The Analysis of Knowledge (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Cite this entry Search the SEP • Advanced Search • Tools • RSS FeedTable of Contents• What's New• Archives• Projected ContentsEditorial Information• About the SEP• Editorial Board• How to Cite the SEP• Special CharactersSupport the SEPContact the SEP ©Metaphysics Research Lab,CSLI,Stanford University  Open access to the SEP is made possible by a world-wide funding initiative. Please Read How You Can Help Keep the Encyclopedia FreeThe Analysis of KnowledgeFirst published Tue Feb 6, 2001; substantive revision Mon Jan 16, 2006 The objective of the analysis of knowledge is to state theconditions that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient forpropositional knowledge: knowledge that such-and-such is the case.Propositional knowledge must be distinguished from two other kinds ofknowledge that fall outside the scope of the analysis: knowing a placeor a person, and knowing how to do something. The concept to beanalyzed -- the analysandum -- is commonly expressed using the schema"S knows that p", where "S" refers to theknowing subject, and "p" to the proposition that is known. Aproposed analysis consists of a statement of the following form:S knows that p if and only if -- . The blank is tobe replaced by the analysans: a list of conditions that areindividually necessary and jointly sufficient. To test whether aproposed analysis is correct, we must ask (a) whether every possiblecase in which the conditions listed in the analysans are met is a casein which S knows that p, and (b) whether everypossible case in which S knows that p is a case inwhich each of these conditions is met. When we ask (a), we wish tofind out whether the proposed analysans is sufficient for S'sknowing that p; when we ask (b), we wish to determine whethereach of the conditions listed in the analysans is necessary. 1.Knowledge as Justified True Belief 1.1 The Belief Condition 1.2 The Justification Condition 2. The Gettier Problem 3. An Alternative Approach: Reliabilism 4. Internalism and Externalism 5. Why Internalism? 6. Why Externalism? 7. Two Analyses of Knowledge Supplement: Knowledge and Skepticism Bibliography Other Internet Resources Related Entries1. Knowledge as Justified True BeliefAccording to the following analysis, which is usually referred to asthe "JTB" account, knowledge is justified true belief. The JTB Analysis of Knowledge: S knows that p iff p is true; S believes that p; S is justified in believing that p. Condition (i), the truth condition, has not generated any significantdegree of discussion. It is overwhelmingly clear that what is falsecannot be known. For example, it is false that G. E. Moore is theauthor of Sense and Sensibilia. Since it is false, it is notthe sort of thing anybody can know.Although the truth-condition enjoys nearly universal consent, let usnevertheless consider at least one objection to it. According to thisobjection, Newtonian Physics is part of our overall scientificknowledge. But Newtonian Physics is false. So it's possible to knowsomething false after all.[1] In response, let us say that Newtonian physics involves a set oflaws of nature {L1,L2,…,Ln}. When we say we know Newtonianphysics, this could be interpreted as saying we know that, accordingto Newtonian physics, L1,L2,…, Ln areall true. And that claim is of course true. Additionally, we can distinguish between two theories, T andT*, where T is Newtonian physics and T*updated theoretical physics at the cutting edge. T* does notliterally include T as a part, but absorbs T byvirtue of explaining in which way T is useful forunderstanding the world, what assumptions T is based on,where T fails, and how T must be corrected todescribe the world accurately. So we could say that, since we knowT*, we know Newtonian physics in the sense that we know howNewtonian physics helps us understand the world and where and howNewtonian physics fails. 1.1 The Belief Condition Unlike the truth condition, condition (ii), the belief condition, hasgenerated at least some discussion. Although initially it might seemsobvious that knowing that p requires believing thatp, some philosophers have argued that knowledge withoutbelief is indeed possible. Suppose Walter comes home after work tofind out that his house has burned down. He utters the words "I don'tbelieve it." Critics of the belief condition might argue that Walterknows that his house has burned down (he sees that it has), but, ashis words indicate, he does not believe it. Therefore, there isknowledge without belief. To this objection, there is an effectivereply. What Walter wishes to convey by saying "I don't believe it" isnot that he really does not believe what he sees with his own eyes,but rather that he finds it hard to come to terms with what hesees. A more serious counterexample has been suggested by Colin Radford(1966). Suppose Albert is quizzed on English history. One of thequestions is: "When did Queen Elizabeth die?" Albert doesn't think heknows, but answers the question correctly. Moreover, he gives correctanswers to many other questions to which he didn't think he knew theanswer. Let us focus on Albert's answer to the question aboutElizabeth: (E) Elizabeth died in 1603. Radford makes the following two claims about this example: Albert does not believe (E). Reason: He thinkshe doesn't know the answer to the question. He doesn't trust his answerbecause he takes it to be a mere guess. Albert knows (E). Reason: His answer is not at all just a luckyguess. The fact that he answers most of the questions correctlyindicates that he has actually learned, and never forgotten, the basicfacts of English history. Since he takes (a) and (b) to be true, Radford would argue thatknowledge without belief is indeed possible. But Radford's example isnot compelling. Those who think that belief is necessary for knowledgecould reply that the example does not qualify as a case of knowledgewithout belief because it isn't a case of knowledge to begin with.Albert doesn't know (E) because he has no justification for believing(E). If he were to believe (E), his belief would be unjustified. Thisreply anticipates what we have not yet discussed: the necessity of thejustification condition. Let us first discuss why friends of JTB holdthat knowledge requires justification, and then discuss in greaterdetail why they would not accept Radford's alleged counterexample.1.2 The Justification Condition Why is condition (iii) necessary? Why not say that knowledge is truebelief? The standard answer is that to identify knowledge with truebelief would be implausible because a belief that is true just becauseof luck does not qualify as knowledge. Beliefs that are lackingjustification are false more often than not. However, on occasion, suchbeliefs happen to be true. Suppose William takes a medication that hasthe following side effect: it causes him to be overcome with irrationalfears. One of his fears is that he has cancer. This fear is so powerfulthat he starts believing it. Suppose further that, by sheercoincidence, he does have cancer. So his belief is true. Clearly,though, his belief does not amount to knowledge. But why not? Mostepistemologists would agree that William does not know because hisbelief's truth is due to luck (bad luck, in this case). Let us refer toa belief's turning out to be true because of mere luck as epistemicluck. It is uncontroversial that knowledge is incompatible withepistemic luck. What, though, is needed to rule out epistemic luck?Advocates of the JTB account would say that what is needed isjustification. A true belief, if an instance of knowledge and thus nottrue because of epistemic luck, must be justified. But what is it for abelief to be justified?[2] Among the philosophers who favor the JTB approach, we findbewildering disagreement on how this question is to be answered.According to one prominent view, typically referred to as"evidentialism", a belief is justified if, and only if, it fits thesubject's evidence.