Military Role in Countering Terrorist Use of WMD
THE MILITARY ROLE IN COUNTERING TERRORIST
USE OF WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION
by
Lansing E. Dickinson, Lt Col, USAF
THE MILITARY ROLE IN COUNTERING
TERRORIST USE OF WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION
by
Lansing E. Dickinson, Lt Col, USAF
The Counterproliferation Papers
Future Warfare Series No. 1
United States Air Force
Counterproliferation Center
Air War College
Air University
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
The Military Role in Countering
Terrorist Use of
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Lansing E. Dickinson, Lt Col, USAF
September 1999
The Counterproliferation Papers Series was
established by the USAF Counterproliferation Center to provide
information and analysis to U.S. national security policy-makers
and USAF officers to assist them in countering the threat posed
by adversaries equipped with weapons of mass destruction.
Copies of papers in this series are available from the USAF
Counterproliferation Center, 325 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL
36112-6427. The fax number is (334) 953-7538; phone (334)
953-7538.
Counterproliferation Paper No. 1
USAF Counterproliferation Center
Air War College
Air University
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427
The internet address for the USAF
Counterproliferation Center is:
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm
Contents:
Page
Disclaimer i
The Author ii
Acknowledgments iii
Abstract iv
I. Introduction 1
II. What Terrorist Threat? 3
III. Policy, Doctrine, and Strategy
13
IV. Current Capabilities 21
V. Shortfalls, Improvements, and
Recommendations 31
VI. Conclusions 41
Notes 45
Disclaimer
The views expressed in this publication
are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or
position of the Department of Defense, the U.S. Government, or
the USAF Counterproliferation Center.
The Author
Lieutenant Colonel Lansing E. Dickinson,
USAF, is Chief of the Programs Integration Division, Directorate
of Plans and Resources, Air Combat Command, Langley AFB,
Virginia. From 1978 when he received his commission to the
present time, he has spent 4,000 hours as a Master Navigator in
the T-37, T-43, B-52 G & H, and B-1B aircraft. He has a
bachelors and masters degree in mathematics from Edinboro
University and has graduated from the USAF Squadron Officer
School, Air Command and Staff College, and the Air War College
(AWC). In October 1997, prior to attending AWC, he served
as the Deputy Commander of the 7th Operations Support Squadron
responsible for 4 squadrons, 41 B-1B aircraft, and 1,115
personnel.
Acknowledgments
The end of the Cold War created a
new-world order and presented new challenges for future leaders.
One of the challenges is countering the ever growing
terrorist threat. Accompanying this threat is a
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These weapons
are now available to individuals, as well as groups and nations,
and pose a serious threat to global stability and security.
The bombing of two U.S. embassies in August 1998 with the
loss of over 300 lives highlighted the problem. The
military is an easy target for these “irrational
actors” and needs to prepare for the future.
Air War College gave me the opportunity to
examine the military role in countering this terrorist threat.
Classes throughout the year focused on future conflict and
the asymmetric means others would use to counter U.S. military
superiority. This paper would not be possible without the
help of the Air War College Counterproliferation team.
Special thanks to my research advisor, Dr. Barry Schneider,
for his patience, insight and critiques. He was
instrumental in helping me produce a quality product.
Additional thanks to Dr. Schneider, Colonel Bob Sutton, and
Colonel Jim Davis for their expert instruction in
counterproliferation and chemical and biological warfare.
Finally, a special thank-you to my wife
Jody for her never-ending support throughout the academic year.
Her encouragement and patience allowed me to survive and
grow in this academic environment. Thanks again for letting
me chase my dreams.
Abstract
Terrorist use of weapons of mass
destruction threatens Americans and our armed forces every day.
To many nations and groups, their only means to counter the
United States is with nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.
The terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction is no
longer a question of “if” they will be used, but
“when” they will be used. This paper examines the
U.S. military capability to counter terrorist use of weapons of
mass destruction. It describes the terrorist threat to U.S.
forces and reasons why terrorists would use these types of
weapons. Our current national policy, strategy and doctrine
highlight the problem, but show a need to improve interagency
coordination and cooperation in the fight against terrorism.
On the military level, combating the threat is an integral
part of our strategy but needs increased emphasis at the planning
level. Capabilities do exist to deter or counter the
threat, protect our forces, and sustain and operate after an NBC
attack. But countering a terrorist threat presents unique
challenges to future leaders and requires improvements in
intelligence, equipment, training and education.
The key to defeating the terrorist threat
is timely and accurate intelligence collection, analysis and
dissemination for detecting, characterizing, and countering the
threat. Improvements in individual and collective
protection are necessary to sustain operations. As
important, the military needs to emphasize realistic joint and
combined training and must add chemical and biological scenarios
to future war games. Finally, the U.S. must be prepared to
find and destroy terrorist weapons before they can be used
against us.
The Military Role in Countering
Terrorist Use
of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Lansing E. Dickinson
I. Introduction
A paradox of the new strategic
environment is that American military superiority actually
increases the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical attack
against us by creating incentives for adversaries to challenge us
asymmetrically.1
— William S. Cohen
The end of the Cold War created a new
world order or as some have described a new world
“disorder.” The United States remains the world's
only superpower with unique responsibilities to ensure global
security. In his National Security Strategy for a New
Century, President Clinton states “Weapons of mass
destruction pose the greatest potential threat to global
stability and security. Proliferation of advanced weapons
and technologies threatens to provide rogue states, terrorists
and international crime organizations the means to inflict
terrible damage on the United States, its allies and U.S.
citizens and troops abroad.”2
To many nations and groups, their only
means to counter the United States are with weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). Secretary of Defense Cohen feels these
weapons may “be used in an attempt to counter U.S. dominance
on the battlefield, neutralize vastly superior U.S. conventional
forces and power projection capabilities, or deter U.S.
involvement in a conflict.”3 This threatens
our armed forces in the United States and overseas and poses a
threat we will face on every deployment and exercise—a
threat we are not prepared to counter. This threat is not
from a regional force, rogue state, or specific terrorist group.
As Secretary Cohen says “A lone madman or nest of
fanatics with a bottle of chemicals, a batch of plague-inducing
bacteria, or a crude nuclear bomb can threaten or kill tens of
thousands of people in a single act of malevolence.”4
This study will look at the U.S. military
capability to counter the terrorist use of weapons of mass
destruction. The first section will examine the terrorist
threat to U.S. forces and show motives and reasons terrorists
would use such weapons. It will describe the weapons and
delivery means available and look at past incidents of use or
threat of use. The second section will review current U.S.
policy and strategy to counter terrorist uses of WMD. This
includes joint doctrine, strategy, and procedures for guidance on
military preparation and response. The third section will
examine the current military capability to respond to WMD.
Are we prepared to deter, defend, and respond effectively
in a nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) environment?
The final section will detail current shortfalls, planned
improvements for the future, and recommendations to improve
overall military capability.
The terrorist threat is real. Some
say it is only a question of time before terrorists use weapons
of mass destruction against our military forces. Secretary
Cohen in the Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review
concluded “the threat or use of chemical and biological (CB)
weapons is a likely condition of future warfare, including in the
early stages of war to disrupt U.S. operations and logistics . .
. This requires that the U.S. military continue to improve its
capabilities to locate and destroy such CB weapons, preferably
before they can be used, and defend against and manage the
consequences of CB weapons if they are used.”5
II. What Terrorist Threat?
Imagine a group of religious zealots
led by a charismatic, half-blind yoga instructor with an
international following of nearly 50,000 members and over $1
billion in assets. Imagine that this group recruits
scientists from around the world, including a number of converts
among the scientific and professional communities in Russia and
Japan. This group also has as converts members of the
Japanese and possibly the Russian national police forces,
military, and intelligence services.
Believing in Armageddon, they decide to
hasten it along by developing a panoply of weapons of mass
destruction right under the noses of their government and
completely unnoticed by U.S. and other Western intelligence
services. They purchase sophisticated dual-use technology
in the United States to develop their lethal weapons. They
send their members worldwide to develop and acquire
weaponry—looking for the Ebola virus in Zaire, mining for
uranium in Australia, seeking protein databases for biological
weapons and laser instruments in the United States, and obtaining
helicopters and other weapon systems from the former Soviet
Union...
On at least three occasions, they
launch unsuccessful biological attacks. However, they
succeed in a sarin gas attack on an unsuspecting, sleeping,
suburban community, killing seven and injuring five hundred.
Ultimately, the cult is only stopped by authorities after
another sarin gas attack on a major subway system during morning
rush hour goes awry. A mistake in crafting their chemical
potion and the premature destruction of their normal delivery
system reduces the potential fatalities from tens of thousands to
twelve dead and five thousand injured.6
— John F. Sopko
The scenario described by John Sopko,
former senior advisor to Senator Sam Nunn on terrorism and
proliferation issues, is not fictitious. It describes the
Japanese terrorist group Aum Shinrikyo. It shows the
potential threat posed to the United States military by nonstate
actors and terrorist groups. Counterproliferation experts
now agree, the terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction is no
longer a question of “if,” but a question of
“when?” It is only a matter of time before
another terrorist group uses a weapon of mass destruction.
The threat is real, the technology available, agents
relatively inexpensive, with attacks that are difficult to
prevent. Terrorist expert Walter Laqueur says the prospects
for terrorism “are improving as its destructive potential
increases. This has to do with the rise of groups and
individuals that practice or might take up terrorism with the
weapons available to them.”7 The weapons
include nuclear, chemical, and biological agents. Terrorist
groups have attempted using all three in the past, with nuclear
the most difficult to obtain and deliver. Chemical and
biological agents are easier to produce, yet more difficult to
disperse. According to Kyle Olson of the Chemical and
Biological Arms Control Institute, Aum Shinrikyo conceived their
Sarin attack on Friday and carried it out on the following
Monday.8 Laqueur states, “now, mail-order
catalogs tempt militants with readily available, far cheaper,
unconventional as well as conventional weapons—the poor
man's nuclear bomb.”9 Did Aum Shinrikyo
break a taboo by using WMD?
Why Weapons of Mass Destruction?
Why would terrorists want to use weapons
of mass destruction? Laqueur says, “the past few
decades have witnessed the birth of dozens of aggressive
movements espousing varieties of nationalism, religious
fundamentalism, fascism, and apocalyptic millenionism.”10
These groups look for ways to spread their cause, gain
media attention, and make a statement. Analyst Elliott Hurwitz
states “If terrorists were to use chemical/biological
weapons in a mass casualty attack, there is no doubt that it
would be an event of singular visibility and importance.
