Feminist History of Philosophy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Cite this entry Search the SEP • Advanced Search • Tools • RSS FeedTable of Contents• What's New• Archives• Projected ContentsEditorial Information• About the SEP• Editorial Board• How to Cite the SEP• Special CharactersSupport the SEPContact the SEP ©Metaphysics Research Lab,CSLI,Stanford University  Open access to the SEP is made possible by a world-wide funding initiative. Please Read How You Can Help Keep the Encyclopedia FreeFeminist History of PhilosophyFirst published Fri Nov 3, 2000; substantive revision Mon May 7, 2007The past twenty-five years have seen an explosion of feminist writing on thephilosophical canon, a development that has clear parallels in otherdisciplines like literature and art history. Since most of the writingis, in one way or another, critical of the tradition, a naturalquestion to ask is: Why does the history of philosophy have importancefor feminist philosophers? This question assumes that the history ofphilosophy is of importance for feminists, an assumption that iswarranted by the sheer volume of recent feminist writing on the canon.This entry explores the different ways that feminist philosophers areinteracting with the Western philosophical tradition. Feminist philosophers engaged in a project of re-reading andre-forming the philosophical canon have noticed two significant areasof concern. The first is the problem of historical exclusion. Feministphilosophers are faced with a tradition that believes that there are nowomen philosophers and, if there are any, they are unimportant. Ofcourse, women are not entirely absent from the history of philosophy,and that brings us to the second challenge we face. Canonicalphilosophers have had plenty to say about women and what we are like.In general terms, we often find that philosophical norms like reasonand objectivity are defined in contrast to matter, the irrational orwhatever a given philosopher associates with women and the feminine.Our tradition tells us, either implicitly through images and metaphors,or explicitly in so many words, that philosophy itself, and its normsof reason and objectivity, exclude everything that is feminine orassociated with women.In response, feminist philosophers have criticized both thehistorical exclusion of women from the philosophical tradition, and thenegative characterization of women or the feminine in it. Feministhistorians of philosophy have argued that the historical record isincomplete because it omits women philosophers, and it is biasedbecause it devalues any women philosophers it forgot to omit. Inaddition, feminist philosophers have argued that the philosophicaltradition is conceptually flawed because of the way that itsfundamental norms like reason and objectivity are genderedmale.[1] By means of these criticisms, feministphilosophers are enlarging the philosophical canon and re-evaluatingits norms, in order to include women in the philosophical "us".The following entry contains 4 major sections. Section 1 ("FeministCriticisms of the Canon as Misogynist") describes feminist readings ofthe philosophical canon that challenge its derogatory characterizationsof women. These are of three kinds: (a) readings that record theexplicit misogyny of great philosophers (like Aristotle's descriptionof a female as a deformed male); (b) readings that argue for genderedinterpretations of theoretical concepts (like matter and form inAristotle); (c) synoptic interpretations of the canon (like the viewthat, historically, reason and objectivity are gendered male). Thethird category of feminist criticisms of the canon diagnoses wherephilosophy as a whole went most deeply wrong, and, in doing so, itconstructs a negative canon of philosophy. The negative canon exposesthe ways in which the views of canonical philosophers throughout thehistory of philosophy are explicitly or implicitly misogynist orsexist. Section 2 ("Feminist Revisions of the History of Philosophy")discusses the response of feminist philosophy to the myths that thereare no women philosophers and, in any case, no important ones. Oneresponse has been the retrieval of women philosophers for thehistorical record. A related development is the elevation to the canonof women philosophers like Mary Wollstonecraft, Hannah Arendt andSimone de Beauvoir. Finally, feminist revisions to the history of philosophy and the canon raise important and pressing questions concerning how to weave women philosophers securely into the story of philosophy so that they begin to appear in the philosophical curriculum. Section 3 ("Feminist Appropriation of CanonicalPhilosophers") examines the way that feminist philosophers have beenengaged in rereading the canon looking for antecedents to feministphilosophy in the work of those philosophers (e.g. Hume) and thosetheories (e.g. Arisotle's virtue ethics) that are most congenial tocurrent trends in feminism or which provide most fuel for feministthought. This is to use the canon as other movements have done—as aresource, and as confirmation that a feminist perspective or problem issecurely rooted in our philosophical culture. Section 4 (Feminist Methodological Reflections on the History of Philosophy) discusses the methodological issues raised by feminist work on the history of philosophy. Feminists who are critical of traditional methods of reading the history