[3] Evidentialists, then, would say that the reason why knowledge is notthe same as true belief is that knowledge requires evidence. Opponentsof evidentialism would say that evidentialist justification (i.e.,having adequate evidence) is not needed to rule out epistemicluck. They would argue that what is needed instead is a suitablerelation between the belief and the mental process that brought itabout. What we are looking at here is an important disagreement aboutthe nature of knowledge, which will be our main focus furtherbelow. In the meantime, we will continue our examination of the JTBanalysis. Let us return to Radford's objection to the belief condition, whichwe considered above. We are now in a position to discuss further howthat objection can be rebutted. Recall that Albert does not takehimself to know the answer to the question about the date ofElizabeth's death. He does not because he does not remember havinglearned the basic facts of British history. Now, it is of course truethat he did learn these facts, and is indeed able to recall them. Butis this by itself sufficient for knowing them? Philosophers who thinkthat knowledge requires evidence would say that it is not. Albertneeds to have evidence for believing that he learned thosefacts. Until he is quizzed, he has no such evidence. Afterthe quiz, when he is told that most of his answers are correct, hedoes have the requisite evidence. For once he comes to know that he isable to produce consistently correct answers to the questions he isasked, he has acquired evidence for believing that he must havelearned this subject matter at school. This evidence is also evidencefor the answers he has given. So at that point, the justificationcondition is met, and thus (since the other conditions of knowledgeare also met) he knows (again) that Elizabeth died in 1603. However,he did not know this before finding out that he must have learnedthose facts, for at that point his answer to the question lackedjustification and thus did not add up to knowledge. Evidentialistswould deny, therefore, that Radford has supplied us with acounterexample to the belief condition.[4]2. The Gettier Problem In his short 1963 paper, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?",Edmund Gettier presented two effective counterexamples to the JTBanalysis (Gettier 1963). The second of these goes as follows. SupposeSmith has good evidence for the false proposition Jones owns a Ford.[5] Suppose further Smith infers from (1) the following threedisjunctions: Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Boston. Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona. Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk. Since (1) entails each of the propositions (2) through (4), and sinceSmith recognizes these entailments, he is justified in believing eachof propositions (2)-(4). Now suppose that, by sheer coincidence, Brownis indeed in Barcelona. Given these assumptions, we may say thatSmith, when he believes (3), holds a justified true belief. However,is Smith's belief an instance of knowledge? Since Smith has noevidence whatever as to Brown's whereabouts, and so believes what istrue only because of luck, the answer would have to be‘no’. Consequently, the three conditions of the JTBaccount — truth, belief, and justification — are notsufficient for knowledge.[6] How must the analysis of knowledge be modified to make it immune tocases like the one we just considered? This is what is commonlyreferred to as the "Gettier problem". Epistemologists who think that the JTB approach is basically on theright track must choose between two different strategies for solvingthe Gettier problem. The first is to strengthen the justificationcondition. This was attempted by Roderick Chisholm.[7] The second strategy is to search for a suitable further condition, acondition that would, so to speak, "degettierize" justified truebelief. Let us focus on this second strategy. According to onesuggestion, the following fourth condition would do the trick: (iv) S's belief that p is not inferredfrom any falsehood.[8] Unfortunately, this proposal is unsuccessful. Since Gettier casesneed not involve any inference, there are possible cases of justifiedtrue belief in which the subject fails to have knowledge althoughcondition (iv) is met. Suppose, for example, that James, who isrelaxing on a bench in a park, observes a dog that, about 8 yards awayfrom him, is chewing on a bone. So he believes There is a dog over there. Suppose further that what he takes to be a dog is actually a robotdog so perfect that, by vision alone, it could not be distinguishedfrom an actual dog. James does not know that such robot dogsexist. But in fact a Japanese toy manufacturer has recently developedthem, and what James sees is a prototype that is used for testing thepublic's response. Given these assumptions, (5) is of coursefalse. But suppose further that just a few feet away from the robotdog, there is a real dog. Sitting behind a bush, he is concealed fromJames's view. Given this further assumption, James's belief istrue. So once again, what we have before us is a justified true beliefthat doesn't qualify as an instance of knowledge. Arguably, thisbelief is directly justified by a visual experience; it is notinferred from any falsehood. But if (5) is indeed a non-inferentialbelief, then the JTB account, even if supplemented with (iv), gives usthe wrong result that James knows (5). Another case illustrating that clause (iv) won't do the job is thewell-known Barn County case (Goldman 1976). Suppose there is a countyin the Midwest with the following peculiar feature. The landscape nextto the road leading through that county is peppered with barn-facades:structures that from the road look exactly like barns. Observationfrom any other viewpoint would immediately reveal these structures tobe fakes: devices erected for the purpose of fooling unsuspectingmotorists into believing in the presence of barns. Suppose Henry isdriving along the road that leads through Barn County. Naturally, hewill on numerous occasions form a false belief in the presence of abarn. Since Henry has no reason to suspect that he is the victim oforganized deception, these beliefs are justified. Now suppose furtherthat, on one of those occasions when he believes there is a barn overthere, he happens to be looking at the one and only real barn in thecounty. This time, his belief is justified and true. But since itstruth is the result of luck, it is exceedingly plausible to judge thatHenry's belief is not an instance of knowledge. Yet condition (iv) ismet in this case. His belief is clearly not the result of anyinference from a falsehood. Once again, we see that (iv) does notsucceed as a solution to the Gettier problem. Above, we noted that the role of the justification condition is toensure that the analysans does not mistakenly identify as knowledge abelief that is true because of epistemic luck. The lesson to belearned from the Gettier problem is that the justification conditionby itself cannot ensure this. Even a justified belief, understood as abelief based on good evidence, can be true because of luck. So if aJTB analysis of knowledge is to rule out the full range of cases ofepistemic luck, it must be amended with a suitable fourth condition, acondition that succeeds in preventing justified true belief from being"gettiered." Thus amended, the JTB analysis becomes a JTB+ account ofknowledge, where the '+' stands for the needed fourth condition.3. An Alternative Approach: Reliabilism The analysis of knowledge may be approached by asking the followingquestion: What turns a true belief into knowledge? An uncontroversialanswer to this question would be: the sort of thing that effectivelyprevents a belief from being true as a result of epistemic luck.Controversy begins as soon as this formula is turned into asubstantive proposal. According to evidentialism, which endorses theJTB+ conception of knowledge, the combination of two thingsaccomplishes this goal: evidentialist justification plusdegettierization (a condition that prevents a true and justifiedbelief from being "gettiered"). However, according to an alternativeapproach that has in the last three decades become increasinglypopular, what stands in the way of epistemic luck — what turns atrue belief into knowledge — is the reliability of the cognitiveprocess that produced the belief. Consider how we acquire knowledgeof our physical environment: we do so through sense experience. Senseexperiential processes are, at least under normal conditions, highlyreliable. There is nothing accidental about the truth of the beliefsthese processes produce. Thus beliefs produced by sense experience, iftrue, should qualify as instances of knowledge. An analogous pointcould be made for other reliable cognitive processes, such asintrospection, memory, and rational intuition. We might, therefore,say that what turns true belief into knowledge is the reliability ofour cognitive processes. This approach — reliabilism, as it is usually called —can be carried out in two different ways. First, there is reliabilismas a theory of justification (J-reliabilism).