The particular group would receive enormous publicity, and
the event would be perceived as not just another assassination,
kidnapping, bombing, or hijacking.”11
Biological warfare (BW) researcher W. Seth
Carus lists four reasons terrorist groups might use biological
warfare: a desire to influence the political-military
calculations of potential adversaries; the dual-use,
off-the-shelf availability; the extreme difficulty of program
detection; and the relative inexpense of developing weapons.12
The Department of Defense Report Proliferation:
Threat and Response states, “The increased
availability of these technologies, coupled with the relative
ease of producing chemical or biological weapons may become more
attractive to terrorist groups intent on causing panic or
inflicting a large number of casualties.”13
Most experts agree terrorist groups are
more likely to use chemical or biological weapons versus a
nuclear weapon. This is due to the ease of acquisition,
inexpense, and easier methods of delivery. Bruce Hoffman,
Director of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political
Violence, says, “previously, terrorism was not just a matter
of having the will and motivation to act, but of having the
capability to do so—the requisite training, access to
weaponry, and operational knowledge . . . Today, however, the
means and methods of terrorism can be easily obtained at
bookstores, from mail-order publishers, on CD-ROM, or even over
the Internet. Relying on such commercially published or
readily accessible . . .manuals and operational guides . . .the
`amateur' terrorist can be just as deadly and destructive as his
more professional counterpart.”14
In an Advanced Concept Research Report,
B.J. Berkowitz summarizes, “the chief advantages of CB
weapons are the unrestricted availability of the necessary
information, the relatively small resources needed, and the
ability to test the product. There are no meaningful
controls on the availability of chemicals, and what little
control exists over pathogenic cultures can be overcome in a
variety of ways. Perhaps most important is the fact that
the chemical and biological materials can be produced under the
cover of an apparently legitimate commercial venture such as a
small research company, fine chemical manufacturer, or
bio-medical laboratory.”15
Other scholars point out weapons of mass
destruction limit selective targeting and pose a risk to the
user. When assessing the terrorist threat, national
security analyst Anthony Fainberg says, “Most of them will
almost certainly continue to avoid the use of such weapons for a
variety of reasons: the old-fashioned methods were suitable
for the goals of most; there may be a reluctance to experiment
with new and dangerous methods; the nature of the acts might
alienate the terrorists from their base of support; the use of
such weapons might bring down the wrath of governments and,
indeed, most of the world upon the terrorists heads.”16
Would this be enough to persuade groups not to use them?
Laqueur contends religious fanatical
elements are the most likely to use WMD. These extremist
groups consider the religious cause justification for taking
lives. He concludes, “proliferation of the weapons of
mass destruction does not mean that most terrorist groups are
likely to use them in the foreseeable future, but some almost
certainly will, in spite of all the reasons militating against
it.”17 Jonathan Tucker from the Center for
Non- proliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of
International Studies says “a CB terrorist attack is a
“low probability, high consequence event” that warrants
careful government planning and preparation.”18
Types of Weapons
As mentioned earlier, weapons of mass
destruction include nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.
Although the use of a nuclear weapon by a terrorist is less
likely than a CB attack, the possibility still exists. Proliferation:
Threat and Response states, “Reported incidents of
nuclear- related smuggling from the former Soviet Union increased
dramatically during the early 1990's but have declined since
1994. News reports about smuggling, however, generally
overstate the potential impact of the particular theft. For
example, most incidents have not involved weapons-usable
materials, but rather radioactive isotopes, natural or low
enriched uranium . . . It is important to emphasize, however,
that all known highly enriched uranium and plutonium stolen to
date is still insufficient to make a single nuclear weapon and
that reports of thefts of weapon-grade material have declined in
the last three years.”19 This does not
preclude a group from using radioactive material in conjunction
with a high yield explosion to contaminate an area or as a
psychological tool against an adversary. However, obtaining
the material still remains difficult. Defense correspondent
Sandra Meadows reviewing a Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment (OTA) report stated, “the difficulty of obtaining
nuclear weapons materials—plutonium or highly enriched
uranium—today remains the single obstacle . . .in pursuing
nuclear weapons.”20
A higher probability exists for terrorist
use of chemical and biological weapons. Laqueur says,
“most terrorist groups do not have the financial and
technical resources to acquire nuclear weapons but could gather
materials to make radiological dispersion devices and some
biological and chemical agents.”21 He goes
on to say nuclear weapons are hard to manufacture and deliver;
chemical agents are easier to produce, but difficult to store and
disperse; and biological agents are easy to procure, but storage
and dispersal are difficult. In his view, terrorists are
more likely to use chemical weapons over biological and nuclear
weapons.
The Congressional OTA report highlighted
the ease of producing chemical weapons. It stated,
“The technology used to produce chemical weapons,
conversely, is much harder to identify as weapons-related than
that for nuclear materials production technology . . . Many
production techniques for chemical weapons, for example, can be
found in the open literature and can be assimilated from standard
chemical engineering principles. Certain chemical agents
such as mustard gas are very simple to produce . . . Multipurpose
chemical plants capable of manufacturing organo-phosphorus
pesticides or flame retardants could be converted in a matter of
weeks or months to the production of nerve agents.”22
Chemicals fall in several categories
including choking, blood, blister, and nerve agents.
Choking agents cause the lungs to fill with fluid; blood
agents prevent blood cells from utilizing oxygen; blister agents
cause eye, lung and skin damage; and nerve agents paralyze the
respiratory muscles. G-series nerve agents such as Tabun,
Sarin, and Soman can lead quickly to death, while the even more
toxic and persistent V-series creates long-term contamination of
people, equipment, and territory.23 Chemical
agents are classified as lethal or nonlethal, rapid acting or
slow acting, persistent or non-persistent. Sulfur mustard
is an ideal agent for terrorists to use against the military
since it is persistent and forces personnel to don protective
gear—seriously degrading performance. The agent of
choice for a terrorist group may be a non-persistent nerve agent
such as Tabun, Sarin and Soman—all which act rapidly and
cause immediate casualties.24
Chemical warfare agents are readily
available and simple to produce. Procedures are based on
old technology (used prior to World War I) and within reach of
any terrorist group. A CIA threat assessment says,
“newer agents, particularly the nerve agents, are more
difficult to produce; however, the technology for these agents is
widely available in the public domain. In many ways,
production of chemical warfare agents is like that of legitimate
commercial compounds . . . The greatest similarities occur
between pesticide and nerve agent production units because these
compounds are so closely related.”25 There
are many ways to disseminate chemical agents, including
conventional munitions such as bombs, missiles, artillery shells,
and mortar rounds. It is also possible to disseminate them
in aerosol form from a crop duster or mobile generator.
Biological agents are of great concern
because all the equipment needed for production is dual-use and
available on the open market. You can produce biological
agents from naturally occurring pathogens such as bacteria and
viruses, which are often self-replicating. Death may be
inflicted by biological agents for a variety of reasons including
cessation of breathing, collapse of body tissues, cell tissue
trauma, and pulmonary failure.26 The OTA report
states, “Biological warfare agents are easier to produce
than either nuclear materials or chemical warfare agents because
they require a much smaller and cheaper industrial infrastructure
and because the necessary technology and know how is widely
available.”27
Robert Kupperman and David Smith state in
a Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International
Studies report that terrorists could produce many biological
agents in sufficient quantities for their use. They
consider anthrax, botulinum toxin, and the plant toxin, ricin, as
typical biological agents. Anthrax grows aerobically, a
product of fermentation, much the same as brewing beer.
Preparing it for dissemination as spores requires some
expertise, but the terrorist can practice disseminating species
that are not pathogenic to humans. Botulinum toxin is a
bacteria found virtually everywhere. Improperly handling
food can cause botulinum toxin poisoning. The toxin, when
crystallized, is extremely lethal and is easy to produce and
dispense. Another easy procedure is extracting ricin from
the castor bean which produces a deadly toxin. When
inhaled, this toxin causes death in hours. Extracting the
protein toxin is a well-documented, easy two-step procedure.28
Brigadier General John Doesburg, the
former Director of the Joint Program Office for Biological
Defense, says, “Anyone who makes home-brewed beer can make
anthrax. Anthrax is a deadly toxin that, depending on the
quantities used, can disable and kill thousands of people within
hours or days . . . Another agent that could be in the enemy's
arsenal is staphylococcus entarotoxin B (SEB)—an
incapacitant that, if it goes into the lungs, causes a fever of
106 degrees within an hour to three hours. The force will
go into immediate malaise, but the agent will not kill them.
If they ingest it, they will have severe diarrhea and
vomiting.”29
The most effective means of delivering
toxic agents is through aerosol clouds. Kupperman and Smith
state, “aerosol dispersal technology is easy to obtain from
open literature and commercial sources, and equipment to
aerosolize biological agents is available as virtually
off-the-shelf systems produced for legitimate industrial,
medical, and agricultural applications. With access to a standard
machine shop, it would not be difficult to fabricate aerosol
generators and integrate components to produce reliable systems
for dispersing microorganisms or toxins.”30
Others suggest dispersing agents with crop dusters or
through building air ventilation systems. The OTA study
sums up the biological threat by stating “Standard
biological agents for covert sabotage or attacks against
broad-area targets would be relatively easy to produce and
disseminate using commercially available equipment, such as
agricultural sprayers.”31
Past Use
The use of weapons of mass destruction is
on the rise. Kupperman and Smith claim there were over 200
attacks worldwide by terrorists sympathetic to Saddam Hussein
during and following the Gulf War. Most of the acts were
minor, but they contend the threat is higher now given it takes
only months to plan, coordinate, and execute a terrorist attack.
They contend, “it is during the lulls (of world
activity) that terrorism achieves center stage—precisely
the effect the terrorists are after.”32 The
Senate Hearings on Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction highlighted the increasing trend in use of WMD:
December
1995: A man with alleged ties to survivalist
groups, is charged with attempting to smuggle 130 grams
of ricin into the United States intending to use it as a
weapon.
October 1995:
Jordanian officials seize sophisticated missile
guidance systems from dismantled Soviet ICBMs on their
way to Iraq.
Summer 1995:
Iraqi defectors reveal the extent of Iraq's massive
chemical and biological program, including anthrax,
botulinum, sarin, and VX.
May 1995:
A white supremacist member of the Aryan Nations
organization is arrested in Ohio after ordering
freeze-dried bubonic plague bacteria for “research
purposes.”
March 1995:
The Japanese Doomsday cult, Aum Shinrikyo, releases
deadly sarin nerve gas into the Tokyo subway system at
the height of the morning rush hour, killing twelve and
hospitalizing five thousand.
