Peter Suber, "Metaphilosophy, Topics"Metaphilosophy Themes and QuestionsA Personal ListPeter Suber,Philosophy Department,Earlham CollegeI made this list of questions primarily to helpstudents appreciate what is distinctive about thebranch of philosophy we call "metaphilosophy".Students who have no trouble understanding when aquestion is epistemological or ethical sometimesnevertheless have great trouble deciding whether aquestion is metaphilosophical. I've found that nostraightforward definition of metaphilosophy helpsstudents with this task. What does help, a bit, is tosee a large number of metaphilosophical questions. Mysecondary purpose is making this list is to helpstudents come up with paper topics, read philosophywith attention to its implicit metaphilosophy, and sortout their own metaphilosophical thoughts.Table of ContentsCognitivitySystematicityMethodologyHistoricitySelf-reference and Self-applicationImmanence and non-immanenceDisagreement and diversityPrimacy of the practicalPhilosophy good and badPhilosophy and expertiseEnds of philosophyDeath of philosophyAnti-philosophiesPhilosophy and assertionPhilosophy and expositionPhilosophy and stylePhilosophy as literatureLiterature as philosophyPhilosophical beautyPhilosophy as sciencePhilosophy and related fields and activitiesPhilosophy and argumentPhilosophy and wisdomPhilosophy and metaphilosophyPhilosophy and the folkPhilosophy and 'primitive' lifePhilosophy and philosophersPhilosophy and pedagogyCognitivity Does philosophy lead to knowledge (is itcognitive)? Can it be true or false? To be cognitive in this sense is to bear anytruth-value, including falsehood, as opposedto bearing none at all. Don't confusecognitivity with truth. To bear a truth-value is not necessarily to beknowable with certainty, or by any method. Don'tconfuse cognitivity with knowability. The question is not whether anything isknowledge or cognitive e.g. science; butwhether philosophy is (ever)knowledge. Does philosophy merely criticize or examineknowledge, without itself being (or becoming)knowledge? If so, then why should we trust it?What warrants it? Can it be objective orcorrigible? How should we evaluate it? Can philosophy be cognitive "in some sense" andnon-cognitive "in another sense"? If so, try toarticulate those senses. Can we say that the"highest" or "most important" philosophy iscognitive or non-cognitive? If philosophy is non-cognitive, would it followthat we should read it non-immanently? (Seesection below on immanent and non-immanentreadings of philosophy.) If philosophy is cognitive, does the apparentlypermanent character of disagreement in philosophybecome a sign of failure? (See the section belowon disagreement and diversity.) In natural science even "negative results" arevaluable. (A negative result is the failure toconfirm an hypothesis.) Is there anythingcomparable in philosophy? What value might"mistaken" philosophies have? Can only non-cognitivist metaphilosophies findvalue in "great mistakes"? Can non-cognitivists have any concept ofphilosophical error? If so, how? If not, isthere a non-cognitivist equivalent? Is philosophical truth more like the truth ofartworks or the truth of science? Are philosophers who are committed to "reason"thereby committed to the cognitivity ofphilosophy? Those who are committed to"inquiry"? Can philosophy be cognitive "ultimately" andnon-cognitive only provisionally? Viceversa? Can you think of examples of each? Do some positions make their cognitivity dependon their certainty? (Can you think of anyexamples?) If such positions don't quite attainthe certainty they need, what is the effect ofrelinquishing their cognitivity? Is philosophy non-cognitive if its point or endis non-cognitive? (See list below for someexamples.) Or is it non-cognitive only if it refrainsfrom claiming truth or falsehood on the way tofulfulling the point, purpose, or end ofphilosophy? Is philosophy non-cognitive if it is prompted,inspired, or caused by something non-epistemic,such as psychological insecurity, class struggle,will to power, or feelings of pleasure and pain? Is all non-cognitivist philosophy fictionalist? If you decide that philosophy is non-cognitive(ultimately, or in the foreground), then how doyou explain the apparent fact that most(practically all) philosophers write as ifphilosophy were cognitive, claiming thatsuch-and-such is true, and thus-and-so false? possible explanations: They had secret doctrines, and did notpublish their real views. (True for themajority?) They were self-deceived. (And we are somuch wiser than they?) The way they wrote does not really implycognitivity; truth claims, refutations,arguments, etc. are moves in the game.(Needs further explanation, justification.) Is non-cognitivism in metaphilosophy plausibleonly to the extent that we are already skepticalabout the possibility of attaining knowledge? Ifnot, why else might it be plausible? What different ways are there to be non-cognitiveand how do we decide to favor some over others?Here are some to consider: truth not propositional; philosophypropositional only as means, or only sometime(Hegel) truth only within system, and system suspendedor floating (Kant? Wittgenstein) non-cognitive point to inquiry for truth(Stoicism, pragmatism, many others) cognitive criteria ultimately subordinate toethical or aesthetic criteria (Nietzsche) self-conscious fictionalism (Nietzsche?Vaihinger) centrality of regulative principles philosophy as "stirring the compost" philosophy as questions, not answers philosophy as search for comfort, solace,utility, beauty, ataraxia, salvation philosophy as literature or art philosophy as expression of personality philosophy as expression of Zeitgeist,substructure, personality, etc. (ideology) philosophy as sheer choice philosophy as cultural action philosophy as liberation philosophy as self-creation philosophy as preparation for death philosophy as meditation philosophy as criticism philosophy as prescription philosophy as play philosophy as worship, celebration philosophy as therapy philosophy as clarification of language philosophy as (a certain kind of) living philosophy as wisdom philosophy as "gadflight" How can we decide that some philosophy is betterthan others? Are non-cognitivists at a loss, ordisadvantage, here? See John Lange, The Cognitivity Paradox,Princeton University Press, 1970; JacobLoewenberg, Reason and the Nature of Things:Reflections on the Cognitive Function ofPhilosophy, Open Court, 1959; James F.Peterman, Philosophy as Therapy: AnInterpretation and Defense of Wittgenstein'sLater Philosophical Project, SUNY Press,1992; Joseph Wayne Smith, The Progress andRationality of Philosophy as a CognitiveEnterprise: An Essay on Metaphilosophy,Avebury, 1988.Systematicity Should philosophy be systematic? What is a philosophical system? What virtues have been claimed for doingphilosophy non-systematically oranti-systematically? Why is beginning a problem for systematicphilosophy? Compare a few philosophers on their actualbeginnings and on their theoretical solutionsto the problem of beginning. Can systems prove themselves without begging thequestion by taking the methods and standards ofproof from within the system? Do systems that purport to be complete licensetheir proponents to interpret disagreement aserror? If so, is this regrettable? Do systems that purport to be complete absorb allcriticism as part of the system (the "tarbabydefense"). If so, is this regrettable? Compare a few systematic philosophers on how theywould respond to one who felt herself to standoutside the system. Kant said (KdrV, B.502) that "Human reason is bynature architectonic. That is to say, it regardsall our knowledge as belonging to a possiblesystem." If Kant is right about this, does itfollow that philosophy should be donesystematically? Or only that reason hopes that acomplete system exists in principle? Kant's quotation continues: "That is to say,it regards all our knowledge as belonging to apossible system, and therefore allows onlysuch principles as do not at any rate make itimpossible for any knowledge that we mayattain to combine into a system with otherknowledge." In any case, is Kant right? Should we decide how to do philosophy in lightof the nature of reason (supposing we couldknow it)? Are systems demanded (by those who demand them)because the explanandum of philosophy issystematic, or because human beings have a quirkypreference (such as a native architectonic oranal retentive neurosis)? Can the philosophical and metaphilosophicaldemands of system-building distort doctrine? Forexample, if logic or ethics ought to saysuch-and-such in truth, could the problem ofbeginning or similar problem leads us in adifferent direction? Are the demands of truthand of systematic coherence compatible? Cf. Nietzsche: "I mistrust all systematizers andavoid them. The will to a system is a lack ofintegrity." Twilight of the Idols and TheAnti-Christ, trans. R.J. Hollingdale,Penguin Books, 1968; from Twilight of theIdols (original 1889), I.26 (p. 25); cfHollingdale's comments on N's anti-systematicityin Appendix A, of this edition, pp. 188-89. See Everett W. Hall, Philosophical Systems:A Categorical Analysis, University ofChicago Press, 1960; George Lucas Jr. (ed.),Hegel and Whitehead: ContemporaryPerspectives on Systematic Philosophy, SUNYPress, 1986; Adriaan Theodoor Peperzak,System and History in Philosophy, SUNYPress, 1986; Jules Vuillemin, What ArePhilosophical Systems?, Cambridge UniversityPress, 1986.Methodology Are there methods peculiar to philosophy? Do