Ancient Skepticism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Cite this entry Search the SEP • Advanced Search • Tools • RSS FeedTable of Contents• What's New• Archives• Projected ContentsEditorial Information• About the SEP• Editorial Board• How to Cite the SEP• Special CharactersSupport the SEPContact the SEP ©Metaphysics Research Lab,CSLI,Stanford University  Open access to the SEP is made possible by a world-wide funding initiative. Please Read How You Can Help Keep the Encyclopedia FreeAncient SkepticismFirst published Tue Nov 4, 1997; substantive revision Fri Jan 11, 2008Skepticism embraces doubt. "Ancient skepticism," as it is standardlyunderstood, encompasses two schools of philosophy which make doubttheir fundamental theme. One is Pyrrhonism, which claims Pyrrho ofElis (4th–3rd c. B.C.E.) as its founder, though Pyrrho's ties to“Pyrrhonism” are loose and often indirect. The otherschool is Academic Skepticism, which comprises a skeptical phase ofPlato's Academy that stretches from the 3rd to the early 1st centuryB.C.E. The latter influences many later thinkers associated with theAcademy (most notably, Cicero and Plutarch). Its relationship tosubsequent phases of the Academy has been studied by Tarrant. The figures associated with these two schools include Pyrrho, Timonof Phlius, Arcesilaus, Carneades, Clitomachus, Philo of Larissa,Cicero, Aenesidemus, Agrippa and Sextus Empiricus. Cicero and Sextusare significant because their works have served as vehicles that conveyskeptical arguments and views to medieval, renaissance, modern andcontemporary philosophy (Diogenes Laertius is another ancient authorwho plays an important role in this regard). Their influence is welldocumented in Floridi, Popkin and Schmitt (see the bibliographybelow).Pyrrhonism, which flourished during and after the 1st c. B.C.E., isthe most mature variant of ancient skepticism. In part this is becausePyrrhonians like Sextus freely borrow and incorporate the arguments,themes and opinions they find in earlier skeptics and in otherskeptically inclined philosophers. The latter include figures likeProtagoras, Socrates, Gorgias, Democritus, Aristippus and Diogenes ofSinope (Diogenes “the Cynic”). In Sextus, the result is arich collection of skeptically inclined arguments on a broad array oftopics. Recent editions of his works make these arguments increasinglyavailable for detailed scrutiny and discussion.1. Overview2. The Historical Context3. Pyrrho and Equanimity4. Appearances5. Arcesilaus and the Academy6. Carneades7. Carneades as Dialectician8. Carneades and Practical Life9. The Arguments for Pyrrhonism10. The Practical Criterion11. The Logic of Ancient SkepticismBibliographyOther Internet ResourcesRelated Entries1. OverviewSextus Empiricus, who flourished at the end of the second century C.E.,describes the “skeptic” (from a Greek verb meaning“to examine carefully”) as an “investigator” (a“zetetic”). According to Sextus, the skeptic is someone whohas investigated the questions of philosophy but has “suspendedjudgment” (practicing epochê) because he is unableto resolve the differences among the contrary attitudes, opinions andarguments he found. Instead of adhering to a definite philosophicalposition, the skeptic is someone who continues to investigate. The most mature skeptical perspective in ancient times isPyrrhonism. Sextus describes its relationship to other ancientphilosophies in the opening passage of his Outlines ofPyrrhonism (henceforth PH).When people search for something, the likely outcome isthat either they find it or, not finding it, they accept that it cannotbe found, or they continue to search. So also in the case of what issought in philosophy, I think, some people have claimed to have foundthe truth, others have asserted that it cannot be apprehended, andothers are still searching. Those who think that they have found it arethe Dogmatists, properly so called — for example, the followersof Aristotle and Epicurus, the Stoics, and certain others. Thefollowers of Clitomachus and Carneades, as well as other Academics,have asserted that it cannot be apprehended. The Skeptics[skeptikoi] continue to search. (PH 1.1–3,Mates)One controversial aspect of these remarks is Sextus' suggestion thatthe Pyrrhonian leaves open the possibility that truth may be found.While this is a logical corollary of the suggestion that the skeptichas not made up his mind about the issues of philosophy, anyonefamiliar with Sextus might question whether he is open to thispossibility. At the very least, it must be said that the Pyrrhonianstance is an overwhelmingly negative one which seems (conceptually andin spirit) to undermine any and all attempts to establish truth.Another controversial aspect of Sextus' work is his description ofthe views of Carneades, Clitomachus and other Academic skeptics. In theOutlines of Pyrrhonism, he struggles to separate Arcesilaus'outlook and the Pyrrhonean point of view, suggesting that Arcesilaus'“Way” is “almost the same as ours” (1.234). Indiscussing the members of the “New” Academy (headed byCarneades and Clitomachus), he claims that they maintain that truthcannot be apprehended, attributing them a position which seems to(inconsistently) imply that they can apprehend that this is so (PH,1.226). This suggestion is plausibly interpreted as an attempt to drivea wedge between Pyrrhonism and a competing school of skepticism.Whatever one decides about Sextus' account of the different Academicskeptics, the Academics he treats as rivals can be classified asskeptics in the sense in which we now use the term. For even if some ofthem adopted the negative dogmatism he implies, their philosophy isstill centred on the conviction that claims to truth are inherentlyuncertain, and it is this conviction which is the heart of ancientskepticism.In their defense of skepticism, the ancient skeptics adopt anattitude of opposition. In the first half of the third century C.E.,Diogenes Laertius attributes a method of opposition to Academicskepticism, writing that Arcesilaus (mid-3rd c. B.C.E.) “was theoriginator of the Middle Academy, being the first to suspend hisassertions owing to the contrarieties of arguments, and the first toargue pro and contra” (4.28–44, Long & Sedley). The mostfamous of the Academic skeptics, Carneades (mid-2nd c. B.C.E.), wasfamous for his ability to oppose Stoic arguments, and is said to havedemonstrated his ability to construct opposing arguments on a famoustrip to Rome, where he argued impressively for justice and, on thefollowing day, argued with equal force against it (Lactantius, Div.Ins., 5.16, 6.6).Judging by Cicero's account in De Finibus 2.2, an attitudeof opposition played an integral role in lessons in the skepticalAcademy, where Arcesilaus, at any rate, proceeded by opposing somethesis enunciated by a student (e.g., “The Chief Good in myopinion is pleasure”). The Academics' principal argument againstStoic epistemology employs opposition in a more specific way, opposingalleged examples of the Stoics' “cataleptic” impressions(impressions which are clear and distinct, and said to be a guarantorof truth), with presumed or admitted false impressions which areequally forceful and convincing. There is, the Academics conclude, noway to establish the trustworthiness of the impressions that are thebasis of Stoic claims to truth.The suspension of judgment that characterizes Pyrrhonism also:…comes about because of the setting of things inopposition. We oppose either appearances to appearances, or ideas toideas, or appearances to ideas. We oppose appearances to appearanceswhen we say “The same tower seems round from a distance butsquare from near by.” We oppose ideas to ideas when someoneestablishes the existence of providence from the orderliness of thethings in the heavens and we oppose to this the frequency with whichthe good fare badly and the bad prosper, thereby deducing thenon-existence of providence. We oppose ideas to appearances in the wayin which Anaxagoras opposed to snow's being white the consideration:snow is water, and water is black, therefore snow is black too. On adifferent scheme, we oppose sometimes present things to present things,but sometimes present things to past and future things…(PH 1.31–5, Long & Sedley)In constructing arguments that oppose potentially true perceptions,opinions, and theories, the Pyrrhonians are willing to cite whateverevidence might seem to serve to demonstrate uncertainty. Perceptionswhich seem to reveal the true nature of the world are opposed byinvoking perceptions which seem to demonstrate the limits ofperception; philosophical opinions are opposed by invoking competitorsor general arguments against our ability to establish truth. Argumentsfor particular conclusions are opposed by counter arguments. And soon.2. The Historical ContextSkeptical doubts are said to characterize times of social upheaval (aconnection said to characterize, not only the ancient world, but thefourteenth century and our own era). It is difficult to judge suchgeneral claims, but it would be surprising if the foundational doubtsthat characterize skepticism were not more evident in times whensocial and intellectual turmoil invite deep questions about what isright and wrong and true and false.Ancient skepticism's ties to other trends in ancient philosophy are moreeasily