Scientific Realism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Cite this entry Search the SEP • Advanced Search • Tools • RSS FeedTable of Contents• What's New• Archives• Projected ContentsEditorial Information• About the SEP• Editorial Board• How to Cite the SEP• Special CharactersSupport the SEPContact the SEP ©Metaphysics Research Lab,CSLI,Stanford University  Open access to the SEP is made possible by a world-wide funding initiative. Please Read How You Can Help Keep the Encyclopedia FreeScientific RealismFirst published Wed Jun 12, 2002It is easier to define scientific realism than it is to identify itsrole as a distinctly philosophical doctrine. Scientificrealists hold that the characteristic product of successful scientificresearch is knowledge of largely theory-independent phenomena and thatsuch knowledge is possible (indeed actual) even in those cases in whichthe relevant phenomena are not, in any non-question-begging sense,observable. According to scientific realists, for example, if youobtain a good contemporary chemistry textbook you will have good reasonto believe (because the scientists whose work the book reports had goodscientific evidence for) the (approximate) truth of the claims itcontains about the existence and properties of atoms, molecules,sub-atomic particles, energy levels, reaction mechanisms, etc.Moreover, you have good reason to think that such phenomena have theproperties attributed to them in the textbook independently of ourtheoretical conceptions in chemistry. Scientific realism is thus thecommon sense (or common science) conception that, subject to arecognition that scientific methods are fallible and that mostscientific knowledge is approximate, we are justified in accepting themost secure findings of scientists "at face value."1. Introduction2. The Empiricist Challenge: Knowledge Empiricism and the Underdetermination Argument3. Realist Responses to the Empiricist Challenge: The Senses Extended and Explanations Rehabilitated4. The Neo-Kantian Challenge: First Version5. The Neo-Kantian Challenge: Second Version6. The "Post-modern" ChallengeBibliographyOther Internet ResourcesRelated Entries1. IntroductionWe defined scientific realism above as the common sense (or commonscience) conception that, subject to a recognition that scientificmethods are fallible and that most scientific knowledge is approximate,we are justified in accepting the most secure findings of scientists"at face value." What requires explanation is why this is aphilosophical position rather than just a common sense one. Consider,for example, tropical fish realism -- the doctrine that there reallyare tropical fish; that the little books you buy about them at petstores tend to get it approximately right about their appearance,behavior, food and temperature requirements, etc.; and that the fishhave these properties largely independently of our theories about them.That's a pretty clear doctrine, but it's so commonsensical that itdoesn't seem to have any particular philosophical import. Why is theanalogous doctrine about science a philosophical doctrine?The answer is that -- setting aside skepticism about the externalworld -- there are no philosophical arguments against tropical fishrealism, whereas important philosophical challenges have been raisedagainst scientific realism. The dimensions of scientific realism,understood as a philosophical position, have been largely determined bythe responses scientific realists have offered to these challenges. Itwill be conceptually useful (and approximately historically correct) tosee the development of scientific realism as a response to fourconsecutive challenges, as follows.The Empiricist Challenge: This is the challenge regarding knowledgeof unobservable "theoretical" entities raised by logical empiricistsand their allies and underwritten by arguments from theunderdetermination of theory choice by observational data.The Neo-Kantian Challenge, First Version: This is the challengeraised by Hanson (1958) and Kuhn (1970) who argue from the theorydependence of methods (and, especially, of observation) to theconclusion that a realist conception of the growth of approximatescientific knowledge cannot be sustained, given the semantic andmethodological incommensurability (Kuhn's term) occasioned byrevolutionary changes in science.The Neo-Kantian Challenge, Second Version: This is the (somehow)related, but (somehow) less relativist conception represented byPutnam's ("internal realist") and Fine's ("natural ontologicalattitude") critiques of "metaphysical" versions of scientificrealism.The "Post-modern" Challenge: This is a challenge (to both realismand empiricism) arising from recent literary, sociological andhistorical studies in the emerging "science studies" tradition. It isgrounded in the conception that such phenomena as science, knowledge,evidence and truth are social constructions, in some sense orother which implies that one should reject the idea that scientificpractices achieve an approximate representational fit, of some sort orother, between the content of scientific theories and theworld or reality.We will discuss these challenges in the sections below. 2. The Empiricist Challenge: Knowledge Empiricism and the Underdetermination ArgumentIt is easy to characterize the basic empiricist underdeterminationargument against scientific realism. Call two theories empiricallyequivalent just in case exactly the same conclusions aboutobservable phenomena can be deduced from each. Let T beany theory which posits unobservable phenomena. There willalways be infinitely many theories which are empirically equivalent toT but which are such that each differs from T, andfrom all the rest, in what it says about unobservablephenomena (for formalized theories, this is an elementary theorem ofmathematical logic). Evidence in favor of T's conception ofunobservable phenomena ("theoretical entities") would have to rule outthe conceptions represented by each of those other theories. But, sinceT is empirically equivalent to each of them, they all makeexactly the same predictions about the results of observations orexperiments. So, no evidence could favor one of them over the others.Thus, at best, we could have evidence in favor of what all thesetheories have in common--their consequences about "observables"--wecould confirm that they are all empirically adequate--but wecould not have any evidence favoring T's conception ofunobservable theoretical entities. Since T was anytheory about unobservables, knowledge of unobservable phenomena isimpossible; choice between competing but empirically equivalentconceptions of theoretical entities is underdetermined by all possibleobservational evidence. [For an important alternative formulation ofthe notions of empirical adequacy and empirical equivalence, see vanFraassen 1980; see also Demopoulos 1982.]Several points about this simple and powerful argument areimportant.1. It needs fixing up. As it stands, the basicunderdetermination argument is fatally flawed. Suppose that Tis some ordinary middle-sized scientific theory, like, e.g., the lawsof Newtonian mechanics. According to the argument as it stands ifT* is some other middle-sized theory empiricallyequivalent to T, then no evidence could favor T overT*, or vice versa. For ordinary scientifictheories this is wrong. Scientists routinely supplement theories withwell established auxiliary hypotheses in order to obtainobservational predictions from them. [In fact, no observationalpredictions can be deduced from Newton's laws unless they have been sosupplemented, and this is true for lots of fundamental scientifictheories; see Kitcher 1982 for a nice discussion.] So, even ifT and T* are empirically equivalent, itcould still happen that they yield different observational predictionswhen supplemented by appropriate auxiliary hypotheses, in which casethere could be observational evidence favoring one over the other.So, it is probably best to think of the underdetermination argumentas applying, not to "small" theories, but to "total sciences,"large-scale conceptions of the world that might represent the totalscientific conception of the world at a time. Such a conception wouldalready contain all of the auxiliary hypotheses which were legitimateby its lights, so the problem just mentioned does not arise. In thisrevised form the underdetermination argument