The Environment and Military Strategy
Air & Space Power Journal - Chronicles Online Journal
The Environment and Military Strategy
by
Colonel Richard W. Fisher, USAFR
War is never an isolated act. (Clausewitz, 1831)1
Introduction
Bats as bombs.
It sounds like a silly gimmick but the technique was actively researched and tested
during World War II.2 Americans trapped whole populations of
wild bats in the desert southwest during the early 1940's and attached timed incendiary
devices on them. The plan was that after the bats were rigged as self propelled weapons,
they were to be metabolically cooled into a quiescent state, packed by the thousands into
canisters and parachuted over enemy targets. Fortunately for the bats, the project failed
in testing but it serves to illustrate a commonly found characteristic of war; that the
environment and its components have little value other than as a military asset or
liability.
Today, the growing worldwide awareness and sensitivity to the health and vitality of
the environment compels analysis of the relationship between environmental security and
national security. Are they intimately and irretrievably tied or is the anxiety about the
earth's environmental perils overdrawn, thereby discounting the importance of the
environment in war. To use the bat bomb as a metaphor, if a bat were a threatened mangrove
ecosystem in South Vietnam, how many more bats (ecosystems) could we sacrifice without
threatening the stability of the entire bat population (integrated global environment).
Should any bats be sacrificed? If so, which ones? Does the genetic pool dangerously shrink
as bats are destroyed? Beyond the strictly biological and physical questions is the issue
of environmental ethics in war. These are provocative questions but are they pertinent to
our national security?
The aims of this paper are twofold. The first is to demonstrate that at least some
consideration of the environmental consequences of war is necessary in the strategic
planning for force employment. The second is to recommend a US strategic force planning
doctrine that accounts for the application of an environmentally responsible force. That
is, this paper will address not the everyday peacetime problems of the Department of
Defense such as the clean-up of hazardous waste sites nor the environmental resources that
are likely to be fought over in the years to come. Rather, at issue is the environmental
damage we are willing to accept and deliver for military gain when we wage war.
A Selected Historical Perspective of the Effect of Warfare on the Environment.
Throughout history, the physical environment and ecology of the earth during wartime
have only presented either logistical problems to be overcome and defeated or
opportunities to be exploited. There are abundant examples from World War II. In the
Pacific Theater, entire tropical islands, above and below the waterline, were denuded by
both the Allies and Japanese as an incidental consequence of conflict. Populations of
indigenous birds and animals on many of these islands were rendered extinct. In the west,
both the German and Allied armies destroyed much soil binding vegetation in North Africa
increasing both windstorms and desertification. The Germans sunk an allied ship containing
a quarter of a million pounds of mustard gas in an Adriatic port. The extremely toxic
effect from the slow release of this chemical has been expected to threaten plant and
animal life in this area for 400 years.3
The earth environment also has been frequently used as a weapon of war. Vegetation has
been burned, soil and water supplies contaminated and the air fouled as it suited a
military mission. The destruction of croplands has been commonplace. Two millennia ago,
the Romans sowed salt on Carthaginian fields during the third Punic War to make them
infertile. More recently, General Sheridan virtually decimated the remaining American
bison herds in 1865, the staple of the plains Indian. A year earlier he had ravaged
virtually all cropland in the Shenandoah Valley. In World War II, the Norwegians
instigated land slides into their own fertile valleys and the Dutch broke dikes flooding a
third of their own productive agricultural land in an attempt to dissuade German
occupation. At the same time, the Germans were decimating the rich Czech beech forests.4
After the advent of the nuclear age when the prospect of global annihilation was a very
real possibility, lower intensity warfare was still conducted with little regard for it's
ecological effect. A notorious example of this was the defoliation of many of the
Indochinese forests in the 1960's. Here, the rich sub-tropical jungle that hid the Ho Che
Min Trail and other areas of military interest were only so much dense foliage to be
eradicated by aerial applications of toxic chemicals. In addition, much of the irrigated
rice growing lands of Vietnam were drained allowing leaching of nutrients and sulfur
accumulation that made the soil barren. The dry vegetation on the defoliated and drained
lands was burned with permanent scaring. These were not fire dominated ecosystems such as
exist in other parts of the world. Beside the loss of valuable cropland, several animal
species were threatened or endangered as a result of these and other ecocidal practices.5
After World War II, strategic planning was built around the development of nuclear
weapons types and arsenal sizes of such massive proportions that consideration of global
human survivability was introduced into strategic thinking. Still, any concern about
global or local environmental health was largely only an issue as it directly related in
the short term to human survival, not the sustaining environment in which people would
expect to live after war. During the 1950's, the US built fallout shelters fully expecting
that civilians could eventually emerge unscathed after a nuclear attack into a fully
functioning and liveable environment.