of philosophy have proposed several alternative reading strategies that they argue are better suited to feminist purposes than traditional methods. These writers are particularly skeptical of the appropriation project outlined in section 3 and their skepticism provokes interesting questions about what it is we do when we do the history of philosophy.1. Feminist Criticisms of the Canon as Misogynist 1.1 Explicit Statements of Misogyny in Philosophical Texts 1.2 Gendered Interpretations of Philosophical Concepts 1.3 Synoptic Interpretations of the Philosophical Canon 2. Feminist Revisions of the History of Philosophy3. Feminist Appropriation of Canonical Philosophers4. Feminist Methodological Reflections on the History of PhilosophyBibliography Comprehensive Bibliography [Supplementary Document by AbigailGosselin] References Other Internet ResourcesRelated Entries1. Feminist Criticisms of the Canon as MisogynistWomen are capable of education, but they are not made foractivities which demand a universal faculty such as the more advancedsciences, philosophy and certain forms of artistic production. ...Women regulate their actions not by the demands of universality, but byarbitrary inclinations and opinions. (Hegel 1973: 263)The idea that the gender of philosophers is important or even relevantto their work is a thought that runs counter to the self-image ofphilosophy. So, it is interesting to explore how and why feministphilosophers came to the realization that gender is a useful analyticcategory to apply to the history of philosophy. We can distinguish twoaspects to this process although, in many cases, the two aspects mergeinto a single project. The first stage of realizing the importance ofgender consisted of the cataloguing of the explicit misogyny of most ofthe canon. The second stage consisted of probing the theories ofcanonical philosophers in order to uncover the gender bias lurking intheir supposedly universal theories. The second stage, the discoverythat a philosopher's supposedly universal and objective theories weregender specific, raised the further question of whether or not thetheoretical gender bias was intrinsic to the theory or extrinsic to it.Let me illustrate these points with Aristotle. 1.1 Explicit Statements of Misogyny in Philosophical TextsThere is no doubt that Aristotle's texts are misogynist; he thoughtthat women were inferior to men and he said so explicitly. For example,to cite Cynthia Freeland's catalogue: "Aristotle says that the courageof a man lies in commanding, a woman's lies in obeying; that "matteryearns for form, as the female for the male and the ugly for thebeautiful;" that women have fewer teeth than men; that a female is anincomplete male or "as it were, a deformity": which contributes onlymatter and not form to the generation of offspring; that in general "awoman is perhaps an inferior being"; that female characters in atragedy will be inappropriate if they are too brave or tooclever"(Freeland 1994: 145-46). However dispiriting or annoying thislitany is, and whatever problems it presents to a woman studying orteaching Aristotle, it can be argued that Aristotle simply held amistaken view about women and their capacities (as did most Atheniansof his time). But, if this is so, then Aristotle's theories, or most ofthem, are not tarnished by his statements about women, and we canignore them, since they are false. I have chosen Aristotle as my example, but similar feministcritiques are available chronicling the explicit misogyny of othercanonical figures like Plato and Kant. Feminist criticisms of Plato'stheories stress dialogues (like the Timaeus and Laws)that characterize women as inferior to men rather than the egalitarianRepublic. Kant's writings, like Aristotle's, provide the idealtarget for feminist criticism because they contain both overtstatements of sexism and racism, and a theoretical framework that canbe interpreted along gender lines.[2]1.2 Gendered Interpretations of Philosophical ConceptsIf we consider Aristotle's theory of hylomorphism we find a connectionbetween form and being male, and matter and being female. That is, wefind that matter and form are gendered notions in Aristotle (Witt1998). By a gendered notion I mean a notion that is connected eitherovertly or covertly, either explicitly or metaphorically with gender orsexual difference.[3] Furthermore, matter and form are not equalpartners in Aristotle's metaphysics; form is better than matter. Andsince hylomorphism is the conceptual framework that underlies most ofAristotelian theory from metaphysics and philosophy of mind to biologyand literary theory, it looks as if his supposedly universal andobjective theories are gendered, and it looks as if his negativecharacterization of women tarnishes his philosophical theories.Are Aristotle's theories intrinsically gendered and sexist, so thatgender cannot be removed without altering the theories themselves?Several feminist philosophers have developed this thesis. For example,in "Woman Is Not a Rational Animal", Lynda Lange argues thatAristotle's theory of sex difference is implicated in every piece ofAristotle's metaphysical jargon, and she concludes that "it is not atall clear that it [Aristotle's theory of sex difference] can simply becut away without any reflection on the status of the rest of thephilosophy"(Harding and Hintikka 1983: 2). Elizabeth Spelman has arguedthat