says that--whatever ourbest scientific conception of the world may be at any given time--wewill ever have any evidence that it embodies knowledge ofunobservables.2. It rests on (a particular interpretation of) an extremelyplausible doctrine about factual knowledge. Traditional empiricismattributed to experience or sensation two different roles: experiencewas the source of all of our ideas--of the raw material forthinking--and experience was the only basis we have for justifyingbeliefs abut matters of fact. The first of these doctrines ofempiricism has fallen on hard times, but the second doctrine (calledknowledge empiricism by Bennett 1964) enjoys widespreadsupport. In particular, it is an epistemological doctrine to whichalmost all scientific realists subscribe. The logical empiricistchallenge to scientific realism arises from a quite plausibleinterpretation of knowledge empiricism according to which what it saysis that there can be no evidence which rationally distinguishes betweentwo empirically equivalent total sciences (call this doctrine theevidential indistinguishability thesis, or theEIT).3. It is part of a selectively skeptical program ofanti-metaphysical "rational reconstruction." The basic aim of thelogical empiricists' project was to solve the demarcationproblem, the problem of distinguishing science (good)from "metaphysics" (bad), by appealing to arguments like theunderdetermination argument. The result was supposed to be thatscientific claims are meaningful and knowable (early on, logicalempiricists identified these two properties) whereas "metaphysical"claims, because they are about unobservables, are (at least) unknowableand (according to early versions of logical empiricism)meaningless.Now almost all actual science is conducted largely in a vocabularyconsisting mainly of "theoretical terms": terms apparently referring tounobservables. It was definitely not the logical empiricists' projectto reject such science. They intended to be selectively skeptical: tobe skeptics about "metaphysics" but not about science. So, theyembarked on a project of providing "rational reconstructions" ofactual scientific theories and methods which were designed toeliminate any apparent commitments to knowledge of unobservables whilestill portraying actual scientific practices as sources of knowledge(see, e.g., Carnap 1932, 1959).In the case of scientific theories, the basic logical empiricistapproaches were variations on the idea of instrumentalism, theview that scientific theories were predictive instruments and that theknowledge they represent is limited to what they predict about theobservable properties of observables. In the case of scientificmethods, strategies for rational reconstruction have not been so easyto formulate. Here's the problem. Almost all of the methods scientistsactually use in conducting experimental or observational studies aretheory dependent: they depend for their justification onknowledge reflected in previously established theories. Kuhn's (1970)discussion of "normal science" makes this point especially clearly, butall of the logical empiricists were acutely aware of it. Moreover, insciences like physics, chemistry, molecular biology and astronomy,almost all of those methods seem prima facie to rest onknowledge of unobservable phenomena (just think about thepresuppositions of the design of any experiment in chemistry). What theproject of rational reconstruction must show is that (almost) all ofthese methods can be reconstructed in such a way that theirapplication, as guides to the identification of empirically adequatetheories, does not require positing knowledge of unobservables.4. The task of rationally reconstructing actual scientificmethods has been the most significant challenge facing logicalempiricism and related anti-realist approaches. Instrumentalismand its variants provide a simple reconstruction of the content ofscientific theories that pretty exactly fits the requirements of theproject of rational reconstruction. The depth of the theory dependenceof scientific methods, and the extent to which they seem to depend onknowledge of unobservables, has posed a deeper challenge for logicalempiricists and their allies. The fate of operationalism illustratesthis challenge. Operationalism was a proposal for rationallyreconstructing the use of "theoretical terms" (terms that apparentlyrefer to unobservables) in science by treating those terms as beingcompletely defined in terms of particular operational procedures,thereby eliminating the apparent references to unobservables.Here's what operationalism says. For any theoretical term (say, forexample, "electron density") we can "rationally reconstruct" the use ofthat term by treating it as having an analytic operationaldefinition in terms of laboratory procedures and instrumentation. So,for example, the operational definition of "electron density" might begiven by a sentence of the form(*) The electron density in a region, R, is givenby the value, x, if and only if E applied toR yields the value x,where E is an instrument such that -- prior to rationalreconstruction (but not after) -- scientists would have thought ofit as a procedure for measuring electron density.The analyticity of operational definitions like (*) is essential tothe project of rational reconstruction. Operationalism is not,for example, the idea that electron density is defined as whatevermagnitude instruments of sort E reliably measure. On thatconception (*) would represent an empirical discovery about how tomeasure electron density, but -- since electrons are "unobservables" --that's a realist conception not an empiricist one. What the project ofrational reconstruction requires is that (*) be true purely as amatter of linguistic stipulation about how the term "electrondensity" is to be used.Since (*) is supposed to be analytic, it's supposed to beunrevisable. There is supposed to be no such thing as discovering,about E,, that some other instrument provides a more accuratevalue for electron density, or provides values for electron densityunder conditions where E doesn't function. Here again,thinking that there could be an improvement on E with respectto electron density requires thinking of electron density as a realfeature of the world which E (perhaps only approximately)measures. But, that's the realist conception which operationalism isdesigned to rationally reconstruct away.In actual, and apparently reliable, scientific practice, changes inthe instrumentation associated with theoretical terms is utterlyroutine, and apparently crucial to the progress of science. Scientistsroutinely replace one instrument with another in order to achieve (asthey would say) more accurate measurements of some unobservablemagnitude -- often in the light of new theoretical developments -- orto permit measurement of it under conditions for which previousinstrumentation was inadequate. According to an operationalistconception, these sorts of modifications would not be methodologicallyacceptable. Most logical empiricists were not willing to accept thisconclusion. After all, they intended to rationally reconstruct the bestof actual scientific practice. So most logical empiricists feltcompelled to reject operationalism.Examples such as these made it clear that -- in apparently reliablescientific practice -- scientists behave as though (1) they obtainknowledge of unobservable (as well as observable) phenomena bydeploying instruments which (perhaps indirectly) detect them,and (2) their theory dependent methodology in these and other mattersis informed by knowledge of unobservables as well as of observables. Inparticular, they appear to improve, or extend the range of, proceduresfor measuring or detecting unobservable phenomena in the light oftheoretical knowledge of those phenomena.These features of scientific practice stimulated the articulation(largely by philosophers in the empiricist tradition) of two differentbut related arguments for scientific realism, to which we now turn ourattention.3. Realist Responses to the Empiricist Challenge: The Senses Extended and Explanations Rehabilitated3.1 Extending the SensesThe fact that scientists, apparently justifiably, treat certaininstruments and procedures as ways of detecting and measuringunobservable (as well as observable) phenomena led several philosophers(see especially Feigl 1956, Maxwell 1962) to adopt what amounts to anon-empiricist (or, perhaps, more flexibly empiricist) understanding ofknowledge empiricism according to which (1) the special epistemic roleof the senses derives from the fact that they are the only detectors wehave built in to our bodies, but (2) the range of phenomena we candetect and measure can be broadened by extending the range of oursenses through the use of instruments and procedures whosejustification is theory dependent. Thus knowledge of phenomena"unobservable" by traditional empiricists standards is possible. Thissort of focus on laboratory detection and manipulation in defense ofrealism finds perhaps its most energetic expression in the writings ofHacking (see, for example, Hacking 1982). 