observed. They are particularly evident in the considerationsthat motivate the skeptics' decision to suspend judgment on the truthof any claim. The skeptics' conclusion that truth is uncertainis at odds with the “dogmatic” philosophies they reject,but this conclusion may still be founded on a similar focus on opposingarguments, antithesis, and conflicting points of view. One might, for example, easily compare the Pyrrhonian convictionthat there are equally convincing arguments for and against any claimto the Protagorean view that one can argue equally convincingly onboth sides of any question. In both cases, one finds a generalcommitment to the possibility of convincing arguments for opposingpoints of view. Despite this mutual commitment, Protagoras defended aperspective which is in some ways diametrically opposed to skepticism(at least if we judge by Plato's account of Protagoras in hisTheaetetus), for it accepts rather than rejects opposingclaims to truth.Ancient skepticism has many affinities to other ancient philosophies.Greek atomism shares, for example,skepticism's interest in opposing perceptions and points of view, andcan be seen as an attempt to explain this opposition by hypothesizingatoms which impact on different kinds of bodies (the bodies ofdifferent individuals, and of different species) in different kinds ofways. Opposites which include opposing points of view also played acentral role in Heracleitean and Platonic epistemology. EvenAristotelean philosophy has affinities to skepticism, affinities whichare in this case manifest in an Aristotelean rhetorical tradition whichincorporates the rhetorical works of Theophrastus, Demetrius ofPhalerum and others, and which emphasizes the power of persuasivespeech rather than argument's ability to establish what is true.In a number of cases, philosophers who have no direct tiesto the skeptical schools anticipate skepticism by stressing thedifficulties inherent in inquiry. Xenophanes was known for his claimthat no one knows clear truth; Democritus maintained that“bastard” knowledge gained through the senses exists onlyby convention; Plato's dialogues contained arguments pro and contra,and cast doubt on everyday opinions; Diogenes of Sinope and otherCynics dismiss philosophical speculation; Epictetus insists thatphilosophers spend too much time on theory (En., 51); and soon. The philosophies that such philosophers endorsed do notincorporate a full fledged skepticism, but their influence added impetus to the skeptics' moves in this direction.More generally, ancient skepticism flourishedin an intellectual milieu which incorporated many general themes and trendsconducive to skeptical conclusions. In markedcontrast with modern science, ancient science could not boast thepractical and theoretical successes of its modern counterpart. In partbecause of this, mysticism and irrationalism were powerful culturalforces in the ancient world. The possibility of conflicting views ofthings was reinforced by an interest in foreign cultures which drewattention to opposing customs and traditions. Opposing interests andperspectives were also manifest in debate, war, political rivalries anda religion and mythology which pitted god against god, man against manand even god against man.Within this broader context, ancient philosophical inquiry ischaracterized both by a remarkable array of conflicting philosophicalperspectives and by famous philosophers known for dazzling argumentsfor paradoxical conclusions (that motion is impossible, that nothingexists, that time is an illusion, etc.). In the midst of theconflicting views and conclusions that this implies, it is notsurprising that some philosophers propound the conclusion that reasoncannot establish truth, and gives us no way to choose between opposingarguments and opposing points of view.3. Pyrrho and EquanimityThe movements that constitute ancient skepticism begin with Pyrrho (ca.365–ca. 275 B.C.E.), though his views and perspective are obscure andopen to different interpretations. In marked contrast to modernskeptics, Pyrrho seems to have proposed his philosophy as somethingmore than an epistemological conclusion, advocating it as a basis for alife of tranquillity and contentment. In keeping with this, Pyrrho wasmost famous, not for his arguments, but because he is said to have usedthem as a basis for a life of exceptional equanimity and contentment. Pyrrho left no writings, and many of the later comments about himseem colored by anachronisms encouraged by his later status as thefigurehead for the Pyrrhonian “revival” of the 1st c. B.C.E.Sextus seems guarded about Pyrrho's own relationship to Pyrrhonism(see, e.g., PH 1.7) and many authors question the extent towhich he adopted the perspective propounded by the later philosopherswho came to be known as Pyrrhonians.The most important evidence on Pyrrho's views is found in thefollowing fragment of Aristocles, a Peripatetic of uncertain date(perhaps 1st c. B.C.E.–C.E., perhaps 2nd c. C.E.).He [Pyrrho] himself has left nothing in writing, but thispupil Timon says that whoever wants to be happy must consider thesethree questions: first, how are things by nature? Secondly, whatattitude should we adopt towards them? Thirdly, what will be theoutcome for those who have such an attitude? According to Timon, Pyrrhodeclared that things are equally indifferent, unmeasurable andinarbitrable. For this reason neither our sensations nor our opinionstell us truths or falsehoods. Therefore for this reason we should notput our trust in them one bit, but should be unopinionated, uncommittedand unwavering, saying concerning each individual thing that it no moreis than is not, or both is and is not, or neither is nor is not. Theoutcome for those who actually adopt this attitude, says Timon, will befirst speechlessness [aphasia], and then freedom fromdisturbance; and Aenesidemus says pleasure. (Eusebius, Prep.Ev. 14.18.2–5, Long & Sedley)The interpretation of this passage is the subject of debate (seeBett, Pyrrho). According to the interpretationmost in keeping with later skepticism, Pyrrho holds that things appearwith equal force to be and not to be (and to both be and not to be; andto neither be nor not to be). According to an alternative(“metaphysical”) interpretation, Pyrrho holds that this ishow things actually are — i.e. that things in the worldactually are and are not (and both are and are not, and neither are norare not). If the latter interpretation is correct, it is a historicalirony that Pyrrho became the most famous spokesperson for a laterskepticism which rejects all claims about the true nature of theworld.According to Diogenes Laertius (9.76), Timon held that Pyrrho'sformula ou mallon (“no more is than is not”) was adetermination to determine nothing, which promoted both an indifferenceto opinions and sensations, and Pyrrho's famous peace of mind (D.L.9.65). Judging by the Life of Pyrrho Diogenes Laertiusincludes in his Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Pyrrho did livea life in accord with the goal of equanimity. Putting aside incredibleanecdotes which suggest that he completely ignored his senses, thepicture which emerges suggests a wise man famous for self control andan even temper. Among other things, we read that Pyrrho lived like arecluse; did not “so much as frown” when treated withdisinfectants, surgery and cautery; voluntarily adopted a life of pietyand poverty; and performed menial tasks to show his indifference. Inone anecdote, he is criticized for failing to maintain his composurewhen a cur rushed at him and terrified him (Pyrrho is said to haveanswered that it is difficult to strip oneself of one's human nature).According to Diogenes, the citizens of Pyrrho's native Elis rewardedhim with honors, making him a high priest, raising a statue in hishonor (Pausanias 6.24.5), on his account passing a law which exemptedphilosophers from taxes (D.L. 9.64).The crux of Pyrrho's practical philosophy lies in the relationshipbetween his skeptical conclusions and the even tempered peace of mindwhich his life exemplified. Sextus sheds some light on this connectionin a passage in which he explains Pyrrhonism's ties to equanimity(ataraxia) by invoking an anecdote which apparently descendsfrom Pyrrho's time in Alexander's court. It tells how Apelles,Alexander's court painter, was so frustrated by his inability to paintthe froth on a horse's mouth that he threw his sponge at his painting,accidentally producing the effect he wanted. “So, too, theSkeptics were hoping to achieve ataraxia by resolving theanomaly of phenomena and noumena, and, being unable to do this, theysuspended judgment. But then, by chance as it were, when they weresuspending judgment the ataraxia followed, as a shadow followsthe body.” (PH 1.29, Mates)The relationship between Pyrrho's equanimity and the equanimityespoused by Sextus and later Pyrrhonians is difficult to judge, thoughSextus provides an explanation of the Pyrrhonean state of mind whichmakes it easier to understand some of the reasons that skepticalconclusions lead to peace of mind. According to Sextus' account anumber of centuries after Pyrrho, equanimity follows skepticism“like a shadow” for two reasons. First, because iteliminates the anxiety that accompanies the study of philosophy —an anxiety philosophy produces by fostering