Aristotle's politicized metaphysics is reflected in his theory ofsoul, which, in turn, is used to justify the subordination of women inthe Politics (Spelman 1983). And, finally, Susan Okin has argued thatAristotle's functionalist theory of form was devised by Aristotle inorder to legitimate the political status quo in Athens, includingslavery and the inequality of women (Okin 1979: ch. 4).If these scholars are right, then Aristotle's theories areintrinsically biased against women, and it is unlikely that they canhave any value for feminists beyond the project of learning about theways in which the philosophical tradition has devalued women.Alternatively, I have argued that the suspect gender associations withAristotelian matter and form are extrinsic to these concepts, andtherefore removable from Aristotle's theories without substantiallyaltering them (Witt 1998). The argument that Aristotle's genderassociations are not intrinsic to his concepts of matter (female) andform (male) turns on the incompatibility of the position that matter isintrinsically female, and form intrinsically male with the positionthat every composite substance is a unity of matter and form. If everycomposite substance is a complex of matter and form, then each would bea hermaphrodite, rather than a male or a female as is the case withanimals. Moreover, whatever plausibility gender associations withmatter and form might have with regard to animals, is lost entirelywhen we consider artifacts, like shoes and beds. If intrinsic genderassociations with matter and form are incompatible with Aristotle'stheory of substance and extrinsic gender associations are compatiblewith that theory, then the principle of charity dictates that we optfor the consistent interpretation.Sometimes, as in the case of Descartes, the feminist argument infavor of a gendered theory is subtle since, unlike Aristotle, heexpresses both a personal and a theoretical commitment to equality.Further, his theories are not stated using gendered notions. Yet, somefeminists have argued that his theory of mind-body dualism, and hisabstract characterization of reason resonate with gender implications—on the assumption that women are emotional and bodily creatures (e.g.Scheman 1993; Bordo 1987; Lloyd 1993b, ch. 3).1.3 Synoptic Interpretations of the Philosophical CanonThe philosophical canon can allow the luster some of its members to betarnished by feminist criticism, just as it has weathered criticismsfrom analytic or continental perspectives. The most radical feministcritics, however, have urged that the canon's central philosophicalnorms and values, like reason and objectivity, are gendered notions.The synoptic approach considers the Western philosophical tradition as awhole, and argues that its core concepts are gendered male. But, ifthis is so, then the Western philosophical tradition as a whole, andthe central concepts that we have inherited from it, requires criticalscrutiny by feminists. Moreover, philosophy's self-image as universaland objective, rather than particular and biased, is mistaken. Feminist synoptic interpretations of the canon take several forms.The first, exemplified by Genevieve Lloyd's Man of Reason,argues that reason and objectivity in the history of philosophy aregendered male.[4] The way that reason and objectivity aregendered male varies as philosophical theory and historical periodvaries, but the fact that they are gendered is a constant. FromAristotle to Hume, from Plato to Sartre, reason is associated withmaleness. Therefore, the notion of reason that we have inherited,whether we are empiricists or existentialists, requires criticalscrutiny.The second form of synoptic interpretation, exemplified by SusanBordo's The Flight to Objectivity, argues that the modernperiod in philosophy, and, in particular, the philosophy of Descartes,is the source of our ideals of reason and objectivity that are genderedmale. In other words, this story chronicles a turn in philosophycoincident with the rise of modern science, which generated ideals ofreason and objectivity that are deeply antagonistic to women andfeminism.[5] Cartesian rationalism and the norms ofmodern science mark a decisive break with a philosophical and culturaltradition that was more accommodating of female characteristics andpowers.It is important to note that Lloyd and Bordo differ not only withregard to the historical story they tell concerning the maleness ofreason, but also with regard to the way they understand that maleness.For Lloyd, the maleness of reason is symbolic and metaphorical ratherthan cultural or psychological. Lloyd does not intend the maleness ofreason to refer to either a socially constituted gender category or apsychological orientation shared by males. "This book is not a directstudy of gender identity. It seeks rather to contribute to theunderstanding of how the male-female distinction operates as a symbolin traditional philosophical texts, and of its interactions withexplicit philosophical views of reason".