we need a method to discover, examine, orjustify a method? Do we need a certified methodto certify a method? If so, how do we escapethis apparent dilemma of circularity and infiniteregress? How does philosophy justify its methods? Do (should) we acquire a method before claimingknowledge, or after? Is knowledge certified bythe method that discovered or established it, oris method certified by the knowledge it discoversor establishes? What is the relationship between method andresult in philosophy? What is, and what ought to be, the role ofargument in philosophy? How rigid is the distinction between argumentto convince and argument to prove? Doesargument have a bona fide epistemicfunction or is it entirely social/political? See section on philosophy and argument below. What are the tenable solutions, if any, to theproblem of beginning? What is the role of criteria in philosophy? Howare they discovered? Do we need criteria tovalidate our criteria? What are the roles of consistency, completeness,and certainty in philosophical writing? What istheir value? What are relations among thesethree traditional desiderata? Is it true (according to Descartes) that alldifferences of result among philosophers may betraced to differences of method? What's wrong with being unmethodical? Why is philosophy more conscious of its methodsthan the sciences?Historicity Is a philosophy determined, or limited, byconditions in the philosopher's time and place? Are some philosophies impossible to understandfrom certain other historical positions? For a given philosopher who claims eternaltruth for her conclusions, how does she claimto have transcended history, and how does sheexplain her own historicity? For a given philosopher who disclaims eternaltruths and asserts that all assertions arehistorically situated, how does she cope withthe apparent self-refutation of her position? Is the history of philosophy the history oferror? What is the relation between the substance of aphilosophy and its 'place' in the history ofphilosophy? What is the relation between philosophy itselfand the history of philosophy? How does this relation differ from thosebetween mathematics, chemistry, literature, orreligion and their histories? If "philosophy is the history of philosophy"(Hegel), then are all philosophical claimshistorically conditioned and liable toreevaluation (including this one)? Can philosophy progress? If so, has it actuallyprogressed? Can philosophy regress? Can you cite anyexamples? Compare the values of writing the history ofphilosophy immanently and non-immanently. What metaphilosophical questions are typicallyanswered (at least by display) in writing thehistory of philosophy? How have philosophers used the history ofphilosophy for non-historical or doctrinalpurposes? See Aristotle's historical remarks at thebeginning of the Metaphysics. Can bad history make good philosophy? (See e.g.Russell and Heidegger on the pre-Socratics.) How do philosophers typically use theirpredecessors? How should they? What would you think of a philosopher who hadread virtually none of his predecessors?(See. e.g. Herbert Spencer.) Hobbes said that if he wasted his time readingthe books of his predecessors, then he'd neverknow more than they did. Would you expect such philosophers to askdifferent kinds of questions and come todifferent kinds of results? If so, try todescribe the difference. In what ways have the questions of philosophychanged and stayed the same from the Greeks tothe 20th century? Is any view of the history or historicity ofphilosophy displayed by philosophies that claimto be "philosophies of the future" rather than ofthe present or past? Cf. Feuerbach, Nietzsche. Why, and how, would a philosopher seek to"overcome" the history of philosophy? Is a "merely antiquarian" interest in the historyof philosophy unphilosophical? Is it legitimate to take philosophical questionsfrom one period and look for answers inphilosophers of another period? What has happened when a philosophical questionis no longer asked, or is greatly reduced inurgency or centrality? (Can you think ofexamples?) What has happened when a position or answer ispassed by without being refuted? Can Kant be right when he says that heunderstands Plato better than Plato understoodhimself? (First Critique, B.370; cfB.862.) Can Fichte be right when he makes the sameclaim about Kant? Can Husserl be right when he says that weunderstand all previous philosophersbetter than they understood themselves?(Crisis of the European Sciences andTranscendental Philosophy, NorthwesternUP, 1970, at 73.) What is historical distance such that thiskind of understanding becomes possible? Can you recognize the historical strata in thelist of questions, for example, in this hand-out? See: Darrel E. Christensen, "Philosophy and ItsHistory," Review of Metaphysics, 18(1960) 58-83; Dauenhauer, Bernard P. (ed.),At the Nexus of Philosophy and History,University of Georgia Press, 1987; W.B. Gallie,Philosophy and the HistoricalUnderstanding, Schocken, 2d ed., 1968; JorgeJ.E. Gracia, Philosophy and Its History:Issues in Philosophical Historiography,SUNY, 1991; Peter Hare (ed.), DoingPhilosophy Historically, Prometheus Books,1996; Frank E. Manuel, Shapes ofPhilosophical History, Stanford UniversityPress, 1965; Adriaan Theodoor Peperzak,System and History in Philosophy, SUNYPress, 1986; Richard Rorty et al. (eds.),Philosophy in History: Essays on theHistoriography of Philosophy, CambridgeUniversity Press, 1984; V. Tejera and ThelmaLavine (eds.), History and Anti-History inPhilosophy, Kluwer Academic Publishing,1989; Craig Walton, "Bibliography of theHistoriography and Philosophy of the History ofPhilosophy," International Studies inPhilosophy, 9 (1977); reprinted Torino:Filosofia, n.d.Self-Reference and Self-Application Are a given philosopher's criteria of truth(knowledge, meaning) true (knowable, meaningful)by their own terms? Must they be? Is self-referential inconsistency asobjectionable as other kinds of inconsistency? Many philosophies have implications for thenature or use of argument, proof, language,method, and philosophy itself. Must philosophiesalways comply with their own strictures on thesesubjects, or can they work at a 'different level'and exempt themselves? Are there interesting or significantphilosophical positions that cannot be expoundedexcept with some self-referential problem orparadox? Can you think of examples? Compare the metaphilosophies of a fewphilosophers on their self-referentialconsistency. Some scholars have distinguished philosophicalreasoning from formal logical reasoning (andscientific and legal reasoning), and found thatsome self-referential methods are peculiar tophilosophy. What uses of self-reference arepeculiar to philosophical reasoning? Find examples of self-justification and self-refutation. Does the search for first principles, orpresuppositions, require frequent encounterswith vicious and benign self-reference? For a given work, what is the effect of doctrine(if any) on the genre of its exposition, type ofdiscourse, or use of language? on its mode ofassertion, type of confidence or certaintyclaimed? Many philosophers use reason to limit or subvertreason (see e.g. Sextus Empiricus, Hume, andKant). If this is paradoxical at first sight,what does it show in the last analysis about thenature of reason, philosophy, and method? How should we judge philosophies which (as most do)instruct us how to judge? If we cannot 'get outside' philosophy to judgephilosophies, should we regret or rejoice?What does it show about the cognitivity ofphilosophy? Why does a given philosopher practice philosophyand write books? Is her book consistent withthis vision of the nature and function ofphilosophy? Can the doctrinal aspect of a philosophy beconsistent with all its other aspects? What isthe price of trying? of failing? See: Steven J. Bartlett and Peter Suber,Self-Reference: Reflections onReflexivity, Martinus Nijhoff, 1987(contains a large bibliography).Immanence and Non-Immanence Should philosophy be explained as theintellectual response to philosophical questions,arguments, living problems, and priorphilosophers? (These would be immanentexplanations.) Should philosophy instead be explained as theupshot, byproduct, epiphenomenon, or side-effectof something else, such as economic or politicalforces, class struggle, will to power, individualpsychology, cultural determinism, or linguisticconfusion? (These would be non-immanent orreductive explanations; they are sometimes called"external critique".) If you prefer an immanent explanation, how do youexplain the role of the historical andpsychological conditions of the philosopher inthe development of her philosophy? Doesphilosophy reflect the material conditions of itstime and place at all? If you prefer a non-immanent explanation,'ultimately', then is your favored explanationsubject to philosophical criticism? If so, whatis the effect of this circle on the strength ofyour explanation? How far can the two types of explanation ofphilosophy work together? Is it consistent tointerpret the same philosopher or text as havingreasons (immanent) and causes (non-immanent), ordoes the latter undercut the former? Can non-immanent analysis of a philosophy avoid"reduction"? What is reduction? If it is objectionable,why is it objectionable? What metaphilosophyis displayed by the view that it isobjectionable? For a given philosopher, ask whether she wants tobe examined solely on the basis of the argumentsand conclusions in her book? Even if so, what might be