March 1995:
Two members of a militia-style group called the
Minnesota Patriots Council are convicted of planning to
use ricin to assassinate IRS agents and other federal
employees.
December
1994: Prague police seize 2.72 kilograms of weapons
grade highly enriched uranium from a Czech policeman and
a Czech, Russian, and Byelorussian with ties to the
nuclear industry.
August 1994:
German authorities seize 363 grams of Pu-239 from a
Lufthansa flight arriving in Munich from Moscow.
The material had come from a nuclear facility in
Obninsk and the defendants claimed they could supply 11
kilograms of plutonium.
May 1994:
The sentencing judge in the World Trade Center case
announces the defendants had placed sodium cyanide in
their explosives package with the intent of creating a
poisonous cyanide gas.33
This shows a definite trend by a variety
of groups intending to use or experiment with WMD. Add to
this the Chechen rebels in November 1995 who placed radiological
material in a Moscow park. Shamir Basayev, the Chechan
leader, led members of the press to the site. Although the
material was contained in a protective canister, it did serve to
embarrass the Russian government and demonstrated the potential
for using radioactive material for contamination purposes.34
There are many other examples and the
trend continues. The terrorist use of weapons of mass
destruction is a national security nightmare. What if other
terrorist acts had included WMD? Correspondent Barbara
Starr suggests if chemical or biological weapons were used in the
Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, the results would have
been staggering. The bombing killed 19 servicemen, but,
“if just over 1 litre of anthrax had been released, around
1,500 military personnel would have died within three days, and
thousands more civilians could have been killed.”35
The 1997 Counterproliferation Program Review Committee
Report states, “the military threat from chemical and
biological warfare is greater today than it has ever
been—particularly in regions where religious, ethnic, and/or
economic strife are feeding the roots of conflict...Not only must
U.S. forces be prepared for these threats, they must be prepared
now.”36
Japanese authorities determined that
Aum had produced the chemical nerve agents sarin and VX.
Further probing after the March 1995 attack indicates that
this was not the first or last use of chemical or biological
agents by the cult. In all, the cult appears to have
conducted at least 2 biological attacks with anthrax and
botulinum toxin and 5 chemical attacks with sarin and cyanide,
including the Tokyo subway attack. These attacks met with
varying success.
The Aum was able to legitimately obtain
all of the components it needed to build its sizable chemical and
biological infrastructures. However, terrorists and violent
sub-national groups need not acquire the massive infrastructure
of the Aum. Only small quantities of precursors, available
on the open market, are needed to manufacture deadly chemical and
biological weapons for terrorist acts.37
— John F. Sopko
The terrorist use of WMD is a real threat.
Major General Robert Orton, former Commandant of the U.S.
Army Chemical School said, “even if such weapons are not
actually used, the threat of use, by itself, will produce
militarily significant results.”38 In an
Air War College briefing, Dr. William Patrick, former head of
product development at the Fort Detrick Biological Warfare
Laboratory, stated the future biological threat is not from a
nation-to-nation exchange, but from an educated terrorist
entering the country on diplomatic immunity carrying
pre-manufactured biological weapons. He feels homegrown
terrorists can produce the BW agents readily enough, but lack the
expertise to “weaponize” such agents. On the
other hand, state sponsors could provide terrorist groups the
means for mass destruction.39 In 1995, Senator
Richard Lugar made a worse prediction stating, “Americans
have every reason to expect a nuclear, biological, or chemical
attack before the decade is over.”40 Is the
military prepared for this terrorist threat?
Correspondent Meadows claims,
“military planners are concerned that an enemy will seize
victory not through force-on-force, but, instead, by the threat
of disseminating deadly biological and chemical agents on the
battlefield.”41 Former Secretary of the
Army Togo West said when it comes to CB weapons, “there are
still people out there in other countries building them and
planning on how they can use them against the United States . . .
We are going to face these issues in regular warfare, because
enemies know that chemicals can be stealthy, silent killers which
could easily dissolve the U.S. conventional military
advantage—not to mention shatter troop morale and
willingness to fight.”42 Are the United
States and the armed forces ready for this challenge?
III. Policy, Doctrine, and Strategy
Weapons of mass destruction pose the
greatest potential threat to global stability and security.43
— President Clinton
Countering terrorist use of weapons of
mass destruction presents new challenges to political and
military leaders. President Clinton in a Letter to Congress
continued his national emergency against WMD by stating,
“the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues
to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national
security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.”44
Congress recognized the threat and enacted the Defense
Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (Title XIV).
This legislation acknowledged the threat, but stated
conventional counter- proliferation efforts do little to prevent
or deter development of WMD by terrorist groups.45
Does our national and military policy focus on the future
terrorist threat?
This section will look at current policy
and strategy dealing with weapons of mass destruction. The
first section will explore national and Department of Defense
(DoD) policy and strategy for countering the terrorist threat.
This will be followed by a review of joint doctrine,
strategy and procedures for specific guidance on military
preparation for this asymmetric warfare.
National Policy and Strategy
In A National Security Strategy for a
New Century, President Clinton highlights the WMD threat.
He states, “we will work to prevent the spread of
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and the materials for
producing them . . . We will continue to ensure that we have
effective means for countering and responding to the threats we
cannot deter or otherwise prevent from arising . . . The United
States must act to deter or prevent such attacks and, if attacks
occur despite those efforts, must be prepared to limit the damage
they cause and respond decisively against the perpetrators.”46
The terrorist threat of WMD presents the military and other
government agencies a new challenge. Secretary of Defense
Cohen in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), “highlighted
the danger to our nation and forces of `asymmetric threats,'
ranging from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons to attacks
via information warfare and terrorism.”47
The QDR provided an excellent summary of the challenges
facing by the United States:
We will
continue to confront a variety of regional dangers.
The
proliferation of advanced weapons and technologies will
continue.
Of particular
concern is the spread of nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons.
U.S.
interests will continue to be challenged by a variety of
transnational dangers.
Increasingly
capable and violent terrorists will continue to directly
threaten the lives of American citizens and try to
undermine U.S. policies and alliances.
U.S.
dominance in the conventional military arena may
encourage adversaries to use such asymmetric means to
attack our forces and interests overseas and Americans at
home.
Strategically,
an aggressor may seek to avoid direct military
confrontation with the United States, using instead means
such as terrorism, NBC threats, information warfare, or
environmental sabotage to achieve its goals.
Dealing with
such asymmetric challenges must be an important element
of U.S. defense strategy, from fielding new capabilities
to adapting how U.S. forces will operate in future
contingencies.48
Countering terrorist use of weapons of
mass destruction is not only a Department of Defense
responsibility, but involves the Department of State, Department
of Transportation, FBI, CIA, and Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) to name a few agencies. Depending on where
the terrorist attack occurs determines which agency has the lead.
This makes countering the problem more difficult.
National Security Strategy, “requires that the DoD
develop the capability to prevent, disrupt, and defeat terrorist
operations before they can carry out a threat to use NBC weapons,
as well as the capability to respond overwhelmingly if an actual
NBC terrorist attack should occur.”49
Prevention, disruption, and defeat require working with the
other agencies on nonproliferation and counterproliferation
efforts. At the same time, the military must be prepared to
operate in an NBC environment. Unfortunately, the military
is not focused on the terrorist threat.
A Department of Defense sponsored Assessment
of the Impact of Chemical and Biological Weapons on Joint
Operations in 2010 states, “The focus of chemical and
biological defense has been, and continues to be, largely on
massive battlefield use of chemical and biological weapons.
Our military judgment is that this is no longer the most
likely threat. . . . While U.S. forces must still be prepared to
fight on a CB battlefield, they must also be able to counter and
cope with limited, localized CB attacks including attacks by
asymmetrical means on key units, facilities, and equipment at
both U.S. and foreign sites.”50 What is DoD
doing to counter this challenge?
In his 1998 Annual Report to the
President and the Congress, Secretary of Defense Cohen
reiterates the chemical and biological threat to future warfare.
He says “U.S. forces continue to improve their
capabilities to locate and destroy such weapons, including hard
and/or deeply buried facilities, preferably before such weapons
can be used, and to defend against and manage the consequences of
chemical and biological warfare (CBW) if they are used. But
capability enhancements alone are not enough. Equally
important is continuing to adapt U.S. doctrine, operational
concepts, training, and exercises to take full account of the
threat posed by CBW as well as other likely asymmetric threats .
. . The Department also needs to better understand the
requirements associated with deterring, defeating, and defending
against adversaries willing to use CBW and other asymmetric
means.”51
Joint Doctrine, Strategy and Procedures
The Joint Staff develops military doctrine
and operational procedures. Joint Doctrine for Nuclear,
Biological, and Chemical Defense, Joint Pub 3-11, contains
doctrine for NBC Defense. It stresses the need to counter
NBC operations with defense and deterrence. U.S. forces
must be able to survive and operate in an NBC environment and to
defend against this threat requires command, control,
communications, computers and intelligence (C4I),
logistical support, medical support, and education and training.
Although not directly addressing WMD use by terrorists,
Joint Pub 3-11 does point out “the potential for their use
can range from blackmail or acts of terrorism during peace to
escalation during conflict or war.”52 The
strategy of defense and deterrence is based on, “providing
direction, intelligence, and employment of U.S. forces in
countering enemy NBC war making capabilities.”53
Will defense and deterrence work against a terrorist
threat?
Deterrence is the first line of defense,
but poses a special challenge when countering a terrorist threat.
Deterrence works when a foe believes you are willing to use
the means to retaliate with unacceptable damage after absorbing
an attack. Deterrence is based on working with rational
actors. Many individuals debate the “rational
actor” issue when discussing terrorist deterrence.
Joseph and Reichart say, “regional states motivated by
messianic antiwestern zealots or by regime survival may well act
differently, perhaps being more willing to risk annihilation for
outcomes the United States would not consider `rational'.”54
Because of this, policy makers must rethink how they
approach deterrence. Brad Roberts suggests our current
policy might drive adversaries to counter our military might.
He says, “Among potential adversaries, the fear of an
overarmed and aggressive United States may well have accelerated
the search for `asymmetric strategies'. Such strategies
seek to pit the strengths of the weak against the vulnerabilities
of the strong; they threaten to inflict huge casualties on U.S.
power projection forces and/or the U.S. populace through
unconventional attack with unconventional weapons.”55
Due to this the military needs to bolster other counter-
proliferation options.
Special Operations Forces (SOF) play a key
role in counterproliferation and combating terrorism.