[6] In understanding themaleness of reason as symbolic rather than as psychological or social,Lloyd avoids making a theoretical commitment to any particularpsychology of sex differences or any particular account of the socialformation of gender identity. What she gains in flexibility, however,she loses in content, since it is difficult to specify exactly whatmetaphorical maleness is, and how it is related to psychological orsocial maleness. Other feminists have attempted to develop an accountof how male metaphors and symbols undermine philosophical arguments(Rooney 1991).For Bordo, however, the maleness of Cartesian reason is given both asocial meaning and a psychological content. First, the social meaningof maleness: "In the seventeenth century it [the feminine orientationtoward the world] was decisively purged from the dominant intellectualculture, through the Cartesian ‘rebirthing’ andrestructuring of knowledge and the world as masculine"(Bordo 1987:100). This social meaning is paired with a psychological consequence:"The ‘great Cartesian anxiety,’ although manifestlyexpressed in epistemological terms, discloses itself as anxiety overseparation from the organic female universe"(Bordo 1987: 5). Cartesian‘anxiety’ is separation anxiety from mother nature; therational norms of clarity and distinctness are read as symptoms ofthis anxiety.[7] Bordo's social-psychological notion ofmaleness while rich and explicit, provides a large target for criticsbecause it is based on a controversial historical thesis (that the 17thcentury showed a marked increase in gynophobia) and a disputedpsychological theory of the family (Object Relations Theory).Luce Irigaray takes a radical stance towards the history ofphilosophy by trying to indicate what is suppressed and hidden in thetradition rather than cataloguing its evident "maleness". Her work,like Bordo's, makes use of psychoanalytic theory in interpreting textsand, like Lloyd's, it explores the symbolic associations ofphilosophical images and concepts. However, unlike Bordo and Lloyd,Irigaray uses highly unconventional methods of interpreting canonicalphilosophical texts in order to uncover the ways in which the feminineor sexual difference is repressed in them. For example, Irigaray useshumor and parody rather than straightforward exegesis, and she pointsto instabilities (contradictions) in philosophical texts as symptoms ofpatriarchal thinking. According to Irigaray, patriarchal thinkingattempts to achieve universality by repressing sexual difference. But,the presence of contradictions or instabilities in a philosophical textis symptomatic of the failure of patriarchal thinking to contain sexualdifference. For example, Irigaray might look at the argument Idescribed above for considering gender associations with form andmatter in Aristotle to be extrinsic, rather than intrinsic, to thoseconcepts, and argue that the fact that Aristotle's hylomorphism as auniversal theory is incompatible with gender associations is a symptomof patriarchal thinking rather than evidence that the proposedinterpretation is mistaken.[8]Despite their different historical stories, and the different waysthat they understand the maleness of reason, each of these panoramicvisions of the history of philosophy deliver the same moral, which isthat the central norms that inform our philosophical culture today aregendered male.[9] Hence, these synoptic narratives of thephilosophical tradition provide historical justifications for feministphilosophers who are critical of our central philosophical norms ofreason and objectivity. Does the feminist synoptic critical reading ofthe history of philosophy justify either the conclusion thattraditional conceptions of reason ought to be flat-out rejected byfeminists or the conclusion that traditional conceptions of reasonought to be subjected to critical scrutiny?Even if feminist historical arguments are successful in showing thatphilosophical norms like reason and objectivity are gendered male, thisconclusion does not justify a flat-out rejection of either traditionalphilosophy or its norms of reason and objectivity (Witt 1993). Recallthe distinction introduced above between intrinsically andextrinsically gendered notions. An intrinsically gendered notion is onethat necessarily carries implications regarding gender, i.e., if onewere to cancel all implications concerning gender, one would be leftwith a different notion than the original. In contrast, anextrinsically gendered notion typically does carry implicationsconcerning gender, but not necessarily so. If the maleness of reason isextrinsic to the traditional concept of reason, then the historicalfact that it was a gendered notion does not justify or require itsrejection by feminists. If on the other hand, it can be shown that themaleness of reason is intrinsic to it, it still does not follow thatreason ought to be rejected by feminists. For, the idea the reason isintrinsically male-biased would justify a rejection of it only if itought to be other than it is. So, what needs to be argued is thatreason and objectivity would be different, and better, if they were notgendered male, but were gender-neutral, gender-inclusive or female.But, if feminist philosophers develop this argument, which they need tobuttress the historical argument, then they are reconceptualizingtraditional notions of reason and objectivity rather than rejectingthem.Even though the work that feminist philosophers have done to showthe ways in which traditional conceptions of reason and objectivity areassociated with maleness falls short of justifying their rejection,their work has been valuable in two respects. First, it has establishedthat gender is associated with the central norms of philosophy, aconclusion that warrants attention