20th WCP: Autonomy in Determinism
Philosophical Anthropology
Autonomy in Determinism (1)
Dieter Wandschneider
Philosophisches Institut der RWTH Aachen (Germany)
dennis.wesche@post.rwth-aachen.de
ABSTRACT: There are good reasons for
determinism — the option for pure
freedom of will proves to be a non-tenable position. However,
this collides with the everyday experience of autonomy. The
following argument will attempt to show that determinism and
autonomy are compatible. (1) A first consideration going back to
MacKay makes clear that I myself cannot foresee in principle my
own determination; hence fatalism has lost its grounds. (2) From
the perspective of physical determination, I show that
quantum-physical indetermination is not at all in a position to
explain autonomy, while from the perspective of systems theory
physical determination and autonomy is well-compatible. (3) The
possibility of knowledge denotes a further increase of such
autonomy. From this perspective, acting is something like
designing-oneself or choice-of-oneself. (4) Consciousness of not
being fixed in principle now becomes a determining condition of
my acting, which appears to be determined by autonomy. This
explains the ineradicable conviction that freedom of will is
essential for human beings. (5) I conclude that the autonomy of
acting is greater the more that rational self-determination
takes the place of stupid arbitrariness.
In 1980 a book by U. Pothast came out with the
provocative title 'The Inadequacy of the Proofs for
Freedom'. (2) Its merit consisted in the fact that it runs through
and refutes all the known types of proofs for freedom in the
philosophical tradition. Pothast's arguments, which thereby
amount to determinism, are in my opinion basically sound, but
surely also need a discriminating judgement, which is treated in the
following discussion.
The view mentioned is alarming in two respects:
First of all, in accordance with the way we see ourselves we are
convinced that freedom is essential for man's
being.
Secondly, philosophers think they have excellent
arguments against determinism.
The strongest objection to determinism is in my
view the following: (3) Truth, i.e., accurate knowledge of the
facts of a case is only possible for me when I can cognitively
get involved with the subject. However, the precondition for
this is that I am not determined by irrelevant constraints in
connection with the subject — e.g., by physical factors or by
my own biological-genetic constitution, but also not by prejudices
and preconcieved notions: precisely because I could not involve
myself in the subject because of such constraints. Reduced to a
formula, this means: truth presupposes freedom.
As a philosophical theory, determinism itself lays
claim to truth, which therewith presupposes freedom,
in accordance with what I have just said. Determinism, however,
denies the possibility of freedom: therefore, this appears to be a
contradiction that discredits determinism as a logically
inconsistent and self-contradictory position.
The argument is captivating. It appears to provide
us with an absolutely sound objection that deals the deathblow to
determinism. Yet this consideration does not stand up to a more
exact test. The premise here is: Whoever seeks knowledge must be
free to think rationally. But there are preconditions for
this, too — actually they are of a logical and an empirical
nature: First of all there are logical rules that must be
observed for rational thinking. The capability for this must
obviously be trained as well. Scientists just don't fall out
of the blue either, but are shaped by genetic dispositions,
socialisation, etc. They need a minimum of intelligence, a good
education, lots of motivation, discipline and, last but not least,
the ability to deal with frustrations and a bit of luck, too. In
short, the ability to do scientific work also has preconditions and
this also means that it is determined by these preconditions.
The argument that at first seemed very convincing, namely, that
determinism itself always presupposes freedom from determining
conditions for the truth it lays claim to is only valid for
irrational determinants, not the conditions of rational thinking.
Therefore, for the latter the argument loses its soundness. This
'proof of freedom', which at first seemed irrefutable,
also proves itself to be insufficient, indeed.
Looking more closely at the matter, determinism
seems so to be, surprisingly enough, the more plausible position. It
is obvious that the structure of the subject possesses determinants.