useful for us, quaphilosophers, to learn about the philosopher's(or philosophy's) psychological, political,economic, or historical background andcircumstances? For a given philosopher, ask whether herimportant theses arose, or are presented as ifthey arose, entirely from thinking about issuesand examining arguments? What of philosophical interest might be (inWittgenstein's terms) displayed but not depictedby a work of philosophy? Is it necessary, or artificial, to distinguishthe grounds of a theory according to the author(the immanent argument) from the causes of thetheory accoring to the reader (the non-immanentexplanation)? If they are distinct, which ismore essential in understanding the nature of aphilosophy? Marxists hold that immanent histories ofphilosophy presuppose idealism. Is this true?Conversely, is it true that idealist historiesmust be immanent histories? Must materialisthistories be non-immanent? Must non-immanenthistories or analyses be materialist? If Marx is right, would it follow thatteaching philosophy to emphasizingthe immanent arguments would presupposeidealism? What are the social and political conditions thatdefine philosophers and philosophy? Doesidentifying them help solve or dissolve anyphilosophical problems? Is immanent philosophy bad faith? "Justacademic"? If philosophy must address one'ssituation to be authentic, how far can it thenaddress the tradition and continue the immanentdialogue of the tradition? Can philosophy be done non-immanently, or onlyviewed non-immanently?Disagreement and Diversity Why have philosophers not agreed as often asscientists? Have philosophers agreed more than at firstappears? Less? Can the apparent disagreement be reinterpreted asmisunderstanding? as development? What may, and may not, legitimately be inferredfrom the spectacle of disagreement in philosophy?Why? For example, does it follow that at least halfthe positions are in error? that we should berelativists? that we should be skeptics? that certainty is unattainable?that philosophyis non-cognitive? that philosophy isdialectical? that truth is contradictory?that philosophy is not a science? thatphilosophers are narcissists? that futurework is necessary? that future work ispointless? something else? If philosophy is cognitive, then is the spectacleof disagreement a sign of failure? Similarly, if one takes the spectacle ofdisagreement to be a sign of health, then isone thereby displaying one's view thatphilosophy is non-cognitive? Is the apparently permanent character ofphilosophical disagreement of philosophers asign of success or failure? (Both? Neither?) How can we conceive "success" (or health) suchthat philosophy is successful (or healthy)despite the perennial disagreement?Can philosophy be a "practical" success anda "speculative" failure?Can philosophy be functional for good in itsculture and for its individual practitioners(even if its theories are false or uncertain)?Can philosophy show the connections amongideas, so that we understand the issues betterand better (even if its theories are false oruncertain)?Can philosophy provide tools forunderstanding (even if its theories are falseor uncertain)? How much of the historical disagreement inphilosophy can be attributed to: the fact that philosophers are askingdifferent questions? the fact that individual philosophers differfrom each other in some combination of race,class, gender, personality, language, century, and culture? exaggerated or polarized statements thatdescribe different but largely compatiblephilosophies? misunderstanding? What does it mean that philosophers disagree evenabout the significance of disagreement? Is disagreement in and of itself a ground ofdoubt? Does disagreement prevent certainty? Ifso, is certainty impossible? Do any philosopherstake disagreement into account in "setting" the"assertiveness level" of their assertions? Is disagreement a sufficient sign ofuncertainty, obliging us to doubt or hesitate,or is it compatible with certainty (i.e. ifall but one are simply wrong)? If disagreement is taken as a sufficient signof uncertainty, and if one of the positionsfighting for recognition in the choir ofdisagreement is actually true, then we willmiss our chance to affirm truth waiting forthe disagreement to disappear. If this is so, are we stupid, or is thistragic? If epistemology converts the search for truthinto the search for certainty (Suber), then doesit thereby convert it to the search for agreementas well? If epistemology (through questions like "howdo you know?") does not do this, are thereother forces that do? If so, what are they? Are some philosophical disagreements"incommensurable"? If so, how are theyadjudicated, if at all? What about disagreements about the true logic,the concept of judgment, the function ofdisagreement, or other parameters of debateand adjudication itself? What about disagreements on the nature orplace of incommensurability? If you incline to an Hegelian or developmentalview of disagreement, how do you explain the factthat a very large majority of philosophers thinkthey are giving the truth once and for all? Arethey all self-deceived? If so, how can this beexplained? Or is it not in fact true that mostphilosophers think they are giving the truth onceand for all? If two positions are not really contradictory,but appear to be so, they may be reconciled atthe immanent level. But all philosophies may bereconciled at a non-immanent level, even if theyreally contradict one another. One non-immanentreconciliation is to regard the positions asstages in the unfolding of truth. What are thedangers, and glories, of non-immanentreconciliations? Is agreement a goal of philosophy? Wouldagreement be a sign of the success of philosophy? If agreements can be false or ideological,then what is the value of agreement as a goalfor philosophy? Is agreement a more reasonable goal forphilosophy if we mean agreement in Habermas'ideal speech situation? From Charles Peirce: Is agreement (ultimateunanimity of all reasonable inquirers) acriterion of truth? If you are inclined to say no, do yourcriteria ultimately reduce to this one? Doyour criteria either use agreement as a signof truth, or imply that agreement isdesirable? Does one philosophy imply that all other,disagreeing philosophies are wrong? Do allphilosophies have a (tacit or explicit)"exclusivity clause"? Find philosophies that do and that do not takethis position. What are their various viewsof disagreement? of logic? of debate? oferror? of corrigibility? For a philosophy without an exclusivityclause, explore the question whether thatphilosophy and its attitude towarddisagreement are self-subverting or self-justifying. Can cognitive philosophies not havean exclusivity clause? Can coherentphilosophies? Can the attempt to rid oneselfof an exclusivity clause depend on the use ofone? Can a philosophy be refuted for relying on ametaphilosophy belied by the fact ofdisagreement? If disagreement can damage (some) philosophicalpositions, then would it matter if all humanbeings agreed on everything starting tomorrow?Or would the rich history of past disagreementsuffice to cause whatever damage disagreementcould cause? Is there any place in philosophy for the argumentfrom consensus gentium? If it has evena limited role, what is it? In the second Critique Kant said thatthe distinction between contingent unanimity andnecessary universality is essential to ethics.Is it essential to philosophy or metaphilosophy? Is disagreement symmetrical? Fichte said he agreed with Kant on the theoryof freedom; before he died, Kant said hedisagreed with Fichte on the theory offreedom. H.L.A. Hart and Hans Kelsen alsodisagree on whether they disagree (Hart thinksthey agree on some points, Kelsen doesn't). What is happening when disagreement appears tobe asymmetrical? What is the relation between a philosopher'sattitude toward disagreement and diversity, andher theory of error? Must philosophers applytheir theories of error to all philosophers whodisagree? If not, when and why not? Why is it so very rare to read words to theeffect, "I am right, everyone else is wrong, andI can prove it..."