Although the concept of fallout shelters was later abandoned as folly, it was not until
the notion of nuclear winter was hypothesized using some general atmospheric circulation
models (GCMs) results during the late 1980's that the effect of war on global ecosystem
functioning and energy budgets was seriously considered. Now, after evaluating the
climatic prospects of global nuclear war, scientists are more pessimistic but not
unanimous in their conclusions about the resilience of the earth to such insult.
In spite of the uncertainty in the environmental debate that grew around the potential
consequence of the use of strategic nuclear weapons, still relatively little attention
among force planning strategists has been directed at the environmental consequences
incumbent in the conduct of either conventional warfare and especially the use of tactical
nuclear weapons. Indeed, some nations continue to act without any apparent environmental
ethic. Modern day examples of truly environmentally irresponsible wartime acts have not
been difficult to find. The most conspicuous recent example was the loathsome destruction
of Kuwaiti oil wells by Iraq in 1990 resulting in damage to Persian Gulf estuaries and the
wasteful loss of an increasingly valuable finite natural resource.6
The most important thing to be said about the consequences of all these examples of
assaults on the environment is that they caused either or both a physical and a biological
change. In some cases, ecosystem function was permanently damaged while in others, natural
processes invoked a new ecosystem paradigm. In some cases, as in the reef building around
sunken ships, the change has actually benefited the environment. Of course, changes of the
same magnitude have occurred and will continue to occur during peacetime. Examples are the
Exxon Valdez oil spill, the huge hydroelectric generation project in the James Bay
drainage of eastern Canada and our long term use of CFCs, although environmental awareness
is playing a greater role in identifying damaging human activities and preventing and
mitigating them. The question is, "Should the important environmental considerations
in peacetime also be a concern during operations of war?" Stated another way,
"Why spend enormous sums to manage, mitigate and improve the environment in everyday
commerce if during wartime, all bets are off?" Such actions may soon be suicidal.
Are There Potential National Security Risks from the Adverse Environmental
Effects of War?
To postulate that the environment should be a factor in the planning for force
employment requires a demonstration that national security risks are posed by the adverse
environmental effect of war today and into the future. In other words, and more to the
point, whether or not a certain battle should be fought or a certain weapon should be
used, is a decision that should be made, at least in part, after evaluating the probable
environmental consequences of that action and it's relationship to the national security.
The potential environmental effects of an action can be more easily understood as a
national security issue by dividing the problem into two broadly defined spatial scales;
global and local. At the global scale such things as changes in global energy budgets as a
consequence of changes in patterns of vegetative cover, atmospheric carbon dioxide,
methane and particulate concentrations are important. Local scale effects occur in our or
the enemy's backyard and are usually readily contained. An example is the contamination of
drinking water reservoirs or farmland soils from the sabotage of a nuclear power plant.
The purpose for the two scales in this assessment is to discriminate between
environmentally adverse wartime effects that can be physically contained (local) and those
that cannot (global).
The issue of whether or not man is even capable of causing global change, after a
strategic nuclear exchange or in any other way, is not a settled debate. At least two
extreme views exist together with a number of more moderate ones. On one extreme, is the
argument that the enormous planetary engine powered by the sun and balanced by the
oceanic, atmospheric and terrestrial heat sinks dwarfs any meager effort by man to
seriously disrupt this equilibrium. In this scenario, anthropogenically caused
perturbations in the earth's energy balance likely would be short-lived lasting perhaps
only weeks. The earth would again soon reach a favorable energy balance.
A corollary to this theory is that the earth's climate continues to change naturally
despite our poor power to affect it. Our climate may radically change naturally to an
uncomfortable or unlivable level and the change would be erroneously attributed to this or
that human event.