According to the Secretary of Defense Annual Report to
the President and Congress, they provide DoD:
A ground
force option short of a major theater war scenario to
seize, recover, disable, render ineffective, or destroy
weapons of mass destruction and associated technology.
Additionally, SOF skills may be used in support of
diplomatic, arms control, and export control efforts.
Offensive
(counterterrorism) and defensive (antiterrorism)
capabilities and programs to detect, deter, and respond
to all forms of terrorism.56
Special Operations Forces are specifically
trained for counterterrorism missions. They have the most
advanced equipment, receive diverse training, and exercise
regularly to maintain proficiency. They are trained to
prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism across the threat
spectrum. Specifically for counterproliferation actions,
Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations
states, “The major objectives of DoD counterproliferation
policy are to prevent the acquisition of WMD and missile
capabilities, (i.e., preventive defense); roll back proliferation
where it has occurred; deter the use of WMD and their delivery
systems; and adapt U.S. military forces and planning to operate
against the threats posed by WMD and their delivery
systems.”57
What about forces other than Special
Operations that may come into contact with terrorist activity.
Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations
Other Than War (MOOTW) addresses combating terrorism.
The pub states, “Although the threat of nuclear
conflict has diminished, proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and conventional advanced technology weaponry is
continuing. Threats directed against the United States,
allies, or other friendly nations—ranging from terrorism to
WMD—require the maintenance of a full array of response
capabilities.”58 The publication goes on to
describe the military role in arms control, anti- terrorism, and
counterterrorism. Many consider arms control a diplomatic
mission, but, “U.S. military personnel may be involved in
verifying an arms control treaty; seizing WMD (nuclear,
biological, and chemical or conventional); escorting authorized
deliveries of weapons and other material (such as enriched
uranium) to preclude loss or unauthorized use of these assets; or
dismantling, destroying, or disposing of weapons and hazardous
materials. All of these actions help reduce threats to
regional security.”59
All three Joint Pubs stress the importance
of planning, intelligence, logistics, medical support, education,
and training for successful counterproliferation operations.
For planning, a key consideration is interagency
coordination and cooperation. Joint Pub 3-11 states,
“Combatant commanders should establish close coordination
relationships with U.S. departments and agencies.”60
This is especially critical against terrorist activity as
the Department of State and country team will be vital players in
the decision process. The Department of State is the lead
agency for incidents taking place outside the United States
unless it involves an aircraft, where the Department of
Transportation takes the lead. Coordination may also be
required with nongovernmental and private voluntary
organizations. Command, control, communication and
computers are part of the planning process and integral for
timely decisions in a terrorist environment. Additionally,
intelligence and information gathering and analysis and sharing
up and down the chain of command and between agencies is
invaluable to terrorist and counterproliferation operations.
“Commanders at all levels must ensure that all sources
of intelligence (signals intelligence, imagery intelligence,
human intelligence (HUMINT), measurement and signature
intelligence, open source intelligence, technical intelligence,
and counterintelligence) are considered and fully involved in the
determination of the enemy's intentions, capabilities, and
vulnerabilities.”61
Doctrine also requires the ability to
survive and sustain operations in an NBC environment. Joint
Pub 3-11 states, “To counter these effects, NBC defense . .
. adheres to the three principles: avoidance, protection,
and decontamination.
Avoidance.
Passive and active measures used in avoiding NBC
attack are keys to NBC defense.
Protection.
This principle consists of hardening of positions,
protecting personnel, assuming mission-oriented
protective posture (MOPP), physical defense measures, and
reacting to attack.
Decontamination.
Decontamination stops the erosion of combat power
and reduces the possibility of additional casualties from
inadvertent exposure or failure of protection.”62
Joint doctrine stresses logistical and
medical support to ensure readiness. Logistical support
provides the sustainability and stocks for NBC readiness.
Sustainability includes anticipation, integration,
continuity, improvisation, and responsiveness for future
operations.63 Each of these areas is critical
when countering a terrorist threat. The logistician must
plan for the unknown, yet have the supplies available to react in
a timely manner. In the same light, medical supporters must
prepared for pre-attack, attack, and post-attack. This
includes defensive measures to protect individuals and equipment,
and the right forces to manage casualties after an attack.
Pre-attack preparation includes immunizations, physical
protection, and training. During an attack, responders must
provide timely detection, treatment, protection, and
decontamination. The post-attack situation requires
monitoring and detection, contamination control, decontamination,
and preparation for additional adversary attacks.
The problem with a terrorist attack is
ensuring the forces are always prepared. Training and
education are critical to this process. This requires
adding NBC and counter terrorist awareness into all training,
exercises, and war games. The importance of education and
training is highlighted in each joint pub. Joint Pub 3-11
sums it up by stating, “The objectives of this training are
to develop and evaluate the readiness of U.S. and multinational
military forces and mission-essential civilians to operate in an
NBC environment and to ensure proficiency with defensive NBC
equipment, materials, and procedures.”64
Responding to the WMD threat on December
7, 1993, then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced the
Defense Counterproliferation Initiative, “to develop the
necessary capabilities to deal with the emerging military threat
posed by weapons of mass destruction.”65
This initiative set the Department of Defense in motion to
deal with this threat and highlighted future military
capabilities and needs. According to Senator Pete Domenici
of New Mexico, future capabilities include military intelligence;
command, control, and communications; passive defenses; active
defenses; and counterforce technologies.66 These
counterproliferation efforts become more difficult when
countering terrorist use, but as Senator Domenici states,
“The only way this emerging threat can be contained is by
clear and forceful U.S. policy that will lead the international
community in a concerted effort to prevent, deter, and, if
necessary, respond to acquisition, threats, and prospective use
of WMD.”67
IV. Current Capabilities
The Gulf War experience exposed
weaknesses in the U.S. forces' preparedness to defend against
chemical or biological agent attacks and the risks associated
with reliance on post-mobilization activities to overcome
deficiencies in chemical and biological readiness.
Post-conflict studies confirmed that U.S. forces were not
fully prepared to defend against Iraqi use of chemical or
biological weapons and could have suffered significant casualties
had they been used.68
— GAO Report to Congress
In his National Military Strategy, General
Shalikashvili stated that, “U.S. forces must have a
counterproliferation capability balanced among the requirements
to prevent the spread of WMD through engagement activities;
detect an adversary's possession and intention to use WMD;
destroy WMD before they can be used; deter or counter WMD;
protect the force from the effects of WMD through training,
detection, equipment, and immunization; and restore areas
affected by the employment of WMD through containment,
neutralization, and decontamination.”69
Countering the terrorist threat presents
military leaders with a new challenge. Traditional
nonproliferation options of dissuasion, denial, disarmament, and
diplomatic pressure are not always available. The threat
may not be known until it is used, putting leaders in a reactive
versus proactive mode. Robert Joseph and John Reichart from
the National Defense University Center for Counterproliferation
Research say, “prevention of proliferation through such
traditional measures as diplomacy, export controls, and security
assurances is an essential element in responding to the NBC and
missile threat. However, given the growing availability of
dual-use technology and alternative suppliers, a determined
proliferator of even modest resources is likely to succeed,
especially with biological warfare (BW) and chemical warfare (CW)
programs.”70 Countering the terrorist
threat requires knowing their supplier, their motives, and their
target. This requires the military to take a more active
role in deterring, preventing, defending against and countering a
terrorist attack.
Deterrence
As mentioned in the previous section,
deterrence can be difficult when working against a terrorist
threat. Richard Betts, Columbia University professor, says,
“The main problem for deterrence, however, is that it still
relies on the corpus of theory that undergirded Cold War policy,
dominated by reliance on the threat of second-strike retaliation.
But retaliation requires knowledge of who has launched an
attack and the address at which they reside. Those
requirements are not a problem when the threat comes from a
government, but they are if the enemy is anonymous. Today
some groups may wish to punish the United States without taking
credit for the action.”71 The problem is
the no-notice terrorist attack. An anonymous strike leaves
a terrorist group with little fear of retaliation.
Additionally, what deters one terrorist or regime will not
necessarily deter another. Identifying the group and a
timely response is critical to deterrence.
For deterrence to work, the United States
must be prepared to use force against terrorists. Robert
Joseph states, “For deterrence to succeed, the United States
must have—and be prepared to have—the capability and
will to prevail in an NBC environment and retaliate against an
enemy, holding at risk assets of value that can be attacked and
destroyed if an enemy undertakes the action which was to have
been deterred . . . To be credible, deterrence must demonstrate
consistency of purpose as well as determination over the long
haul.”72 A clear signal was sent on August
20, 1998 when U.S. forces attacked the terrorist camp and
facilities of Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan and Sudan.
This timely attack showed U.S. resolve and added
credibility to our national policy of making no concessions to
terrorists and bringing pressure to bear on state sponsors of
terrorism.73
Prevention
The key to prevention is a strong
intelligence network. A Congressional Research Service
Report to Congress states, “every step to stem the spread of
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapon systems starts with
sound intelligence. The quest for indisputable clues
requires painstaking reconnaissance/surveillance activities,
patience, and luck.”74 Sound intelligence
is even more important when combating terrorist use of NBC.
Terrorists could be getting their material or weapons from
rogue states or developing their own technology. Looking
for trends in chemical and biological programs is difficult.
The congressional report goes on to say, “CW and BW
development processes offer few clues that help observers
determine when weapon proliferation is taking place. Both
employ dual-use materials that can be used equally well for
harmless and harmful purposes. Neither need large,
distinctive facilities to create militarily useful agents.
Field testing often is avoidable and would be difficult to
detect if conducted at night or camouflaged as conventional
activity, such as crop dusting. Chemical and biological
munitions are externally indistinguishable from conventional
bombs or artillery shells.”75 Terrorists
will not be producing or stockpiling large amounts of weapons, so
these indicators will also not be readily noticeable.
Military personnel will need to rely more on surveillance
and reconnaissance and continue to improve human intelligence
efforts.