? Do philosophers commonly have this attitudebut timidly or courteously refrain fromvoicing it? Or do they have this attitudeonly rarely? How should a philosopher regard the critics anddissenters who do not agree with her? Compare a few philosophers on how theyactually regard critics and dissenters (e.g.as mistaken, underdeveloped, self-deceived,blameworthy, stubborn, pitiable,unintelligent, uninspired, unfortunately bornin wrong sex, culture, or century, true in theuntrue form,...). What is displayed about one's metaphilosophy,and about one's epistemology and ethics, byhow one regards critics and dissenters? What features of a philosophy and ametaphilosophy permit one to use the "tarbabydefense", that is, to embrace and envelope allcritics and dissenters, saying they areexplained by the system and even confirm thetruth of the system? Are these featuresobjectionable in themselves, or desirable? See Frank Brown Dilley, "The Nature ofPhilosophical Disagreement," in hisMetaphysics and Religious Language,Columbia University Press, 1964; Frank BrownDilley, "Why Do Philosophers Disagree?"Southern Journal of Philosophy, 7 (1969)217-28; Henry Alonzo Myers, SystematicPluralism, Cornell University Press, 1961;George Kimball Plochmann, "Metaphysical Truth andthe Diversity of Systems," Review ofMetaphysics, 15 (Oct. 1959-Jan. 1960)51-66; Nicholas Rescher, The Strife ofSystems: An Essay on the Grounds and Implicationsof Philosophical Diversity, University ofPittsburgh Press, 1985; Wilmon Henry Sheldon,Strife of Systems and ProductiveDuality, Harvard University Press, 1918;Joseph Wayne Smith, "Against OrientationalPluralism in Metaphilosophy,"Metaphilosophy, 16, 2-3 (April-July,1985) 214-20 (against Rescher).Primacy of the Practical Is 'the practical' (the ethical) primary inphilosophy? Do we do non-ethical philosophy ultimately forthe sake of ethics, and all philosophy ultimatelyfor the sake of action or living? Is philosophy essentially a kind of inquiry? Is philosophy essentially a kind of action orlife? What is the relation between 'the speculative'and 'the practical' in philosophy? Do we hold one philosophy rather than anothersolely by virtue of intellectual criteria or atleast partially by sheer choices? Explore what Fichte, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche,and Sartre have said on this question. Is it legitimate to judge (say) epistemologicaldoctrines by their implications for ethics? Is it legitimate to judge (say) ethical doctrinesby their implications for epistemology? What kind of philosophy should we do if we holdthat ethics is morally prior to everything, butthat some kinds of knowledge are temporally priorto ethics? If good action requires true belief, how do wecope with the difficulty of attaining truebelief? That is, how do we act ethically whileundertaking the philosophical (scientific,quotidian...) labor of attaining true belief?Should we settle for approximations andfictionalist shortcuts (as in Descartes'provisional morality), or should we spend all thetime it takes to "do epistemology right", lettingour duties suffer in the meantime? Can philosophy be dangerous? If so, what areyour models of safety and danger? What is therelation between truth and safety? What are thedangers of philosophy? Hume said (Treatise at p. 272) thaterrors in religion are dangerous while thosein philosophy are only ridiculous. Are thereno dangerous errors in philosophy? (If so,why?) Can philosophy be useful for social or politicalends? If so, how and which ends? If so, isservice toward those ends the "point" ofphilosophy? If not (if philosophy is not usefulfor social and political ends), is that acriticism? Hegel believes that philosophy cannot give moralor political advice, since it always comes on thescene too late (spreading its wings only with thefalling of the dusk). If true, would this ruleout the primacy of the practical for philosophy?(What does Hegel himself say?) What does it reveal about the nature ofphilosophy that the life of Socrates, far morethan his views, has been cherished andinfluential for two millenia? Studying the meaning of the word "of" is apt toaffect one's life less than studying the conceptof freedom. Is it fair to judge the merits of aphilosophy, or character of a philosopher, by thedegree of integration of the philosophy in thelife of the philosopher? Are there different answers to the questions, (1)how did philosophy arise, and (2) why should onestudy philosophy? For example, did philosophyarise for epistemological reasons, to render ourbeliefs coherent, or for metaphysical reasons, tounderstand what was going on, whereas (perhaps)one ought to study philosophy for moral reasons? Let us say that "primary" philosophy tries toanswer the important questions that actuallyarise in life, and that "secondary" philosophytries to answer the questions that arise in doingprimary (and secondary) philosophy. Secondaryphilosophy may address questions of methodologyor systematicity, consistency, try to head offparadoxes of self-reference, and so on. If wegrant primacy to the practical, what is the valueof secondary philosophy? Should we avoid it? Do it quickly and getback to primary philosophy? Spend as long aswe must at it in order to be sure that ourprimary philosophy is well-founded, even ifwe spend most of our lives at it? Should we expect the study of philosophy to helpus decide in specific cases how to act? Are philosophers moral experts? Are moralexperts (if any) philosophers? Should we expect the study of philosophy to makeus better people? If so, exactly how? If not, then what is the value of studyingphilosophy? What does a philosopher expect from a goodreader? Scholarship and understanding? Or somemore authentic reflection or action? Does itdepend on the philosopher or work? Identify a philosopher who expected thelatter. How effective was his/her book ineliciting or inviting that reflection oraction?Philosophy good and bad How do we distinguish good or great philosophyfrom lesser philosophy? How have philosophers done it? Do our criteria come from the philosophies weare judging to be good or great? (What arethe paradoxes of saying yes, or no, here?) Is it an objection to some non-immanent readingsof philosophy that they ignore excellence andlook at all works, good and bad, as equallyrepresentative of a certain underlying cause, oras symptoms of some syndrome? Is the evaluation of philosophy, asNorthrop Frye says of literature, much lessimportant than its interpretation? Is there a dimension of quality in philosophybeyond its truth or plausibility? Can truephilosophy be badly done, or false philosophywell done? If so, what kind of quality is thisand what are its criteria? Call this dimension of quality the "craft"dimension. Can attention to craft everdistort doctrine, or suggest paths that 'pure'epistemology, metaphysics, or ethics (etc.)would not have suggested? See also section on philosophical beauty,below.Philosophy and expertise What talents or skills are required for "good"philosophizing? Is familiarity with the history of philosophyrequired? Is mastery of formal logic (or argumentationmore loosely) required? Is skill at exegesis required? Is acquaintance with the other arts andsciences, including history, required? Is wide experience, or "life", required? Can philosophy be "expertly" done and remainexoteric? If one denies that there is a special kind ofexpertise for philosophy, is one therebycommitted to relativism? Cf. Hegel on the foot as standard of shoemaking,reason as the standard of philosophizing; not allwho have feet are expert cobblers; not all whohave reason are expert philosophers; LesserLogic, 5; Phenomenology, 67. What else is required beyond "reason"? Cf. Kant on the "genteel tone" that had recentlyarisen in philosophy. Cf. C.E.M. Joad on "Bunkumismus"; there are no"stigmata of competency" in philosophy;Return to Philosophy, Dutton, 1936, p.36; also see 23-24, 35-37.Ends of philosophy Do we, or should we, do "philosophy forphilosophy's sake"? If so, what becomes of thepursuits of truth, justice, and good life? Ifnot, what is the purpose of philosophy? Is there a single "point" to the practice ofphilosophy? Or could it be a mixture of (addyour own...) moral improvement, inquiry fortruth, solace, salvation, diversion, celebration,puzzle-solving, aesthetic enjoyment, worship,zestful living, and wonder? In what sense are the ends of philosophytherapeutic for the philosopher and for thereaders? In its ends or goals, is philosophy closer toart, religion, or the sciences? Are the ends of philosophy yet to be achieved?Or are they constantly achieved and/or by theirnature in need of continual pursuit and accomplishment? If philosophy is worth doing, is it worth doingforever? Or is it worth doing only until it is"finished" (whatever that would be)? If the chase is worth more than the capture,would it ever make sense (or ever make goodphilosophy) to forgo the capture when it waswithin reach in order to continue the chase?If we translate this out of metaphor, what arewe talking about? Lessing: if God had truth in one hand andpursuit of truth in the other, he'd choose thesecond. Wittgenstein: let the fly out of thefly bottle; get to the point where you canstop doing philosophy. What would lead a philosopher to expound aposition and then at the end to abandon it, or inthe metaphor of Sextus Empiricus made famous byWittgenstein, to kick down the ladder afterclimbing up it? Compare this self-cancellation in SextusEmpiricus, Hume, Emerson, Kierkegaard,Wittgenstein, and Feyerabend. Feuerbach and Wittgenstein (among others) want tostop doing philosophy. What would justifystopping? Wittgenstein and some other analytic philosophersbelieve that (good) philosophy "leaves everythingthe way it was". Describe a perspective thatwould make this a virtue, and another that wouldmake it a vice. What is certainty? Does philosophy seek or needcertainty? Is the conquest of doubt overrated inimportance by the tradition? What importantends require it? Marx protested that previously philosophersmerely tried to interpret the world, but that thepoint is to change it. Which pre-Marxianphilosophers deserve this criticism? How wouldsome reply to Marx? If a philosophy makes the philosopher miserable,is it thereby failing to achieve the ends ofphilosophy? See James F. Peterman, Philosophy as Therapy:An Interpretation and Defense of Wittgenstein'sLater Philosophical Project, SUNY Press,1992; Harry Redner, The Ends of Philosophy:An Essay in the Sociology of Philosophy andRationality, Rowman and Allanheld, 1986;Death of philosophy Why have analytic philosophers claimed thatphilosophy is or ought to be finished? Why have continental philosophers? What is philosophy such that it might well befinished? What is it such that it is clearlystill alive? Are there good philosophical reasons for wantingto cease doing philosophy, or to abolish it? See Kenneth Baynes et al (eds.), AfterPhilosophy: End