A contrasting position contemplates the tenuous circumstances upon which life is based.
In it, the survival of life on earth is critically dependent on maintaining a favorable,
but very sensitive energy and lifecycle balance, not disrupted by man. Here the thought is
that once the balance is seriously disturbed, it cannot be brought back into an
equilibrium favorable to life as we know it.
With such a strong dichotomy of opinion, the prudent person would likely agree that the
conservative approach is certainly safest. In other words, the high degree of uncertainty
evident in the science suggest that we should hedge against nuclear war by taking steps
that are well understood to be beneficial even if the global environment turns out to be
very robust. Research climatologist Dr. Stephen Schneider suggests that "tie-in"
benefits be considered when deciding on wise and economically favorable global strategies.7 In the case of climate change, he suggests that reducing fossil
fuel use has a resource conservation benefit in the long run even if the climate warming
prediction falls short. The analogy in weapons use is apparent; even if the use of nuclear
weapons does not cause a nuclear winter, their eradication will have at least resulted in
a safer world. Although some may argue that the world would be, in fact, less safe without
nuclear weapons because the knowledge to build them still exists, first use8 in anger is still a step further afield than when the weapon is
already available. Inspecting for weapon construction is a far safer activity than
managing the weapons themselves.
An example of a local scale adverse environmental effect is a low intensity conflict
using conventional weapons in an amphibious landing of a Marine Division. Planners might
conclude with some confidence that the landing would destroy coral reefs adversely
affecting fisheries in shallow waters and flatten coastal forests during initial fighting
on shore. Further action might result in assured destruction of nearby productive oil
wells fouling estuaries and further damaging fisheries. Preplanning might also determine
that if the enemy were defeated, the conquered nation would need either to feed themselves
using local resources or, to avoid anarchy, receive assistance from the conquerors. The
cost in the eventual clean-up of the soil and water, loss of oil production and the
rendering of food and water assistance to indigenous peoples may be more than the
victorious nation is willing to cope with. Thus, that nation might conclude that the
disruption to the local environment caused by the environmental consequences of the
military action outweighs the political or economic gains that could be made if the
operation proceeded or if some alternative military or diplomatic alternative were to be
found. The costs can be characterized in terms of both present dollar economic costs and
possibly in continuing support costs. Clearly, the environment can be an important
consideration at both the local and the global scale.
A provocative additional consideration could be posed if the operation endangers the
last known surviving pod of threatened whales, for example. Linking the survival of a
whale species to national security or even to ecosystem balance is not straight-forward
but it is a legitimate ethical problem. This illustration serves to pose the dilemma,
"how much and what kind of environmental damage is acceptable in the furtherance of
military objectives?" Unfortunately, there are no easy prescriptions for such
considerations. At least the dilemma should be answered with the rhetorical question,
"will we be better off achieving the military objective and, in this example, losing
the whale to extinction or is there a satisfactory alternative that meets the military
objective and saves the whale?" Like most difficult strategy questions, the
consequences of each possible alternative cannot be fully known a priori. We do not know
which thread in the web of life and human existence the whale occupies, ethically as well
as biologically, nor are we likely to know this for many other environmentally destructive
wartime actions. Increased size and scope of the adverse environmental effects short of
clear global destruction only serve to make the problem of identifying acceptable levels
of damage more difficult.
At least two wartime force application opportunities deserve attention when assessing
the national environmental security risk; the offensive application of force and the
counter-offensive response. In the offensive action, we have the greatest latitude to
choose the battlefield, specifically the time and place to fight. If a valuable
environmental resource, such as a water supply or a productive forest, were at risk during
an offensive attack, it probably would be prudent to work harder to locate and eliminate
the keystone to the enemy, if it exists, rather than prolong a fight. Finding and
destroying the enemy's center of gravity is obviously the objective of any fight, but in
this case, we might assume that putting tanks on the field of battle is harm to be
avoided, if possible. Timing of an offensive action may be desirable to gain favorable
soil moisture, await forest reseeding or to avoid migratory birds, for instance. The
capability to accomplish a mission with these constraints requires superior intelligence,
accurate weapons and added patience.