[9] The most basic version of this view — let's call it 'simpleJ-reliabilism' — takes knowledge to be justified true beliefbut, unlike evidentialism, conceives of justification in terms ofreliability: Simple J-Reliabilism: Part A: S knows that p iffS's belief that p is (i) true and (ii) justified. Part B: S is justified in believing thatp iff S's belief that p was produced by areliable cognitive process (in a way that degettierizes S'sbelief). Second, there is reliabilism as a theory of knowledge (K-reliabilism).[10] According to this approach, knowledge does not requirejustification. Rather, what it requires (in addition to truth) isreliable belief formation. Let us define this second version ofreliabilism thus: Simple K-Reliabilism: S knows that p if, and only if, S'sbelief that p (i) is true and (ii) was produced by a reliablecognitive process (in a way that degettierizes S's belief). The degettierization-clauses in parentheses are needed because theGettier problem is no less of a problem for reliabilism as it is forthe JTB approach. We will set this issue aside for now and return toit at the end of this section. In the following passage, Fred Dretske articulates how K-reliabilismcan be motivated: Those who think knowledge requires something other than, orat least more than, reliably produced true belief, something(usually) in the way of justification for the belief that one'sreliably produced beliefs are being reliably produced, have,it seems to me, an obligation to say what benefits this justificationis supposed to confer…. Who needs it, and why? If an animalinherits a perfectly reliable belief-generating mechanism, and it alsoinherits a disposition, everything being equal, to act on thebasis of the beliefs so generated, what additional benefits areconferred by a justification that the beliefs are beingproduced in some reliable way? If there are no additional benefits,what good is this justification? Why should we insist that no one canhave knowledge without it? (Dretske 1989, p. 95) Further below we will discuss how advocates of the JTB approachmight answer Dretske's question. In the meantime, let us focus a bitmore on Dretske's account of knowledge. According to Dretske, reliablecognitive processes convey information, and thus endow not only humans,but (nonhuman) animals as well, with knowledge. He writes: I wanted a characterization that would at least allow for thepossibility that animals (a frog, rat, ape, or my dog) could knowthings without my having to suppose them capable of the moresophisticated intellectual operations involved in traditional analysesof knowledge. (Dretske 1985, p. 177) It does indeed seem odd to think of frogs, rats, or dogs as havingjustified or unjustified beliefs. Yet attributing knowledge to animalsis certainly in accord with our ordinary practice of using the word'knowledge'. So if, with Dretske, we want an account of knowledge thatincludes animals among the knowing subjects, we might want to abandonthe traditional JTB account in favor of K-reliabilism. Advocates of J-reliabilism take justification, and thus reliablebelief formation, to be a necessary condition of knowledge. Advocatesof K-reliabilism also take reliable belief formation to be a necessarycondition of knowledge, however without saying anything aboutjustification. We might wonder, therefore, whether there is anysubstantive difference between the two views, a differencethat goes beyond the mere terminological difference of using vs. notusing the word 'justification'. Why not think that J and K-reliabilismactually amount to the same thing?[11] Simple J-reliabilism and simple K-reliabilism would appear to beextensionally equivalent: whatever is a case of knowledge according tothe former is also a case of knowledge according to the latter, andvice versa. This does not mean, however, that there is no importantdifference between the two views. Suppose B is a belief that, thoughproduced by a reliable faculty or process, is in fact false. About B,K-reliabilism implies one and only one thing: B is not an instance ofknowledge. But J-reliabilism implies two things about B: (i) B is notan instance of knowledge; (ii) B is a justified belief. So althoughthe two theories do not differ with regard to which beliefs qualify asinstances of knowledge and which do not, they do differ in thefollowing respect: Whereas J-reliabilism yields implications aboutjustification or the lack of it, K-reliabilism does not. This could beviewed as a consideration favoring J-reliabilism. Beliefs that fail toqualify as knowledge can, after all, still exhibit an epistemicallydesirable quality, namely that of being justified. We might beinterested in having an account of this quality even if we do not wantto conceive of justification as resulting from the possession ofevidence. According to Dretske, his version of K-reliabilism avoids Gettierproblems. He says: Gettier difficulties … arise for any account of knowledge thatmakes knowledge a product of some justificatory relationship (havinggood evidence, excellent reasons, etc.) that could relate oneto something false…. This is [a] problem for justificationalaccounts. The problem is evaded in the information-theoretic model,because one can get into an appropriate justificational relationshipto something false, but one cannot get into an appropriateinformational relationship to something false. (Dretske 1985, p. 179) However, consider again the case of the barn facades. Henry sees areal barn, and that's why he believes there is a barn near-by. Sincethe barn he is looking at is an actual barn, it would appear that theperceptual process that causes Henry to believe this does not relatehim to anything false. So if perception, on account of itsreliability, normally conveys information, it should do so in thiscase as well. Alas, it arguably does not. Since Henry would havebelieved the same had he been situated in front of one of the manybarn-facades in the vicinity, we are reluctant to judge that Henryknows there is a barn nearby. There is reason to doubt, therefore,that Dretske's version of K-reliabilism escapes the Gettierproblem. In general terms, since reliable faculties can be just as misleadingas a person's evidence, a bare bones reliability condition does littletoward solving the Gettier problem. When Henry travels through BarnCounty, surely his vision works just as well as it wouldelsewhere. Hence, unless we are told how to gauge reliability relativeto the subject's environment, reliabilism offers us no reason to judgethat Henry fails to know that there is a barn near-by. Or consider theexample of the Japanese toy-dog. When James believes that there is atoy-dog before him, his failure to know this is not due to a suddendeterioration of his vision. Rather, James fails to know because anotherwise reliable faculty, vision, is misleading on this particularoccasion. Hence, if reliabilism is to yield the correct outcome aboutthis case, it needs to be amended with a further clause. We need to betold either a principled reason why James's visual faculty fails to bereliable under the circumstances, or else why James fails to know eventhough his belief is produced by a reliable faculty. Clearly, then,Gettier cases pose as much of a problem for reliabilism as for anevidentialist JTB account. Neither theory, unless amended with aclever degettierization clause, succeeds in stating sufficientconditions of knowledge.