the hope that one will beable to understand what is true about reality and what is good and badin human life. Second, because skeptical conclusions are said topromote a moderate response to the misfortunes and calamities thatmight otherwise disturb one's peace of mind, allegedly because thesemisfortunes and calamities can't, according to skepticism, beknown to be bad, and so shouldn't even be held to be.It is plausible to suppose that Pyrrho, who revered Democritus andstudied under the Democritean Anaxarchus, maintained his attitude ofcalm composure by using the kind of thinking already evident in thefollowing fragment of Democritus:[In order to achieve cheerfulness]… one must keepone's mind on what is attainable, and be content with what one has,paying little heed to things envied and admired, and not dwelling onthem in one's mind. Rather must you consider the lives of those indistress, reflecting on their intense sufferings, in order that yourown possessions and condition may seem great and enviable, and you may,by ceasing to desire more, cease to suffer in your soul… Onemust… [compare] one's own life with that of those in worsecases, and must consider oneself fortunate, reflecting on theirsufferings, on being so much better off than they. If you keep to thisway of thinking, you will live more serenely (fr. 191, cf. fr. 3; Kirk,Raven and Schofield).The exercises here proposed promote peace of mind by opposing theopinion that one is suffering from misfortune with comparisons thatcast doubt on this opinion. A commitment to the relativity of valuejudgments — a natural component of skepticism — in this wayprovides a psychological basis for peace of mind. As the old saw goes,“I was upset about my lack of shoes until I met a man with nofeet.”Pyrrho's use of such tactics is implied by the report that he wasfond of Homer's lines (Il. 21.106–7): “Ay friend, diethou; why thus thy fate deplore? Patroclus, thy better, is nomore”. These lines combat the thought that one is faced withdeath (a thought of the sort inclined to disturb one's equanimity) withthe opposing thought that one has no grounds for complaint — forone's better, the great warrior Patroclus, has suffered the same fate.Oppositions of this sort may be implied when it is said that Pyrrho“talked to himself” in order to train himself to be good(D.L. 9.64, cf. 69). Similar methods and ideals seem reflected in afamous incident in which Pyrrho's teacher Anaxarchus cures Alexander'sdespondency (Plutarch, Alex., 52), and in Anaxarchus' own fameas “the happy one,” which is in part founded on (or perhapsthe basis for) the story that he was unflappable even when he suffereda horrible death at the hands of the tyrant Nicocreon (D.L.9.59–60).Flintoff locates the origins of Pyrrho's philosophy in India, wherePyrrho travelled in the court of Alexander the Great. It was on thistrip that Pyrrho was exposed to Indian ascetics (the so calledgymno-sophists — the “Naked Philosophers” ofIndia) and their commitment to an enlightened state of mind. There canbe no doubt that someone with Pyrrho's inclinations must have beenimpressed with their studied indifference, though not in a way thatnegates the likelihood that Pyrrho's philosophy has Greek origins.Looked at from the point of view of earlier Greek philosophy,Pyrrho's skepticism may be an extension of aspects of Democriteanthought which he would have studied with Anaxarchus, who is alsonotable for skeptical tendencies and whom Pyrrho followed to India. Inkeeping with this, Pyrrho's epistemology may be rooted in Democritus'doubts about ordinary opinions (which Democritus rejected as purely“conventional” on the grounds that they are contradictoryand truth resides in atoms and the void); his formula oumallon descends from atomism (DeLacy); his goal of equanimityreflects the Democritean practical ideals we have already noted; andPyrrho is reported to have admired Democritus above all others (D.L.9.67).These affinities being noted, Pyrrho takes skeptical inclinationsmuch further than Democritus, rejecting atomism as well ordinaryopinions, in the process giving up on philosophy and on all attempts toestablish what is true (D.L. 9.69,65; cf. Sextus, PH 1.28–29;AM [Adversus Mathematicos] 11.1). As Aristocles putsit, “if we are so constituted that we know nothing, then there isno need to continue enquiry into other things…. Pyrrho of Eliswas … a powerful spokesman of such a position” (Eusebius,14.18.1–2, Long & Sedley).4. AppearancesPyrrho's philosophy raises a number of issues which reverberatethroughout the history of skepticism. Questions about the consistencyof his and later skeptical perspectives are particularly significant.As Aristocles says, “in admonishing us to have no opinion, they[the skeptics] at the same time bid us to form an opinion, and insaying that men ought to make no statement they make a statementthemselves: and though they require you to agree with no one, theycommand you to believe themselves…” (Eus. Prep.Ev. 14.18, Gifford). Other commentators ask how Pyrrho survived the pitfalls of day today life — much less achieved supreme contentment — if herefused to believe the truth of his impressions. According to oneancient report in Diogenes Laertius, this was a practical as well as atheoretical issue for Pyrrho, who accepted skepticism “in hisactual way of life, avoiding nothing and taking no precautions, facingeverything as it came, wagons, precipices, dogs, and entrusting nothingwhatsoever to his sensations. But he was looked after… by hisdisciples, who accompanied him” (D.L. 9.62, Long & Sedley).Not much can be made of this account of Pyrrho's life, for Laertius hasa penchant for fantastic stories and is willing to stretch his lives toinclude them. In this case, he cites as his authority “thosearound” Antigonus of Carystus (3rd c. B.C.E. author of a now lostLives of Philosophers), who is not an impressive source.As Hallie says, we might contrast the claim that Pyrrho rejected thesenses with Posidonius' account (1st c. B.C.E.) of Pyrrho's actions whenhe was caught in a storm at sea (D.L. 9.68). Confronted with otherpassengers wailing and cringing with horror, Pyrrho is said to haveremained calm and pointed to a small pig which was calmly eating on thedeck, saying that its attitude demonstrated the unperturbed state ofthe wise man. Though Timon included “sensations” as well as“opinions” within the scope of Pyrrho's skepticism, thissuggests that it is human fears and frailties, not ordinaryimpressions, which Pyrrho wanted to expunge by skeptical inquiry.Pyrrho's follower Timon suggests that the Pyrrhonean guides himself by“appearances” (phainomena — what“appears to be the case”). This suggests that Pyrrho wascommitted to some kind of tentative belief in (or acceptance of) whatappears to be the case. As Diogenes Laertius puts it:…the dogmatists say that they [the skeptics] abolishlife, in the sense that they throw out everything that goes to make upa life. But the skeptics say that these charges are false. For they donot abolish, say, sight, but only hold that we are ignorant of itsexplanation…. We do sense that fire burns, but we suspendjudgement as to whether it is fire's nature to burn…. “Weonly object,” they say, “to the non-evident things added onto the phenomena [the appearances]…. For this reason, Timon inhis Pytho says that he has not diverged from what iscustomary. And in his Likenesses he says, "But the apparentutterly dominates wherever it goes." And in his work On theSenses he says, “That honey is sweet I do not posit; that itappears so I concede.” (D.L. 9.104–5, Inwood &Gerson)If one accepts that this is Pyrrho's view, then we should interprethis claims — including, perhaps, the claims that things“are” indifferent, unmeasurable and inarbitrable — asclaims about appearances. This implies that one should reject themetaphysical interpretation of Pyrrho's point of view. Whether a moveof this sort can save Pyrrho or other ancient skeptics from the chargeof inconsistency remains a matter of debate (for influential statementsof the different sides of this debate, see Barnes, Frede andBurnyeat).5. Arcesilaus and the AcademyPyrrho's impact on his immediate contemporaries seems quite limited.Timon is his only student of repute and ancient skepticism's next phaseis not Pyrrhonian but Academic. The exact origins of skepticism in theAcademy are not known, but it is plausible to suppose that it became aschool of skepticism because the successive heads of the Academy fromearly in the 3rd c. B.C.E. chose to emphasize the skeptical aspects ofPlato's dialogues. The latter include Socrates' heroic interpretationof the Delphic Oracle in the Apology (which suggests that hewas wisest among mortals because he was aware of his ignorance); theprincipled insistence on the need for further argument and reflectionin dialogues like the Crito, the Euthyphro and theLaches; the questioning of the forms in theParmenides; a recurring pessimism about ordinary opinion; andthe indeterminate nature of the dialogue form itself, which lendsitself to many interpretations. In keeping with the latter, Cicerodefends a version of Academic skepticism, claiming that Plato is askeptic because he is always arguing pro and contra, states nothingpositively, inquires into everything, and makes no certain statements(Ac 1.46). The first