or Transformation? MITPress, 1987; Daniel Brudney, Marx's Attempt to Leave Philosophy, Harvard University Press, 1998; Ian Hacking, "Is the End in Sightfor Epistemology?" Journal ofPhilosophy, 77 (1980) 579-88; Jaegwon Kim,"Rorty on the Possibility of Philosophy,"Journal of Philosophy, 77 (1980) 588-97;Kai Nielsen, After the Demise of theTradition: Rorty, Critical Theory, and the Fateof Philosophy, Westview Press, 1991; QuentinSkinner, "The End of Philosophy," New YorkTimes Review of Books, 23, 4 (March 19,1981) 46-48; Peter Suber, "Is Philosophy Dead?"Earlhamite, 112, 2 (Winter 1993) 12-14;Meredith Williams, "Transcendence and Return:The Overcoming of Philosophy in Nietzsche andWittgenstein," International PhilosophicalQuarterly, 28, 4 (December 1988).Anti-philosophies Are there positions or theories that, if true orjustified, would make most or all philosophynugatory? Consider the claims of the followingin this light: the ancient Greek skeptics Marxists on ideology some existentialists on the role and absurdityof choice American pragmatists radical empiricists naive realists some natural scientists on the exclusivity ofsound method religious fundamentalists on faith those believing that thinking is a disease anti-intellectuals (even intellectualanti-intellectuals) How does, and how should, philosophy evaluatethese claims?Philosophy and assertion Do all philosophies "take positions" or "makeassertions"? If not, what have some philosophiesdone in place of these? Why couldn't Plato (or Nietzsche...) just statehis assertions and argue them? If we translatedPlato (or Nietzsche...) into a "handbook" oftheir assertions and arguments, what would belost except for "rhetorical color"? What of philosophical significance havephilosophies done in addition to taking positionsor making assertions? What are we missing if we read works ofphilosophy only for their assertions? What modes of assertion have philosophers used? hypothesis (Fichte's idealism? Leibniz onnon-contradiction?) faith reason: proved, non-hypothetical (Kant'sapodeictic certainty) subjunctive mood (some Kierkegaard) moral certainty (Kant on god, freedom, andimmortality) non-assertion (Greek skeptics' "aphasia") sheer assertion, as in some aphorists and someexistentialists; essentially without argument non-cognitive: sheer choice cognitive: sheer dogmatism presuming on readers' agreement orintrospective certification (much of Locke) questioning, not (or more than) answering doubting, not (or more than) affirming "my view from here now" "view from nowhere" (Thomas Nagel) as reflection of Zeitgeist, personality etc. mischievous, misleading instrumental to see truth (Hegel?Wittgenstein?) important to be misunderstood in certain way(Kierkegaard? Nietzsche?) concealment of secret doctrine (Plato?Descartes?) Skeptics challenge the right of anyone to makeassertions. What is the value of a philosophythat does not meet the skeptical challengeexplicitly and successfully? Does assertion per se presupposefinality, objectivity, exclusivity, orcognitivity? If not, what "logical space" isleft open by assertion? If so, how can aphilosopher who wishes to deny philosophy one ofthese things (finality, objectivity, exclusivity,objectivity) expound her position withoutself-referential inconsistency? What would be the point of making and revokingphilosophical assertions in the same work? See Wittgenstein's proposition 6.54 in theTractatus and its antecedents inSextus Empiricus (Outlines ofPyrrhonism) and Kierkegaard(Concluding Unscientific Postscript).Philosophy and exposition What is the relation between the substance of adoctrine and the genre in which it ispresented (dialogue, treatise, system, essay,aphorism, private journal, novel, poem...)? Do different genres communicate in different wayssuch that some are inappropriate for philosophyor for particular philosophical positions? Are there philosophical positions that canonly or that can best beexpounded in the genres of literature? What is the relation between the order in which aposition is expounded and the logical order ofinference? Compare a few philosophers on whatguides the expositional order. Compare and contrast the orders of proof,time, exposition, and discovery. How do theyinteract in works of philosophy? Why do philosophers write books? Compare themotivations of a few philosophers. What implications can a doctrine have for thelegitimate motives for promulgating it?Discuss a few cases. Contrast, where you can, the motives forwriting books that are found in biographicalresearch with the motives that follow from thedoctrine immanently. Can you find a casewhere these two motives are inconsistent? Can a doctrine imply that its promulgation isunimportant, or even unwise? Can you think ofany examples? Can exposition per se distort or beliethe substance of a philosophy? Can you think of examples? Are there any serious philosophical positionsthat would be falsified or undermined by theexistence of an exposition of them? Why would a philosopher write a work with theintention of being difficult to understand, or ofbeing misunderstood by some? See Descartes, Discourse on Method,Part 6; Nietzsche, The Gay Science, §§190, 371, 381; Beyond Good andEvil, §§27, 43; Johannes Climacus,Philosophical Fragments andConcluding Unscientific Postscript. How should we read such texts? Do we (1) workvery hard and crack the code or (2) 'respect'the intention to hide or to mislead, and takethe work at face value? To what extent are philosophers responsible forthe use or misuse of their work? Discuss thecase of one or two philosophers (e.g. Plato,Hegel, and Nietzsche were all used by Nazischolars to justify the Nazi program). Is exposition essential to philosophy? What is lost if philosophy is done silently? Do philosophers have any kind of obligation topublish their thoughts, enter dialogue,respond to critics, or enlighten the rest ofus? If so, is there a correlative obligation toexpound clearly? non-fictionally?systematically? Is philosophy inherently a public or socialenterprise? a dialogue or conversation? What is the relation between utterance andcontemplation? Is argument essential to philosophy or only toits public exposition and audience (or both orneither)?Philosophy and style What is the relation between the substance of adoctrine and the style in which it is written? Are style and substance inseparable? Or canevery substance (doctrine, position) beexpressed in other styles? Does style itself convey substance? Why would a philosopher ever use irony? Find a few philosophies that have implicationsfor the use of language and compare them on therelation between their style and content. Howwell did their own writing live up to, abide by,or embody their views? See e.g. Aristotle on systematic equivocation;Locke on general terms; Kant on definition (orexamples, or prosaic language); Hegel onpicture-language; Compare a philosopher's metaphorical andnon-metaphorical expressions for theircontribution to the vision and integration in theposition. Arthur Lovejoy said of William James that hewrote so well that it is difficult to know whathe was saying or whether it is true. Shouldphilosophers, like scientists and jurists, adoptdry styles that create no risk of persuasionbeyond the evidence? See F.C.S. Schiller, "Must Philosophy beDull?" (in his Our Human Truths) Margaret Wiley said of Spenser and Emerson thatthey adopted paradox as a style in order to avoidthe risk of oversimplification. Are there other"logically objectionable" tropes that might havehigher rhetorical justifications in philosophy? Some have suggested that opacity is aphilosophical style, adopted in order to mystifyand avoid the burden of precision. Is this justcynical? Edgar Allen Poe said nothing was ineffable. Onequalification we may put on this is that nothingthinkable is ineffable. One way to readthis is that everything thinkable can beexpressed in common language; the introduction oftechnical vocabulary, or new languages, is alwaysunnecessray. We could refine this further to ana priori suspicion more than a provabletruth: if we feel driven to esoteric language toexpress our esoteric thought, then we shouldfirst suspect that we are bad writers. Are technical vocabularies justified inphilosophy? Are new ways of using language needed by somephilosophies? Or are those who think so justinsufficiently agile with common language? What is clarity? Is it reasonable to demand that all philosophybe written clearly? Is clarity always doctrinally neutral? Does "clarity" mean the same thing todifferent philosophical paradigms? What are the differences among (1) Kant'sreluctance to use examples, (2) Hegel'sreluctance to use picture-language, and (3)Dennett's preference for using "intuition pumps"? See Pat Bigelow, Kierkegaard and the Problemof Writing, Florida State University Press,1988; Brand Blanshard, On PhilosophicalStyle, Indiana University Press, 1954;Robert Ginsberg (ed.), The Philosopher asWriter: The Eighteenth Century, SusquehannaUniversity Press, 1987; Berel Lang, TheAnatomy of Philosophical Style: LiteraryPhilosophy and the Philosophy of Literature,Basil Blackwell, 1990; Berel Lang (ed.),Philosophical Style: An Anthology about theWriting and Reading of Philosophy,Nelson-Hall, 1980; special issue of TheMonist on Philosophy as Style andLiterature as Philosophy, 63, 4 (October1980); John J. Richetti, PhilosophicalWriting: Locke, Berkeley, Hume, HarvardUniversity Press, 1983; Richard Rorty,"Philosophy as a Kind of Writing: An Essay onDerrida," in Rorty's Consequences