[12] 4. Internalism and Externalism Evidentialists reject both J-reliabilism and K-reliabilism. We willfirst focus on J-reliabilism and further below discuss whyevidentialists reject K-reliabilism as well. Evidentialists rejectJ-reliabilism because they take justification to be something that isinternal to the subject. J-reliabilists, on the other hand,take justification to be something that is external to the subject.[13] How are we to understand the difference between the, so to speak,internality and the externality of justification? Let us turn toRoderick Chisholm, one of the chief advocates of internalism. In thethird edition of Theory of Knowledge, Chisholm says thefollowing: If a person S is internally justified in believing a certainthing, then this may be something he can know just by reflecting uponhis own state of mind. (Chisholm 1989, p. 7) In the second edition of this book, he characterizes internalism ina somewhat different way: We presuppose … that the things we know are justified for usin the following sense: we can know what it is, on any occasion, thatconstitutes our grounds, or reasons, or evidence for thinking that weknow. (Chisholm 1977, p. 17) These passages differ in the following respect: in the first Chisholmis concerned with the property of justification (a belief's beingjustified); in the second, with justifiers: the things thatmake justified beliefs justified. What is common to bothpassages is the constraint Chisholm imposes. In the first passage,Chisholm characterizes justification as something that is recognizableon reflection and, in the second, as the sort of thing thatcan be known on any occasion. Arguably, this is just aterminological difference. It would not be implausible to claim thatwhat can be recognized through reflection is something that can berecognized on any occasion, and what can be recognized on any occasionis something that can be recognized through reflection. Although thispoint deserves further examination, let us here simply assume thatrecognizability on reflection and recognizability on any occasionamount to the same thing. In what follows, we will refer to it asdirect recognizability. As already noted, in the first passage Chisholm imposes the directrecognizability constraint on justification, in the second onjustifiers. Does this amount to a substantive difference? If thedirect recognizability of justifiers implies the directrecognizability of justification, and vice versa, then the twopassages we considered would indeed just be alternative ways ofstating the same point. Whether they really are is perhaps debatable,but here we will simply assume that it makes no substantive differencewhether the characterization of internalism focuses on justificationor justifiers. Chisholm, then, defines internalism by saying that justification isrecognizable on reflection, and thus in terms of the accessibility ofjustification. This type of internalism may therefore be calledaccessibility internalism. Alternatively, internalism couldbe defined in terms of limiting justifiers to mental states. Accordingto this second approach, internalism says that justifiers must beinternal to the mind, i.e., must be mental events orstates. Internalism thus defined could be labeled mental state internalism.[14] Whether accessibility internalism and mental state internalism aregenuine alternatives depends on whether being directly recognizable isan essential property of mental states. If it is, then what appear tobe genuine alternatives might in fact not be.[15] Since here we cannot go into the details of this issue, we will cutthis matter short and simply define internalism, as suggested byChisholm, in terms of direct recognizability, while acknowledging thatit might be preferable to define it by restricting justifiers tomental states. We will refer to internalism as defined here as"J-internalism," since it imposes the direct recognizabilityconstraint not on knowledge but justification. J-Internalism: Justification is directly recognizable. At any time t atwhich S holds a justified belief B, S is ina position to know at t that B is justified.[16] J-internalism is to be contrasted with J-externalism, which issimply its negation. J-Externalism: Justification is not directly recognizable. It is not the case thatat any time t at which S holds a justified beliefB, S is in a position to know at t thatB is justified. (There are times at which S holds ajustified belief B but is not in a position to know thatB is justified.) Next, we will discuss what consequences we can derive fromJ-internalism. To begin with, we can derive the result that SimpleJ-reliabilism is an externalist theory. Suppose S's beliefB has, at time t, the property of being reliablyformed. B's being reliably formed at t, andS's being able to recognize at t that B isreliably formed, are clearly two different affairs. It could be thecase that B is reliably formed without S's beingable to tell at t that B is reliablyformed. According to Simple J-reliabilism, however, reliability byitself — without the subject's having any evidence indicatingits presence — is sufficient for justification. SimpleJ-reliabilism, therefore, allows for cases of the following kind:S's belief B is reliably formed and thereforejustified, but, since B's reliability is, so to speak,"hidden" from S, S cannot directly recognize thatB is justified. J-reliabilism is, therefore, an externalisttheory. To illustrate this point, let us consider a familiar example due toLaurence BonJour.[17] Suppose Norman is a perfectly reliable clairvoyant. At timet, his clairvoyance causes Norman to form the belief that thepresident is presently in New York. However, Norman has no evidencewhatever indicating that he is clairvoyant. Nor has he at tany way of recognizing that his belief was caused by his clairvoyance.Norman, then, cannot at t recognize that his belief isjustified. So Simple J-reliabilism implies that Norman's belief isjustified at t although Norman cannot recognize at tthat his belief is justified. Second, J-internalism allows us to derive the consequence — asit should — that evidentialism is an internalist theory. Thequestion of what a person's evidence consists of is of course notuncontroversial. Nor is it uncontroversial what kind of cognitiveaccess a subject has to her evidence. However, it would not be withouta good deal of initial plausibility to make the following twoassumptions. First, a subject's evidence consists of her perceptual,introspective, memorial, and intuitional states, as well as herbeliefs. In short, a subject's evidence consists of her mental states.Items other than mental states are never part of a subject's evidence.[18] Second, a subject's mental states are directly recognizable to her.[19] If we now add the further assumption (mentioned above) that thedirect recognizability of justifiers implies the directrecognizability of justification, then we get the result thatevidentialism is a form of J-internalism. Let us display the argumentin detail: Why Evidentialism is a Version of J-Internalism: According to evidentialism, justifiers consistof a person's evidence. A person's evidence (consisting of hermental states) is directly recognizable to that person. Therefore: According to evidentialism, a person's justifiers are directlyrecognizable to that person. If the justifiers that make a person's justified beliefsjustified are directly recognizable to that person, then thejustification of that person's justified beliefs is directlyrecognizable to that person. Therefore: According to evidentialism, the justification of a person'sjustified beliefs is directly recognizable to that person. The crucial premises in this argument are (2) and (4). Evidentialistswould be reluctant to call ‘evidence’ something that isnot directly recognizable to a subject.