture of Reason: The Structure and Substance ofRationality (OxfordUP, 2001) Religious Commitment and Secular Reason (Cambridge UP,2000) "Self-Evidence," Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999):205-228. "Moral Knowledge and Ethical Pluralism," in J. Greco and E.Sosa, ed., TheBlackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp.271-302. Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to theTheoryof Knowledge (Routledge,1998). Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character (Oxford, 1997). "The Place of Testimony in the Fabric of Knowledge andJustification," AmericanPhilosophical Quarterly 34 (1997): 405-422. "Perceptual Experience, Doxastic Practice, and the RationalityofReligiousCommitment," Journal of Philosophical Research 20 (1995): 1-18. BruceAune,University of Massachusetts, Amherst Guy Axtell,Universityof Nevada, Reno. Administrator of JanusBlog, a virtuetheory (including virtueepistemology) discussion forum. "Expanding Epistemology: A Responsibilist Approach,”forthcoming, Philosophical Papers. "Virtue-Theoretic Responses to Skepticism,” forthcoming in J.Greco, ed., Oxford Handbook ofSkepticism, Oxford UP. "Two for the Show: Anti-Luck and Virtue Epistemologies inConsonance,” Synthese 158(2007): 363-383. "Blind Man’s Bluff: The ‘Basic Belief Apologetic'," Philosophical Studies 130 (2006):131-152. “Felix Culpa: Luck in Ethics and Epistemology,” Metaphilosophy34(2003): 331-352. "Epistemic Luck in Light of the Virtues," in Fairweather &Zagzebski,ed., Virtue Epistemology (Oxford UP, 2002). ed., Knowledge, Belief, and Character: Readings in VirtueEpistemology,Rowman & Littlefield, 2000. "Virtue Theory and the Fact/Value Problem," in Axtell, ed., Knowledge,Belief, and Character: Readings in Virtue Epistemology. "The Role of the Intellectual Virtues in the Reunification ofEpistemology," TheMonist 81 (1998): 353-370. "Recent Work on Virtue Epistemology," AmericanPhilosophicalQuarterly34 (1997): 1-26. "Epistemic Virtue-Talk: The Reemergence of American Axiology?" TheJournalof Speculative Philosophy 10 (1996): 172-198. DoritBar-On, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge,OxfordUP, 2004. "Externalism and Self-Knowledge: Content, Use, and Expression," Noûs 38 (2004): 430-455. "Avowals and First-Person Privilege" (with D. Long), PhilosophyandPhenomenological Research 62 (2001): 311-335. "Anti-Realism and Speaker Knowledge," Synthese 106(1996):139-166. GeorgeBealer, Yale University "The Origins of Modal Error," Dialectica58 (2004): 11-42. "Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance," inGendler,Hawthorne,eds., Conceivability and Possibility (Oxford UP, 2002), pp.71-125. "A Priori Knowledge," Proceedings of the Twentieth WorldCongressofPhilosophy (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000); Vol. V,Epistemology:1-12. "A Theory Of The A Priori," Philosophical Perspectives13(1999):29-55. "The A Priori," in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The BlackwellGuidetoEpistemology (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 243-270. "Intuition and The Autonomy of Philosophy," in DePaul, Ramsey,eds., RethinkingIntuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in PhilosophicalInquiry(Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), pp. 201-239. "A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy" (pp. 121-142)and "APrioriKnowledge: Replies to William Lycan and Ernest Sosa" (pp. 163-174), PhilosophicalStudies 81 (1996). "On the Possibility of Philosophical Knowledge," PhilosophicalPerspectives10 (1996): 1-34. James R. 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