3.2 Explanation RehabilitatedThe conception that instruments, designed with the help oftheoretical understanding, can extend the range of the senses so as toprovide information about unobservable phenomena surely has to be acomponent of any even remotely plausible defense of scientific realism.Still, by itself the idea that instruments can extend the senses isinadequate as a rebuttal to the basic underdetermination argument.Here's why. The basic idea behind the extending-the-senses approach todefending scientific realism is that -- as scientists' knowledge ofunobservable phenomena improves and as instrumental design becomes moresophisticated -- measurement and detection would become possible forphenomena hitherto beyond the reach of reliable detection andmeasurement; think of going from light microscopes, to electronmicroscopes, to x-ray crystallography devices (which can produce imagesof atomic structures within crystals).That has to be the realist's conception, but consider the effect ofunderdetermination arguments. Suppose that, at some stage in theprocess of the improvement of theories and instruments, certainphenomena, D, posited by existing theories are detectable bythe extended senses, but others are not. Let T be the totalscience of the time, and let T* be a theoryempirically equivalent to T with respect, not to theirobservational consequences, but with respect to their consequenceregarding the phenomena in D. The basic underdeterminationargument can be repeated with respect to T andT*, leading to the conclusion that T doesnot reflect any knowledge of phenomena outside D. Thus thereis no evidential basis for any extension of measurement and detectionbeyond D. Since this argument is applicable at any stage ofany supposed extension of the senses, it challenges -- in the name ofknowledge empiricism -- any extension of the senses.3.3 Explanation as EvidentialConsiderations such as these seem to have focused the attentions ofrealists on what we might call extra-experimental standardsfor theory assessment. To see what these are, let's examine theEIT mentioned earlier. Why would a knowledge empiricist defendthe EIT? An obvious answer is that she might think that theonly consideration which ever justifies accepting one theory,T, over a rival, T*, is that someprediction about observables obtained from T has proven to betrue, whereas a prediction from T* about the sameexperiment or observation has proven to be false.But is anything like this right? Pretty obviously -- and prettyobviously by empiricist standards -- no. Here's why. Consider any casein which observations in some set, O, provide us with goodscientific evidence to accept some theory, T, such thatT applies to an range of observable cases not represented inO (that is, consider any case of scientifically justifiedinduction). In any such case there will always be infinitely manypair-wise empirically inequivalent theories such that (a) eachof them is empirically inequivalent to T and (b) eachof them is compatible with all the observational data ever collected.This is just the Humean point that induction is not deductively valid.If we have sufficient scientific evidence to justify our acceptingT, that evidence must justify our rejection of each of theseother theories. [Note that this conclusion must be accepted whether oneis an empiricist or a scientific realist regarding the interpretationof T and its rivals, since the theories in question arepair-wise empirically inequivalent and are empirically inequivalent toT.]Let T* be one of these rivals to T.T* is empirically inequivalent to T, so itwould be possible in principle to run a crucial experiment todiscriminate between T and T*. But,rational standards for the assessment of scientific evidence dictatethat we are justified in rejecting T* even thoughno such experiment has been run! So, there must be rational standardsfor the assessment of scientific evidence in addition to thestandards which say that evidence for or against a theory can beprovided by the success or failure of observational predictions derivedfrom the theory. Let's call these standards extraexperimental. They solve the equation (!):(!) T’s observational predictions have been thusfar confirmed + Y = There is good scientific evidence favoringthe empirical adequacy of T, AND, both realists and empiricists agree, they are capable ofadjudicating between competing substantive conceptions of the world(because they can adjudicate between empirically inequivalenttheories).So, realists and empiricists agree that it isn't true that rationalstandards for the assessment of scientific evidence dictate that choicebetween competing theories must always be based on the results ofcrucial experiments. Where does that leave the underdeterminationargument against knowledge of unobservables?Almost all scientific realist responses to empiricist anti-realismin the last three decades can be understood as variations on the ideathat the solution to (!) -- which empiricists must agree exists on painof abandoning selective skepticism for skepticism about induction --also solves (!!):(!!) T's observational predictions have been thusfar confirmed + Y = There is good scientific evidence favoringthe (approximate) truth of T, even of its claims aboutunobservables.Defenses of realism along these lines (see, e.g, Boyd 1983; Byerlyand Lazara 1973; Lipton 1993; Miller 1987; McMullin 1984; Psillos 1999;Putnam 1972, 1975a, 1975b) deploy somewhat different resources, but onething they have in common is that they reflect, and participate in,what might be called the rehabilitation of explanation in recentphilosophy of science. An obvious reply to the EIT is that itignores the role of explanation as an evidential standard: perhaps one,among a family of empirically equivalent theories, is to be preferredbecause it explains observable phenomena better than the others, eventhough it makes the same observational predictions. The standardlogical empiricist treatment of explanation, the deductive-nomologicalaccount (see Hempel 1942, 1965; Hempel and Oppenheim 1948), responds byidentifying the explanatory power of a theory with its predictivepower.Over the last several decades a great many philosophers have beencritical of some aspects or other of this reduction of explanation toprediction (see, e.g., Boyd 1985; Kitcher 1981; Lipton 1991; Kitcherand Salmon 1989; McMullin 1984, 1987; Miller 1987; Salmon 1984, 1989).In the context created by this critical work, the notion ofexplanation, as an independent component of rational scientificmethodology, has been to some extent rehabilitated.A closely related development is also important. Goodman 1954 drewthe attention of philosophers of science to the important point thatonly some hypotheses, the projectible ones, are in the runningfor confirmation by observations, and that projectibility judgments arein some way or other a posteriori judgments informed bypreviously established theories and practices. What has become prettyclear is that, however they are to be philosophically analyzed,projectibility judgments are in fact judgments of plausibility in thelight of previously established theories (Boyd 1999; Lipton 1991,1993), and that plausibility of the relevant sort is a matter of thesort of unification with those theories which has explanatory import.So, explanation, in its own right, and as an aspect of projectibilityjudgments, appears to play a crucial role in the assessment ofobservational evidence for scientific theories.To a good first approximation, the following characterize theconditions under which observations, O, substantially confirma theory T:T is projectible (that is, theoretically plausible in thelight of the best established science).The observations in O either confirm predictions obtainedfrom T, or validate explanations based on T orboth.For each of the projectible alternatives, A, to Twhich address the same questions, the observations in Oprovide evidence against the predictions and/or explanationsunderwritten by A.The observations in O were obtained under conditions whichembody controls for each of the experimental artifacts or errors ofsampling which are suggested by projectible conceptions of the relevantobservational or experimental conditions.The basic strategy of defenses of realism which argue that thesolution to (!) -- which empiricists accept -- also solves (!!)involves arguing that the considerations of explanatory power of thesort indicated in characterizations like 1.