[20] So (2) would appear to be a premise that evidentialists are likely toendorse. And (4) expresses no more than one part of what we alreadyassumed: that the direct recognizability of justifiers implies thedirect recognizability of justification, and vice versa. Ofcourse, both premises might be challenged. What seems safe to say,therefore, is the conditional point that, if (2) and (4) capture whatis essential to evidentialism, then evidentialism implies internalismabout justification. As mentioned at the beginning of this section, evidentialists alsoreject K-reliabilism. They do so because, pace Dretske, they thinkthat internal justification — justification in the form ofhaving adequate evidence — is necessary forknowledge. In other words, they deny that a belief's origin in areliable cognitive process is sufficient for the belief's being aninstance of knowledge. Let us refer to this position as internalismabout knowledge, or K-internalism, and let us define it using theconcept of internal justification: the kind of justificationthat meets the direct recognizability constraint. K-Internalism: Internal justification is anecessary condition of knowledge. A belief's origin in a reliablecognitive process is not sufficient for its being an instanceof knowledge. K-externalism is the negation of K-internalism: K-Externalism: Internal justification is not a necessary condition of knowledge. Abelief's origin in a reliable cognitive process is sufficientfor its being an instance of knowledge. Consequently, there are casesof knowledge without internal justification. In this section, we have merely concerned ourselves with whatinternalists and externalists disagree about with regard to bothjustification and knowledge. In the next two sections, we will examinewhat reasons internalists and externalists can cite in support oftheir respective views.5. Why Internalism? First, both J- and K-internalism can be motivated by appealing toevidentialism as a premise. As we saw in the previous section,evidentialism is plausibly construed as entailing internalism.Consequently, reasons in support of evidentialism are also reasons insupport of J-internalism. Moreover, evidentialists would say thatinternal justification is a necessary condition ofknowledge. Evidentialists would support this claim withexamples. Consider again BonJour's clairvoyant Norman. Norman has noevidence for thinking that he is a reliable clairvoyant. SupposeNorman's belief B is caused by his clairvoyance. Supposefurther Norman has no independent evidence forB. Evidentialists would say that, since due to the lack ofevidence B is unjustified, B is not an instance ofknowledge. Considerations supporting evidentialism, then, are alsoconsiderations in favor of K-internalism.[21] Second, there is an argument for internalism that starts with what isknown as the deontological conception of epistemic justification: Deontological Justification: S is justified in believing that p iff inbelieving that p, S does not violate any of hisepistemic duties. The concept of duty employed here must not be confused with ethicalor prudential duty. The type of duty in question is specifically epistemic.[22] What exactly epistemic duties are is a matter of controversy. Afairly uncontroversial starting point is to say that epistemic dutiesare those that arise in the pursuit of truth.[23] Thus we might express the concept of deontological justificationalternatively as follows: S is justified in believing thatp iff in believing that p, S does not failto do what he ought to do in the pursuit of truth. Of course, this wayof putting things leads us directly to a further question: In thepursuit of truth, exactly what is it that one ought to do?Evidentialists would say: It is to believe what, and only what, one'sevidence supports.[24] Let's call proponents of the deontological concept of justificationdeontologists. If deontologists conceive of epistemic duty inthe way suggested in the previous paragraph, then they can argue asfollows: To be justified is to meet the duty of believing what one'sevidence supports. Evidential support is directly recognizable.Therefore, deontological justification is directlyrecognizable. Hence, deontological justification is internaljustification. There is also an argument from deontology to internalism that does notdepend on evidentialism as a premise.[25] It derives the direct recognizability of justification from thepremise that what determines epistemic duty is directlyrecognizable. From Deontology to Internalism: Justification is a matter of epistemic duty fulfillment. Therefore: What determines justification is identical to whatdetermines epistemic duty. What determines epistemic duty is directly recognizable. Therefore: What determines justification is directly recognizable. If what determines justification is directly recognizable, thenjustification itself is directly recognizable. Therefore: Justification is directly recognizable. (2) follows directly from the deontological conception ofjustification. (5) is nothing new; we have assumed it above already.The argument's main premise is of course (3).[26] Though certainly not implausible, this premise is open to criticism.Clearly, then, the argument is not uncontroversial. Nevertheless, itseems fair to say that it represents a straightforward and notobviously implausible derivation of internalism from deontology. Third, internalism (J or K) can be supported by objecting toparticular externalist accounts of justification or knowledge. Let ususe reliabilism for the purpose of illustration. Internalists willargue that reliable belief formation is neither necessary norsufficient for justification, nor sufficient for knowledge when addedto true belief. To challenge sufficiency, internalists would citecases like BonJour's Norman, the unwittingly reliable clairvoyant.Evidentialists would say that the beliefs arising from hisclairvoyance (unless supported by adequate evidence) are neitherjustified nor instances of knowledge. To support the claim thatreliable belief production is not necessary for justification,internalists will appeal to the possibility of being deceived byDescartes's evil demon. Let's suppose you are a victim of suchdeception, and let's distinguish between the normal world and the evildemon world. Your memories, experiences, and beliefs in the evil demonworld mirror your memories, experiences, and beliefs in the normalworld. However, whereas your beliefs in the normal world are by andlarge true, by far most of your beliefs in the evil demon world arefalse and thus unreliably produced. Simple J-reliabilism implies,therefore, that your beliefs in the evil demon world areunjustified. To internalists, this is an intuitively implausibleresult. Here is why. Your beliefs in the normal world are (as we mayassume) by and large supported by adquate evidence and thereforejustified. However, as far as your evidence is concerned, there is nodifference between the evil demon world and the normal world. Yourbeliefs in the evil demon world, internalists would therefore say, arealso by and large supported by adequate evidence and thereforejustified. Hence internalists would reject the claim that beingproduced by reliable faculties is a necessary condition of epistemic justification.