from anyone attempting to understandour philosophical tradition. Second, the historical studies raisequestions about reason and objectivity that are valuable areas ofinquiry for contemporary philosophers.2. Feminist Revisions of the History of PhilosophyThese women are not women on the fringes of philosophy, butphilosophers on the fringes of history. —Mary Ellen WaitheFeminist canon revision is most distinctive, and most radical, inits retrieval of women philosophers for the historical record, and inits placement of women in the canon of great philosophers. It is adistinctive project because there is no comparable activity undertakenby other contemporary philosophical movements, for whom canon creationhas been largely a process of selection from an already establishedlist of male philosophers. It is a radical project because byuncovering a history of women philosophers, it has destroyed thealienating myth that philosophy was, and by implication is or ought tobe, a male preserve.In A History of Women Philosophers Mary Ellen Waithe hasdocumented at least 16 women philosophers in the classical world, 17women philosophers from 500-1600, and over 30 from 1600-1900.And, in the recent feminist series Re-reading the Canonthree of the fourteen canonical philosophers are women: MaryWollstonecraft, Hannah Arendt and Simone de Beauvoir. What is crucialto understand is that none of the three is canonical—if by that youmean included in the history of philosophy as it is told in philosophydepartment curricula, in histories of philosophy, and in scholarlywriting.Indeed, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, published in 1967,which contains articles on over 900 philosophers, does not include anentry for any of them. Moreover, if the index is to be believed, deBeauvoir and Wollstonecraft are not mentioned at all in any article,and Hannah Arendt merits a single mention in an article on "Authority".Far from being canonical, these women philosophers are scarcely evenmarginal, warranting perhaps a passing reference in a survey ofexistentialism or political philosophy, but little more.[10] Hence,the feminist series Re-reading the Canon is not only engagedin a critical re-reading of canonical figures like Plato and Hegel, butis also, by fiat, changing the contours of the canon.The project of retrieving women philosophers has a paradoxicalrelationship with contemporary feminist theory, however. On the onehand, it is clearly a feminist project; its originators were interestedin establishing that women have been philosophers throughout thehistory of the discipline despite their routine omission from standardhistories and encyclopedias of philosophy. However, the newly-recovered women philosophers suggest that there is little overlapamong three groups: women philosophers, feminine philosophers andfeminist philosophers. For most of the newly discovered womenphilosophers were not feminist thinkers nor did they write philosophyin a feminine voice, different from their male counterparts. Indeed,their breadth of philosophical interests is comparable to that of malephilosophers although their domain of application sometimes differs. Inher introduction to A History of Women Philosophers Mary EllenWaithe comments "If we except the Pythagorean women, we find littledifferences in the ways men and women did philosophy. Both have beenconcerned with ethics, metaphysics, cosmology, epistemology and otherareas of philosophic inquiry"(Waithe 1987-1991 Vol. 1: xxi). Andanother editor, Mary Warnock, comments "In the end, I have not foundany clear "voice" shared by women philosophers (Warnock 1996: xlvii).The women philosophers restored to the tradition by feminist hands arenot all proto-feminists nor do they speak in a uniform, and different,voice from their male peers.Similarly, women philosophers who are candidates for initiation intothe philosophical canon—like Mary Wollstonecraft, Hannah Arendt andSimone de Beauvoir—are a diverse crew. According to ElizabethYoung-Bruehl "That Hannah Arendt should have become a provocativesubject for feminists is startling" presumably because of Arendt'sexplicit criticism of feminism. And while Wollstonecraft and deBeauvoir were both feminists, they share neither a common philosophicalvoice nor common philosophical principles. In The Vindication ofthe Rights of Women Wollstonecraft argued for the education ofwomen using Enlightenment principles, while Beauvoir's The SecondSex reflects her marxist and existentialist roots.The diversity of women philosophers raises the question why theirrecovery or re-valuation is an important project for contemporaryfeminist theory. What the retrieval of women philosophers, and theirinclusion in the philosophical canon has done is to challenge the myththat there are no women in the history of philosophy and the fallbackposition that if there are any women philosophers, they areunimportant. Lovers of wisdom that we all are, we all benefit from thecorrection of these mistaken beliefs. Moreover, as feminists, we areinterested in correcting the effects of discrimination against womenphilosophers, who were written out of history, unfairly, because oftheir gender not their philosophical ideas.However, what is really at issue is not philosophy's past, but itspresent; its self-image as male. That self-image is created andmaintained in part by a tacit historical justification. It is adamaging