-4. successfully adjudicatebetween empirically equivalent theories, so that knowledge ofunobservables is sometimes obtained.3.4 Two Explanationist Strategies for Defending RealismThere is a (very) rough division between two versions of thestrategy in question. One strategy, let's call it localexplanationism, (perhaps reflected in McMullin 1980, 1987;Miller 1987; and Lipton 1993) involves arguing that the relevantexplanation-involving, extra-experimental criteria do, in some cases,successfully adjudicate between empirically equivalent theories, sothat some scientific knowledge of unobservable phenomena is actual. Analternative approach, the abductive strategy, (see, e.g., Boyd1983, Psillos 1999) treats scientific realism itself as ascientific hypothesis which is supported by the fact that it providesthe only viable explanation for the such success as methodologicalprinciples like 1.-4., above, have as guides to the identification ofempirically adequate theories. The justification of inductivemethods in science is, therefore, provided by scientific realism,understood as itself an a posteriori scientifichypothesis.There are interesting differences between these approaches, andbetween the various different versions of each, but certain empiricistchallenges can be raised against all or most of them. Fine (1984,1986a) has offered two very significant, and closely related,criticisms of the abductive strategy. First, Fine argues, the strategybegs the question against anti-realist positions by treating scientificexplanatory power as carrying evidential weight in philosophy. Afterall, the dispute between empiricist anti-realists and realists is, inthe first instance, a dispute about whether a theory's explanatorypower can count in favor of the claims it makes about unobservables.[van Fraassen 1980 makes similar criticisms; he and Laudan 1981 eachalso challenges the claim that scientific realism provides the bestexplanation for the reliability of scientific methods in identifyingempirically adequate theories.]Fine's second criticisms is more abstractly epistemological. Hepoints out that, according to the realist who adopts the abductivestrategy, the methods of science are to be philosophically justified byappeal to a posteriori scientific findings, i.e., byappeal to the scientific realist's scientific explanation for theirreliability. This approach, he argues, violates the philosophicalrequirement that the justification for the methods in a domain ofinquiry should be grounded in methods more secure than the methodsbeing justified.Plainly these criticisms represent serious challenges to theabductive strategy. Importantly, they also challenge anyversion of the local explanationist strategy unless it incorporates ana priori (as opposed to an empirical scientific) defense ofthe evidential relevance of the explanatory power of theoretical claimsabout unobservables. There are two reasons to doubt that such an apriori defense is available.In the first place, philosophical defenses of epistemologicalpositions almost always rest, at least in part, on appeals tophilosophical "intuitions" regarding particular cases. Although manyphilosophers regard the deliverances of philosophical intuitions asjustified a priori, in fact epistemic intuitions aboutparticular cases deliver to us the results of our trained (or, in somecases, untrained) judgments regarding the domain of inquiry inquestion. They are reliable guides to matters epistemological just incase -- and to the extent that -- the training in question has itselfbeen relevantly reliable (Boyd 1999).For philosophers of science, the relevant training centrallyincludes training in the methods and findings of the relevant sciences.Since, "pre-analytically" at least, those methods countenance inductiveinferences to explanations involving unobservables, and since the mostcelebrated findings often incorporate the results of such inductions, avery significant burden of proof would rest on someone who maintainedthat her philosophical arguments in favor of accepting inductiveinferences to explanatory theories about unobservables did not, atleast tacitly, rest on intuitions which beg the question againstempiricist anti-realism.Moreover, there are independent reasons to doubt that there could bean a priori defense of accepting the results of inductiveinferences to the best explanation, whether or not that explanationposits unobservables. To a good first approximation, typicalscientific explanations offer accounts of the causal mechanisms orprocesses by which some phenomena are brought about, and scientistsevaluate the explanatory power of a theory by trying to assess thelikelihood that mechanisms or processes posited by the theory operateto produce the relevant effects. Their judgments in these matters are,almost always, informed by experiments and observations but they arenevertheless highly theory dependent, ordinarily relying heavily onpreviously established "background" theories concerning the relevantsorts of causal mechanisms and processes (for accounts with this flavorsee, e.g., Lipton 1993, Psillos 1999, Boyd 1985). Such judgments arereliable only to the extent that those background theories arerelevantly approximately accurate.In consequence, any defense of the practice of counting theexplanatory power of a particular theory as providing evidence in itsfavor would appear to require a defense of the proposition that thefindings of the relevant background sciences are relevantlyapproximately accurate. While, in some cases, this may be a justifiedconclusion, its justification could hardly be a priori (for anaccount somewhat more sympathetic to a prioricity for certaincases, see Miller 1987). Exactly similar arguments regarding theorydependent judgments of projectibility provide additional primafacie support for the same anti-a prioristic conclusion(Boyd 1999).In the light of these challenges, there is a strong case to be madethat any defense of scientific realism must rest on a conceptionaccording to which both scientific methods and methods in thephilosophy of science, must lack a priori justifications. Sucha conception of science, and of the relevant parts of philosophy, wouldthus be non-foundational and, presumably, naturalistic (see Psillos1999). [For a somewhat different naturalistic conception, see Kitcher1993. For an excellent discussion of competing metaphilosophicalconceptions in the philosophy of science and their relation to debatesabout realism see Wylie 1986.]3.5 Realism and Approximate TruthWhether or not the defense of scientific realism requires theadoption of a non-foundationalist conception of knowledge, it almostcertainly requires the articulation of a conception of approximatetruth. It is central to any plausible realist conception that, at leastsometimes, the historical development of scientific theories reflectprogress by successive approximation to the truth -- aboutunobservables as well as about observables, and it is central toarguments for realism that involve the rehabilitation of explanation asan epistemic notion that relevant improvements in approximate knowledgeare typically reflected in improvements of method. So, realistphilosophy of science relies heavily on the notion of approximatetruth.Laudan 1981 raises against scientific realism (and especiallyagainst abductive arguments for realism) the "pessimisticmeta-induction." He points out that there are lots of real historicalcases in which scientific theories which have been predictivelysuccessful and have contributed