[27] 6. Why Externalism? One reason for externalism lies in the attraction of philosophicalnaturalism. According to Gilbert Harman, this view, whenapplied to ethics, "is the doctrine that moral facts are facts ofnature. Naturalism as a general view is the sensible thesis thatall facts are facts of nature" (Harman 1977, p. 17). Whatnaturalists in ethics want, according to Harman, is to be able to locate value, justice, right, wrong, andso forth in the world in the way that tables, colors, genes,temperatures, and so on can be located in the world. (Harman 1984, p. 33) According to this conception of naturalism, a naturalist inepistemology wants to be able to locate such things as knowledge,justification, certainty, or probability "in the world in the way thattables, colors, genes, temperatures, and so on can be located in theworld." How, though, are naturalists to accomplish this? According toone answer to this question, they can accomplish this by identifyingthe non-epistemic grounds on which epistemic phenomenasupervene. Alvin Goldman describes this desideratum as follows: The term ‘justified’, I presume, is an evaluative term, aterm of appraisal. Any correct definition or synonym of it would alsofeature evaluative terms. I assume that such definitions or synonymsmight be given, but I am not interested in them. I want a set ofsubstantive conditions that specify when a belief isjustified … I want a theory of justified belief to specify innon-epistemic terms when a belief is justified. (Goldman 1979, p. 1) However, internalists need not deny that epistemic phenomenasupervene on non-epistemic grounds, and that it is the task ofepistemology to reveal these grounds. It is doubtful, therefore, thatthe goal of locating epistemic value in the natural world establishesa link between philosophical naturalism and externalism.[28] According to a second approach, the way to locate epistemic value inthe natural world is to employ the methods of the natural sciences.[29] Appealing to this methodological constraint, externalists might arguethat, because the study of justification and knowledge is an empiricalstudy, justification and knowledge cannot be what internalists take itto be, but rather must be identified with reliable belief production:a phenomenon that can be studied empirically. It is far from clear,however, that the fundamental questions of epistemology can beanswered by employing the methods of the natural sciences. Forexample, can empirical sciences solve the Gettier problem? Can theyanswer the question of whether knowledge requires evidence? Can theytell us whether the beliefs of evil demon victims are justified, orwhether BonJour's Norman can acquire knowledge on account of hisclairvoyance even though is he as no reason to suppose that he is inpossession of such a faculty? Indeed, is the question of whetherepistemology can be done solely by employing empirical science aquestion that can be answered by empirical science itself? It is noteasy to imagine that these questions should be answeredaffirmatively. But if the methodological constraint in question cannotbe sustained with complete generality, then this constraint offers usno compelling reason to think that justification and knowledge are thesort of thing that can only be studied empirically, and thus cannot bewhat internalist take them to be. A second reason for externalism (more specifically, J-externalism)has to do with the connection between justification andtruth. Internalists conceive of a justified belief as a belief that,relative to the subject's evidence or reasons, is likely to betrue. However, such likelihood of truth is compatible with thebelief's actual falsity. Indeed, likelihood of truth as internalistsconceive of it can be exemplified in the evil demon world, in whichyour justified beliefs about the world are mostly false. Henceexternalists view the connection between internalist justification andtruth as being too thin and therefore demand a stronger kind oflikelihood of truth.[30] Reliability is usually taken to fill the bill.[31] William Alston, for example, has argued that, without a reliabilityconstraint, the connection between justification and truth becomes too tenuous.[32] He argues that only reliably formed beliefs can be justified, anddefines a reliable belief-producing mechanism as one that "would yieldmostly true beliefs in a sufficiently large and varied run ofemployments in situations of the sorts we typically encounter" (Alston1993, p. 9). Suppose we endorse this conception ofjustification. Let's suppose further that most of our beliefs arejustified. It then follows that most of the beliefs we form inordinary circumstances would have to be true most of the time. Such abelief system could still be brought about by an evil demon. However,it would not be a belief-system consisting of mostly false beliefs,and thus the evil demon responsible for it wouldn't be quite as evilas he could be. So what Alston-type justification rules out is this: abelief system of mostly justified beliefs that is generated by an evildemon who sees to it that most of our beliefs are false. This, then,is the benefit we can secure when, as externalists suggest, we makereliability a necessary element of justification. Internalists would object that a strong link between justificationand truth runs afoul of the rather forceful intuition that the beliefsof an evil demon victim are justified even when they are mostlyfalse. In response, externalists might concede that the sort ofjustification internalists have in mind and attribute to evil demonvictims is a legitimate concept, but question the epistemologicalrelevance of that concept. Of what epistemic value (of whatvalue to the acquisition of knowledge), they might ask, is internaljustification if it is the sort of thing an evil demon victim canenjoy, a person whose belief system is massively marred by falsehood?Internalists would reply that internal justification should not beexpected to supply us with a guarantee of truth, and that its valuederives (at least in part) from the fact that internal justificationis necessary for knowledge. A third reason for externalism has to do with Dretske's question aboutjustification: "Who needs it, and why?" Dretske would say, of course,that nobody needs it (for the acquisition of knowledge, that is)because reliable belief production is sufficient for turning truebelief into knowledge. With this, internalists disagree.[33] As we have seen, they take the existence of examples like BonJour'sclairvoyant Norman as a decisive reason to reject this sufficiencyclaim. Internalists, therefore, would answer Dretske's question thus:Those who wish to enjoy knowledge need justification, and they need itbecause one does not know that p unless one has adequateevidence for believing that p. In reply to this, Dretske might repeat a point — one thatamounts to a fourth reason for externalism — from the passage weconsidered above: he takes animals such as frogs, rats, apes, and dogsto have knowledge. This is surely in line with the way we ordinarilyuse the concept of knowledge. The owner of a pet who does not attributeknowledge to it would be hard to find. But are animals capable of thesophisticated mental operations required by beings who enjoy the sortof justification internalists have in mind? It would seem not.