self-image for women philosophers today, and for women whoaspire to be philosophers. The real significance of uncovering thepresence of women in our history, and in placing women in our canon isthe effect that has on the way we think about the "us" ofphilosophy.The rediscovery of women philosophers raises the following question: How can women philosophers be rewoven into the history of philosophy so that they are an integral part of that history? In a recent essay (1994), Lisa Shapiro, considering the case of women philosophers in the early modern period, argues that it is not enough to simply add a woman philosopher or two to the reading list. Rather, according to Shapiro,we need to provide internal reasons for the inclusion of women philosophers rather than relying upon a feminist motivation on the part of the teacher or editor. The history of philosophy is a story and we need to find a plot line that includes new, female characters.One way to do this is to show how certain women philosophers made significant contributions to the work of male philosophers on central philosophical issues. We could call this the "Best Supporting Actress" approach in that the central cast remains male and the story line of philosophy is undisturbed. It is a good strategy for several reasons: it is relatively easy to accomplish, and it provides an internal anchor for women philosophers. On the other hand, it reinforces the secondary status of women thinkers and if this were the only way of integrating women philosophers, that would be an unfortunate result. The wholly inadequate interpretation of Beauvoir's philosophical thought as a mere application of Jean-Paul Sartre's is a good example of the limitations of this strategy. Not only does is reinforce a secondary, handmaiden role for Beauvoir, but it also promotes a distorted understanding and appreciation of her thought (Simons 1995).Alternatively, we could find in the work of women philosophers issuesthat they have developed in a sequential fashion. Shapiro suggests that there are certain philosophical issues concerning women's rationality, nature, and education that women philosophers of the seventeenth century discuss extensively in a sequential, interactive fashion. The thread extends into the following century in the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Wollstonecraft. Since philosophers become canonical as part of a story anchored at one end by contemporary philosophical questions that are thought to be central, the task would be to make these questions ones that we turn to the tradition for help in answering. And, of course, these are precisely the central questions posed and discussed extensively by contemporary feminism. Thus, the idea is that as we pose new kinds of questions to the history of philosophy we will find in women philosophers an important, sequential discussion that we can securely thread into our curricula and textbooks.At this relatively early stage of the process of including women in the history of philosophy I think that we need all to use all three strategies. There is nothing wrong with a purely external approach. By all means one should include a woman philosopher on a topic just to provide an indication that there are some interesting and important women working on a particular topic. And the strategy of anchoring a woman philosopher's work to a male canonical figure can also be a useful strategy as long as it is done in a manner that preserves the independence and originality of her work. Finally, it is important to ask new questions of the tradition, questions that might allow some women philosophers to play a starring role rather than a walk-on part.3. Feminist Appropriation of Canonical PhilosophersFeminist philosophers have also changed the history of philosophy byappropriating its ideas for feminist purposes. From the perspective ofnegative canon formation, the history of philosophy is a resource onlyin so far as it describes the theories and thinkers that were mostdeeply mistaken about women. Other feminist historians of philosophyhave found important resources for feminism in canonical philosophers.Indeed, they have found valuable concepts even in the worst offendersof the negative canon, like Aristotle and Descartes.For example, in The Fragility of Goodness Martha Nussbaumhas described the virtues of an Aristotelian ethics with its emphasison the importance of concrete context, emotion and care for others inan ethical life (Nussbaum 1986). And Marcia Homiak has argued thatAristotle's rational ideal, far from being antithetical to feminists,actually captures some of feminism's deepest ethical insights (Homiak1993). With regard to Descartes, Margaret Atherton has argued that hisconcept of reason was interpreted in egalitarian rather thanmasculinist terms by several women philosophers of the 18th century,and was used in their arguments for equal education for women.