positively to scientific methodologyhave not been true, so that the truth of scientific theories need notbe posited in order to explain the successes of scientificpractice.The obvious realist reply is that what must be posited is theapproximate truth the relevant theories (see Hardin andRosenberg 1982 and Laudan 1984). Articulation of this reply raisesimportant issues, since any consistent theory can berepresented as approximately true in certain respects, Moreover, asLaudan points out, many of the historically important andmethodologically significant theories are, by our current lights,deeply false in some important respects. Efforts to develop anappropriate account of approximate truth in science include Niiniluoto1987, Oldie 1986, Weston 1992, Boyd 1990.One novel approach to the problem of approximation is provided byWorrall's structural realism (Worrall 1994; for a critique see Psillos1995, 1999). The basic idea here is that the most serious departuresfrom the truth in scientific theories tend to be errors about thenatures of the basic phenomena rather than about theirstructural relations. In the light of this generalization, thestructural realist proposes accepting the claims about causalstructures (even unobservable ones) posited by well confirmedtheories while withholding acceptance from what those theories sayabout the natures of the phenomena so related. To a good firstapproximation, one might think of structural realism as the view that,for any well established scientific theory, T, one shouldaccept the Ramsey sentence obtained from T by replacing eachtheoretical term in T by a new variable, and then prefixing,to the resulting open sentence, existential quantifiers over thosevariables, where the quantification is understood to range over causalstructures in nature.Aside from its importance as a contribution to the literature onapproximate truth, structural realism is significant in two other ways.In the first place, it reflects a general tendency in the literature onscientific realism to worry about the extent to which scientificrealists must portray scientific knowledge as potentially resolvinggenuinely metaphysical questions. Putnam's internal realismand Fine's natural ontological attitude (discussed below) may be seenas important ontologically deflationary approaches to thisquestion.The other significance of structural realism lies in the fact thatthe distinction upon which it relies -- that between causal structuresand natures -- may have been, in a certain sense, challenged byphilosophers like Shoemaker (1980) who hold that properties,magnitudes, states and the like are defined by their contributions tothe causal powers of things. It is an interesting question whetherapproaches to metaphysics like Shoemaker's are compatible with theapproaches to approximation informed by structural realism.4. The Neo-Kantian Challenge: First VersionHanson (1958) and, especially, Kuhn (1970 -- first published 1962;see Scheffler 1967, Shapere 1964 for early discussions) raisedsignificant challenges to scientific realism, arguing from the theorydependence of methods (and, especially, of observation) to theconclusion that a realist conception of the growth of approximatescientific knowledge cannot be sustained The intellectual impact oftheir work in the philosophy of science has been very different fromthe impact it has had in the rest of the humanities and in many of thesocial sciences. In the later disciplines the impact of Kuhn,especially, has been to underwrite the sort of anti-realist"postmodernism" discussed later in this essay. In the philosophy ofscience, by contrast, the impact of Hanson and Kuhn has been mainly tostimulate the articulation of naturalistic or causalconceptions of reference and essentialist conceptions of thedefinitions of scientific kinds and properties. [I am here presentingwhat might be thought of as the "standard" conception of Kuhn'sposition and of responses to it. There has been a recent revival ofinterest in Kuhn among analytic philosophers and others, andalternative readings of Kuhn are possible (see, e.g., Hoyningen-Huene1993 and the papers collected in Hoyningen-Huene and Sankey 2001).Whatever the merits of less standard interpretations of Kuhn, it wasthe standard conception of his arguments that occasioned the realistresponses discussed here.]That arguments proceeding from the theory dependence of scientificmethods and of measurement should have been deployed againstrealism is initially surprising. After all, most of the significantarguments for scientific realism emphasize theory dependence.Moreover, Kuhn's discussion of what he calls normal scienceseem to have exactly anticipated the abductive argument for realismdiscussed above. He insists that the success of research in normalscience is explained, in significant part, because scientificpractitioners have, as a result of their understanding of theparadigmatic theory, a quasi-metaphysical knowledge of the basic (andoften unobservable) causal factors involved in the phenomena theystudy.Where Kuhn's account departs from a realist conception of the growthof approximate knowledge is in his treatment of what he callsscientific revolutions. Although most empiricist philosophersof science had recognized the theory dependence of scientific methodseven before the work of Hanson and Kuhn, it was Hanson's and Kuhn'swork which made it clear that accepting the theory dependence ofscientific methods raise the possibility of incommensurabilitybetween competing scientific theories (or paradigms): thepossibility that in science there might be disagreements betweentheoretical perspectives such that there do not exist methods for theirresolutions which are both rational and fair (to thecompeting positions).What each author claimed was that this situation had actuallyobtained in important historical cases where, according to a realistperspective, one might think that the rational application ofscientific methodology had resulted in the replacement of one theory bya more nearly accurate one. What was especially striking -- andchallenging to a realist conception -- was Kuhn's claim that among the"scientific revolutions" where this had occurred was the transitionfrom Newtonian mechanics to special relativity at the beginning of the20th century.What is important in understanding the realist response to Kuhn'sclaim about this particular historical case is that there are lots ofexperimental results (like, e.g., those which are ordinarily understoodto reflect the increase of mass of particles in a cyclotron) such thatthey certainly look like cases in which a methodology -- includingmeasurement procedures -- which is acceptable by both Newtonian andrelativistic standards adjudicates in favor of the relativisticconception. Lots and lots of relativistic effects are such that theycan be, apparently, detected and measured using instruments whosedesign begs no questions against either of the competing "paradigms."The transition from Newtonian mechanics to special relativity certainlylooks like a textbook case of rational progression from, one theory toan even more accurate one.Against this picture Kuhn argues that no such successiveapproximation occurred because Newtonian mechanics and relativitytheory do not share a common subject matter regarding which the latteris a better approximation than the former. For example -- he argues --the term "mass" as it occurs in Newtonian mechanics does not refer tothe same magnitude as does the term "mass" in relativistic mechanicsbecause "Newtonian mass is conserved; Einsteinian is convertible withenergy. Only at low relative velocities may the two be measured in thesame way, and even then they must not be conceived to be the same(102)."In giving this remarkable argument Kuhn was tacitly relying on aconception of the referential semantics of scientific terms probablyderived from the work of Carnap (see Carnap 1950; there are importantcontroversies about the proper interpretation of Carnap -- see, e.g.,Friedman 1987, 1991 -- but they are irrelevant to our story). Theconception in question is a version of the standard empiricist"descriptivist" conception that the referent of a term is picked out bya description which constitutes the analytic definition of the term inquestion. According to the version Kuhn relies on, the analyticdefinition of a scientific term is