An environmentally responsible counter-offensive response leaves fewer alternative
choices on the battlefield but nonetheless necessitates consideration of the weapons type
and application including whether or not a fight should be carried on.
Clausewitz discussed the virtues of mountains, rivers, streams and swamps as assets to
either a defensive or an offensive position, but, of course, he did not address the short
or long term ecological consequences of using these resources in war since, at the time,
the earth's resources were largely thought to be resilient and boundless. The quote at the
top of this article was originally in reference to the political causes of war.
Nevertheless, it can be reasonably postulated that Clausewitz, were he alive today, might
also agree that the statement has validity when applied generally to war and specifically
to war and the environment. This seems especially likely since the earth today is
generally regarded to be facing a critical and growing threat from activities less violent
than war.
How Does the Department of Defense Address Environmental Issues Today? The
current administration has made responsible environmental actions around military bases
and with defense contractors a high priority.9,10 The theme of this strategy was summed up in "C3P2"
(clean-up, comply, conservation and pollution prevention). Clean-up refers to the removal
or immobilization of hazardous substances on military installations. All entities of the
Department of Defense (DoD) are instructed to fully comply with federal, State and local
laws and regulations. Conservation encourages resource users to find ways to accomplish
missions using fewer resources. Pollution prevention is an emission concept that is simple
enough; if a pollutant is not emitted, it does not have to be cleaned-up.
The National Security Strategy recognizes that the increased competition for the
"free" goods of clean air and water, productive fisheries and arable land may
well lead to political instability around the world.11 The
strategy goes further to recognize the multiplying problems of drought, climate change and
natural catastrophes to world order and the need for a long term US policy. The question
posed here is what consideration should be given to force employment (i.e. military
operations). The current defense guidance in silent on this issue.
The Army professes "environmental stewardship"12
and the Navy "environmental security"13 but both
refer only to their peacetime intentions similar to C3P2.
Only the recent Bottom-up Review in the current prominent National Security literature
mentions the consideration of weapons performance and military operations as a matter of
environmental concern.14 These points are raised in the
context of a variety of threats from global to national. To date, apparently no strategy
has been articulated to address these concerns.
What Environmental Considerations Should Our Force Employment Planning Include
for Wartime Applications?
As the sole superpower in combined wealth and strength, the US is an likely target for
ecocidal attacks by those wishing to garner attention. The US in it's role as preeminent
champion against tyranny is also very likely to be faced with the dilemma of determining
the best course of action, whether diplomatic or military among many, to achieve military
objectives while protecting natural resources. Ethical, responsible and prudent behavior
that has the strategic best interest of the US and the future world populations will be
essential.
Force employment strategies must complement these responsibilities with two fundamental
precepts:
That the US never deliberately wages war on the environment.
That the US abides by pertinent treaties and conventions, even though other countries
may renege on them.
Further, the following policy positions should be specifically adopted by the US.
As a general consideration, the US should include environmental effects as an issue of
central value along with politics, economics and social effects when deciding whether or
not to wage war and, if so, in what manner. It may well be that the potential long-term
environmental risk due to loss of productivity outweighs the importance of other
considerations.
The US should prioritize potential battlegrounds around the world for their strategic
environmental importance. For instance, a particularly productive estuary might be an
important area to avoid for an amphibious operation if an air assault would be as
effective and the post war rebuilding required a stable source of seafood. In another area
of the world, destruction of a forest during a war might be expected to lead to severe
erosion and thereby substantial loss of productivity, possible elimination of species with
proven or unproven medical utility. SIPRI suggests that valuable natural areas could be
permanently protected if they have the following characteristics:
They are part of a substantial contribution to the global climate balance.
Their ecosystems are recognized to be intrinsically fragile.
They support unique habitats.
They provide habitat to an endangered or threatened species.15
The US should match conflict type (e.g., low intensity conflict (LIC)) and associated
expected damage with ecosystem priority. For example, for a short LIC, a moderately robust
and elastic ecosystem might be able to tolerate the expected disturbance, while an already
stressed and unstable one would not.
Retaliation to an environmentally destructive attack with an in-kind response (as in
Mutually Assured Destruction) is, by definition, a lose-lose situation for both aggressor
and defendant. Suitable responses whether military or diplomatic should be ready in case
of such an attack. When essential, offensive and counter-offensive actions should be aimed
at perpetrators and military capabilities. These actions should be decisive and trenchant,
not broad and imprecise.