ofPragmatism, University of Minnesota Press,1982, pp. 90-109. More under Literature as Philosophy, below.Philosophy as literature Are there perspectives that make it fruitful tosee philosophy as a sub-genre of literature? See for example: Collingwood, section of Essay onPhilosophical Method Lewis White Beck, essay, "Philosophy asLiterature" Juan Marias, Philosophy as DramaticTheory Kenneth Burke, essay, "DramatisticIntroduction to Kant" (mostly on Kant'sethics) If philosophy is non-cognitive, does it thenacquire the same value and epistemic standing asliterature (whatever those are)? Why or why not? If we read the history of philosophynon-immanently as the reflection of personality,how could we distinguish philosophy andliterature? Are theories (philosophical and scientific) andliterary plots variations on a single structure,the story? What would a general theory ofstories look like, and how would it force us toreinterpret the nature and history of philosophy? Do great works of philosophy and of literaturesurvive "the test of time" for different reasons?How do works of each kind become "dated" andprimarily of historical interest? Can we interpret Kierkegaard's "authorship" (histerm), with its many pseudonyms and histrionics,as a gigantic work of literature? What is gainedand lost by such a reading? Can we interpret Platonic dialogues as dramas?What is gained and lost by such a reading? Are philosophy and literature different (insofaras they are different) primarily in genre orprimarily in substance? Was Aristotle (in the Poetics) rightto locate the difference in literature's useof particulars and philosophy's use ofuniversals? What similarities does such atheory recognize or permit? See the bibliography at the end of the nextsection.Literature as philosophy Can philosophy be written in the genres ofliterature? Can we say (as Santayana does) thatDante, Shakespeare, and Goethe are philosophers? Why might a philosopher occasionally expound herideas in the genres of fiction? Obvious examples are Rousseau'sEmile, Nietzsche'sZarathustra, and some works ofLucretius and Voltaire. Can we say the sameof the novels of Dostoevsky, Sartre, deBeauvoir, or Iris Murdoch? the poetry ofMilton, Blake, or Wordsworth? How would you characterize the boundaries betweenphilosophy and literature today? In the past,e.g., in the generation of Goethe? Shakespeare?Plato? Hesiod? What makes the boundary between philosophy andliterature change over time? What changes haveoccurred? Can you correlate the changes withphilosophically important changes in the historyof philosophy, or with critically importantchanges in the history of literature? Is it unfair to literature, or to philosophy, tosee literature as "empirical philosophy" thatmakes its position known through concreteparticulars? Why is the novel a genre more commonly used byexistentialists than by other kinds ofphilosophers? See Anthony J. Cascardi, The Bounds ofReason: Cervantes, Dostoevsky, Flaubert,Columbia University Press, 1986; Anthony J.Cascardi (ed.), Literature and the Questionof Philosophy, John Hopkins UniversityPress, 1987; Albert Cook, The Stance ofPlato, Rowman & Littlefield, 1995; RichardEldridge, On Moral Personhood: Philosophy,Literature, Criticism, and Self-Understanding, University of Chicago Press,1990; Ethan Fishman, Likely Stories: Essayson Political Philosophy and Contemporary AmericanLiterature, University of Florida Press,1989; Hans-Georg Gadamer, Literature andPhilosophy in Dialogue: Essays in GermanLiterary Theory, trans. Robert H. Paslick,SUNY Press, 1993 (on Goethe, Hölderlin, Rilke,and others); Jill Gordon, Turning Toward Philosophy: Literary Device and Dramatic Structure in Plato's Dialogues, Penn State University Press, 1999; Thomas Gould, The AncientQuarrel Between Poetry and Philosophy,Princeton University Press, 1991; JürgenHabermas, The Philosophical Discourse ofModernity, MIT Press, 1990 (contains asection called "Excursus on Leveling the GenreDistinction Between Philosophy and Literature,"pp. 185-326); Everett W. Knight, LiteratureConsidered as Philosophy: The FrenchExample, Collier Books, 1962; Richard Kuhns,Structures of Experience: Essays on theAffinity Between Philosophy and Literature,1970; Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, The Subjectof Philosophy, University of MinnesotaPress, 1993; Berel Lang, The Anatomy ofPhilosophical Style: Literary Philosophy and thePhilosophy of Literature, Basil Blackwell,1990; Bernd Magnus et al, Nietzsche's Case:Philosophy as/and Literature, Routledge,1992; Donald G. Marshall (ed.), Literature asPhilosophy, Philosophy as Literature,University of Iowa Press, 1987; Martha CravenNussbaum, Love's Knowledge: Essays onPhilosophy and Literature, Oxford UniversityPress, 1990; Mark Taylor, Deconstruction inContext: Literature and Philosophy,University of Chicago Press, 1986 (interplay oflit. and philosophy from Kant to Derrida); SamuelWeber, Demarcating the Disciplines:Philosophy, Literature, Art, University ofMinnesota Press, 1986. Also see the journal,Philosophy and Literature, published byJohns Hopkins University Press.Interpreting Philosophy When we read a philosophy text, must weassimilate the position we find to our own termsin order to understand it? Does understandingalways require assimilation? If so, then is understanding always distorted? If not, how can understanding occur withoutassimilation? If understanding requires assimilation, thencould there be incommensurable disagreements thatwe simply never notice? We might not notice them because we assimilatethe incommensurable other and it seemscommensurable to us, or because theincommensurable other never comes into focus(our understanding) sufficiently for us toacknowledge its existence or content. If understanding requires assimilation, then mustwe be unfair to positions in conflict with ourown? Do we beg the question to judge positions weread by our own standards rather than judgingour own position by the standards of theposition we are reading? What if our own position explains away theposition we are reading, as opposed toexplaining it? Can we avoid judging a conflicting paradigmfrom the partisan position of our ownparadigm? If not, what does this imply about thepermanency of disagreement, the fairness ofjudgments, and the nature of interpretationand debate? Does fairness require commensurability? What follows for the ethics of argument fromthat fact that we can demand fairness butcannot demand commensurability? If there is incommensurability, or simplyassimilation without incommensurability, then theideal speech situation is violated. Does this mean that "logical rudeness" isunavoidable, and non-ideological agreementforeclosed? Do philosophers intend a single meaning that herreaders can discover with due diligence? Is'good' interpretation 'accurate' interpretationthat uncovers the historical intention of theauthor? Or is this model of textualunderstanding simply inadequate? What can the interpretation of philosophylearn from literary theory on this question?Does it matter that philosophy is "non-fiction"?Philosophical beauty Can philosophy be beautiful? If so, how doesphilosophical beauty differ from literary,scientific, and mathematical beauty? Is philosophical beauty linked in any way to thecontent of the philosophy? For example, is theharmony of form and content beautiful? Is truthan element of beauty? Were Shaftesbury and Keatsright to identify truth and beauty? Do we often use beauty as an unacknowledgedcriterion of truth? Can we acknowledge andjustify this practice? Is the distinction between the beauty ofexpression (language and organization) and thebeauty of ideas (content) easier to make, orharder, in philosophy than in literature? What are some beautiful works or theories ofphilosophy? Are there "great" works of philosophy that arenot beautiful? Are there beautiful works thatare not great? What are the elements of philosophical ugliness?Philosophy as science Is philosophy a science, as so many philosophershave claimed? If so, how can we explain the wideand deep disagreements in philosophy? Compare the visions of philosophy as a science oftwo or more philosophers, e.g. Kant, Hegel,Husserl. What model of science was used? Howappropriate was it? If inappropriate, whatdimensions of philosophy did it violate orignore? What features of science have led so manyphilosophers to try to emulate it? In what periods has philosophy most and leastemulated its contemporary science? Can youcorrelate the coming and going of such periodswith the state of science? with the state ofphilosophy? How tenable is it to say that the sciences wereonce part of philosophy and were jettisoned whenthey became scientific? What does that implyabout the nature of what currently passes underthe name of philosophy? Do philosophers who believe that philosophy iscapable of discovering truths thereby believethat philosophy is some kind of science? Canphilosophy be cognitive and unscientific? If so,how? See C.J. Ducasse, Philosophy as a Science:Its Matter and Its Method, Oskar Piest, 1941(on many different models of philosophy as ascience); Edmund Husserl, "Philosophie alsstrenge Wissenschaft," Logos, 1(1910-11) 289-95; Hilary Putnam, RenewingPhilosophy, Harvard University Press, 1992(against science as a model for philosophy); HansReichenbach, The Rise of ScientificPhilosophy, University of California Press,1951.Philosophy and related fields and activities How is philosophy different from (and similar