For the terrorist threat, more emphasis
needs to be placed on HUMINT. A study on Joint
Operations in 2010 commented, “an increasing emphasis on
the HUMINT side of intelligence collection and a more widespread
consciousness of chemical and biological indicators is important
to improve our ability to analyze threats.”76
The report recommended specific targeting of low level
chemical and biological threats and intent to use; increasing the
number of analysts; increasing the awareness of non-CB
specialists; and precision location of mobile missiles.77
Defense
Military units must continue to improve
active and passive defenses. With the unanticipated
terrorist threat, forces must be prepared to survive and operate
in a contaminated environment. “Passive defense
involves military capabilities that protect against nuclear,
chemical and biological weapon effects. Programs involve
contamination avoidance (recon- naissance, detection, and
warning), force protection (individual and collective protection
and medical support) and decontamination.”78
Contamination avoidance relies on timely
detection and warning. In Medical Aspects of Chemical
and Biological Warfare, the U.S. Army Surgeon General points
out, “Detection of an attack, with subsequent warning of
affected forces downwind, can allow adoption of an effective
protective posture and continuation of military operations with
minimal degradation of operations.”79
Detection devices are divided into two groups: point
and standoff. “Point detectors sample the immediate
area to determine the presence of chemical agents . . . In
addition to monitoring the atmosphere, the point detectors
provide monitoring after an attack, identify the contaminated
area, monitor collective protection areas, monitor effectiveness
of decontamination, and identify chemical contamination during
reconnaissance efforts.”80 Currently, we
rely on detection paper for point detection to identify chemical
agents. This paper is attached to personnel and equipment
to sample the atmosphere and kits are available to sample soil or
water. The Army also has a hand-held chemical agent monitor
(CAM) to detect contamination of personnel, equipment, and
surfaces. Although these systems are critical for forces on
the ground, mobile point detection provides additional and
earlier threat recognition.
The U.S. Army Medical Management of
Biological Casualties Handbook highlights the importance of
timely detection. “Once an agent has been dispersed,
detection of the biological aerosol prior to its arrival over
target, in time for personnel to don protective equipment, is the
best way to minimize or prevent casualties. However,
interim systems of detecting biological agents are just now being
fielded in limited numbers.”81
Three systems are currently in use for
chemical and biological mobile point detection. “The
M21 Remote Sensing Chemical Agent Alarm (RSCAAL) is an automatic
scanning, passive infrared sensor. The M21 detects nerve
and blister agent clouds based on changes in the background
infrared spectra caused by the presence of the agent vapor.”82
Efforts are underway to develop improved sensors to detect
biological and chemical agents. Two mobile systems
complement the RSCAAL. “The Biological Integrated
Detection System (BIDS) is vehicle mounted and concentrates
aerosol particles from environmental air, then subjects the
particle sample to both generic and antibody-based detection
schemes for selected agents.”83 It can
detect and identify between 5 and 25 agent-containing particles
per litre of air in 15 to 30 minutes.84
Additionally, the Army has acquired the
German FOX Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Reconnaissance System
(NBCRS). “The FOX is instrumented to detect chemical
contamination in its immediate vicinity with a variety of probes,
and at a distance via a standoff detector (M21).”85
Point detection is critical to identify agents after an
attack, but to protect forces, minimize casualties, and manage
BW/CW effects we need to identify agents at a distance with
standoff detection. Work is beginning in this area and will
be discussed in the next section.
Individual and collective protection
allows military forces to survive and operate in a CB
environment. Timely detection and warning is critical to
allow forces, “to adopt an adequate posture, since the
effects of agents can sometimes occur in less than a
minute.”86 Our current individual
protection equipment is adequate for initial protection. Medical
Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare states,
“total individual protection requires an integrated approach
with the primary mechanism beinout also risking widespread contamination . . . and should
also have the means to disrupt and destroy BW facilities without
recourse to the open use of military power.”156
If intelligence sources can determine a terrorist is
stockpiling WMD or is being supplied WMD from a rogue state,
policy makers need a timely process in place to make the decision
to pre-empt or not pre-empt. The lives of our
military forces depend on this timely process.
VI. Conclusions
The terrorist is a criminal, not a
soldier. He strikes indiscriminately at the target of his
choosing, with any means, at any time. All targets are
legitimate in his eyes. He seeks to inflict as much damage
as possible to horrify and shock the local population and global
audience and to embarrass the leaders of a country.157
— General J.H. Binford Peay
Terrorists will use weapons of mass
destruction in the future. Robert Joseph says, “NBC
capabilities are seen as weapons of the weak against the strong,
as the only arms that can overcome the conventional superiority
of the West. They are not weapons of last resort, but
rather weapons of choice to be threatened or used early in a
conflict for political and psychological as well as military
purposes.”158 The military must be prepared
for attack by terrorists at times and places of their choosing,
not ours. According to Senator Domenici, “The only way
this emerging threat can be contained is by a clear and forceful
U.S. policy that will lead the international community in a
concerted effort to prevent, deter, and if necessary, respond to
acquisition, threats, and prospective use of WMD.”159
Our U.S. foreign policy and military
doctrine and strategy highlight the terrorist threat. The
President in his National Security Strategy says, “We
must continue to deter and be prepared to counter the use or
threatened use of WMD, reduce the threat posed by existing
arsenals of such weaponry and halt the smuggling of nuclear
materials. We must identify the technical information,
technologies and materials that cannot be allowed to fall into
the hands of those seeking to develop and produce WMD. And
we must stop the proliferation of non-safeguarded dual-use
technologies that place these destructive capabilities in the
hands of parties hostile to the U.S. and global security
interests.”160 The Secretary of Defense
reiterates the problem in Proliferation: Threat and
Response, where he states, “The proliferation of
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and their delivery means
is not a hypothetical threat . . . the NBC proliferation threat
has become transnational and now has the potential to come from
terrorist organizations . . . DoD has unique responsibilities for
the military responses needed if prevention fails: active
defense, passive defense, counterforce, and response to
paramilitary/covert threats.”161
There is a terrorist threat and it is only
a matter of time before terrorism will be directed at military
forces deploying, employing and redeploying for conventional
battlefield operations and for military operations other than
war. Our currive defenses and relevant because they provide additional
early warning for units at risk of attack . . . The regional
commanders have identified other requirements to improve passive
defenses . . . A key ingredient to dissuading proliferants from
acquiring or using these weapons is to eliminate their value.
Passive defenses that allow sustained combat and logistical
operations are among the best ways to accomplish this.”94
“Active defense involves programs
that detect, track, identify, intercept and destroy, and
neutralize nuclear, chemical and biological warheads . . .”95
Improvements in this area concentrate on missile defense.
Although a terrorist could have access to missiles, most
experts do not expect terrorists to employ their weapons with
this technology. Improvements in this area are still
progressing to help detect, track, identify, intercept, and
destroy warheads. This capability does provide an important
psychological advantage for friendly forces.
Counterforce involves destroying an
enemy's weapon prior to him using it. Once sources identify
WMD production or storage areas, government and military leaders
must counter the threat. We cannot afford to wait for a
terrorist to use a weapon of mass destruction if we have the
intelligence available to identify the group. Senator
Domenici states, “unless military responses are undertaken
in unequivocal self-defense or are sanctioned by the UN Security
Council, they will be seen by some to constitute challenges to
national sovereignty and raise questions of international
law.”96 Waiting for UN consensus or
international approval may prove to be too late to counter the
threat. This will be the most difficult issue leaders will
face in the counterproliferation decision process.
The Joint Operations in 2010 Report
highlights the limited ability we have in countering chemical and
biological threats. It states, “The United States
Special Operations Command is currently one of the few elements
in the U.S. Government possessing the capability to locate,
identify, recover, neutralize and transport CB weapons.
Both the USMC Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force
and the Army's Tech Escort Unit also have the capability to
execute these tasks in a more limited fashion.”97
All would need timely, reliable, and precise intelligence.
A problem these teams would face once in country is how to
dispose of the captured munitions. If the weapons are to be
destroyed, collateral damage and contamination must be
considered.
Aircraft and cruise missiles attacks are
other counterforce options. The same damage and
contamination issues must be analyzed. A congressional
report says, “Aircraft and/or cruise missile attacks on
biological and chemical warfare plants almost certainly would
create undesirable collateral damage and casualties among
civilian populations . . . Results could be counterproductive in
political, moral, and perhaps economic terms.”98
The key to successful defense is training,
education and awareness. We currently train for battlefield
operations, but are not trained for the no-notice terrorist
response. Major General Orton, former Commandant of the
U.S. Army Chemical School, says, “NBC defense training and
the introduction of NBC conditions during exercises is crucial
for establishing a versatile force capable of power-projection
operations . . . Personnel must be adequately trained, properly
equipped, and psychologically prepared for the effects of nuclear
and chemical weapons.”99
Response
One area in which the U.S. military is
making progress is response and consequence management after an
attack. Timeliness in identifying chemical, biological, or
nuclear contamination is critical for casualty recovery and
decontamination efforts. Major Joseph Osterman, a U.S.
Marine Corps Infantry Officer, in a U.S. Naval Proceedings
article highlighted the Department of Defense role in responding
to a terrorist CB attack. He said, “unique technical
capabilities are required to identify the chemical or biological
agent employed, conduct limited decontamination, and complete
site appraisal. Much of the response strategy will depend
on a timely identification. The unit must be able to
conduct on-site detection and identification and to collect,
package, and transport samples to predetermined laboratory
facilities for off-site analysis, if required.”100
Medical response plays a critical role in
defeating or mitigating the terrorist threat. This response
is important prior to and after an attack. The Medical
Management of Biological Casualties Handbook states:
The medical response to the threat or use
of biological weapons may be different depending on whether
medical measures are employed prior to exposure, or whether
exposure has already occurred and/or symptoms are present.
If provided before exposure, active immunization or
prophylaxis with antibiotics may prevent illness in those
exposed. Active immunizations may be effective against
several potential biological warfare agents, and is probably the
best modality for future protection of U.S. military forces
against a wide variety of biological threats. After
exposure, active or passive immunization as well as pre-treatment
with therapeutic antibiotics or antiviral drugs may ameliorate
disease symptoms. After onset of illness, only diagnosis of
the disease and general or specific treatment are left to medical
care providers. The good news is that excellent vaccines
and antitoxins exist for several of the most likely biological
warfare agents, and more are under development.101
Medical response for a chemical attack
takes a similar approach. Medical units must train for
pre-attack, attack and post-attack measures. Pre-attack
measures include training on characteristics of chemical agents;
defensive planning; self-aid and buddy care training; casualty
decontamination; activation of collective protection; and
detection/monitoring training. Attack measures include
detection and monitoring; guidance to commanders; first aid
treatment; treatment and evacuation; and individual and
collective protection. Post-attack consists of monitoring
and reporting; control of contamination; damage assessment and
control; monitoring for effects; medical treatment;
decontamination; and preparation for future attacks.102
Part of the response effort is research
and development to identify biological and chemical threats.