[34] 7. Two Analyses of Knowledge K-internalism and K-externalism, then, are supported by conflictingintuitions. On the one hand, there are examples like BonJour'sclairvoyant Norman, examples that strongly suggest that internaljustification is necessary for knowledge. On the other hand,there is Dretske's point that knowledge is enjoyed by not only humansbut animals as well. This strongly suggests that internaljustification is not necessary for knowledge. Both of thesethoughts are inherently plausible. Might it be possible to reconcilethem? If animals could have the sort of justification internalistshave in mind, internalism would be compatible with animalknowledge. Certainly, animals have sensory experiences, just as humansdo. Some internalists think that sensory experiences, in and bythemselves, constitute evidence. Such internalists might not shy awayfrom attributing internal justification and therefore knowledge toanimals. Other internalists, however, think that S's sensoryexperiences constitute evidence only if S can coherently viewthem as a reliable guide to truth. That, it would seem, is a conditionanimals can't meet. Suppose animals are not the sort of beings that can have internallyjustified or unjustified beliefs. If so, we get two alternative andirreconcilable analyses of knowledge: one internalist, the otherexternalist. Let us state a gloss of the respective analyses. In theseanalyses, the term "internal justification" stands for the kind ofconcept internalists have in mind, and the term "externaljustification" for the kind of concept externalists employ. External Knowledge (EK): S knows that p iff p is true; S believes that p; S is externally justified in believing that p(in a way that degettierizes S's belief). Internal Knowledge (IK): S knows that p iff p is true; S believes that p; S is internally justified in believing thatp; S's belief that p is degettiered. EK and IK agree and differ in the following respects: According to both EK and IK, knowledge requires true belief. Thequestion each of these analyses is intended to answer is: what do weneed to add to true belief to get knowledge? According to both, whether or not one knows is an externalmatter. K-internalists acknowledge the externality of knowledge fortwo reasons. The first is that knowledge requires truth; the second isthat knowledge requires degettierization. Let us consider each ofthese reasons in turn. First, consider an evil demon victim's false belief that he hashands. By the victim's own lights, it certainly looks as though hehas hands. Surely, the victim would take himself to knowthat he has hands. Since he has no hands, he is mistaken in thinkinghe knows he has hands. His failure to know, however, is not directlyrecognizable to him. For unless his evidential situation were tochange radically, no amount of reflection will enable him to figureout that he has no hands. So because of the truth condition, it is notalways directly recognizable whether or not one knows. Knowledge,therefore, is essentially external. Second, let us examine why degettierization is an externalmatter. Call the condition needed to rule out Gettier-cases the'G-condition'. If the G-condition is met, then S isnot in a Gettier situation. If the G-condition is not met,then S is in a Gettier situation. Whether or not theG-condition is met might not be directly recognizable to S,just as whether or not S's beliefs are reliably producedmight not be directly recognizable to S's. For example,BonJour's Norman has a faculty (his clairvoyance) whose reliability ishidden from him. On reflection, Norman cannot tell that that he is areliable clairvoyant. (Of course, future experiences might revealthis to him.) Similarly, evil demon victims cannot through reflectionfigure out that their perceptual faculties are unreliable. Likewise, asubject who is in a Gettier situation cannot directly recognize— find out through reflection alone — that he is. ConsiderHenry in Barn County: that there is an abundance of barn facades inthe area is a feature of his situation that is (at least for the timebeing) hidden from him. Therefore, it's not directly recognizable tohim that he is in a Gettier situation. This point can begeneralized. It is an essential aspect of the G-condition that, whenit is not met, the subject is not in a position to recognize thisdirectly. Hence degettierization, and thereore knowledge, areessentially external. IK requires internal justification, EK does not. That is the onecondition where the two analyses differ. As a result of thisdifference, EK includes within the scope of knowledge animals, butfails to accommodate the intuition underlying BonJour's case ofclairvoyant Norman and other cases like that. IK, on the other hand,does accommodate this intuition, but — counter-intuitively, asK-externalists would say — excludes animals from the range ofsubjects that can have knowledge. If the internalism/externalism controversy is seen as essentially acontroversy over the nature of justification, then the debateover J-internalism vs. J-externalism would appear to be a case oftalking past each other. J-internalists and J-externalists simplyintend justification to achieve different things. They each operatewith a different concept of justification. J-externalists takejustification to be the sort of thing that turns true belief intoknowledge, and they view the Gettier problem merely as the problem ofadding the right sort of bells and whistles to thejustification-condition. J-internalists, on the other hand, cannotview degettierization as something that can, in the form of a suitableclause, be tacked on to the justification condition, fordegettierization is an external matter. Rather, internalists takejustification to be the sort of thing that turns true anddegettiered belief into knowledge. Since J-internalists andJ-externalists assign different roles to justification, what theyultimately disagree about is not the nature of justification, but thesort of thing in relation to which the theoretical role of epistemicjustification is fixed: knowledge. Internalists assignjustification the role of turning true and degettiered belief intoknowledge because they think that internal justification is necessaryfor knowledge. In contrast, externalists (J-externalists, that is)assign a different role to justification — that of turning truebelief into knowledge — because they think that internaljustification is not necessary for knowledge. It is thisdifference in their respective views on the nature of knowledge thatleads to different views on the nature of justification. Thus we are confronted with a fundamental disagreement about thenature of knowledge. Externalists such as Dretske would say that thedesideratum of making knowledge a natural phenomenon that isinstantiated equally by humans and animals must trump the demand thatknowledge require the possession of justification in the form ofadequate evidence. Externalists of that persuasion would have to say,therefore, that Norman, the unwitting clairvoyant, has knowledge justas much as a mouse that knows where to look for thecheese. Internalists would argue the other way around. To them,Norman-type cases establish the necessity of adequate evidence. And sothey would say that, just as Norman's reliable clairvoyance (byitself, in the absence of evidence) does not give him knowledge, amouse's reliable cognitive mechanisms do not give it knowledge ofwhere to look for the cheese. Externalists would say that it merelyseems to us that Norman lacks knowledge when in fact he hasit. Internalists would say that it merely seems to us that animalsknow when in fact they do not. It might be a mistake to expect that there is a decisive argumentthat settles the dispute between internalists and externalists one wayor another. One way to respond to the intracatability of the debate isto acknowledge that there simply is not one concept ofknowledge for which there is an analysis that has any chance ofmeeting with broad assent. Rather, we might conclude that, when we usethe word "knowledge", we have sometimes one concept and at other timesanother concept in mind. If we take this approach, we can distinguishbeween animal knowledge and reflectiveknowledge. The former, we might say, is reliably formed truebelief (that meets a suitable Gettier-clause built into thereliability condition), and the latter is internally justified truebelief (that meets a suitable, separate Gettier-condition). Whereasthe former kind of knowledge can be shared by animals and humansalike, the latter kind is available only to beings who are capable ofintellectual reflection.