to)religion, theology, faith, literature, empiricalscience, history, mathematics, logic,linguistics, dreaming, guessing, common sense,play? Take a religious philosopher and ask what, in herview, religion offers that philosophy does not,and vice versa. (This will tend tohighlight her metaphilosophy.) Ditto with a scientific philosopher; with anartistic philosopher; with a literaryphilosopher.... What are the most important similarities anddifferences between philosophy and the Glass BeadGame? If all knowledge is a seamless web, and onlyartificially divided into "fields", then what isthe place and function of philosophy? It is often said that philosophy synthesizes theinsights or principles of the different sciencesand humanistic disciplines. Is this true? Ifso, how are these syntheses made and what istheir intellectual value? To what extent isphilosophy parasitic on the other disciplines? Must good philosophers be well-acquainted withmany other fields? What are the sources of philosophicalinspiration? How much philosophy could be donewithout the results of other disciplines? Howmuch philosophy is stimulated by otherphilosophy, and how much by science or art, andhow much by "life itself"? Are there results in any of the special sciences,e.g. logic, that philosophers must accept to begood philosophers? Or are all such results opento philosophical criticism? Can philosophy make a contribution to thesolution of problems within the natural or socialsciences? If so, how? Can you think of possibleor actual cases. Thomas Kuhn believes that when scientificparadigms are tottering, scientists turn moreoften to philosophy, which provides freshcreative insights. When paradigms are stable,one of their beneficial functions is toprotect scientists from the need to askfoundational questions so they can donecessary detail-work. This view makesphilosophy useful, alluring, and dangerous allat once. Is this view historically correct? What plays the role for philosophy thatphilosophy plays for science? Recall how Mill and James were both curedof severe depressions that halted theirphilosophical work by immersion in poetry(Wordsworth for Mill, Whitman for James).Music seems to have played a similar rolefor Socrates and Schopenhauer.Wittgenstein was a garderner in amonastery, and watched American westernsfrom the front row, when he neededdistraction from philosophy, or a freshwind in the doldrums. Is philosophy essentially playful? See Huizinga on philosophy and play; RichardHofstadter on intellectualism as piety andplay; Schiller on centrality of play to beinghuman; Kant on play and reason in thirdCritique; Gadamer on play; play inGlass Bead Game; Socratic method.Has the relation between philosophy and other academic disciplines changed over time? If so, it is more a function of changes within philosophy or changes within the other disciplines? Did the fairly sudden success of the physical sciences in the 17th century change philosophy? If so, how exactly? What does this show about the relation between philosophy and science?How did philosophy emerge from non-philosophy? Why? How did it differentiate itself from proto-science, religion, and myth?Why do we think Thales was the first philosopher? If not Thales but x, then why x?See Alasdair MacIntyre, "Philosophy, the 'Other'Disciplines, and Their Histories,"Soundings, 65 (1982) 127-45.Philosophy and argument Are there forms of argument peculiar tophilosophy? How is "philosophical reasoning"unlike other kinds of reasoning? Consider the charge of infinite regress,self-referential inconsistency. Must philosophy be argued? What is the value ofphilosophical works that are not at all argued,e.g. some aphoristic works, Wittgenstein'sTractatus? What is the role of argument in philosophy? Toprove? To persuade without necessarily proving?To show the linkage of ideas without necessarilypersuading or proving? Something else? If abstruse arguments are not persuasive, evenwhen sound (Hume), then what are the chances thata sophisticated philosophy can be "lived"? If argument is not essential to philosophy, couldit still be essential to a philosophicalcurriculum? What is the value to philosophers oflearning to analyze and compose arguments? Must different genres of philosophy use argumentdifferently? Do systems encounter specialproblems in supporting themselves by argument notencountered by essays? Vice versa? What philosophical reasons have been given in thetradition to excuse the lack of argument in agiven work or for a certain assertion? E.g., it's a matter of faith; it's morecertain than any proof; it's admittedlyhypothetical; it's a sheer choice; it'spresupposed by the very concept of argument,logically prior to any argument; it's a"potential contribution" In general is contemporary philosophy morerigorous in its arguments than prior philosophy?More self-conscious in making arguments? Moredemanding that arguments be made in works ofphilosophy? Is it the other way around? Is the importanceof argument cyclical instead? What drives the fortunes of argument in thehistory of philosophy?Philosophy and wisdom What is wisdom? How does it differ (if at all)from knowledge? from virtue? Is wisdom non-cognitive? Was Socrates right that wisdom is compatiblewith, or even the same as, ignorance? Can philosophy bring us closer to wisdom? If so,how? Is philosophy better or worse at bringing usto wisdom than other kinds of study orpractice? Compare the visions of wisdom in a fewphilosophers. Does philosophy still love wisdom? If it has other ends, what might they be? If it has ceased to love wisdom, roughly whenand why did it cease to do so? For a given work of philosophy, what is itsvision of wisdom (if any), and how does it (if atall) promote wisdom in its readers? How does a work of philosophy that is notexplicitly about wisdom reveal or betray itsvision of wisdom? How does a work of philosophy that ostensivelyargues for certain conclusions and articulatesa doctrine promote wisdom? May we properly object if a work of philosophyhas no intention to promote the wisdom of itsreaders? What is the place of play and humor inphilosophy? How are they related to wisdom? Who was more right, Pythagoras for humbly callinghimself a mere lover of wisdom (philo-sopher), orHegel for saying that the time has come to gobeyond love to the actual attainment and scienceof wisdom?Philosophy and metaphilosophy What is the relation of philosophy andmetaphilosophy? Compare the envelopment of metaphilosophy byphilosophy in a few philosophers. That is, howhas reflection on metaphilosophical problemsaffected (for better or worse) answers tophilosophical questions? Can metaphilosophical reflection help solvephilosophical problems? Is there any philosophical point in deciding thescope, nature, or value of philosophy? Is "philosophy" a descriptive or normative term? If the distinction between philosophy andmetaphilosophy makes sense (even provisionally),then is there an infinite series ofmeta-meta-meta...-philosophical questions andperspectives? If metaphilosophy is a "branch" of philosophy, isit one like ethics that is done in one book whileepistemology is done in another book? If not,just how is metaphilosophy assimilated to(absorbed by, subordinated to) philosophy? Is the metaphilosophical self-consciousness ofphilosophy increasing with time? If so, why? Isthis a sign of progress? If so, what kind?regress? Compare a few philosophers on how theydistinguished (in theory and in practice) betweenbad philosophy and non-philosophy. How do these methods shed light on thosephilosophers' views of the nature ofphilosophy? If there are interesting disparities betweenthe theory and practice of philosophers inmaking this distinction, what does that sayabout their metaphilosophy?Philosophy and the folk Does everyone "have a philosophy"? How important is it to think about philosophicalquestions explicitly, e.g. by studying the booksof philosophers? Can all good philosophy be exoteric? If not, whynot? Is it an objection that a philosophy is not asexoteric as it could be? Is Kant right that philosophy need not bepopular, that is, accessible tonon-professionals? Are argumentative rigor and technical terminologydispensable from philosophy? At what price? What about conceptual difficulty andcomplexity? Is "common sense" the ultimate criterion ofphilosophy, as John Kekes suggests? Or does(good) philosophy routinely violate common sense? Is Nicholas Rescher correct to suggest that theorigin of philosophy lies in the attempt to makeconsistent the endoxa (ordinary beliefs)that we inherit from our culture? Aristotle's methodological remarks in theNichomachean Ethics suggest that weshould consult and juxtapose inherited moralbeliefs as the first step of moral philosophy.Why is this likely to be helpful? Cabell said bitterly that literature was astarveling cult kept alive by the literary. Isphilosophy a starveling cult kept alive by thephilosophical, irrelevant to the lives of non-philosophers? In Buddenbrooks Thomas Mann shows thedisastrous effect on a businessman of picking upa volume of Schopenhauer. Philosophy was onceread by the educated lay public as commonly asliterature was. What happened, and was it(entirely) regrettable? When was philosophy commonly read bythe general educated public? Does the historyof the esoteric and exoteric pendulum inphilosophy shed any light on the value andpossibility of reaching a general audience, oron the kinds of philosophy that may do so? What happened to the nature of philosophy as itbecame a special field, an academic department, aprofession? And what happened to its practice