Accordingly, only the traditional concepts of freedom of choice
but not freedom of will can be considered for man:
'Freedom of choice' denotes the possibility that I can
do one or the other thing at my own discretion, i.e.,
autonomy. This means, first of all, that the circumstances do
not prevent me from acting so; secondly, autonomy is founded in my
subjective structure, which in turn must certainly be regarded as
determined in many ways: By character, types of needs, wishes and
objectives, but also intellectual competence, breadth of
comprehension, etc. 'Freedom of will', on the other
hand, would mean that my actions are not only independent of
external compulsion but also of the internal structure of my Self,
in addition, and that means: My actions would be, so to speak,
independent of myself — undoubtedly a most paradoxical
idea. So autonomy remains the only reasonable possibility,
understood as freedom of choice, which, however, includes
determinations
in an essential sense. Can such a point of
view be called anything else than 'determinism'?
We may feel that the victory of determinism that
emerges here is alarming. As good, modern individualists we all have
a well-developed sense of freedom that clearly seems to exclude
determinism. Is this to prove itself to be a total illusion?
In the following I would like to show in several
steps in what sense the undeniable determination of man nevertheless
contains an element of freedom.
1. The Problem of Fatalism
A first problem in this connection concerns
the attitude towards thought and actions. Namely, if this
attitude is determined, this would seem to suggest a
fatalistic consequence. Determination of actions would seem
to be a fact that I can no less escape than Oedipus his own fate.
Then I would only need to wait and see what happens to me, for it
must obviously happen, whatever I do.
I'm sitting e.g. at a café and out in
the lake a man is struggling to keep from being drowned. As a
fatalist I would perhaps say: Save him: Then I would have to get up
and dive into the water. But I then think, 'At this very
moment I am being determined to drink my coffee'. I try to
justify my denial of assistance with my alleged fate. As a fatalist
I therefore assume that my future decisions are already definitely
fixed so that one could basically know of them beforehand,
e.g., by means of a suitable method of calculation.
Such an assumption is clearly refutable. This is
shown by an interesting argument which has been given with various
accentuations, e.g., by H. Bergson, M. Planck, (4)
K.R. Popper, (5) and
Donald MacKay. At this point I would like to describe MacKay's
thought experiment discussed in this connection
(6) : MacKay proceeds
from the assumption that a neurophysiologist would be in the
position to measure the state of my brain exactly and from this
infer my subsequent actions. I think it is clear that this is a
maximum assumption that is unrealistic for various reasons; however,
we are dealing with a thought experiment. If my actions could
be predicted by a scientist in this manner, then two alternatives
are possible: (1) He can withhold his knowledge from me; then only
he knows how I will act and I myself remain in the dark about it.
(2) Or, he informs me of his knowledge and I can believe him or not.
The state of my brain, however, changes because of this information
and, therefore, the state of my motivation and the disposition of my
actions as well. In other words, if I am informed about the state of
my brain, this information then becomes false due to it. In
the first case the observer could know my future actions in advance,
as long as he does not inform me about them; in any case, however, I
do not have this knowledge. In the second case, however, if he
informs me, this knowledge becomes outdated through the act of
informing itself. Be that as it may: For himself everyone is
in the situation of one who in principle cannot know his
future thoughts and actions. Pothast calls this
not-being-able-to-know in principle epistemic indeterminism, (7)
i.e., indeterminism on the epistemic level.
In respect to ethics this fact of epistemic
indeterminism is enormously momentous, for fatalistic arguments
become unfounded because of it. All arguments with an alleged fact
of having to or not being allowed to do something specific are then
unfounded and, therefore, absolutely unsuitable for the
justification of actions or their omissions.
As presented, this is then indeterminism on the
subjective-epistemic level; however, objective
determination of action is not affected by this. Now this
appears to collide with the fact of the daily experience of
autonomy, which exists, e.g., in the evidence that we
lead our lives — we plan the day, we work toward a
distant goal, indeed, in a certain sense we could even say with
Sartre: We design ourselves. That is a profound statement, but in
comparison with the absolute situational restriction of the animal
— "tied down tightly....on the stake of the moment",
as Nietzsche says (8) — it is not erroneous. We have seen that
various determinants are at work here, too. Nevertheless: The
possibility of planning our lives remains a fascinating fact that
suggests autonomy, and the question is then: How can we
reconcile these objective determinations with autonomy?
