Liberalism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Cite this entry Search the SEP • Advanced Search • Tools • RSS FeedTable of Contents• What's New• Archives• Projected ContentsEditorial Information• About the SEP• Editorial Board• How to Cite the SEP• Special CharactersSupport the SEPContact the SEP ©Metaphysics Research Lab,CSLI,Stanford University  Open access to the SEP is made possible by a world-wide funding initiative. Please Read How You Can Help Keep the Encyclopedia FreeLiberalismFirst published Thu Nov 28, 1996; substantive revision Mon Sep 10, 2007As soon as one examines it, ‘liberalism’ fractures into avariety of types and competing visions. In this entry we focus ondebates within the liberal tradition. We begin by (1) examiningdifferent interpretations of liberalism's core commitment —liberty. We then consider (2) the longstanding debate between the‘old’ and the ‘new’ liberalism. In section (3)we turn to the more recent controversy about whether liberalism is a‘comprehensive’ or a ‘political’ doctrine. Weclose in (4) by considering disagreements as to ‘thereach’ of liberalism — does it apply to all humankind, andmust all political communities be liberal?1. The Debate About Liberty 1.1 The Presumption in Favor of Liberty 1.2 Negative Liberty 1.3 Positive Liberty 1.4 Republican Liberty 2. The Debate Between the ‘Old’ and the ‘New’ 2.1 Classical Liberalism 2.2 The ‘New Liberalism’ 2.3 Liberal Theories of Social Justice 3. The Debate About the Comprehensiveness of Liberalism 3.1 Political Liberalism 3.2 Liberal Ethics 3.3 Liberal Theories of Value 3.4 The Metaphysics of Liberalism 4. The Debate About The Reach of Liberalism 4.1 Is Liberalism Justified in All Political Communities? 4.2 Is Liberalism a Cosmopolitan or a State-centered Theory? 4.3 Liberal Interaction with Non-Liberal Groups: International 4.4 Liberal Interaction with Non-Liberal Groups: Domestic 5. ConclusionBibliographyOther Internet ResourcesRelated Entries1. The Debate About Liberty1.1 The Presumption in Favor of Liberty‘By definition’, Maurice Cranston rightly points out,‘a liberal is a man who believes in liberty’ (1967:459). In two different ways, liberals accord liberty primacy as apolitical value. (i) Liberals have typically maintained that humansare naturally in ‘a State of perfect Freedom to ordertheir Actions…as they think fit…without asking leave, ordepending on the Will of any other Man’ (Locke, 1960 [1689]:287). Mill too argued that ‘the burden of proof is supposed tobe with those who are against liberty; who contend for any restrictionor prohibition…. The a priori assumption is in favourof freedom…’ (1963, vol. 21: 262). Recent liberalthinkers such as as Joel Feinberg (1984: 9), Stanley Benn (1988: 87)and John Rawls (2001: 44, 112) agree. This might be called theFundamental Liberal Principle (Gaus, 1996: 162-166): freedom isnormatively basic, and so the onus of justification is on those whowould limit freedom, especially through coercive means. It followsfrom this that political authority and law must be justified, as theylimit the liberty of citizens. Consequently, a central question ofliberal political theory is whether political authority can bejustified, and if so, how. It is for this reason that social contracttheory, as developed by Thomas Hobbes (1948 [1651]), John Locke (1960[1689]), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1973 [1762]) and Immanuel Kant (1965[1797]), is usually viewed as liberal even though the actual politicalprescriptions of, say, Hobbes and Rousseau, have distinctly illiberalfeatures. Insofar as they take as their starting point a state ofnature in which humans are free and equal, and so argue that anylimitation of this freedom and equality stands in need ofjustification (i.e., by the social contract), the contractualtradition expresses the Fundamental Liberal Principle.