[35] To sum up, if we attempt to articulate an analysis of knowledge, wemust find answers to the following questions:How can the analysis of knowledge be made immune to Gettier cases?Does knowledge require justification?If it does, is the nature of justification internal or external? As we have seen, how these questions are to be answered is extremelycontroversial. Most likely, there isn't one single concept ofknowledge that permits consensus on what the necessary and sufficientconditions of knowledge are. Rather, it might be that we mustdistinguish between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge, andthat each of these concepts has its own analysis. In addition to theproblems we have discussed in this essay, there are further issuesthat bear, in a broader sense, on the analysis of knowledge. One ofthese is: What is the extent of our knowledge? Do we know about as much aswe think we do? When we discuss this question, we are confronted with a paradox. Onthe one hand, there is a seemingly sound argument for the conclusionthat we don't even know that we have hands, and thus know much lessthan we are inclined to think. On the other hand, we are convincedthat we do know that we have hands. If this conviction is right, theargument can't be sound after all. The following, supplementarychapter discusses the issues that arise when we try to solve thisparadox and examines how they bear on our understanding of the conceptof knowledge. Supplement: Knowledge and SkepticismBibliography Almeder, Robert. 1998. Harmless Naturalism. The Limits ofScience and the Nature of Philosophy. Chicago and La Salle: OpenCourt. Alston, William. 1989. Epistemic Justification. Essays intheTheory of Knowledge. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. -------. 1991. Perceiving God. 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Cambridge:Harvard University Press. -------. 1991. "Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology."In: Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and SocialSciences. (Cambridge: MIT Press.) -------. 1999. "Internalism Exposed." The Journal ofPhilosophy 96, pp. 271-293. Greco, John. 1993. "Virtues and Vices of Virtue Epistemology."Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23. Greco, John and Sosa, Ernest (eds.). 1999. The BlackwellGuide to Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell. Harman, Gilbert. 1977. The Nature of Morality. Oxford:Oxford University Press. -------.1984. "Is There a Single True Morality." In: David CoppandDavid Zimmerman (eds.). Morality, Reason and Truth. New Essays onthe Foundation of Ethics. Totowa: Rowman and Allenheld, pp.27-48. Kornblith, Hilary. 1999. "In Defense of a NaturalizedEpistemology." In: Greco 1999. -------. 2001. Epistemology: Internalism andExternalism. Malden (MA): Blackwell.Oxford University Press. -------. 2002. Knowledge and its Place inNature. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lehrer, Keith. 1990. Theory of Knowledge. Boulder:Westview Press. Nozick, Robert. 1981. Philosophical Explanations.Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Plantinga, Alvin. 1993. Warrant: The Current Debate.Oxford: Oxford University Press. -------. 1993b. Warrant and Proper Function. Oxford:Oxford University Press. -------. 1996. "Respondeo." In: Jonathan L. Kvanvig. Warrantin Contemporary Epistemology. Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory ofKnowledge. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. Pollock, John. 1986. Contemporary Theories of Knowledge.Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield. Radford, Colin. 1966. "Knowledge---By Examples." Analysis27, pp. 1-11. Russell, Bruce. 2001 "Epistemic and Moral Duty." In: Steup (ed.)2001 a. Shope, Robert K. 1983. The Analysis of Knowing. A Decade ofResearch. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Sosa, Ernest. 1991. Knowledge in Perspective. SelectedEssays in Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. -------. 1997. 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AnInquiry Into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations ofKnowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. -------. 1999. "What is Knowledge?" In: Greco 1999, pp.92-116.Bibliography for the SupplementAustin, J. L. 1962. Sense and Sensibilia. Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press.Cohen, Stewart. 2005. "Contextualism Defended." In Steup and Sosa (eds.)2005, pp. 56-62.-------. 2001. "Contextualism Defended: Comments on RichardFeldman's ‘Skeptical Problems, Contextualists Solutions'."Philosophical Studies 103, pp. 87-98.-------. 1999. "Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure ofReasons." Philosophical Perspectives 13.-------. 1988. "How to be a Fallibilist." PhilosophicalPerspectives 2, 91-123.Conee, Earl. 2005. "Contextualism Contested". In Steup and Sosa(eds.) 2005, pp. 47-56.DeRose, Keith. 1999. "Contextualism: An Explanation and Defense."In: Greco and Sosa (eds.) 1999, pp. 187.-------. 1995. "Solving the Skeptical Problem." ThePhilosophical Review 104, pp. 1-52.-------. 1992. "Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions."Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52, pp. 913-929.Dretske, Fred. 2005. "The Case Against Closure." In Steup and Sosa(eds.) 2005, pp. 13-26.-------. 1970. "Epistemic Operators." The Journal ofPhilosophy 67, pp. 1007-23.Engel, Mylan. 2003. "What's Wrong With Contextualism, and aNoncontextualist Resolution of the Skeptical Paradox."Erkenntnis 61, pp. 203-231.Feldman, Fred. 1986. A Cartesian Introduction toPhilosophy. New York: McGraw Hill.Feldman, Richard. 1999. "Contextualism and Skepticism."Philosophical Perspectives 13, pp. 91-114.-------. 2001. "Skeptical Problems, Contextualist Solutions."Philosophical Studies 103, pp. 61-85.Goldman, Alvin. 1976. "Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge."The Journal of Philosophy 73, pp. 771-791.Greco, John and Sosa, Ernest (eds.). 1999. The Blackwell Guideto Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell.Hawthorne, John. 2005. "The Case for Closure." In Steup and Sosa(eds.) 2005, pp. 26-43.-------. 2004. Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford: ClarendonPress.Lewis, David. 1996. "Elusive Knowledge." Australasian Journalof Philosophy 74, pp. 549-567.Lite, Adam. 2004. "Is Fallibility an Epistemological Shortcoming?"The Philosophical Quarterly 54, pp. 233-251.Moore, G.E. 1959. Philosophical Papers. London: Allen andUnwin.Pryor, James. 2005. "What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?"Philosophical Issues 15, pp. 349-378.Russell, Bruce. 2004. "How to be an Anti-Skeptic and aNoncontextualist." Erkenntnis 61, pp. 245-255.Schiffer, Stephen. 1996. "Contextualist Solutions to Skepticism."Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96, pp. 317-333.Sosa, Ernest. 2003. "Relevant Alternatives, ContextualismIncluded." Philosophical Studies 119, pp. 3-15.Sosa, Ernest. 1999. "How to Defeat Opposition to Moore."Philosophical Perspectives 13, pp. 141-153.Steup, Matthias. 2005. "Contextualism and ConceptualDisambiguation." Acta Analytica 20, pp. 3-15.Steup, Matthias and Sosa, Ernest (eds). 2005. ContemporaryDebates in Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell.Stine, Gail. 1976. "Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, andDeductive Closure." Philosophical Studies 29, pp. 249-61.Stroud, Barry. 1984. The Significance of Skepticism.Oxford: Clarendon Press.Vogel, Jonathan. 1976. "The New Relevant Alternatives Theory."Philosophical Perspectives 13, pp. 155-180.Other Internet ResourcesKeith De Rose's Epistemology Page The Epistemology Research GuideContextualism in Epistemology — A BibliographyRelated Entries brains in a vat | contextualism, epistemic | epistemic closure principle | epistemology: naturalized | epistemology: social | epistemology: virtue | justification, epistemic: coherentist theories of | justification, epistemic: foundationalist theories of | justification, epistemic: internalist vs. externalist conceptions ofAcknowledgmentsI wish to thank Laurence BonJour and Michael Bergman for helpfulcomments and criticisms. Copyright © 2006 byMatthias Steup<steup@stcloudstate.edu> |
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