of the Academic skeptics is Arcesilaus (316/315–242/241B.C.E.), who served as Head of the Academy during a period of its historywhich Diogenes Laertius calls “the Middle Academy.” In anextant fragment, Ariston, a 3rd c. Stoic philosopher, describesArcesilaus as a combination of “Plato in front, Pyrrho behind,Diodorus [Cronus, a dialectician of impressive skill] in themiddle” (D.L. 4.33). According to Sextus, Arcesilaus' philosophyis “virtually identical” with Pyrrhonism (PH1.232). Sextus here assumes Pyrrhonism as he himself understands it, sothis need not imply a close connection to Pyrrho. The latter isdifficult to judge. While there is no sign of the asceticism that weassociate with Pyrrho (see, e.g., D.L. 4.37–42), it does seem thatArcesilaus held that skepticism aims at happiness (AM 7.158)and some of the anecdotes we find in Plutarch suggest that he believedthat we should deal with misfortune and unhappiness by finding opposingways of looking at trying situations (see “On ControllingAnger,” 461E and “On Tranquillity of Mind,”470A–B).Arcesilaus' arguments focused primarily on Stoic epistemology.According to Couissin, he had no views of his own and offers thepositions and arguments ascribed to him only as a reductio ad absurdumof the Stoic point of view. It is difficult, perhaps impossible, tojudge whether this is so, especially as it is never easy to distinguishcases in which philosophers intend a particular argument or positionmerely for the sake of argument (Caton illustrates how far one can takesuch suggestions when he argues that Descartes proposes thecogito only for the sake of argument).However one interprets Arcesilaus' ultimate convictions, the crux ofhis attack on Stoicism is a critique of the “cataleptic”impression (the katalêptikê phantasia) the Stoicspropose as a basis for their epistemology. According to the Stoics,cataleptic impressions are impressions which reveal, in virtue of theirclearness and distinctness, certain truth. According to Arcesilaus,there is no good ground for believing there are such impressions, orany other impressions which can provide a guarantee of truth. This issomething that he was said to demonstrate by pairing impressions whichare said to be cataleptic with equally clear and distinct impressionswhich are presumably mistaken. In most cases, it appears that thelatter were vivid and (at the moment they occur) convincing impressionswhich were experienced in dreams, hallucinations, and other abnormalstates (Ac. 2.77; AM 7.252).Like any skepticism, Arcesilaus' philosophy is plausible only ifthere is some way to reconcile it with our apparent need to accept somekind of belief (and choose between alternative beliefs) in day to dayaffairs. Sextus suggests that Arcesilaus tried to overcome this problemby combining his skeptical conclusions with the principle that oneshould accept “the reasonable” (the eulogon) as apractical criterion in day to day affairs.… [S]ince it was necessary … to inquire intothe conduct of life, which naturally cannot be directed without acriterion, upon which happiness too, that is, the goal of life dependsfor its reliability, Arcesilaus says that he who suspends judgmentabout everything regulates choices and avoidances and, generally,actions by reasonableness, and, proceeding according to this criterion,will act correctly. For happiness arises because of prudence, andprudence resides in correct actions, and a correct action is thatwhich, having been done, has a reasonable defence. Therefore, he whoadheres to reasonableness will act correctly and will be happy.(AM 7.158, Inwood & Gerson)Commentators who see Arcesilaus as a purely negative, ad hominemdialectician suggest that Arcesilaus did not actually endorse suchviews, and only forwarded them as a possible alternative to thestandard Stoic reliance on cataleptic impressions (an alternative whicharguably follows from the Stoics' own assumptions). In favour of theview that Arcesilaus endorsed “the reasonable”, it can besaid that Sextus seems convinced that this is so, and that some suchcommitment makes good philosophical sense (see Hankinson, 86–91),especially in a historical context in which philosophers were expectedto provide a practical guide to life.Debates about Arcesilaus' skepticism frequently revolve around thequestion whether it can be made consistent with an acceptance of apractical criterion like the “reasonable” or, much morefundamentally, the beliefs which daily life appears to require. It isclear that this was a heated issue already in ancient times, forPlutarch's Against Colotes (2nd c. C.E.) takes the 3rd c. B.C.E.Epicurean philosopher Colotes to task for his attack on Arcesilaus in ano longer extant book entitled On the fact that the doctrines ofthe other philosophers make it impossible even to live. Inassessing the implications for skepticism, it is important to recognizethat Colotes' book was not a specific attack on Arcesilaus, but a muchbroader attack on a diverse list of philosophers which includesDemocritus, Aristotle, Parmenides and Socrates (indeed, virtuallyeveryone but Colotes' mentor, Epicurus).In defending Arcesilaus, Plutarch provides an account of his viewswhich is said to explain how it is compatible with action. According tothis account, the soul has three movements: sensation, impulse, andassent. This distinction being made, Plutarch says that Arcesilausallows us to accept sensation and impulse so long as we stop short ofassent and opinion (Mor. 1122C–D). According to Plutarch, itfollows that Arcesilaus' skepticism is compatible with action and thatColotes fails to see this because the nuances of Arcesilaus' views getfrom him the kind of unappreciative attention “a performance onthe lyre gets from an ass” (Mor. 1122B).6. CarneadesThe Heads of the Academy after Arcesilaus were, in order, Lacydes,Telecles, Evander, and Hegesinus. Little is known about their views,though it appears that they accepted some variant of Arcesilaus'skepticism. The next phase in the history of the Academy and thehistory of ancient skepticism is the “New Academy” whichbegins with Carneades' (214/213–129/128 B.C.E.) leadership. According toa fragment of the 2nd c. C.E. Platonist Numenius (preserved in the workof Eusebius, a 3rd–4th c. C.E. Christian bishop), Carneades wasvictorious on every issue he debated. According to Diogenes Laertius(D.L. 4.62, cf. 7.183), he became so famous attacking Stoic argumentsthat he mocked the Stoic school, saying “if Chrysippus had notexisted neither would I” (mimicking the Stoic maxim, “ifChrysippus had not existed, neither would the Stoa”). Sextus reports two of Carneades' central arguments against the Stoics'cataleptic impressions and any alternative “criterion” ofknowledge proposed by the dogmatic philosophers (AM7.159–165). According to the first argument, there can be nocriterion which establishes certain truth because reason, the senses,and any other possible criterion sometimes misleads us. According tothe second argument, the impressions (or “presentations”)that inform our judgments are not completely objective, and reflecttheir own nature as well as the nature of the reality they reflect— as light shows both itself and the things it illuminates. Thesubjectivity emphasized in the latter argument may have beenunderscored by an appeal to the standard Academic argument that anyimpression which appears true can be paired with (and opposed by) anindistinguishably similar impression which is apparently false.Despite Carneades' arguments against all criteria of knowledge,Eusebius says that he did not suspend judgment on all matters(Prep. Ev. 14.7.15), and distinguished between those thingsthat are “non-evident” (non-apparent) and those that are“non-apprehensible.” This suggests that Carneades held thateverything is non-apprehensible but that some things are“evident” (i.e. not non-evident). It might seem tempting tocompare the commitment to evident things that this alleges with thePyrrhonian commitment to appearances, but the extant evidence suggeststhat Carneades propounded a more nuanced account of the apparent,distinguishing between impressions which are more and lesspersuasive.In “Against the Logicians,” Sextus discusses Carneades'views in the context of his attack on the Stoic theory of catalepticimpressions. According to Sextus, Carneades adopted thepithanon (the “plausible”) as a practicalcriterion and distinguished between impressions which are:(i) implausible; (ii) plausible (i.e. appear true “to an intensedegree”);(iii) irreversible (i.e. plausible and confirmed by otherimpressions); and(iv) tested (i.e. irreversible and tested by the scrutinyof surrounding circumstances).Some have argued that this criterion is an improvement on Stoicepistemology, insofar as it suggests that we should accept impressionswhich are not merely “clear and distinct” but (in addition)irreversible and tested.According to Sextus' account of Carneades' views, Carneades addedfurther sophistication to his criterion of choice by holding thatdifferent levels of plausibility are appropriate in different kinds ofcircumstances. In matters of no importance, or circumstances in whichthe time at one's disposal is limited, for example, plausibleimpressions may suffice. In contrast, weighty matters require ourreliance on impressions which are irreversible and tested (AM7.184).Sextus illustrates Carneadean plausibility with an example:On seeing a coil of rope in an unlighted room a man jumpsover it, conceiving it for the moment to be a snake [i.e. judging thisto be plausible], but turning back afterwards he inquires into thetruth, and on finding it motionless he is already inclined to thinkthat it is not a snake [for this impression seems reversible], but ashe reckons, all the same, that snakes too are motionless at times whennumbed by winter's frost, he prods at the coiled mass with a stick, andthen, after thus testing the impression received, he assents to thefact that it is false to suppose that the body presented to him is asnake. (AM 7.187–88, Bury)If we judge by Sextus and other ancient sources, Carneades tried tomake the pithanon compatible with his skepticism byemphasizing its subjectivity and not proposing it as a measure ofobjective probability or truth. Clitomachus thus writes that “TheAcademic school holds that there are dissimilarities between things ofsuch a nature that some of them seem plausible and others the contrary;but this is not an adequate ground for saying that some things can beapprehended [or grasped as true] and others cannot, because many falseobjects are plausible…” (Cicero Ac. 2.103; cf.104 and AM 7.169). This suggests that Carneadean assent toplausibility is consciously subjective and in this way more constrainedthan the assent implied by claims to truth. This is one way in whichCarneades and his followers may have tried to render their acceptanceof the plausible compatible with their skeptical conclusions.7. Arcesilaus and Carneades as DialecticiansIn an influential article, Coussin has argued for a "dialectical"interpretation of Academic skepticism. According to thisinterpretation, Arcesilaus and Carneades adopted a purely negativestance and do not commit themselves to anything. All their argumentsare, on this account, to be understood as attempts to show how one canargue against the views of others. Any views that they express areaccepted only "for the sake of argument."This account of Academic skepticism maintains that Arcesilaus andCarneades only constructed arguments against others points of view,and did not endorse skeptical doctrines or the positive philosophieswhich Sextus (a rival skeptic) attributes to them. In particular itsuggests that Arcesilaus did not endorse the eulogon andCarneades did not endorse the pithanon as criteria foraccepting some limited belief. When Carneades argues that we canaccept and follow “plausible” impressions he is, on thisaccount, proposing this position merely for the sake of argument— to show that alternatives to dogmatic epistemology are inprinciple possible (see, e.g., Striker).On this interpretation, Arcesilaus and Carneades were dialecticians.They are “skeptics” in the sense that they refused tocommit themselves to any of the premises they (or others) use, or anyof the conclusions drawn from them, and were not concerned to adoptbeliefs or philosophical positions on any of the matters theydiscuss. Their achievement is, on this account, not a positiveskeptical philosophy but a negative skepticism which incorporates adialectical ability to argue against prevailing points of view, and adisinclination to positively elaborate any positive philosophicalviews.It is not easy to discern when and whether the Academics' argumentsare forwarded positively or merely "for the sake of argument,"especially as this dialectical practise is a part of academicskepticism. Most famously it is evident on the occasion whenCarneades visited Rome and argued in favour of justice, and on thenext day against it. The key question is whether this is the way theAcademics always argued, or whether they sometimes assented to beliefand/or forwarded arguments meant to establish some beliefs — forexample, the skeptical conclusion that knowledge cannot be attained— as more likely than others. In the Academica 2.78, Cicero reports that Philo (ofLarissa, Cicero's Academic teacher) and Metrodorus (a pupil ofCarneades) ascribe to Carneades a skepticism which holds that the sagecannot apprehend anything (grasp it as true) but may accept an opinionnonetheless. In answer to this interpretation, Cicero says that heprefers the view of Clitomachus, who holds that Carneades did not somuch accept this view as advance it in argument. In at least thiscase, this suggests that the view that Carneades defended was anaccount of the Stoic sage derived from the premises of the Stoics andother philosophers. But this leaves open the question whether thenon-sage can reasonably accept opinions, a view that Thorsrudattributes to Carneades, Cicero and Clitomachus (cf. Hankinson,94).In favor of the dialectical interpretation of Carneades' claims manycommentators cite Academica 2.139, where Cicero says thatClitomachus used to declare that he had never been able to understandwhat Carneades did accept (see Striker, 55; Hankinson, 94; Inwood& Gerson, 165; Long & Sedley, Vol 1, 455). This suggests thedialectical interpretation but Cicero's report is embedded in adiscussion of the good, in which Carneades is said to have defendedCalliphon's view that the good is pleasure with such zeal “thathe was thought actually to accept it (although Clitomachus used todeclare that he had never been able to understand what Carneades didaccept)”. Taken in this context, the parenthetical comment canbe interpreted as the claim that Clitomachus did not understand whatCarneades held in this regard, not as the claim that Carneades nevercommits himself to any point of view.Sextus and Cicero clearly think that the Academics do positivelyendorse both skeptical conclusions and their various criteria forpractical affairs. Thorsrud argues that the most significant extantaccount of their views — provided by Cicero — clearlysuggests that all the Academics shared this point of view. Hesuggests that they make room for this positive skepticism by allowingan acceptance of impressions which does not contradict their rejectionof assent. This acceptance implies a fallibilistic conception ofbelief that emphasizes its qualified and subjective nature (in asimilar vein, Bett recognizes a Carneadean "approval" which hedistinguishes from the "assent" that Carneades rejects). Thisconception is compatible with, indeed encourages, the skeptic'scontinued examination of all beliefs and the pursuit of inquiry todetermine whether any beliefs can be determined to be true, reasonableor plausible. To some extent, the arguments for and against the dialecticalinterpretation of the Academics revolve around the question how theAcademics' views can be rendered most consistent. In favour of thedialectical interpretation, it saves the Academics from one of the keycriticisms of the skeptical perspective: the claim that skepticsinconsistently accept particular beliefs. For someone with nopositive views cannot be charged with inconsistency. Against thedialectical interpretation it can be argued that it leaves theAcademics open to another standard criticism: that skepticism isinconsistent with life and philosophical inquiry (even of theskeptical sort). For arguments, actions and decisions imply someacceptance of belief.8. Carneades and Practical LifeWhether or not he was a pure dialectician, Carneades' dexterity inargument is the most notable feature of the extant evidence abouthim. He was not a moralist in the way that Pyrrho was, though Ciceroimplies some commitment to contentment-through-antithesis when he saysthat Carneades criticized the way in which Chrysippus used a passagein which Euripides recounts the pain of life, saying that Chrysippusused the passage to promote pessimism instead of using it to comfortthose who were badly off by reciting the misfortunes of others(Tusc. Disp. 3.59–60).Different kinds of oppositions are used to preserve an even temperwhen Carneades claims that we should oppose the expected with theunexpected — health with the possibility of sickness, safety withthe possibility of accident, etc. — because the unexpected maycause us grief if it catches us off guard and unprepared (Plutarch,Tranq. 