Treaties and Conventions. International agreements in place serve to provide a
foundation, though of course, do not guarantee ethical environmental actions in war. Four
of importance to responsible environmental actions in war are:
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Biological and Toxin Weapons (1972).
Binds signatory nations not to use biological weapons.
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques (1977).
Binds signatory nations not to deliberately manipulate nature to suit military purposes.
The Law of the Sea.
A broad agreement on maritime activities which includes provisions not to degrade the
sea to suit military objectives.16
The Chemical Weapons Convention (1992)
Binds signatories not to use "chemical weapons for any reason, including
retaliation".17
Other broad international laws regulating ethical behavior need to be adopted to protect
the international environment. For example, a "Law of the Atmosphere" might
stipulate as illegal the intentional befouling of the atmosphere or the use of weapons or
techniques which have a reasonable probability of changing the weather or climate. In
addition, the importance of including a non-retaliation clause, as provided in the
Chemical Weapons Convention, cannot be overstated.
The US should eliminate all nuclear weapons from its arsenal, as General Charles Horner,
retired Commander of US Space Command suggests, while simultaneously pursuing a vigorous
policy of urging every other nation to do the same.18 The
reasoning which substantiates a "zero" policy begins with the question of
whether we should ever actually use such a weapon for any purpose. The answer is
"no", sufficient space supported conventional forces will be all that we need. A
more difficult question is "would we ever use nuclear weapons in anger again?"
The answer postulated here is, "no", for these reasons. Consider first-use.
Understanding, as we do, the politically destabilizing, morally detrimental and
environmentally adverse consequences of using nuclear weapons, it is difficult to imagine
any situation in which US first-use is to our advantage.
Consider our opportunity for a retaliatory nuclear strike. Would our reply to launches
against the US from within the Ukraine or Russia, as an example, be in kind retaliation?
Most likely not since the enemy would not apt to be rational or responsible and therefore
would not fear retaliation. Such an event would, most probably, not be nationally
sponsored or involve the full coordination of all nuclear weapons within or between these
countries. Our response to such an attack likely would be measured and consist of
conventional weapons. Taking a non-first-use example, if a nuclear exchange were initiated
between Pakistan and India, would the US ever enter the fray with nuclear weapons? This
prospect seems remote because the escalation, environmental and moral risks are simply too
high. Strategic nuclear don't have value in either case because they offer no deterrence
and the potential global environmental disaster with their use would have to be avoided at
all political costs.
The mere presence of these nuclear weapons in the world is destabilizing primarily
because of the persistent danger of unintended use, such as their falling into the hands
of terrorists groups or states who sponsor terrorism. The belief that responsible nations
who have nuclear weapons should perpetuate a base level arsenal to discourage their
acquisition by those who don't have such weapons ignores the typical terrorist motives.
Terrorists groups, such as the Humas, will not bow to the kind of deterrence effective
during the cold war. Further, reprisal with nuclear weapons of our own would be impossible
since such groups usually conceal their operations within populated areas and certainly
absurd in terms of the necessary force to accomplish the objective, that is, of stopping
the terrorist acts. The practical advantage of the "zero" policy is that we need
only be concerned about the cheaper alternative of detecting weapons production rather
than both tracking existing weapons and detecting production.
The earth and it's atmosphere have tolerated more than a thousand nuclear bomb
explosions since the dawn of the nuclear age, many of them much greater in size than the
two dropped on Japan in 1945, yet the continued presence of thousands more nuclear weapons
still poses the most environmentally devastating potential on earth. The real danger in
their existence is in controlling their use after the initial contemporary wartime use.
Highly tenuous and questionable command, control and accountability of the thousands of
nuclear weapons in various locations around the world would be difficult. First-use today
makes the subsequent use far more probable and begets continued use, truly a potential
pandora's box whereby more frequent and, likely, very reckless use would occur.
Conclusion.
As the world population continues to grow and the effective land and sea areas
available to sustain stable, healthy and productive communities of people and other living
organisms shrinks, a legitimate international security issue balances on the question of
where the equilibrium between population and consumption is to be found. Wars can be
expected to be fought over these issues using these very same resources.