andpopularity? If we distinguish philosophical beliefs fromordinary beliefs, how do (and how should)philosophers live ordinary lives? To what extentmust philosophical beliefs be put aside to takepart in ordinary life (Hume, Fichte)? Is there a presumption in favor of "commonsense", or agreement with "the folk", such thatphilosophers must explain their departures from(more than their agreement with) these norms?What is the nature of the pressure to explainthese departures? Do philosophers assume too hastily that there isa "natural consciousness" or non-philosophicalmind? What are the differences between thedisagreements among philosophers and thedisagreements among other folk? The term "natural consciousness" is used inHegel, "natural standpoint" in Husserl andother phenomenologists. Find philosophers who use folk consciousness as aparadigm of error, and as a test or criterion oftruth. What are the fundamental epistemologicaland political disagreements among suchphilosophers?Philosophy and 'primitive' life What is the relation between philosophy and myth? How do Socrates and Plato use myth forphilosophical purposes? What is the subsequent history of this use? What is the prehistory of this use? Canphilosophy fruitfully be seen as originatingin myth? Cf. Schelling's call for a new mythology atthe end of his System of TranscendentalPhilosophy. What kind of philosophy can precede a scientificconsciousness and what kinds can follow it? Is there a stage in the history of culture whenphilosophy is indistinguishable from religion?from shamanism? See Paul Radin, Primitive Man asPhilosopher, D. Appleton, 1927 (reprinted,Dover, 1957); John Sallis (ed.), Philosophyand Archaic Experience, Duquesne UniversityPress, 1982.Philosophy and philosophers What is gained and what is lost by studyingphilosophical texts apart from the biographies oftheir authors? To what extent, and for whatpurposes, should we bring in biography? Compare the autobiographies of a few philosopherson their relation to their philosophies. (TryCroce, Mill, Collingwood, Jung, Quine, Rescher.) Why have so few philosophers writtenautobiographies, compared, say, to novelists ordiplomats? To what extent is philosophy autobiographical? See Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil,§6: "...every great philosophy so far hasbeen...the personal confession of its authorand a kind of unconscious memoir". See Ernest Campbell Mossner, "Philosophy andBiography," in his Hume, Doubleday,1966. See de Beauvoir's many-volume autobiographywhere, if anywhere, she expounds herphilosophical position. The psychological motives, economic interests,and personal animosities of a philosopher may allbe sources of his/her work. How relevant arethey to our evaluation of that work? Does the recognition of causes for beliefundermine the recognition of reasons for belief? When we say that the life-and-times of aphilosopher "illuminate" her work, or that herlife situation "influenced" her work, can we makesense of these claims without reducing philosophya complex effect of blind causation? Is there aslippery slope from influence to reduction? Ifnot, what is the "snag" that keeps reasons fromsliding to causes? Do non-immanent reductions of philosophynecessarily entail relativism and determinism?Must they be self-referentially inconsistent? What parts of a philosophy can biography mostilluminate? Its truth-value? the properinterpretation of its texts? the philosopher'schoice of topics, scope of coverage, emphasis?expositional style and structure? idea of theaudience, hence, degree of rigor, use oftechnical language, political appeals? Steven Bartlett has written that philosophers asa group are typically individualistic and evennarcissistic, more concerned to develop their ownthought than to share or understand the thoughtof others. How true is this? Does philosophy appeal only to certainpersonality types? If so, what non-immanentperspectives on philosophy does this suggest?Could philosophy be a neurosis? Which came first, psychological tendencies orphilosophical positions? Might the latter have their own autonomy andsimply attract (rather than being explainedby) the former? Should we always explain the latter throughthe former instead of sometimes the formerthrough the latter? May we legitimately call someone a philosopherwho denied that she was a philosopher? (See caseof Simone de Beauvoir; cf. Dostoevsky, Camus,Buber.) May we deny the name of philosopher toone who called himself a philosopher? (Analyticphilosophers often deny that their non-analyticcolleagues are philosophers.) How would we, and how should we, interpret theworks of a philosopher with known moral failings?For example: Nietzsche was a vicious misogynist,Charles Peirce beat his wife, Heidegger was aNazi. See the case of Paul de Man, aninfluential deconstructionist lately revealed tohave been an early Nazi propagandist. Do these failings contaminate all the writingsby that philosopher, perhaps on a theory thata philosophical position comes from the wholeperson? Can we compartmentalize, and hold aphilosopher benighted on questions of genderor politics, but profound on epistemology,metaphysics, or perhaps even other topicswithin ethics? Do we deliberabely ignore such failings on theground that to let them diminish ourassessment of the writings would commit thegenetic fallacy? In answering this question, how do we factorin our belief that everyone has moralfailings, including we ourselves? How would we, and how should we, change ourevaluation of a philosopher's work if we learnedthat he killed someone in cold blood? See case of Louis Althusser, who murdered hiswife at the height of his respect andinfluence as a Marx scholar. If a philosophy cannot 'be lived', whatlegitimately follows about its worth as aphilosophy? See e.g. Hume. See: William Earle, "Philosophy asAutobiography," in his Public Sorrows andPrivate Pleasures, Indiana University Press,1976, pp. 161-75; C.E.M. Joad, "Thought andTemperament," pp. 218-52 of his Essays inCommon Sense Philosophy, George Allen &Unwin, 2d ed. 1933; Jean-Jacques Lecercle,Philosophy Through the Looking Glass,Open Court, 1985; Albert W. Levi, "The MentalCrisis of John Stuart Mill," PsychoanalyticReview, V, xxxii (1945) 86-101; Fay HortonSawyier, "Philosophy as Autobiography: JohnStuart Mill's Case," Philosophy ResearchArchives, 11 (1985) 169-79; Ben-AmiScharfstein, The Philosophers: Their Livesand the Nature of Their Thought, BasilBlackwell, 1980. This is a selective bibliography; see mylonger bibliography in a separate handout.Philosophy and pedagogy How should philosophy be taught? What metaphilosophical questions must be answeredbefore we can decide how philosophy should bestbe taught? Compare the following approaches: emphasis on topics, doctrines, texts,questions, periods, figures lecture, discussion, dialogue, questioning,answering, reading waiting for questions to arise in life What background should one have prior to thestudy of philosophy? Should philosophy be taught academically to 18year olds? Most philosophers were not addressing readersso young. Most philosophical questions arisenaturally in life, but not necessarily by age18. Fichte thought it preferable to address youngpeople who had not already committedthemselves to a philosophical position. Can philosophy be taught to elementary schoolchildren? Can philosophy, responsibly taught, "corruptyouth"? In the Athenian sense of this phrase,can it avoid "corrupting youth"? Has the nature or direction of philosophy changedsince most philosophers became professors ofphilosophy (academics, that is, middle classprofessionals with lower class incomes) roughlyduring the lifetime of Kant? See David W. Hamlyn, Being a Philosopher:The History of a Practice, Routledge, 1992. Philosophy and literature share the problem ofthe "canon". How do we decide which works shouldbe taught in an undergraduate curriculum whenthere is not enough time to teach everything?(This is similar to, but significantly differentfrom, the question which books we should readourselves, knowing we cannot read them all.) Are "the classics" classical only by criteriathat are class-biased and injurious tominority viewpoints? Even if so, should "the classics" be given alarge slice of the curriculum simply becausethey have molded, and do comprise, the actualtradition? If we say 'no', are we substituting wishfulthinking for historical fact? If we say 'yes', are we perpetuating aninjury? Are we more justified, or less justified, infollowing this path if our curriculum islimited to the Western (European) tradition? What time should be allotted to contemporaryworks that have not had the chance to be"tested by time"? What time should be allotted to heterodoxworks that challenge the traditional canon? Is this kind of challenge a good idea inphilosophy even if the classics are classicalbecause they are actually great and universal?That is, is it part of good philosophyteaching to challenge even great works, evenwith flimsy works? If some mix of classical and non-classicalworks seems best, what specific criteriashould we use when it is painfully clear thatevery non-classical work will squeeze out aclassical work (some work "that everyphilosophy student should know")?Return to the Metaphilosophy course home-page.![[BlueRibbon]](http://www.earlham.edu//~peters/blueribb.gif) Peter Suber,Department of Philosophy,Earlham College, Richmond, Indiana, 47374, U.S.A.peters@earlham.edu. Copyright © 1997-2000. Peter Suber. |
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