474F–75A). In a famous speech Carneades provided aparadigm example of the way that opposing arguments can promote peaceof mind when he argued, for Clitomachus' sake in the wake of thedestruction of his native Carthage, that the wise man will not bedistressed even at the loss of his own homeland (Cicero, Tusc.Disp. 3.54).Though this suggests that the Carneadean perspective promoted somekind of equanimity, Sextus writes that its doctrine of the plausible isnot consistent with (late) Pyrrhonian moral ideals, for it is notcompatible with the Pyrrhonians almost ascetic (one might say“apathetic”) acceptance of appearances. As Sextus puts it,“[A]lthough both the [later] Academics and the Skeptics say thatthey are persuaded of certain things, here too the difference of thephilosophies is very evident. For “to be persuaded” hasdifferent senses: on the one hand, it means not to resist but simply tofollow without much proclivity or strong pro feeling, as the child issaid to be obedient to his teacher; but sometimes it means assent tosomething by choice and with a kind of sympathy due to strong desire,as when a profligate man is persuaded by one who approves of livingextravagantly. Since, therefore, the followers of Carneades andClitomachus say both that they are strongly persuaded and that thingsare strongly persuasive [i.e. plausible, pithanon], whereas wesay that we simply make a concession without any strong feeling, wewould differ from them in this respect, too.” (PH 1.230,Mates). This difference highlights the much more significant role thatindifference plays in Pyrrhonian — as opposed to Academic —skepticism.9. The Arguments for Later PyrrhonismCarneades' successor in the Academy was Clitomachus (d. 110/9 B.C.E.).He authored voluminous exegetical writings (now lost) which reportedand explained Carneades' arguments and his skepticism. FollowingClitomachus, the head of the Academy was Philo of Larissa (d. 84/3B.C.E.), who taught, on the basis of the Carneadean notion of“plausible” impressions, an epistemology which allowed anAcademic to respond to disputed questions by adopting whatever positionseemed most plausible after a thorough examination of the arguments onall sides. One did so on the understanding that one was not claiming tohave established certain truth, or to know that any doctrinewas the truth. One only held a position as rationally best-supportedand, therefore, most worth believing. In this way, one held a positionto be true without claiming to know that this was so. As is evident inthe philosophical writings of Philo's pupil Cicero, this in practicemeant the adoption (in a tentative spirit) of many Stoic points ofview.The next important ancient skeptic was Aenesidemus, who defected fromPhilo's Academy and revived Pyrrhonism in the early years of the firstcentury B.C.E. “The Academics,” he said, “especiallythe ones now, sometimes agree with Stoic opinions and, to tell thetruth, appear to be just Stoics in conflict with Stoics”(Photius, Bibl. 212, Inwood & Gerson). In response,Aenesidemus' eight books of Pyrrhonian Arguments propoundedthe view that “the Pyrrhonist determines nothing, not even this,that he determines nothing” (ibid.). Yet Aenesidemus himself isreported to have given up on Pyrrhonism in the end, and to havefinished his career as a Heracleitean, apparently on the grounds thatskeptical antithesis is a a road that leads to the realization thatreality is full of opposites (PH 1.210, compare AM7.349, 9.336–67, 10.216, and Tertullian, De Anima 9.5,14.5).Though Aenesidemus' books on Pyrrhonism do not survive, they aresummarized by Photius (9th c. C.E.). His account suggests that theysystematized Pyrrhonism by establishing standard argumentativestrategies and collecting an array of arguments, puzzles and conundrumsborrowed from the whole of Greek philosophy.We know of later Pyrrhonism primarily through three surviving worksof Sextus Empiricus (ca. 200 C.E.):(i) The Outlines of Pyrrhonism; (ii) Against the Dogmatists, which consists of“Against the Logicians” (2 books), “Against thePhysicists” (2 books), and “Against the Ethicists” (1book); and(iii) Against the Learned (Adversus Mathematicos),which combines the five books of Against the Dogmatists withsix further books that attack the epistemological pretensions ofmathematicians, grammarians, etc.The relations between these books are complex and not yet wellexplored (in Sextus 1997, Bett argues for a reading of Against theEthicists which would make it propound a different skepticism thanthe Outlines of Pyrrhonism, which is normally taken as thestandard account of Pyrrhonism).Aenesidemus' most important arguments are the ten modes (or“tropes”) which Sextus attributes to “the olderskeptics” at PH 1.35–163. These ten ways of arguingcreate antitheses and promote the suspension of judgment(epoche) by contrasting:(i) the opposing perceptions and views of the world whichcharacterize different species: “For how could one say, withregard to touch [for example], that animals are similarly affectedwhether their surfaces consist of shell, flesh, needles, feathers orscales? And, as regards hearing, how could one say that perceptions arealike in animals with a very narrow auditory canal and in those with avery wide one, or in those with hairy ears and those with ears that arehairless… [P]erfume seems very pleasant to human beings butintolerable to dung beetles and bees, and the application of olive oilis beneficial to human beings but kills wasps and bees.”(PH 1.50, 55, Mates) (ii) the opposing perceptions and views of the world whichcharacterize different individuals: thus “…the greatestindication of the vast and limitless difference in the intellect ofhuman beings is the inconsistency of the various statements of theDogmatists concerning what may be appropriately chosen, what avoided,and so on.” (PH 1.85–86, Mates)(iii) the opposing perceptions and views of the world whichcharacterize different sense organs: thus “Pictures seem to thesense of sight to have concavities and convexities,” for example,“but not to the touch,” and “Let us imagine someonewho from birth has …lacked hearing and sight. He will start outbelieving in the existence of nothing visible or audible, but only ofthe three kinds of quality he can register. It is therefore apossibility that we too, having only our five senses, only registerfrom the qualities belonging to the apple those which we are capable ofregistering. But it may be that there objectively exist otherqualities” (PH 1.92, 96–7, Mates).(iv) the opposing perceptions and views of the world whichcharacterize different circumstances: “Thus, things affect us indissimilar ways depending on whether we are in a natural or unnaturalcondition, as when people who are delirious or possessed by a god seemto hear spirits but we do not…. And the same water that seems tous to be lukewarm seems boiling hot when poured on an inflamedplace…. Further, if someone says that an intermingling ofcertain humors produces, in persons who are in an unnatural condition,odd phantasiai [impressions] of the external objects, it mustbe replied that since healthy people, too, have intermingled humors, itis possible that the external objects are in nature such as they appearto those persons who are said to be in an unnatural state, but thatthese humors are making the external objects appear to the healthy in anatural people other than they are. (PH 1.101–2, Mates).(v) the opposing perceptions and views of the world thatcharacterize different positions and distances and places: for example,“lamplight appears dim in sunlight but bright in the dark. Thesame oar appears bent in water but straight when out of it”(PH 1.119, Mates).(vi) the opposing perceptions and views of the world thatcharacterize mixtures: thus “we deduce that since no objectstrikes us entirely by itself, but along with something, it may perhapsbe possible to say what the mixture compounded out of the externalobject and the thing perceived with it is like, but we would not beable to say what the external object is like by itself… The samesound appears one way when accompanied by a rarefied atmosphere,another way when accompanied by a dense atmosphere” (PH1.124, 125, Mates).(vii) the opposing perceptions and views of the world due todifferent quantities and structures: thus “[the] individualfilings of a piece of silver appear black, but when united with thewhole they affect us as white… And wine, when drunk inmoderation, strengthens us, but when taken in excess, disables thebody…” (PH 1.129, 131, Mates).(viii) the opposing views possible because of the relativity of allthings: “…since all things are relative, we will suspendjudgment about what things exist absolutely and in nature… Thishas two senses. One is in relation to the judging subject [differentsubjects perceiving differently]… The other in relation to theconceptions perceived with it…” (PH 1.135,Mates).(ix) the opposing perceptions and views of the world due toconstancy or rarity of occurrence: for “The sun is certainly amuch more marvelous thing than a comet. But since we see the sun allthe time but the comet only infrequently, we marvel at the comet somuch as even to suppose it a divine portent, but we do nothing likethat for the sun. If, however, we thought of the sun as appearinginfrequently and setting infrequently, and as illuminating everythingall at once and then suddenly being eclipsed, we should find much tomarvel at in the matter.” (PH 1.141, Mates). And(x) the opposing perceptions and views of what is right and wrongwhich characterize different ways of life, laws, myths and“dogmatic suppositions”: for “among the Persianssodomy is customary but among the Romans it is prohibited by law; andwith us adultery is prohibited, but among the Massagetae it is bycustom treated as a matter of indifference, as Eudoxus of Cnidosreports… and with us it is forbidden to have intercourse withone's mother, whereas with the Persians this sort of marriage is verymuch the custom. And among the Egyptians men marry their sisters, whichfor us is prohibited by law. (PH 1.152, Mates).Later Pyrrhonian modes more clearly isolate the basicepistemological issues which are raised by the traditional ten modes.The five modes of Agrippa (whose date is unknown, though he is laterthan Aenesidemus) focus, as Barnes has shown, on some of the underlyingepistemological concerns that motivate skeptical conclusions. Sextuspresents them at PH 1.164–77, where he says that they promotethe suspension of judgment by invoking:— disagreement, for among philosophers