provided by the most basic lawscontaining the term. Thus, as the example of "mass" illustrates, anychange in the fundamental laws involving a scientific term must involvea change in referent (or reference failure, a possibility Kuhn1970 does not discuss).4.1 "Causal" and Naturalistic Theories of ReferenceWhat was important for the development of realist philosophy ofscience was the fact that most philosophers of science were, at leasttacitly, themselves inclined to some version of analytic descriptivism.The anti-realist consequences which Kuhn (and Hanson) derived fromdescriptivist conceptions let to the articulation by realists ofalternative theories of reference. Characteristically, these theoriesfollowed the lead of Kripke (1971, 1972), whose work was mainlyconcerned with the semantics of modality, and Putnam (1972, 1975a,1975b), whose work was mainly concerned with issues in the semantics ofscientific terms. Each of them advocated a "causal" theory of referenceaccording to which the reference relation between a term and itsreferent was a matter of there being the right sort of (chain of)causal relation(s) between uses of the term and (instances of) itsreferent. Numerous variations on this naturalistic theme --some assigning importance to descriptive elements as well as causalrelations in the establishment of reference -- have been proposed (see,e.g., Boyd 1999, Dretske 1981, Enç 1976, Field 1973, Kitcher1992, Miller 1987, Papineau 1987, 1993, Psillos 1999). It is by nowpretty well accepted that some departure from analytic descriptivism,involving some causal elements, is a crucial component of a realistapproach to scientific knowledge.4.2 Realism and the Revival of EssentialismKuhn's analytic descriptivism assigns to the analytic definition ofa scientific term the role of fixing its referent. Once that role isassigned to other ("causal," "naturalistic") features of term use, itbecomes possible to explore the issue of non-analytic aposteriori definitions of the kinds, magnitudes, etc. to whichscientific terms refer. The work of Kripke and Putnam just cited gaverise to a class of theories according to which scientific kinds, etc.have real rather than nominal definitions ("real essences" rather than"nominal essences" in the sense of Locke 1689). The paradigm example isthat the real definition, or essence, of water is described by theformula "H2O". It is by now a standard feature of realistconceptions of science that they incorporate some version or other ofthe idea that scientific kinds, categories, etc. (naturalkinds) possess such real definitions (for interesting discussionsof the development of this realist conception with special reference tobiological kinds see Wilson 1999a, 1999b).The idea that natural kinds possess such definitions has beenconsistently linked, in the realist literature, to discussions of theprojectibility of predicates and hypotheses (Goodman 1954,Quine 1969). Only by reference to kinds (etc.) with real rather thannominal definitions -- only by, in some sense or other,"cutting the world at its (a posteriori defined) joints" --are we able to fit our language use to the world in such a way as tomake reliable induction and explanation possible (Boyd 1999; Psillos1999; Putnam 1972, 1975a, 1975b; Sismondo 1996; Wilson 1999b).One further point about real essences is important. The stockexample of a real definition (H2O for water) might suggestthat real definitions of scientific kinds (etc.) must, like logicalempiricists' ideal nominal definitions, specify necessary andsufficient conditions for kind membership. In fact, examination ofcases in those sciences which study complex phenomena indicate thatsome natural definitions may consist of families of imperfectly"clustered" properties, with the result that the kinds they define donot have precisely determinate boundaries (Boyd 1999, Wilson 1999b; butsee also Hacking 1991a, 1991b). Realism may imply that there is, inthat sense, vagueness in nature (contrast Putnam 1983).4.3 The Metaphysics of Social ConstructionKuhn tacitly adopts a semantic conception according to which themost basic laws in a paradigm are exactly true by linguisticconvention. He also claims that such laws provide quasi-metaphysicalknowledge of basic causal factors. His claim that these laws areexactly true is what leads him to conclusions about the (semantic)history of recent physics which are prima facie implausible,and it is this feature of his semantic conception against which causalor naturalistic theories of reference are mainly directed.The example of the semantics of the names of fictional charactersindicates that the linguistic conventions operating in fiction make itpossible to establish it by convention that certain claimsabout a character are approximately true without therebyestablishing their exact truth. Versions of Kuhn's socialconstructivist position could, therefore, be formulated according towhich the establishment of a paradigm imposes by convention,on the phenomena scientists study, a quasi-metaphysical structure whichmakes the central laws of the paradigm approximately (but notnecessarily exactly) true.Although Kuhn never considered this version of constructivism, itfits well with the tradition of anthropological relativism to whichKuhn's position is often assimilated. It is not refuted by argumentsfor causal or naturalistic theories of reference, nor does it entailwildly implausible claims about incommensurability in recent science.It is, however, pretty clearly an anti-realist position -- one whichhas resonances with the sorts of "postmodern" anti-realism discussedlater in this essay. A realist rebuttal to it is available if one makesexplicit, and defends, a piece of common, and philosophical, senseabout the metaphysics of conventionality: the no non-causalcontribution thesis (2N2C). According to2N2C, human social practices make no non-causalcontribution to the causal structure of the world, and are in that waymetaphysically innocent (see Boyd 1999).5. The Neo-Kantian Challenge: Second VersionStructural realism represents one attempt to defend scientificrealism while being modest about its metaphysical implications.Putnam's "internal realism" and Fine's closely related "naturalontological attitude" (NOA) represent other attempts to followscientific realists in taking the findings of science at "face value"while avoiding realism's excessively metaphysical understanding ofthose results (Putnam 1978, 1981, 1983a; Fine 1984, 1986a, 1986b, 1991;for a nice exposition see the Introduction to Papineau 1996; forcritiques see Glymour 1982; Millikan 1986; Newton-Smith 1989a, 1989b;McMullin 1991; Papineau 1987)."Internal realism" and NOA are not easy to explicate andare, almost certainly, not the same position. Nevertheless they sharesome important elements in common."Thin" Truth: Both Putnam and Fine assert thatone can (and should) accept the well established theories of science(even about unobservable) as (probably) true, but that thisshould not be understood as accepting the "metaphysical realist"(Putnam's term) view that the statements which constitute thosetheories correspond to reality. They advocate a "thin"conception of truth rather than a correspondence conception. InPutnam's early papers defending internal realism he adopts a pragmaticconception of truth according to which truth of sentences is a matterof being epistemically acceptable in the limit of ideal inquiry. In thecase of Fine, it's less clear exactly which thin conception of truth isat work.De-Natured Naturalism: Naturalistic conceptions ofreference have it that reference of scientific terms is a matter ofcertain causal patterns which relate the use of terms to instances oftheir referents. Relations of measurement and detection are supposed tobe centrally involved in the establishment of reference, at least inparadigm cases. It is explicit in Putnam, and surely implied by Fine'sposition, that if the causal theory of reference, and relatedcausal theories of detection and measurement, are understood asscientific theories (in linguistics, say, and -- for theoriesof measurement and detection -- theories in the relevant sciences) thenthey might, for all the internal realist or NOAer says, bewell confirmed. What is to be denied is that such conceptionsunderwrite a correspondence conception of truth. They are bits ofscience, but not (also) bits of