The United Nations has adopted the Lovelock concept of earth as Gaia, an interdependent
set of components functioning together in homeostasis.19 Gaia
is sensitive to perturbations such as pollution, changes in land use and, of course, war.
Those concerned about the health and vitality of the global ecosystem view current
anthropogenic perturbations as radical enough to seriously alter the natural and
relatively benign balance of life and climate. Others persuasively argue that the earth
has demonstrated a remarkable resilience and adaptability which defies man's poor power to
disrupt or even to understand it's function. Deciding whether or not to account for the
environmental consequences of war depends on who is most credible. Prudence dictates
actions that are effective with the least disturbance.
Robinson sees two major ways to reduce the effect of war on the environment. One is to
preserve certain ecosystems as no-fight zones and the other is to expand the practical
knowledge in the civilian community so people are generally knowledgeable about the issue
and it's intrinsic perils.20
Past wars have been environmentally destructive, but just how important this
destruction has been in the long term ecological balance of the earth is not clear. With
more people to feed, less arable land and more polluted oceans, national security is
increasingly dependent on a healthy global ecosystem and a stable climate. Yet highly
destructive weapons in the hands of nations and special interest groups who do not share
these concerns (i.e., are irrational) have the potential to threaten our national security
when used in environmental irresponsible ways. In the face of this uncertainty, a prudent
path is to minimize as much as possible the human caused change, including that from war,
on the environment.
That adverse environmental effects from war should be minimized is perhaps axiomatic.
Yet, actions have historically belied intentions. Fortunately, the US has recognized that
the global environment is a US national security issue. But implementation of this policy
to the fullest extent requires the development of complementary military strategies and
doctrine to shape the force structure and the application of force in the future.
&127;
Notes
1. Karl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and
Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 78.
2. Conrad Crane, The Air War in Europe (Lecture presented to the Naval
War College, 13 Oct 94).
3. Susan Lanier-Graham, The Ecology of War: Environmental Impacts of
Weaponry and Warfare (New York: Walker & Co., 1993), 52-68.
4. Lanier-Graham, 52-68.
5. SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), Ecological
Consequences of the Second Indochina War (Stockholm: Almquist and Eiksell, 1976), 58-72.
6. Kattalai S. Ramachandran, Gulf War and Environmental Problems (New
Dehli: Ashish Publishing House, 1991), xiii.
7. Stephen H. Schneider, "The Changing Climate: The Risky
Planetwide Experiment" Greenhouse Glasnost: The Crisis of Global Warming (New York:
The Ecco Press, 1990), 128.
8. It is presumed here that the first use in wartime, fifty years ago,
has been sufficiently forgotten so as not to be an important consideration today.
9. Les Aspen, Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense to the
President of the United States (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1994), 82-83.
10. Sherri Wasserman Goodman, "Vision for Environmental
Security," Defense 94, Issue 3, 1994, 25-39.
11. William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and
Enlargement (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1994), 15.
12. Togo D. West and Gordon R Sullivan, A Statement of the Posture of
the United States Army Fiscal Year 1995 (Washington DC: US Department of the Army, 1994),
70.
13. John H. Dalton, Department of the Navy Posture 1994 Statement
(Washington DC: Department of the Navy, 1994), 47.
14. Les Aspen, Report of the Bottom-up Review (Washington DC: US
Department of Defense, 1993), 99.
15. SIPRI, 58-72.
16. Arnd Bernaerts, Guide to the 1982 UN Convention on Law of the Sea
(Surrey, England: Fairplay Publications, 1982), 64-65, 126-128.
17. Colin L. Powell, Roles, Missions and Functions of the Armed Forces
of the United States (Washington DC: US Department of Defense, 1993), II-5.
18. "Why Not Zero?", Air Force Times, 1 Aug 94, 6.
19. Frank Barnaby, ed., The Gaia Peace Atlas (New York: Doubleday,
1988), 10).
20. J.P. Robinson, The Effects of Weapons on Ecosystems (Elmsford, NY:
Pergamon Press, 1979), 68.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the
author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air
University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government,
Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
This article has undergone security and policy content review and has been
approved for public release IAW AFI 35-101.
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