The U.S. Army Medical Research and Material Command and
Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Disease,
“develop strategies, products, information, procedures, and
training for medical defense against agents of biological origin
and naturally occurring infectious diseases of military
importance that require special containment.”103
Capabilities include identifying and evaluating threat
capability in agents and delivery methods, producing vaccines,
technical guidance on personnel protection and decontamination,
and training for medical response. The Naval Medical
Research Institute also provides research and technology for
agent classification and immunizations related to military
requirements and operational needs.104
The Counterproliferation Program Review
Committee focused on the terrorist threat. They directed
DoD in conjunction with other agencies to look at,
“supporting, training, and equipping DoD teams to detect,
neutralize, and render safe NBC weapons and devices in permissive
and nonpermissive environments both in the U.S. and overseas.
DoD teams include the Army's Technical Escort Units (TEU)
and 52nd Ordnance Group, the Navy's Defense Technical Response
Group (DTRG), Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units, and
SOF units.”105 The TEU, part of the Army's
Chemical and Biological Defense Command, “is a specialized
army unit with missions of escorting the movement of chemical or
biological material and finding, rendering safe and disposing of
chemical or biological munitions.”106
The Marines developed a short-notice
Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF).
General Charles Krulak, Commandant, USMC, formed the unit
after the Aum Shinriyko attack on the Tokyo subway. He was
looking to fill what he “perceived as a national security
void—the U.S.'s inability to deal swiftly with an incident
of chemical or biological terrorism.”107
The team worked with the FBI and local authorities during
the Atlanta Olympics and is, “able to deal with nerve gas
agents like Sarin and blister agents like mustard gas, as well as
some 25 biological and toxin threats like anthrax and
typhoid.”108 The unit is designed to come
in after an attack. “This self-contained,
self-sufficient response unit is integrated into the consequence
management plans of the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) U.S. Atlantic
Command and is trained to deploy domestically or overseas in
support of the CINCs or the Department of State . . . The CBIRF
will have enhanced capabilities for detecting and identifying
specific CW/BW agents, assessing downwind hazards, conducting
advanced lifesaving support, and decontaminating patients to
facilitate medical treatment.”109 DoD is
exploring the formation of a “911-BIO” consequence
management team involving CBIRF and TEU “to enhance military
capabilities to respond effectively to the terrorist/
paramilitary use of BW.”110
According to our National Security
Strategy, “The WMD threat to our forces is receiving the
special attention it deserves. We are enhancing the
preparedness of our Armed Forces to effectively conduct sustained
operations despite the presence, threat or use of WMD. Such
preparedness requires the capability to deter, detect, protect
against and respond to the use of WMD when necessary. The
Administration has significantly increased funding to enhance
biological and chemical defense capabilities and has begun the
vaccination of military personnel against the anthrax bacteria,
the most feared biological weapon threat today.”111
Yet despite these efforts, most units are
still in a reactive mode and trained to respond after the fact.
John Roos in describing the TEU and the Department of
Energy's Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) says they,
“are organized and equipped only to detect, contain, limit
the damage from, and clean up after an attack has occurred.
Neither organization routinely trains with, or is even
linked to, a standing force or other response team that includes
the highly specialized medical, security, and other personnel and
material assets that would be in immediate demand at the scene of
a terrorist attack involving WMD.”112 Where
should the military go from here?
V. Shortfalls, Improvements, and
Recommendations
Soldiers are fearful of the effects
from weapons of mass destruction and prolonged operations in
protective equipment produces numerous psychological effects on
soldiers.113
— Major General Robert Orton
The military is making progress in
counterproliferation, but most efforts are focused on a major
theater conflict. The Counterproliferation Review Committee
evaluated a terrorist surprise attack on U.S. forces.
“In the surprise attack, terrorists targeted an air
base supporting U.S. military activities in a foreign country
with a sufficient quantity of CW and BW agents to provide a
lethal dose to base personnel while minimizing the risk of
exposure to the surrounding population . . . It was estimated
that U.S. SOF troops at current readiness levels could
simultaneously neutralize several of the BW dispensers and/or
bands of terrorists with high confidence, provided their
locations were known or could be found quickly.”114
The critical factor is having timely intelligence to
prepare for the threat. The other key factor is having
troops, other than SOF, trained to counter the threat. The
military needs to improve in these areas and identify other
operational shortfalls.
Shortfalls
The 1994 Deutch Report and 1995
Counterproliferation Program Review highlighted the following
areas as current shortfalls in operational capabilities:
Real time
detection and characterization of BW/CW agents
Passive
defense capabilities for sustained operations
Underground
structures detection and hard target defeat
Prompt mobile
target kill
Capability to
locate and disarm terrorist NBC areas
Detection and
interception of low flying/stealthy cruise missiles
Rapid
production of protective BW vaccines115
A critical element is real time detection
and characterization of chemical and biological agents.
According to Dr. H. Lee Buchanan, Deputy Director of the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, “especially vital
are biological weapon sensors that provide not only dependable
advanced warning of specific exposure but also accurate `all
clear' assessments after the application of countermeasures . . .
For the most part, detectors are effective only for specific
agents (e.g., individual strains). Knowing this, an
adversary can exploit that specificity by modifying pathogens or
toxins genetically, so they will not be recognized.”116
We currently have limited mobile point detection capability
with the FOX, BIDS and remote sensors. The Army medical
management handbook states, “Until reliable detectors are
available in sufficient numbers, usually the first indication of
a biological attack in unprotected soldiers will be the ill
soldier.”117 We also need standoff
detection capability to be able to avoid contaminated areas after
an attack. Brad Roberts in a briefing at the U.S. Air Force
Air War College said “At present, the best warning available
from detectors is delayed notification of attack, essential for
triggering medical treatments but inadequate for triggering
preventive masking.”118
Additionally, we need units able to
conduct timely detection and identification to limit further
contamination and to prevent the spread of contamination to
adjacent areas. As pointed out in the previous section, the
TEU, CBIRF, and NEST teams are able to detect, contain, limit the
damage from, and clean up after an attack, but do not train or
deploy with forces on a regular basis. John Roos says this
is not a shortcoming for these units, but a void in the larger
national response picture.119
A similar problem exists for the
timeliness in producing vaccines. Vaccines are only
effective for a specific strain, making immunizations very
selective. Dr. Buchanan says, “it takes
months—even years—to develop and test a vaccine, even
after the antigen has been isolated. After immunization it
takes weeks for the body to build up an effective concentration
of antibody. In biological warfare, therefore, the offense
usually has a great advantage. This places an unrealistic
burden on the depth and reliability of intelligence and advanced
reconnaissance.”120 The Army handbook
stresses the impact of lethal biological agents. It states,
“Diseases produced by the offensive use of biological agents
against U.S. forces could be lethal and/or disabling. From
a military standpoint, incapacitation of a high percentage of
friendly forces may be as operationally significant as effects
caused by more lethal agents.”121 Although
vaccines exist for many agents and testing is promising, of the
14 diseases listed in the Army handbook, 6 have no vaccines and
only 3 are licensed, as depicted in the table on the following
page.122
Brad Roberts says, “rapid innovation
in the tech base promises more numerous vaccines, lower costs,
shorter lead times, improved effectiveness, and the possibility
of protecting against more than one agent with a single or series
of inoculations.”123 We need to continue
efforts in vaccine research and development.
Biological Agent Vaccines
Source: Medical Management
of Biological Casualties Handbook. Fort Detrick,
Maryland: U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of
Infectious Disease, July 1998, p. 112.
DoD also needs to improve individual and
collective protection gear. The ability to survive and
operate depends on the protective equipment. Currently, the
equipment is bulky, uncomfortable, and short in supply.
Being able to use the equipment and having faith in it is
essential to sustaining operations after an attack. Medical
Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare says successful
defense depends on “personal protective equipment,
consisting of a properly fitted mask and overgarment with gloves
and boots as required. This equipment is the most critical
component of chemical defense equipment, the first line of
defense.”124
We have a similar problem with
decontamination equipment. Joseph and Reichart say the,
“United States does not have an adequate capability to
decontaminate people, equipment, or areas exposed to BW
agents.”125 According to Dr. Barry
Schneider, Director of the USAF Counter- proliferation Center,
“We need a breakthrough in techniques for solving the large
area decontamination problem (such as, ports/airfields).
Solvents may not work unless they are so caustic that they
are also harmful to health and equipment.”126
Another major shortfall exists in training
and education. A GAO report highlighted inadequacies in
individual and unit training. The report cited the
“inability to handle CW and BW casualties, improper wear of
masks, and the inability to operate detection equipment.”127
With our current emphasis on military operations other than
war, and the increase in small-scale contingency operations, the
probability of a terrorist attack rises. Increased emphasis
must be placed on training, WMD scenarios in future joint and
combined exercises, and war games focused on asymmetric warfare.
Improvements
With these shortfalls, there are
improvements on the horizon. The QDR highlights the need
for DoD to “improve intelligence collection, distribution,
and information-sharing with allies, and strengthen our
capability to protect citizens and military personnel from
chemical or biological attacks with special emphasis on high
threat regions.”128 Are we making progress
in this area? Kupperman and Smith suggest preparedness
begins with “technological innovations designed to detect
and identify pathogens and toxins; active defenses
(counter-clouds of disinfectants and high-power ultraviolet
lasers); pharmacological defenses (vaccines, toxoids, monoclonal
antibodies, and antibiotics); disinfectant aerosols built into
air-conditioning systems of large buildings; and effective
decontaminates following an attack.”129
According to the Army Surgeon General, success depends on
an integrated system of chemical and biological equipment
including real-time detection and warning; personal protective
equipment; collective protection; decontamination; and medical
treatment.130
TEU members are working with Los Alamos
scientists on improved detection and characterization equipment.
These include instruments, “that can identify the
composition of any chemical munition or device without opening it
(thanks to a noninvasive, acoustic resonance spectroscopy
technique) to Transportable Emergency Response Monitoring Modules
(TERMM) designed for unobtrusive, prolonged sampling and
state-of- the-art analysis of chemical and biological agents . .