realist naturalist philosophy.5.1 An Analogy with PhenomenalismAn analogy with issues regarding knowledge of the external world maybe helpful here. One classical early logical empiricist response toquestions about our knowledge of (observable) external objects was thephenomenalist strategy of representing external objects as "logicalconstructions" analytically defined in sense-datum terms (see, e.g.,Carnap 1928). That certain experience patterns constituted experiencesof, e.g., chairs was supposed to reflect, not a discovery about someepistemically important metaphysical relation between chairs and thosepatterns, but, instead, the implication of the analytic definition of"chair" in the sense-datum language.Nevertheless, nothing in the phenomenalist project was supposed topreclude the possibility that psychologists studying perception mightdiscover that those very experience patterns are caused by lightreflected off chairs and stimulating the retina is particular ways.This would be unobjectionable as a bit of empirical science, but it wasnot to be understood as positing an epistemically relevant relation ofdetection and representation between the experiential pattern andchairs, understood as experience-independent features of theworld. It could not be understood as a component inphilosophical justification of the claim that we know about,and "chair" refers to, experience-independent chairs.By contrast, non-foundationalist "causal" or "reliabilist"conceptions of perceptual knowledge in the tradition initiated byGoldman (1967, 1976) would treat the relevant discovery bothas an empirical scientific discovery and as a component of a(naturalistic) philosophical (and epistemicallyrelevant) explanation of why our chair beliefs sometimes representknowledge about (experience independent) chairs. Similarly, if thepsychological findings in question were incorporated into a suitableempirical theory of language use they could, on a causal ornaturalistic conception of reference, underwrite thephilosophical conception that "chair" refers to (experienceindependent) chairs.5.2 Non-Foundationalist Epistemology AgainWhat this suggests is that a defense of realism against internalrealism or NOA must follow the lead of non-foundational causal theoriesof knowledge, and of perception in particular, in insisting thatscientific findings about, e.g., the measurement and detection oftheoretical entities, and about the reference of scientific terms havephilosophical as well as scientific relevance (see, e.g., Boyd 1999,Byerly and Lazara 1973, Hacking 1982, Psillos 1999). 5.3 Challenges Regarding the Epistemology and Metaphysics ofReference and KindsThe arguments Putnam offers in defense of internal realism arecomplex, and (as the critiques cited indicate) both controversial andsometimes hard to explicate. Nevertheless, it seems pretty clear thatPutnam attributes to "metaphysical realism" something like thefollowing commitments:Reference is a relation between linguistic entities and entirelyextra-linguistic (and in that sense independentlyexisting) natural kinds. Natural kinds (magnitudes, etc.) are,somehow or other, out in the world, and available for discovery andnaming. There is a single set of such natural entities somehow given bythe structure of the world itself, independently of humanpractice.The reference relation between natural kind (magnitude, etc.) termsand their referents is a purely causal matter, where thepurity in question is a matter of the reference relation's beingdefinable without significantly acknowledging descriptive elements orhuman intentions.If one accepts this picture of scientific realism, understoodmetaphysically, then it is natural to think that what makes theassociated conception of truth a correspondence conception isthat reference is seen as a relation between terms and suchindependently existing kinds. The realist correspondenceconception, so conceived, is subject to two important challenges.First, if we think of natural kinds as things somehow independent oflinguistic and methodological practices, then there are lots of naturalkinds out there, and it is difficult to see how the causal conceptionof reference fixing could explain how a natural kind term could everhave a unique referent. This problem is exacerbated if one thinks ofreference as being purely causal in the way just indicated, sinceintentional and descriptive factors, which might otherwise be thoughtto reduce the ambiguity of the reference relation, are set aside. Suchconsiderations seem to be the basis of the "model theoretic" argumentsin Putnam 1978, 1980) against "metaphysical realism."Secondly, reference to natural kinds is supposed to explain theinductive successes of scientific practice, so there must be some quiteintimate connection between natural kinds and the conceptual machineryof the sciences. If one thinks of realist theories as entailing thatnatural kinds are independent of that machinery, it is hard to see howthe explanation could work unless it rested on something like aobjective idealist theory according to which natural kinds aresomehow metaphysically "fitted" for explanation and inductionindependently of the relevant practices. Such an assumption isprofoundly at odds with the philosophical naturalism and metaphysicalmaterialism ordinarily associated with scientific realism. This sort ofconsideration appears to underwrite aspects of Putnam's criticism ofmaterialist metaphysical realism in "Why There Isn't a Ready MadeWorld" (Putnam 1983a).5.4 Realist responsesOf these two challenges, the first has received much more attentionfrom scientific realists. There has been widespread acceptance of theview that descriptive and/or intentional factors must figure in anyscientific realist account of reference (e.g., Boyd 1999, Enç1976, Kitcher 1992, Papineau 1979, Psillos 1999).Much less has been said by realists about the sense, if any, inwhich scientific realism is committed to there being natural kinds(etc.) which are independent of us. Psillos (1999), for example,discusses problems with pure causal theories of reference extensively,but takes it to be a basic posit of scientific realism that"…the world has a definite and mind-independent natural-kindstructure" (xix). Boyd (1999) offers an alternative approach accordingto which, like natural kind terms and classificatorypractices, natural kinds themselves should be thought of associal artifacts deployed in achieving an appropriate fit oraccommodation between inductive and explanatory practices and relevantcausal structures.Whether the intrusion of descriptive and intentional notions intorealist accounts of reference, or the treatment of natural kinds associal artifacts, is compatible with the main spirit of scientificrealism depends on the sense(s) in which scientific realism should beunderstood as entailing that the phenomena scientists study are "mindindependent." A possible response to this question, compatible with theproposals just mentioned, is that the relevant sense of mindindependence is fully captured by the no non-causal contributiondoctrine discussed earlier.6. The "Post-modern" ChallengeMost recent work in the relatively new discipline of science studies(see, e.g, Biagioli 1999; Galison 1987; Latour and Wolgar 1979; Latour1987; Pickering 1984, 1995; Pinch 1985; Shapin 1982, 1994; Shapin andSchaffer 1985) and a significant body of work in feminist philosophy ofscience or feminist aproaches to particular science (see, e.g., Alcoffand Potter 1993; Antony 1993; Antony and Witt 1993; Conkey and Spector1984; Fuss 1989; Gero and Conkey 1991; Harding 1986, 1987, 1991;Harding and Hintikka 1983; Harding and O'Barr 1987; Hartsock 1987;Haslanger 1993; Keller 1983: Longino 1989, 1990; Tuana 1989; Wright1996; Wylie 1991, 1993, 2000; Wylie and Okruhlik 1987) has been to someextent influenced by, or has engaged with, anti-realist "postmodern"conceptions according to which such phenomena as science, knowledge,evidence and truth are social constructions, in some sense orother which implies that one should reject the idea that scientificpractices achieve an approximate representational fit of some sort orother between the content of scientific theories and the worldor reality.Although serious interchanges between scientific realism and theseapproaches have not developed to the level of exchanges between, e.g.,scientific realist approaches