andordinary people there is interminable disagreement; — regress ad infinitum, for the skeptic asks for aproof of a claim, a proof of the reliability of this proof, and so onad infinitum;— relativity, for things are relative to both one'ssubjective nature and the concepts one employs in judging them;— hypothesis, for the skeptic does not allow us totake as our starting point something which is taken for granted;— circular reasoning, for the skeptic rejects proofsthat are circular, as when sense impressions are used to establish theveracity of the senses.The standard modes are reduced even further in a set of two basicmodes propounded in the next section of the Outlines ofPyrrhonism (1.178–79). There Sextus argues that everything whichis apprehended (as true) must be apprehended through itself or someother thing. But this is problematic, for the first alternative isundermined by the “controversy among philosophers” and thesecond by a demand for justification which entails a regress adinfinitum. The latter can be stopped only by claiming thatsomething is apprehended as true in virtue of itself, a possibilitywhich is undermined by the first of the two modes.The different sets of Pyrrhonian modes (collected in Annas andBarnes) systematize skeptical arguments against dogmatic philosophicalpositions, but the Pyrrhonians do not restrict themselves to theirformal modes. Judging by Sextus, the modes are usually backed, and veryfrequently supplanted, by a lengthy catalogue of other, specificarguments which can be used to argue for epoche on whatevertopic happens to be at hand (space, time, the good, the gods, fate, themeaningfulness of standard conceptions of human nature, and so on andso forth). No encyclopedia article can fully convey the endlessassortment of claims and counter claims that Sextus seems ready tomarshal on any topic.10. The Practical CriterionThe bulk of Sextus' work is a concatenation of opposing arguments usedto promote the suspension of judgment. In the midst of this attack onthe views of the dogmatist philosophers, it is easy to forget thatSextus and the Pyrrhoneans, like Pyrrho before them, proposedskepticism, not only as (in some way) an epistemological conclusion,but also as a way of life (an agôgê). According to Sextus, the merits of the Pyrrhonian way of livinginclude its rejection of the useless speculation which he attributesto dogmatist philosophy. Like Hume, the Pyrrhoneans in this wayclaimed that their philosophy replaced abstruse and unhelpfulphilosophical speculation with mundane matters of practicalconcern. The practical spirit this implies is reflected at PH2.241–44, where Sextus condemns the convoluted arguments andconundrums of ancient dialectic:As regards sophisms the exposure of which is useful, thedialectician will not have a word to say, but will propound sucharguments as these — “If it is not so that you both havefair horns and have horns, you have horns; but it is not so that youhave fair horns and have horns, therefore you have horns.”“If a thing moves, it moves either in the spot where it is orwhere it is not; but it neither moves in the spot where it is (for itis at rest) nor in that where it is not (for how could a thing beactive in a spot where it does not so much as exist?); thereforenothing moves.” “Either the existent becomes or thenon-existent; now the existent does not become (for it exists); nor yetdoes the non-existent (for the becoming is passive but the non-existentis not passive); therefore nothing becomes.” “Snow isfrozen water; but water is black; therefore snow is black.” And when he has made a collection of such trash he draws hiseyebrows together, and expounds Dialectic and endeavours very solemnlyto establish for us by syllogistic proofs that a thing becomes, a thingmoves, snow is white, and we do not have horns, although it is probablysufficient to confront the trash with the plain facts, smashing uptheir positive affirmation by means of equally weighty contradictoryevidence derived from the appearances. (PH 2.241–44, Bury,revised, cf. Timon's attitude reported in D.L. 9.111, 2.107)Appealing to a precedent set, according to their account, by Pyrrho,the Pyrrhoneans proposed that we replace philosophical attempts toestablish what is true with a willingness to accept appearances. It isthis willingness which is said to provide the Pyrrhonean with thefoundation that was needed for ordinary actions and skepticalassertions. As Diogenes Laertius writes:Aenesidemus too in the first book of his PyrrhonianArguments says that Pyrrho determines nothing dogmatically becauseof the existence of contradictory arguments, but rather followsappearances. He says the same thing in Against Wisdom andOn Investigation. And Zeuxis, an associate of Aenesidemus, inOn Twofold Arguments and Antiochus of Laodicea and Apellas inhis Agrippa posit the phenomena alone. Therefore, according tothe skeptics, the appearance is a criterion, as Aenesidemus too says.(D.L. 9.106, Inwood & Gerson)According to Sextus, “when we question whether the externalobject is such as it appears, we grant that it does appear, and we arenot raising a question about the appearance but rather about what issaid about the appearance; this is different from raising a questionabout the appearance itself. For example, the honey appears to us to besweet. This we grant, for we sense the sweetness… And even whenwe do present arguments in oppostion to the appearances, we do not putthese forward with the intention of denying the appearances but by wayof pointing out the precipitancy of the Dogmatists…”(PH 1.19, Mates). The Pyrrhoneans' commitment to appearances is consolidated in a“Practical Criterion” which was advocated as a“standard of action” which allowed the Pyrrhonian to“perform some actions and abstain from others.”Holding to the appearances, then, we live without beliefsbut in accord with the ordinary regimen of life, since we cannot bewholly inactive. And this regimen of life seems to be fourfold: onepart has to do with the guidance of nature (physis), anotherwith the compulsion of the pathê [feelings, affectionsof the soul], another with the handing down of laws and customs, and afourth with instruction in arts and crafts (technê).Nature's guidance is that by which we are naturally capable ofsensation and thought; compulsion of the pathê is thatby which hunger drives us to food and thirst makes us drink; thehanding down of customs and laws is that by which we accept that pietyin the conduct of life is good and impiety bad; and instruction in artsand crafts is that by which we are not inactive in whichever of thesewe acquire. (PH 1.23–4, Mates)Like Pyrrho's follower Timon, the Pyrrhoneans claimed that skepticalarguments and the Pyrrhonian acceptance of appearances could providethe basis for a life characterized by peace of mind. As DiogenesLaertius puts it, “The skeptics say the goal is suspension ofjudgement, upon which freedom from anxiety follows like a shadow, asTimon and Aenesidemus and their followers put it.” (D.L. 9.107,Inwood & Gerson, cf. PH 1.29). According to Sextus, thetelos of skepticism is tranquillity of mind(ataraxia) and “moderate” feeling “inrespect of things unavoidable.” (PH 1.26)We do not… take Sceptics to be undisturbed in everyway — we say that they are disturbed by things which are forcedupon them; for we agree that at times they shiver and are thirsty andhave other feelings of this kind. But in these cases ordinary peopleare afflicted by two sets of circumstances: by the feelings themselves,and no less by believing that these circumstances are bad by nature.Sceptics, who shed the additional opinion that each of these things isbad in its nature, come off more moderately even in these cases.(PH 1.29–30, Annas & Barnes)Mates has criticized this aspect of Pyrrhonism, writing that“It is hard to find much plausibility in the general claim thatthe person who, on a given occasion, thinks "this appears tome to be very, very bad” will be any less upset than if hethought “this is very, very bad” (63). ThePyrrhonean might answer that their acceptance of appearances is morepowerful than this suggests, for it takes place within the context ofequally convincing arguments for and against the view that things areas they appear. When faced with the thought that “This is very,very bad,” the Pyrrhonean will, therefore, combat this thought bytrying to develop a set of compelling arguments for the conclusion that“This appears bad, but I have equally convincing reasons forthinking it may not be so.” In such a context, it is thecompelling arguments which the Pyrrhonean produces that are supposed toprovide a psychological basis for the detached and distant“following” of appearances which characterizes Pyrrhonianequanimity (isostheneia). The equal force of opposingarguments is thus the key to Pyrrhonian ataraxia).Given the practical goals of Pyrrhonism, one might argue that thepsychological force of Pyrrhonian arguments was as important as theirlogical force, for it was designed to constrain a Pyrrhonean'sattachment to appearances. The psychological implications highlight oneof the fundamental differences that separates ancient and modernarguments for skepticism, for the ancient skeptics (and especially thePyrrhonians) used skeptical arguments as psychological tools designedto break down