. and a helicopter- mounted Light Detection and Ranging system
for tracing chemical contamination, and the work about to begin
on fluorescence techniques aimed at quickly identifying various
biological agents.”131
Other DoD improvements in detection and
characterization include, “standoff detection systems that
use laser systems and can provide advance warning from 30 to 50
km distance and point detectors that will be placed on attended
air vehicles, with warning sent back by radio or forward-emplaced
point detectors with radio links to a headquarters or a central
warning network.”132 For standoff
detection, the Army is pursuing the long-range biological
standoff detection system (LR-BSDS). This system, “is
not a detector of biological agents. It only discriminates
man-made particulate clouds from natural clouds. This
provides forces an indication that something is happening out
there. Unlike natural clouds, biological clouds tend to
expand, disperse, and reproduce.”133 This
system would be mounted on a Blackhawk helicopter and could
monitor and track clouds out to 30 kilometers. There are
currently three operational LR-BSDS systems.134
The Army is also pursuing the “Short-Range Biological
Standoff Detection System (SRBSDS). It will employ an
ultraviolet and laser-induced fluorescence to detect biological
aerosol clouds at distances up to 5 kilometers. The
information will be used to provide early warning, enhance
contamination avoidance efforts, and cue other detection
efforts.”135
The other services are also improving
identification systems. “A naval detection system
called IBAD, for integrated biological agent detector, acts as a
local alarm for blue water point detection. There are
currently 25 systems fielded on various ships.”136
Another Navy system, the Specific Emitter Identification
System, “would improve DoD's ability to identify and track
ships at sea suspected of transporting nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons, delivery systems, and related
materials.”137
The DoD Joint Biological Defense Program
Office is working with industry and commercial technologies for
long-term point detection capability. “JBPDS (joint
biological point detection system) will provide a common
detection suite for most threat agents in 10 to 15 minutes.
It will be activated in 2001. Officials estimate that
1,400 units are needed for all the services. . . . The Defense
Department is currently evaluating industry proposals for a joint
chemical agent detector (JCAD) system capable of automatically
detecting, identifying, and quantifying chemical agents inside
aircraft and ships, providing hand-held monitoring capabilities,
and protecting troops with a pocket-sized detection and alarm . .
. JCAD must be able to detect 10 agents in the presence of 183
`battlefield interferences' such as smoke, diesel exhaust, or
vapor, without giving a false response.”138
Testing is also underway using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for
threat detection.
The President in a Message to Congress highlighted
DoD passive defense improvements permitting forces to survive and
operate in an NBC contaminated environment. These include
“new protective masks, advanced chemical and biological
protective garments, stand-off optical chemical detectors, and
first-ever capabilities for point biological agent detection and
stand-off aerosol/particulate detection.”139
Other recommendations include improving protective
equipment to reduce the weight and heat stress to improve
military readiness. The Joint Service Lightweight
Integrated Suit (JSLIST) program will be fielded this year and
provides the future chemical-biological protective equipment for
all the services. The JSLIST is a lightweight garment with
improved protective handwear and overboots. It is less
bulky and has state-of-the-art material to reduce heat stress.140
Lightweight shelters are also being developed for
collective protection. New developments center on,
“improved adsorbents and impregnants as replacements for
activated charcoal; methods to better determine filter lifetime;
and new systems, such as pressure and temperature-swing
adsorption, which may provide significant improvements for
collective protection in ships, aircraft, and armored
vehicles.”141
Finally, decontamination technology
supports advances in sorbents, coatings catalysis and physical
removal. “There is a need for an effective and
environmentally safe reactive decontaminant that does not harm
equipment and personnel. Bacterial enzymes, catalytic-type
compounds, and other stable decontaminants (e.g., quaternary
ammonium complexes) are under consideration. Sorbent
compounds and nonaqueous decontaminants are also being
investigated for use on electronic components and other sensitive
equipment.”142
The U.S. Army Medical Research and
Material Command, “continues to develop a number of new
generation vaccines against agents such as botulinum toxins,
Yersinia Pestis, Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis virus and other
biological threat agents, as well as novel approaches to
preventing and treating chemical agent exposure . . . In
addition, preventive medicine and subject matter experts provide
crucial training for first responders and other medical personnel
on the medical management of chemical and biological casualties,
advise on medical plans and operations, evaluate threat
capability for specific chemical and biological agents in various
scenarios and regularly train with interagency rapid response
teams.”143
For counterforce, the United States needs
the ability to intercept and destroy NBC weapons prior to them
being used against our forces. When destroying weapons,
care must be taken to protect friendly forces, limit collateral
damage, and limit collateral contamination. Improvements in
this area include, “counterforce sensor technology projects
such as tactical unattended ground sensors and airborne
forward-looking infrared radar for target surveillance,
characterization, battle damage assessment and collateral effects
monitoring, a weapon-borne sensor to enhance underground target
bomb damage assessment, and improved missile launch detection
using overhead assets . . . and weapons enhancements such as a
precision-guided penetrating munition to defeat underground
targets.”144
Future research and development technology
efforts specifically designed for anti-terrorist activity
include, “chemical/biological agent perimeter monitoring
sensors; a vented suppressive shield to contain biological and
chemical weapons effects; a Quick Mask for responsive protection
against chemical and biological agents; a joint U.S.-Canadian
explosive ordnance disposal suit for biological and chemical
threats; a non-intrusive chemical agent detection system; and, a
special chemical and biological agent sample extraction and rapid
identification system.”145
Recommendations
It is only a matter of time before U.S.
military forces will encounter terrorist use of WMD. The Quadrennial
Defense Review says we must prepare for a range of asymmetric
challenges, “chief among these are threats of NBC weapons
use, terrorism, and information warfare.”146
To counter the terrorist WMD threat will take improvements
in intelligence, equipment, and training. If these fail,
the U.S. must be prepared to destroy the threat.
The key to defeating terrorism is to know
when and where they will strike. This is easier said then
done, but it is our first line of defense. During testimony
to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Former Defense Secretary
William Perry stated, “We must increase our `active
defenses' by getting better at gathering intelligence so that we
can pre-empt or disrupt terrorist operations before they can come
to fruition . . . Therefore we must intensify our intelligence
targeting of international terrorists . . . The goal is to
discover their identities, their sources of funds, their materiel
flow and their plans in order to pre-empt them before they
attack.”147
A crucial part of intelligence is keeping
abreast of the threat. With the dual-use nature of chemical
and biological weapons, experts in these fields reside in the
civilian sector. Dr. Buchanan feels it is impossible to
restrict the flow of biotechnology information, so he recommends
using the expertise of the technological community for
formulation of policy and strategy and employing their knowledge
base to help improve our defense capabilities.148
Due to the unique nature of the terrorist
threat, more emphasis needs to be placed on increasing HUMINT
collection. The Joint Operations in 2010 Study says
we must, “ensure HUMINT critical collection priorities
include specific targeting of low level chemical and biological
threats and intent to use; increase HUMINT resources related to
this area; and review any restrictive control policies which
currently inhibit full utilization of existing DoD HUMINT
capabilities.”149
The National Security Strategy sums
up the intelligence challenge by stating, “We must continue
to attract and retain enough highly qualified people to provide
human intelligence collection, translation and analysis in those
many emerging areas where there simply is no technological
substitute, and we must forge strong links to the private
enterprises and public institutions whose expertise is especially
critical.”150
The second area for improvement is better
equipment for protection and decontamination. As already
stated, we need individual protective equipment that is
lightweight and usable in all environments. We must ensure
we have enough equipment for all individuals and make certain we
train and exercise with the equipment. This includes
equipment for U.S. military and allies, contractors, indigenous
port and air base workers and, if possible, all dependents in the
area of responsibility.
We also need to develop decontamination
equipment for large areas and equipment. The 2010 Study
states, “equipment must be developed and procured which can
rapidly and effectively decontaminate large areas such as ports
and airfields (at least tactical and airlift ramps) and essential
equipment.”151 Further research and
development is recommended for decontamination requirements,
“for afloat prepositioned equipment; for sensitive equipment
such as communications equipment and avionics; and for resumption
of full operations at contaminated ports and airfields.”152
The third area requiring concentration is
training. The QDR states DoD “must institutionalize
counterproliferation as an organizing principle in every facet of
military activity, from logistics to maneuver and strike warfare,
and internationalize those same efforts to encourage our
allies and potential coalition partners to train, equip, and
prepare their forces to operate with us under NBC
conditions.”153 Training begins at basic
training for personal protection, but more emphasis needs to be
added on sustaining operations in a contaminated area. This
includes adding annexes to war plans to, “integrate the use
of NBC reconnaissance and decontamination assets into the overall
plan. The emphasis must be on training to reduce the
effects of the use of weapons of mass destruction.”154
Robert Joseph points out the lack of
tactical training and procedures for NBC operations. He
states, “we also lack TTP (tactics, techniques, and
procedures) needed to overcome key vulnerabilities identified by
operators and planners. These vulnerabilities include
protection of facilities such as ports and prepositioning depots,
large groups of personnel, and essential equipment and supplies;
decontamination capabilities for large areas and sensitive
material such as airfields and aircraft; and handling
contaminated casualties and cargoes.”155
Improvements are needed in training at every level, to
include field training, exercises, and war games.
Finally, the United States must be
prepared to destroy terrorist WMD prior to their use against our
allies or us. Brad Roberts says, “the United States
needs to be able to destroy BW production and storage facilities
without also risking widespread contamination . . . and should
also have the means to disrupt and destroy BW facilities without
recourse to the open use of military power.”156
If intelligence sources can determine a terrorist is
stockpiling WMD or is being supplied WMD from a rogue state,
policy makers need a timely process in place to make the decision
to pre-empt or not pre-empt. The lives of our
military forces depend on this timely process.
VI. Conclusions
The terrorist is a criminal, not a
soldier. He strikes indiscriminately at the target of his
choosing, with any means, at any time. All targets are
legitimate in his eyes. He seeks to inflict as much damage
as possible to horrify and shock the local population and global
audience and to embarrass the leaders of a country.157
— General J.H. Binford Peay
Terrorists will use weapons of mass
destruction in the future. Robert Joseph says, “NBC
capabilities are seen as weapons of the weak against the strong,
as the only arms that can overcome the conventional superiority
of the West. They are not weapons of last resort, but
rather weapons of choice to be threatened or used early in a
conflict for political and psychological as well as military
purposes.”158 The military must be prepared
for attack by terrorists at times and places of their choosing,
not ours. According to Senator Domenici, “The only way
this emerging threat can be contained is by a clear and forceful
U.S. policy that will lead the international community in a
concerted effort to prevent, deter, and if necessary, respond to
acquisition, threats, and prospective use of WMD.”159
Our U.S. foreign policy and military
doctrine and strategy highlight the terrorist threat. The
President in his National Security Strategy says, “We
must continue to deter and be prepared to counter the use or
threatened use of WMD, reduce the threat posed by existing
arsenals of such weaponry and halt the smuggling of nuclear
materials. We must identify the technical information,
technologies and materials that cannot be allowed to fall into
the hands of those seeking to develop and produce WMD. And
we must stop the proliferation of non-safeguarded dual-use
technologies that place these destructive capabilities in the
hands of parties hostile to the U.S. and global security
interests.”160 The Secretary of Defense
reiterates the problem in Proliferation: Threat and
Response, where he states, “The proliferation of
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and their delivery means
is not a hypothetical threat . . . the NBC proliferation threat
has become transnational and now has the potential to come from
terrorist organizations . . . DoD has unique responsibilities for
the military responses needed if prevention fails: active
defense, passive defense, counterforce, and response to
paramilitary/covert threats.”161
There is a terrorist threat and it is only
a matter of time before terrorism will be directed at military
forces deploying, employing and redeploying for conventional
battlefield operations and for military operations other than
war. Our current national policy, strategy and doctrine
highlight the problem, but there is a need for more interagency
coordination and cooperation. National leaders must design
a decision process to consider preemptive strikes if terrorists
are known to have weapons of mass destruction and intend to use
them to attack American citizens. Combating the terrorist
WMD threat is an integral part of our military strategy, but
needs increased emphasis at the planning level. This
includes emphasis in intelligence, equipment, training and
education.