and logical empiricist or neo-Kantianones, a number of philosophers of science have defended a realistapproach against post modern relativism and skepticism (see, e.g., Boyd1999; Kitcher 1993; Papineau 1998; Pettit 1998; Sismondo 1993a, 1993b,1996). Several factors are probably important in determining thedimensions of the dispute between realists and postmodernists.6.1 Boundary WorkSociologists of science have identified a feature of scientific workwhich is especially important when new (sub)disciplines are beingestablished. Practitioners of emerging disciplines devote considerableeffort to distinguishing the approach of their new disciplines from theapproaches of more fully established disciplines, often by adopting asubstantially adversarial stance towards them. This phenomenon has beenplayed out in the establishment of science studies and (to a somewhatlesser extent)feminist philosophy. In each of these cases, mainstreamrealist and empiricist approaches to epistemology have been specialtargets of such adversarial stance taking. In the case of sciencestudies, to a very good first approximation, the "boundary work"foundations of the emerging discipline rest on a critique ofepistemology and of the correspondence conception of truth. Thisperfectly ordinary, and non-culpable, boundary work resistance totraditional epistemology and the correspondence theory has proven to bea barrier to communication between mainstream philosophers of scienceand others in science studies. 6.2 Postmodern Responses to Naive Empiricist Conceptions ofObjectivityThere is a prevalent conception of scientific objectivity which ishistorically associated with empiricist conceptions of science, eventhough it is sufficiently naive that probably no professionalempiricist philosopher of science ever defended all of its components.According to it, the objects of scientific study are natural kinds(etc.) which areindependent of human practices,defined by eternal,unchanging,ahistorical, andintrinsicnecessary and sufficient membership conditions;referred to in fundamental,exceptionless,eternal, andahistoricallaws; anddiscovered by the deployment of eternal,ahistorical,politically and culturally neutral, andfoundationalscientific methods.To a significant extent, anti-realist postmodern conceptions ofscience take these components of naive empiricism to be definitive ofthe notion of scientific objectivity. Postmodern students of sciencehold -- correctly (Boyd 1999; Sismondo 1993a, 1993b, 1996; Knorr Cetina1993) -- that nothing in actual scientific practice even remotely fitsthese criteria for objectivity. On this basis they often reach theanti-realist conclusion that scientific research never achievesobjective knowledge. It is characteristic of defenses of realismagainst postmodern anti-realism that they deny, about one or more ofthe components mention, that they are necessary for objectiveknowledge.6.3 "Quantum Superposition" of Conceptions of SocialConstructionThere are, in the literature and in intellectual discourse, roughlythree versions of "social constructivism," the view that science is the"social construction of reality."Neo-Kantian socialconstructivism. This is the view discussed earlier accordingto which the adoption of a scientific paradigm successfullyimposes a quasi-metaphysical causal structure on the phenomenascientists study.Science-as-social-processsocial constructivism. This is the view that theproduction of scientific findings is a social process subject to thesame sorts of influences -- cultural, economic, political,sociological, etc. -- which affect any other social process.Debunking social constructivism. This isthe skeptical position according to which the findings of work in thesciences are determined exclusively, or in large measure, not by the"facts," but instead by relations of social power within the scientificcommunity and the broader community within which research isconducted.These are quite distinct positions. For example, 1. and 3. aremutually inconsistent, and 2. is compatible with either 1., or 3., orwith standard logical empiricist and scientific realist conceptions.Nevertheless, in science studies and in other disciplines influenced bypostmodernism they tend to become conflated.In the first place, many practitioners in such disciples, forreasons rehearsed above, take 2. to imply that traditional realist andempiricist conceptions are mistaken. Moreover, having adopted 2., theytend to adopt a position which looks like a quantum superposition of 1.and 3., oscillating between thinking of scientific practice as (really)constructing the (quasi-metaphysical) truth and denying that it leadsto truth in any metaphysically interesting sense.The inconsistencies involved are made clearest in cases in whichscientific theories of race and gender are said to be "socialconstructions." Often the intent here is to engage in scientific andpolitical criticism but, in so far as the neo-Kantian, and the fullydebunking conceptions of social construction are simultaneouslyoperative, authors often have a difficult time finding the resourcesfor saying that such theories are really (really!) false. [Fordiscussions of these conflations and their impact on methodological andpolitical criticism see Sismondo 1993a, 1993b, 1996; Knorr Cetina 1993;Boyd 1999.]6.4 Naturalism and the symmetry thesisIn one of the founding documents of contemporary science studies,Barnes and Bloor (1982) criticize a tendency in the history,philosophy, and sociology of science to treat true and false scientifictheories asymmetrically: explaining the acceptance of true theories asthe ordinary and to-be-expected result of applying the scientificmethod, but explaining the acceptance of false theories by appealinginstead to the operation of "social factors." They propose thatexplanations for the acceptance of scientific theories should besymmetrical, appealing to the same sorts of factors in explaining theacceptance of true and false theories.In science studies, it has been nearly universal to accept thesymmetry thesis and to interpret it as requiring thattruth or the facts not be treated as among thefactors involved in explaining the adoption of scientific theories.Almost certainly, a defense of scientific realism in the light of thesymmetry thesis will require insisting that a naturalisticscientific realism does, by considering facts of all sortspotentially relevant to the explanation of the acceptance of scientifictheories, satisfy the requirements of the symmetry thesis. Thelocus classicus for this approach is Antony 1993; it isdeveloped in Sismondo 1999.6.5 EssentialismOne of the most important sources of resistance to scientificrealism among feminist philosophers has been the conception thatrealism underwrites essentialism and that essentialism is a centralcomponent of racist and sexist ideology (see Fuss 1989 for adiscussion). A naturalistic version of scientific realism doesentail a sort of essentialism about natural kinds (etc.) but that sortof essentialism need not have the form suggested by the stereotype ofscientific objectivity discussed above, and need not be inimical tocritiques of scientific racism or sexism (Boyd 1999, Sismondo 1996). Inparticular, it is compatible with the sort of realist naturalismdiscussed here that social categories like race and gender might haveas their essences a certain role in the stabilization orjustification of particular sorts of historically situated oppressionand exploitation. 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Resources for Feminist Research 16(3): 12-16.Other Internet ResourcesPreprints in the Philosophy of Science (sponsored by thr Philosophy ofScience Association and the Center for Philosophy of Science,University of Pittsburgh)Links to Philosophy (of Science) Resources (Johns Hopkins UniversityPhilosophy Department)The Science Wars Homepage (sponsored by the Science Wars MonitorInternational; contains references to the controversies around "socialconstructivism" in science studies)[Note: Many of the authors mentioned in this entry who are still activehave websites which often contain information about their most recentwork.] Related Entries Feyerabend, Paul | Kuhn, Thomas | scientific explanation | scientific knowledge: social dimensions of Copyright © 2002 byRichard Boyd <rnb1@cornell.edu> |
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