2. Autonomy in Physical Determinations (9)
In this connection we must secondly consider
the physical aspect, first of all. Our starting point is the
thought that human acts of will are inevitably connected with mental
processes and therfore processes of the brain, which, however, are
subject to natural laws as physical-chemical processes and,
therefore, ought to be strictly determined. Not even freedom of
thought seems to exist. Physical determinism seems to determine the
mind no less than the course of the heavens — indeed, a
terrifying vision!
One possibility of escaping this consequence seemed
to appear with the development of quantum theory. According
to the classical theory of physics, the chain of cause and effect is
absolutely solid, but this is no longer true from the perspective of
quantum physics. The quantum theory contains — at least in its
established form — indeterministic elements. Thereby,
so it seemed, the concept of freedom could be saved from the
deterministic grip of classical physics. According to quantum theory
there are gaps in the causal chain, so to speak, and it seemed that
autonomy could be accommodated in these gaps.
P. Jordan already made such a suggestion about
fourty years ago. (10) In a book by
P. Rohs that recently came out the
author argues in a similar way (11)
and so considers the principle
compatibility of freedom and physics to be safeguarded.
I think this example is instructive. The question
is really: What could indeterminism in quantum physics that we lay
claim to here do for the concept of freedom? However: statistical
chance has taken the place of strict causality in quantum theory.
Consequently, the freedom of human action understood in this manner
would be nothing other than chance in the form of roulette-like
processes. Does this satisfy us? Is freedom nothing more than
senseless chance? Trying to save freedom in this way would rather
mean sacrificing its meaning. Freedom could hardly be accommodated
in the quantum 'gap' of the causal chain.
Then, however, the following question becomes
pressing: How can our thinking be subject to determinations and
simultaneously be independent of accidental effects in the
environment (e.g., the weather, gravitation, phases of the moon),
when we are concerned about constructing correct, logical
connections, for example? The answer is: Because the human being is
a system and as such exists, as it were,
'independently' of his environment in a certain sense.
We mean thereby that processes in the system are subject to specific
'laws of system', which are independent of the
conditions of the environment — within a certain range of
fluctuation. Even television functions independently of the position
of the stars.
The new perspective made possible by modern
system theory is crucial here. Systems are characterized by
their own laws. They possess thereby a certain autonomy specific
to the system, i.e., independence from the environment of the
system, but in such a way — this is important —
that everything occurs according to the laws of physics. Natural
laws remain unchanged, but there exist dominant system determinants
on a high level in the hierarchy — 'high up in the
hierarchy' in the sense of their functional status in the
system hierarchy; as such, they have a 'controlling'
function, so to speak. A 'gap in the causal chain' is as
unnecessary for this as are different non-classical laws of
nature.
So much for the side of physical determinations
which thus is clearly compatible with autonomy with respect to the
environment; in reference to this I would like to briefly mention
system autonomy. A basic aspect of freedom in a deterministic
context has thereby now become visible.
3. Knowledge and Self-Awareness
A third aspect in reference to the
relationship between autonomy and determination of actions results
from the possibility of knowledge for man: His horizons
extend far beyond the immediate present. The ability to think and to
know represents — in contrast to animals — an immense
liberation from the factual circumstances. The daily
consciousness of autonomy already mentioned, which we also
possess without philosophy, has its origin therein. Through the
detachment from the immediate situation and emotional conditions it
becomes possible for me to lead my life autonomously, i.e.,
to make plans, to orientate myself toward distant goals, and to
persevere in this direction against obstacles. Knowledge certainly
has determining conditions, too. However, in contrast to animals the
result of such determinations represents an enormously enlarged
perspective, which we therefore experience as freedom rather
than determinations. In this sense I prefer to speak of
'autonomy through knowledge'.
Yet that is all still too general: I possess not
only knowledge of the world but also knowledge of my knowledge,
knowledge of myself, self-awareness. So I also know that I
am able to know, and that also means that I can always widen
my limited knowledge. With that a further most important aspect of
the relationship between autonomy and determinations now becomes
visible: In self-awareness, in the return to myself I discover
beyond the possibilites existing in factual knowledge that I
can make possibile such possibilites for myself, or, stated
differently, that I can overcome factual limitations and, as it
were, — à la Sartre — 'design' myself
as he who I wish to be — another unbelievable expansion of the
freedom of choice, which so frankly, to use an expression from
Kierkegaard, has the character of
'choice-of-oneself'. In this perspective of
self-aware choice-of-oneself I understand myself as a being that is
definitively restricted to nothing and that in this respect is
autonomous in a fundamental sense. Let us call this
'autonomy as choice-of-oneself'.