The key to defeating the terrorist threat
is timely and accurate intelligence. This is necessary for
detection, characterization, and countering the threat.
Improvements are being made in these areas, but emphasis
needs to be placed on human intelligence, intelligence sharing
between agencies and allies, and continued improvements in
detection equipment. We will also need congressional and
military support to fund improvements for the future.
The second area for concern is individual
and collective protection equipment. Military forces have
been using the same bulky protective equipment for over 20 years.
The equipment is hard to operate in and has been shown in
studies to degrade mission effectiveness. Initial efforts
are underway for lightweight equipment and quick-donning masks.
Additionally, improvements in decontamination are needed to
ensure the ability to sustain operations after an attack.
Current shortfalls exist in decontaminating large areas and
sensitive equipment. This is exactly what the terrorist
will target at a staging port or airfield.
Most important, the military needs to
emphasize training for NBC threats. We need to switch from
limited MOPP level training in protective gear at different
levels of threat to realistic joint and combined exercises.
Exercises must force units to wear their protective
equipment, find their limitations, and experience the
difficulties in sustaining operations in a contaminated
environment. We also need to add chemical and biological
scenarios to war gaming exercises during all levels of
professional training.
Irrational actors will not hesitate to use
WMD against U.S. citizens and soldiers. The military needs
to be ready to respond to the challenge. Current efforts
focus on responding after an attack. In the future, we need
to prevent attacks from happening and be able to survive and
operate during and after an attack. Improvements will
require a combined interagency approach, pooling all available
military and civilian resources. Political and military
leaders need to highlight the terrorist WMD threat in future
policy, planning, training, and exercises.
Concluding his testimony on the Khobar
Towers bombing to the Senate Armed Services Committee, General
Peay concluded, “Even with additional physical security
upgrades, however, we must recognize that we will remain
vulnerable to terrorist attacks. No amount of money or
physical security upgrade alone can stop a determined terrorist.
We must recognize that while terrorism has been a threat to
our country for many years, it is evolving and growing more
sophisticated.”162
Notes
1. Office of the
Secretary of Defense. Proliferation: Threat and
Response. (Washington, DC: Government Printing
Office, November 1997), iii.
2. Clinton,
William J. A National Security Strategy for a New
Century. Washington, DC: Government Printing
Office, October 1998), 6.
3. Office of the
Secretary of Defense, iii.
4. Ibid, iii.
5. Cohen, William
S. Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review.
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May
1997), 13.
6. Hays, Peter L.
and others, Countering the Proliferation and Use of Weapons of
Mass Destruction (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1998),
37-38.
7. Laqueur,
Walter. Postmodern Terrorism. Foreign Affairs,
Sep-Oct 1996, 28.
8. Olson, Kyle.
Aum Shinrikyo Case Study. Air War College
Briefing, November 3, 1998.
9. Laqueur, op.
cit., 28.
10. Ibid., 28.
11. Purver, Ron,
Chemical and Biological Terrorism: The Threat
According to the Open Literature, CB Terrorism (Canadian
Security Intelligence Service: 1995), 1-2.
12. Roberts, Brad,
Biological Weapons: Weapons of the Future?
(Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Significant Issues Series, Volume XV,
Number 1, 1993), 22-23.
13. Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and
Response (Washington, DC: Government Printing
Office, November 1997), 49.
14. Hoffman,
Bruce, “Terrorism and WMD: Some Preliminary
Hypotheses,” The Nonproliferation Review,
Spring-Summer 1997, 50.
15. Purver, op.
cit., 2.
16. Roberts, Brad,
Ed., Terrorism with Chemical and Biological Weapons:
Calibrating Risks and Responses (Alexandria, VA:
The Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1997),
78.
17. Laqueur, op.
cit., 34.
18. Roberts, op.
cit., 96.
19. Office of the
Secretary of Defense, op. cit., 49.
20. Meadows,
Sandra I., “Regional Instability Rips Current Security
Notions,” National Defense, January 1995, 19.
21. Laqueur, op.
cit., 29-30.
22. Meadows, op.
cit., 19.
23. Starr,
Barbara, Briefing: Chemical and Biological Terrorism,
Jane's Defence Weekly, August 14, 1996, 20.
24. Central
Intelligence Agency, The Biological and Chemical Warfare
Threat, Langley, VA: 1997, 23-27.
25. Ibid., 30.
26. Starr, op.
cit., 20.
27. Meadows, op.
cit., 19.
28. Roberts, Biological
Weapons: Weapons of the Future?, 39-40.
29. Meadows,
Sandra I., “U.S. Forces Prepare for Future Chemical,
Biological Blitzkrieg,” National Defense,
September 1997, 41.
30. Roberts, Biological
Weapons: Weapons of the Future?, 41.
31. Meadows,
“Regional Instability Rips Current Security Notions,”
19.
32. Roberts, Biological
Weapons: Weapons of the Future?, 35-36.
33. Hays, op.
cit., 40-41.
34. Office of the
Secretary of Defense, op. cit., 51.
35. Starr, op.
cit., 16.
36.
Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, Report on
Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation and NBC
Terrorism, U.S. Government, May 1997, 3-6.
37. Central
Intelligence Agency, op. cit., 24.
38. Orton, Robert
D. and Neumann, Robert C., “The Impact of Weapons of Mass
Destruction on Battlefield Operations,” Military Review,
December 1993, 67.
39. Patrick,
William C. III, “The United States Offensive Biological
Program,” Air War College Briefing, February 19, 1999.
40. Mercier,
Charles L. Jr., “Terrorists, WMD, and the U.S. Army
Reserve,” Parameters, Autumn 1997, 100.
41. Meadows,
“U.S. Forces Prepare for Future Chemical, Biological
Blitzkrieg,” op. cit., 40.
42. Ibid., 40.
43. Clinton,
William J., A National Security Strategy for a New
Century (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,
October 1998), 6.
44. Clinton,
William J., “Letter to Congressional Leaders on Weapons of
Mass Destruction,” U.S. Newswire, November 12, 1998,
2384.
45. Birdsong,
George M., Weapons of Mass Destruction: Terrorist Use
and the State of Domestic Response. Carlisle Barracks,
PA: March 31, 1997, 13.
46. Clinton, A
National Security Strategy for a New Century, 5-8.
47. Cohen, William
S., Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review.
Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 1997,
viii.
48. Ibid., 3-4.
49. Office of the
Secretary of Defense. Proliferation: Threat and
Response. Washington, DC: Government Printing
Office, November 1997, 74.
50. Department of
Defense. Assessment of the Impact of Chemical and
Biological Weapons on Joint Operations in 2010: A Summary
Report. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc: November
1997, 22.
51. Cohen, William
S., Annual Report to the President and the Congress.
1998, available from http://www.dtic.mil, II-2-II-3.
52. Joint Pub
3-11. Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and
Chemical (NBC) Defense. July 10, 1995, I-1.
53. Ibid., I-3.
54. Joseph, Robert
G. and Reichart, John F., “Deterrence and Defense in a
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environment,” Comparative
Strategy, January-March 1996, 68.
55. Roberts, Brad,
“Rising Powers: Weapons Proliferation and New Great
Powers,” Current News, March-April 1995, 25.
56. Cohen, Annual
Report to the President and Congress, op. cit., IV-1.
57. Joint Pub
3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.
April 17, 1998, II-10.
58. Joint Pub
3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than
War, June 16, 1995, I-3.
59. Ibid.,
III-1-III-2.
60. Joint Pub
3-11, I-4.
61. Ibid., III-8.
62. Ibid.,
II-7-II-9.
63. Ibid.,
IV-2-IV-3.
64. Ibid., VI-1.
65. Domenici, Pete
V., “Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction,” The
Washington Quarterly, Winter 1995, 146.
66. Ibid., 148.
67. Ibid., 150.
68. Larson,
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69. Department of
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70. Joseph, Robert
G. and Reichart, John F., “Deterrence and Defense in a
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71. Betts, Richard
K., “The New Threat of Mass Destruction,” Foreign
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72. Joseph, Robert
G., “Regional Implications of NBC Proliferation,” Joint
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73. Clinton,
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74. Collins, John
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75. Ibid., 5.
76. Department of
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Weapons on Joint Operations in 2010: A Summary Report,
(McLean, VA: Booz-Allen & Hamilton, November, 1997),
23.
77. Ibid., 23.
78.
“Stanching Global Weapons Proliferation,” Defense,
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79. Zajtchuk, Russ
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80. Ibid., 377.
81. Eitzen, Edward
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Medical Research Institute of Infectious Disease, July 1998),
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82. Zajtchuk, op.
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83. Eitzen, op.
cit., 112.
84. Starr,
Barbara, “Briefing: Chemical and Biological
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85. Zajtchuk, 382.
86. Ibid., 362.
87. Ibid., 363.
88. Ibid., 373.
89. Ibid., 384.
90. Ibid.,
384-386.
91. Ibid., 386.
92. Ibid., 386.
93. Department of
Defense, Assessment of the Impact of Chemical and Biological
Weapons on Joint Operations in 2010, op. cit., 27.
94.
“Stanching Global Weapons Proliferation,” 40-41.
95. Ibid., 43.
96. Domenici, Pete
V., “Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction,” The
Washington Quarterly, Winter 1995, 149.
97. Department of
Defense, Assessment of the Impact of Chemical and Biological
Weapons on Joint Operations in 2010, op. cit., 28.
98. Collins, 26.
99. Orton, Robert
D., and Neumann, Robert C., “The Impact of Weapons of Mass
Destruction on Battlefield Operations,” Military
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100. Osterman,
Joseph, “Who Will Answer the Chem/Bio Call?” U.S.
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101. Eitzen, op.
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102. Zajtchuk, op.
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103. Clinton,
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