[11]Other feminists have urged the reconsideration of the views ofcanonical figures, like Hume and Dewey, who have played only a minorrole in the negative feminist canon. For example, Annette Baier hasargued at length for the value of a Humean perspective in bothepistemology and in ethics for feminist theory (Baier 1987; Baier1993). And, in Pragmatism and Feminism Charlene Seigfriedargues for the value of pragmatism for feminism; a position also takenby Richard Rorty (Seigfried 1996; Rorty 1991).It is interesting to note that some of the very same philosopherswho were cast as the villains of the negative canon are also mined byfeminist theorists for useful ideas. Indeed, it is likely that everyphilosopher, from Plato to Nietzsche, who has been condemned to thenegative canon also appears in some feminist's positive canon. This isperplexing. After all, if feminists evaluate canonical texts sodifferently, it raises questions about the coherence of feministinterpretations of texts. Is Aristotle a feminist hero or villain? AreDescartes' ideas dangerous for feminists or useful to them? Iffeminists have argued both positions, we begin to suspect that there isno such thing as a feminist interpretation of a philosopher. And thismight lead us to wonder about the coherence and unity of the project offeminist canon revision.Why is it that feminist philosophers have reached different, andeven sometimes incompatible interpretations of the history ofphilosophy? In my view, the multiple and contrary readings of thephilosophical canon by feminists reflects the contested nature of the"us" of contemporary feminism. The fact that feminist interpretationsof canonical figures is diverse reflects, and is a part of, on-goingdebates within feminism over its identity and self-image. Disagreementsamong feminist historians of philosophy over the value of canonicalphilosophers, and the appropriate categories to use to interpret them,are, in the final analysis, the result of debate within feministphilosophy over what feminism is, and what is theoretical commitmentsshould be, and what its core values are.4. Feminist Methodological Reflections on the History of PhilosophyDisagreements over the value of the history of philosophy for feminist theory has stimulated discussion concerning the methods and presuppositions of the study of the history of philosophy itself. Can feminists use the history of philosophy as a resource in the same way that other philosophical movements have done? This question, in turn, inspires us to reflect upon different reading strategies that we might employ in relation to the history of philosophy.Cynthia Freeland (2000) criticizes the idea that feminists can mine the history of philosophy for useful ideas as other philosophical movements and perspectives have done. She argues that the feminist appropriation/inheritance approach to the history of philosophy is an ideology. Freeland defines an ideology as a theory or viewpoint that is politically oppressive and epistemically flawed. Feminists who view the philosophical canon as a resource to be mined for ideas useful to feminism are engaged in a potentially oppressive activity since the history of philosophy is replete with ideas and theories that are (or might be) oppressive of women today. The epistemic flaw is that the appropriation approach is overly reverential of the tradition and might therefore be insufficiently critical of it. Deference is not an epistemic virtue. Freeland points out that appropriators tend to use standard criteria of historical interpretation like the principle of charity that tries to find consistency in a philosopher's theories or doctrines. Following out this line of thought, it turns out that all standard historians of philosophy might be guilty of this epistemic defect since all of them use standard criteria of historical interpretation. The criticism cuts a wide swath since it requires feminist historians of philosophy to deviate radically from the norms of their discipline since it turns out that the norms themselves might promote deference and oppression. What kind of feminist engagement with the history of philosophy remains possible?Several reading strategies other than the standard have been advocated. Some feminists advocate a radical departure from the norms of textual interpretation by focusing, and drawing out the "unthought" of a text; its images and metaphors; its omissions and paradoxes. (Deutscher 1997) Others emphasize the importance of questioning the line demarcating a text from its cultural, psychological or material context. (Schott 1997) And yet others advocate for an active philosophical engagement with a text rather than the backward-looking activity of trying to determine the exactmeaning of a historical text. (LeDoeuff 1991) These reading strategies, in turn, raise further issues concerning the limits of the history of philosophyand the criteria for adequate interpretation.BibliographyComprehensive BibliographySupplementary Document: Bibliography of Feminist Philosophers Writing about the History of Philosophy [by Abigail Gosselin]References Alanen, Lilli, Witt, Charlotte ed. 2004. Feminist Reflections on the History of Philosophy (Kluwer Academic Publishers) Amorós, Celia. 1994. "Cartesianism and Feminism. What ReasonHas Forgotten; Reasons for Forgetting" in Hypatia vol. 9, no. 1 (Winter1994).Antony, Louise, Witt, Charlotte ed. 1993. A Mind of One's Own:Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity (Westview Press).Atherton, Margaret. 1993. "Cartesian Reason and Gendered Reason"in Antony and Witt 1993.–––. 1994. Women Philosophers of the EarlyModern Period (Hackett Publishing Co.).Baier, Annette. 1987. "Hume, the Women's Moral Theorist" Womenand Moral Theory ed. Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers (Romanand Littlefield)–––. 