Nonetheless, the capability of choice-of-oneself,
which assumes self-awareness, is also the result of a process of
development depending on various conditions. Determinations are thus
essentially in choice-of-oneself as well. I would therefore rather
speak more precisely of 'limited
choice-of-oneself'.
And nevertheless: A pure unlimited consciousness
of possibilities on the level of self-awareness is opposed to
these undeniable factual determinations. Thus, not only
limited knowledge that accordingly presents limited possibilities to
me, but, as it were, the meta-knowledge, that I am in the
position to know, i.e., I know I can gain knowledge I do not have
and I also know, at least in principle, how I can gain it —
e.g., where I can 'look it up' or at least how I can
find out where I can look it up. The knowledge of my own limitations
also makes it possible for me to free myself from these restrictions
in a certain sense.
In spite of my factual pre-shaping I am thus
certain that it does not bind me down. Surely, my decisions to act
are also determined by internalized norms of society, but 'in
a pinch' — that is also certain — I can also
question them and, if necessary, replace them with other ones. In
short: Nothing at all is definitively restricted from the
perspective of choice-of-oneself. In spite of all undeniable
determinations this indestructible consciousness of possibility and
in this sense consciousness of freedom are constantly being
confirmed by this fact. (12)
4. Consciousness of Autonomy as a Determinant of
Action
Fourthly, with the consciousness of
choice-of-oneself something decisively new occurs
simultaneously: This consciousness of principally not-being-bound,
of a limitless horizon of possibilities now itself becomes a
determinant of my actions. I thereby act, although factually
determined in many respects, in the awareness of basically unlimited
possibilities and that is, I think, action of a completely different
quality than without this consciousness: The moment this
consciousness of autonomy that transcends everything itself is part
of the structure of the subject, then it itself has become a
determinant of action. The set of internalized norms according to
which I act has here been increased by another norm, as it were,
which states: 'Choose freely, according to your possibility to
do so': This is, therefore, a view that knows it is
autonomous, wants to be autonomous and thus is motivated to cross
borders and thereby to confirm and prove itself as autonomous.
Thus, it is decisive: Consciousness of autonomy
is now itself a part of the determining factors of my actions
and thus develops an enormous determining power: I will do
everything to preserve this freedom of autonomous choice-of-oneself,
which completely determines my idea of myself as a human being. This
idea of freedom is not an empty, inconsequential thought but rather
determines the real actions of man, which in this form seem
to be determined toward autonomy. Kant's dictum:
"Every being that cannot act but under the idea of
freedom is in a practical sense really free precisely because of
this fact" (13) touches on this central point of the problem of
freedom.
The possibility of choice-of-oneself is thus
characterized by the fact that determinations and freedom converge,
so to speak. Undifferentiated discussions of
'determinations' do not recognize the fact that
determinations in the form of choice-of-oneself change into in
freedom. As long as this has not been understood, I think the
problem of freedom inevitably maintains its aporetic character.
To be sure: Also autonomy realized as
choice-of-oneself constitually contains determinations and is,
therefore, freedom of choice and not freedom of will — and yet
it comes extremely close to this. Or should we rather say:
Understood correctly, it is the freedom of will that we
really have in mind? For pure freedom of will, a desire
without a specific will, as we have seen, is something
impossible. However, thereby it is also clear that the abstract
opposition of freedom and determinations represents a false
alternative. Pothast's option for determinism mentioned at the
beginning has, I think, become more differentiated by the ideas
developed and insofar has been corrected. This was my primary
interest here.