their own and others' psychological attachment to belief.It is in this way that their arguments were meant to fosterataraxia.In explaining why the skeptic's collection of arguments includessome which are weak, Sextus therefore says that the skeptic usesarguments of different strengths “just as doctors have remediesof different strengths for bodily ailments and for those sufferingexcessively employ the strong ones and for those suffering mildly themild ones” (PH 3.280, Inwood & Gerson).11. The Logic of Ancient Skepticism11.1 How radical is ancient skepticism?Sextus makes much of the skeptic's open-minded attitude to thepossibility of apprehending truth, but the arguments that he and otherancient skeptics offer raise deep questions about any claim totruth. It is difficult to see how any considerations could convince aphilosopher like Sextus that skepticism is mistaken, for he himselfsays that the skeptic will not assent even if he can find no faultwith a proposed position. “When someone propounds to us a theorywhich we are unable to refute, we say to him in reply ‘Just as,before the birth of the founder of the School to which you belong, thetheory it holds was not as yet apparent as a sound theory… solikewise it is possible that the opposite theory to that which you nowpropound is… not yet apparent to us, so that we ought not asyet yield assent to this theory which at the moment seems to bevalid.’” (PH 1.33–34, Bury)The broad application of the arguments for ancient skepticism areevident in the Pyrrhonian modes, which are universally applicable andcan be used to question any and all belief. Within its ancient context,skepticism is able to raise more radical doubts than those thatcharacterize modern skepticism because ancient philosophers did nothesitate to countenance extreme points of view. An example which Sextusfavours is Gorgias' argument for the conclusion that nothing exists(and that if it did we could not know so, and that we could notcommunicate it even if we knew). Elsewhere we find Sextus citing theopinion of Xeniades of Corinth, who is said to have maintained thatevery impression and opinion is false (AM 7.53, cf. 48)— a disconcerting view but arguably no more so than its opposite,which appears to be the Protagorean claim that every impression andopinion is true. Sextus has a pronounced interest in radical positionsof this sort, for they can be exploited for skeptical ends, bothbecause they contradict other philosophical opinions, and because theyraise radical doubts about all things.Mates underscores the radical nature of the questions that theancient skeptics, emphasizing that Sextus will not even grant that wehave coherent concepts of the external world, soul, body, senseimpressions, etc. As he puts it in discussing the Sextus' attitude tothe external world, “His own deep skepticism leaves him in astate of epochê, not only as to whether there are anysuch things as ‘external objects', but even as to whether these termsof the Dogmatists have any intelligible meaning at all.” (55)11.2 How relevant is ancient skepticism? The radical nature of ancient skepticism does not itself show thatskepticism is a perspective relevant to contemporary philosophy.During much of the history of Western philosophy, ancient skepticismhas been dismissed on the grounds that it is too radical to be takenseriously. Certainly it must be said that many of the arguments ofthe skeptics are of marginal interest to philosophy today. But it isequally clear that ancient skepticism raises fundamental questionswhich continue to be of fundamental interest. A whole series ofcommentators have demonstrated ancient skepticism's relevance to therise of modern epistemology (see, e.g., Fosl, Groarke, Jardine,Popkin, Schmitt), and there can be little doubt that the skepticsunderstood and contended with the key epistemological issues thatarise when one attempts to build a rational basis for belief (issuesencapsulated in the problem of the criterion and the later modes). Inthe realm of value, Laursen has argued that ancient skepticism alreadycontains within it the seeds of modern liberalism.The relevance of the ancient skeptics' response to the issues theyraise is more difficult to judge. The contemporary discussion ofskepticism, belief, and knowledge is in this regard more distant fromits ancient cousin. In at least one case, there does seem to be acontemporary answer to skepticism which has no ancient antecedent anddoes not, therefore, figure in ancient discussions for and againstskepticism. It is the suggestion that skeptical inquiry can in someway be linguistically dissolved. Such a view is evident in the work ofWittgenstein, Putnam and others who argue that skeptical claims insome way violate the norms that govern meaningful language (and can,therefore, be rejected as nonsensical). In ancient times, Aristocleswrote that skepticism is inconsistent with the assumption that theskeptic understands language (Eus., Prep. Ev. 14.18) but itis difficult to find an ancient answer to skepticism which can beconsidered a close analogue to this linguistic turn. One's attitude tothis omission inevitably depends on one's assessment of the strengthof this attempt to undermine skeptical considerations (for a negativeassessment, see Mates, 68–85).11.3 Is ancient skepticism consistent? The radical nature of the skeptical perspective raises the questionwhether ancient skepticism is inherently nconsistent. How, theskeptics' critics ask, is the suspension of judgment on all questionscompatible with the claim that there are equal arguments for andagainst any position; with the professed conclusion that knowledge isunattainable; or with the beliefs that skeptics seem to embrace in thecourse of their daily lives? The skeptics answer that their views arenot inconsistent, for they accept skepticism in some“undogmatic” way which does not contradict their rejectionof claims to truth (see Frede).The Pyrrhonean version of this response is their claim that theyaccept appearances without committing themselves to belief. Johnsenhas tried to show how it may be possible to consistently achieve thisgoal. When one judges ancient skepticism from this point of view, itis important to remember that its attack on truth assumes a particularconception of truth. Burnyeat emphasizes that this conception is a“realist” one which suggests that a claim is true if itcorresponds to a real objective world that is not subjective (butexists, as we might put it, from “a god's eye point ofview”). As Burnyeat writes:In the controversy between the skeptic and the dogmatistsover whether any truth exists at all, the issue is whether anyproposition of a class of propositions can be accepted as true of areal objective world as distinct from mere appearance. For“true” in these discussions means “true of a realobjective world”; the true, if there is such a thing is whatconforms with the real, an association traditional to the wordalêthês since the earliest period of Greekphilosophy (cf. AM 11. 221). Now clearly, if truth is restricted to matters pertaining to realexistence, as contrasted with appearance, the same will apply [torelated skeptical conceptions]… The notions involved,consistency and conflict, undecidability, isostheneia,epochê, ataraxia, since they are defined interms of truth, will all relate, via truth to real existence ratherthan appearance. (Burnyeat, “Can the Sceptic Live HisScepticism,” p. 121) Burnyeat's point is key, for it implies that ancient skepticism is anattack on realist truth which has affinities to modern andcontemporary anti-realism. In the context of questions aboutconsistency, it provides a possible answer to the charge that theskeptics were inconsistent, for contemporary philosophy acceptsconceptions of belief that do not mean accepting something “astrue in the realist sense.” One might therefore argue that theancient skeptic's decision to suspend judgment on claims to (realist)truth in principle leaves room for anti-realist forms of belief andassent (cf. Groarke). Rather than eschew all belief (i.e. belief inour sense), this suggests that the ancient skeptic rejects aparticular kind of belief to which contemporary epistemology offers avariety of alternatives (founded on coherence accounts of truth,etc.). Unlike the contemporary anti-realist, the ancient skepticsretained a realist conception of “truth” and“belief” and, therefore, expressed their position as therejection of belief and the adoption of a weaker following ofappearances, subjective impressions, and so on. This is an importantdifference, but the move away from realist conceptions of belief issimilar in both cases.The extent to which ancient skepticism can be compared to contemporaryanti-realism is open to debate. But it suggests that skepticism maynot be fatally inconsistent (for it rejects realist truth in favour ofan anti-realist conception of belief) and that the positive accountsof belief that the ancient skeptics propose are, like many of theirarguments against claims to truth and knowledge, relevant to modernand contemporary philosophical concerns.BibliographyAnnas, Julia & Jonathan Barnes. The Modes of Scepticism:Ancient Texts and Modern Interpretations. New York: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1985.Algra, K., J. 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