1993. "Hume, the Reflective Women'sEpistemologist?" in A Mind of One's Own.Bar On, Bat-Ami. 1994. Engendering Origins: Critical FeministReadings in Plato and Aristotle (Albany SUNY Press).–––. 1994. Modern Engendering: CriticalFeminist Readings in Modern Western Philosophy (Albany SUNYPress).Bordo, Susan R. 1987. The Flight to Objectivity: Essays onCartesianism and Culture (State University of New YorkPress).Butler, Judith. 1990. Gender Trouble (Routledge1990).Cornell, Drucilla, 1993. Transformations (New York1993).Deutscher, Penelope, 1997. Yielding Gender: Feminism,Deconstruction and the History of Philosophy (London and NewYork: Routledge).Falco, Maria J., ed. 1996. Feminist Interpretations of MaryWollstoncraft (The Pennsylvania State University Press).Freeland, Cynthia, 1994. "Nourishing Speculation: A FeministReading of Aristotelian Science" in Engendering Origins: CriticalFeminist Readings in Plato and Aristotle ed. By Bat-Ami Bar On(State University of New York Press, Albany).–––, ed. 1998. Feminist Interpretations ofAristotle (The Pennsylvania State University Press)–––. "Feminism and Ideology in AncientPhilosophy" in Apeiron Vol. XXXIII, no. 4. December 2000Frye, Marilyn, 1992. The Possibility of Feminist Theory(California, The Crossing Press).Fuss, Diana. 1989. Essentially Speaking (Routledge).Harding, Sandra and Hintikka, Merrill eds. 1983. DiscoveringReality (Dordrecht, Holland D. Reidel).–––. 1986. The Science Question inFeminism (Cornell University Press).Hegel, G.W. F.1973. The Philosophy of Right, T.M. Knox(trans) (New York, Oxford University Press).Hekman, Susan, ed. 1996. Feminist Interpretatons of MichelFoucault (The Pennsylvania State University Press)Holland, Nancy J., ed. 1997 Feminist Interpretations ofJacques Derrida (The Pennsylvania University State Press).Homiak, Marcia. 1993. "Feminism and Aristotle's Rational Ideal" inAntony and Witt 1993.Honig, Bonnie, ed. 1995. Feminist Interpretations of HannahArendt (The Pennsylvania State University Press)Keller, Evelyn Fox, 1985. Reflections on Gender andScience (Yale University Press)LeDoeuff, Michele. 1991. Hipparchia's Choice: An Essay Concerning Women, Philosophy, Etc. Trans. Trista Selous, Oxford: Blackwell.Leon, Celine and Walsh Sylvia, ed., 1997. FeministInterpretations of Soren Kierkegaard (The Pennsylvania StateUniversity Press)Lloyd, Genevieve. 1993a. "Maleness, Metaphor, and the‘Crisis’ of Reason" in Antony and Witt 1993.–––. 1993b. The Man of Reason: "Male" and"Female" in Western Philosophy (The University of MinnesotaPress, Minneapolis).–––. 2002. Feminism and History of Philosophy(Oxford)Mills, Patricia Jagentowicz, ed. 1996 Feminist Interpretationsof G.W.F.Hegel (The Pennsylvania State University Press).Nussbaum, Martha. 1986. The Fragility of Goodness: Luck andEthics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge UP)Okin, Susan Moller, 1979. Women in Western PoliticalThought (Princeton)O'Neill, Eileen, 1978. "Disappearing Ink: Early Modern WomenPhilosophers and Their Fate in History" in Kourany, Janet, ed.Philosophy in a Feminist Voice: Critiques and Reconstructions(Princeton University Press)Rooney, Phyllis. 1991. "Gendered Reason: Sex, Metaphor andConceptions of Reason" by Phyllis Rooney in Hypatia 6:2(Summer 1991): 77-103.–––. 1994. "Recent Work in Feminist Discussionsof Reason." American Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 31, Number1, (January 1994).Rorty, Richard. 1991. "Feminism and Pragmatism" MichiganQuarterly Review 30/2 (Spring 1991) 231-58Rorty, Richard, Schneewind, J.B., Skinner, Quentin eds. 1984.Philosophy in History (Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress).Scheman, Naomi. 1993. "Though This Be Method, Yet There Is Madnessin It: Paranoia and Liberal Epistemology" in Antony and Witt1993.Schott, Robin May, ed. 1997. "The Gender of Enlightenment". InFeminist Interpretations of Immanuel Kant. University Park:Pennsylvania State Press.Schott, Robin May. 1988. Eros and Cognition (Boston).Seigfried, Charlene Haddock. 1996. Pragmatism and Feminism(Chicago & London, University of Chicago Press).Shapiro, Lisa. 2004. "Some Thoughts on the Place of Women inEarly Modern Philosophy" in Alanen and Witt 2004.Simons, Margaret A., ed. 1995. Feminist Interpretations ofSimone de Beauvoir (The Pennsylvania State UniversityPress).Soper, Kate, 1995. What is Nature?: Culture, politics and thenon-human (Oxford, Blackwell).Spelman, Elizabeth, 1983. "Aristotle and the Politicization of theSoul" in Harding and Hintikka 1983.–––. 1988. Inessential Woman(Boston).Tuana, Nancy, 1992. Woman and the History of Philosophy(New York, Paragon Press).–––. ed. 1994. Feminist Interpretations ofPlato (The Pennsylvania State University Press).Waithe, Mary Ellen ed. 1987-1991. A History of WomenPhilosophers Vol. 1-3 (Kluwer Academic Publishing).Warnock, Mary ed. 1996. Women Philosophers (London J.M.Dent).Witt, Charlotte. 1993. "Feminist Metaphysics" in Antony and Witt1993.–––. 1998. "Form, Normativity and Gender inAristotle: A Feminist Perspective" in Freeland 1998.–––. 2006. "Feminist Interpretations of thePhilosophical Canon" Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society,vol. 31, no. 2 (Winter, 2006) Other Internet Resources[Please contact the author with suggestions.] Related Entries feminism, approaches to | feminism, history of Copyright © 2007 byCharlotte Witt<cewitt@cisunix.unh.edu> |
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