5. Reasonable Self-Determination
Thus, the will is also determined in
choice-of-oneself, but now by self-chosen 'spiritual'
determinants like ideas, principles, logical connections, etc.: So,
finally, a fifth aspect of autonomy becomes visible. The
acutal point here is that this spiritual form of
determinations can be so strong that I am predictable for
others and for myself. In MacKay's neurophysiological thought
experiment that was not possible, at least for myself, because every
change there in the physical state of the brain could lead to
changed behaviour. For 'human beings with principles' on
the other hand, that is not to be expected. Epistemic indeterminism
has been replaced here by epistemic determinism, so to speak: Due to
this spiritual-epistemic determinism actions are bound to a maximum
degree, and, at the same time, this self-chosen limitation means a
maximum of autonomy — not merely the autonomy of the
system on the physical level and not autonomy through
knowledge either, but simply autonomy of
choice-of-oneself and so determinations toward freedom,
which have, as presented, the character of spiritual
self-determination.
We must remember here that the spiritual
determinants mentioned — after Kant Hegel saw this in all
clarity — are, in fact, not a foreign force for man, who is in
an important sense spirit, but rather his own essence.
Submitting oneself to them is, therefore, not alienation but, to use
a common term of Hegel, being-with-oneself. As a spiritual
being I am, so to speak, the more with myself and in such a way
self-determining the more I orientate myself towards those
principles that are constitutive for the spirit: towards the
principles of thinking and so logic.
This corresponds to the fact that logic itself
— but this already belongs to another context —
represents the sphere of autonomy per se, because and insofar as it
cannot be founded by an authority outside of logic, for founding is
itself an internal-logical connection. In other words: Logic
— logic in a fundamental sense — can only be considered
as self-founding and self-determining.
But that also means that true
self-determination can never be arbitrary. I can only take
part in the autonomy of logic with strict adherence to the
principles of it, i.e., to reasonable principles. True autonomy is
thus just as much adherence: Adherence to the principles of
logic and so in the end reasonable self-determination.
Reasonable self-determination: However, this is
always the hard-won freedom of reason and reasonable
choice-of-oneself with the help of others and good providence;
therefore nothing self-evident and something that can also fail in
the course of development of a human life.
Notes
(1) Translated from the German by E. Kummert.
(2) Pothast, U. (1980)
Die Unzulänglichkeit der Freiheitsbeweise. Frankfurt/M.
1980.
(3) This obviously goes back to H. Rickert and has been
further developed and stated more precisely within the framework of
the analytical philosophy of J. Boyle, G. Grisez, and O. Tollefsen.
(Rickert, H. (1921) System der Philosophie. 1. Teil:
Allgemeine Grundlegung der Philosophie. Tübingen 1921;
Boyle, J.M./ Grisez, G./ Tollefsen, O. (1976) Free Choice. A
Self-Referential Argument.
London 1976). Cf. also Pothast 1980, Kap. VII).
(4) Planck, M. (1936) Vom
Wesen der Willensfreiheit, in: Planck, M.: Vorträge und
Erinnerungen. Darmstadt 1973.
(5) Popper, K.R. (1950)
Indeterminism in Quantum Physics and Classical Physics, in: British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science I (1950).
(6) MacKay, D. (1978) Freiheit des Handelns in einem
mechanistischen Universum, in: Pothast, U. (ed. 1978)
Seminar: Freies Handeln und Determinismus. Frankfurt/M.
1978.
(7) Cf. Pothast (ed. 1978),
21.
(8) Nietzsche, F.
(1951) Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben.
Stuttgart 1951, 5.
(9) For an instructive account on this topic see Earman, J.
(1986) A Primer on Determinism. Dordrecht
1986.
(10) Cf. e.g. Jordan, P. (1956) Der gescheiterte
Aufstand. Betrachtungen zur Gegenwart. Frankfurt/M. 1956, 63 ff, 114
ff.
(11) Rohs, P. (1996) Feld — Zeit — Ich.
Frankfurt/M. 1996, ch. 20 f.
(12) Cf. Wandschneider, D. (1979) Selbstbewußtsein
als sich selbst erfüllender Entwurf, in: Zeitschrift für
philosophische Forschung, Bd. 33 (1979).
(13) Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten,
Akademieausgabe IV, 448.
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