(ii) The Fundamental Liberal Principle holds that restrictions onliberty must be justified, and because he accepts this, we canunderstand Hobbes as espousing a liberal political theory. But Hobbesis at best a qualified liberal, for he also argues that drasticlimitations on liberty can be justified. Paradigmaticliberals such as Locke not only advocate the Fundamental LiberalPrinciple, but also maintain that justified limitations on liberty arefairly modest. Only a limited government can be justified; indeed, thebasic task of government is to protect the equal liberty ofcitizens. Thus John Rawls's first principle of justice: ‘Eachperson is to have an equal right to the most extensive system of equalbasic liberty compatible with a similar system for all’ (Rawls,1999b: 220).1.2 Negative LibertyLiberals disagree, however, about the concept of liberty, and as aresult the liberal ideal of protecting individual liberty can lead tovery different conceptions of the task of government. As is well-known,Isaiah Berlin advocated a negative conception of liberty:I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no manor body of men interferes with my activity. Political liberty in thissense is simply the area within which a man can act unobstructed byothers. If I am prevented by others from doing what I could otherwisedo, I am to that degree unfree; and if this area is contracted by othermen beyond a certain minimum, I can be described as being coerced, or,it may be, enslaved. Coercion is not, however, a term that covers everyform of inability. If I say that I am unable to jump more than ten feetin the air, or cannot read because I am blind…it would beeccentric to say that I am to that degree enslaved or coerced. Coercionimplies the deliberate interference of other human beings within thearea in which I could otherwise act. You lack political liberty orfreedom only if you are prevented from attaining a goal by other humanbeings (Berlin, 1969: 122).For Berlin and those who follow him, then, the heart of liberty isthe absence of coercion by others; consequently, the liberal state'scommitment to protecting liberty is, essentially, the job of ensuringthat citizens do not coerce each other without compellingjustification.1.3 Positive LibertyMany liberals have been attracted to more ‘positive’conceptions of liberty. Although Rousseau (1973 [1762]) seemed toadvocate a positive conception of liberty, according to which one wasfree when one acted according to one's true will (the general will),the positive conception was best developed by the Britishneo-Hegelians of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,such as Thomas Hill Green and Bernard Bosanquet (2001 [1923]). Greenacknowledged that ‘…it must be of course admitted thatevery usage of the term [i.e., ‘freedom’] to expressanything but a social and political relation of one man to otherinvolves a metaphor…It always implies…some exemptionfrom compulsion by another…’(1986 [1895]:229). Nevertheless, Green went on to claim that a person can be unfreeif he is subject to an impulse or craving that cannot becontrolled. Such a person, Green argued, is ‘…in thecondition of a bondsman who is carrying out the will of another, nothis own’ (1986 [1895]: 228). Just as a slave is not doing whathe really wants to do, one who is, say, an alcoholic, isbeing led by a craving to look for satisfaction where it cannot,ultimately, be found.For Green, a person is free only if she is self-directed orautonomous. Running throughout liberal political theory is an ideal ofa free person as one whose actions are in some sense her own.Such a person is not subject to compulsions, critically reflects onher ideals and so does not unreflectively follow custom, and does notignore her long-term interests for short-term pleasures. This ideal offreedom as autonomy has its roots not only in Rousseau's and Kant'spolitical theory, but also in John Stuart Mill's On Liberty.And today it is a dominant strain in liberalism, as witnessed by thework of S.I. Benn (1988), Gerald Dworkin (1988), and Joseph Raz(1986); see also the essays in Christman and Anderson (2005).This Greenian, autonomy-based, conception of positive freedom is oftenrun together with a very different notion of ‘positive’freedom: freedom as effective power to act or to pursue one's ends. Inthe words of the British socialist R. H. Tawney, freedom thusunderstood is ‘the ability act’ (1931: 221; see also Gaus,2000; ch. 5.) On this view of positive freedom, a person who is notprohibited from being a member of a Country Club but who is too poorto afford membership is not free to be a member: she does not have aneffective power to act. Although the Greenian autonomy-basedconception of positive freedom certainly had implications for thedistribution of resources (education, for example, should be easilyavailable so that all can develop their capacities), positive freedomqua effective power to act closely ties freedom to materialresources. It was this conception of positive liberty that Hayek hadin mind when he insisted that although ‘freedom and wealth areboth good things…they still remain different’ (1960:17-18).1.4 Republican LibertyAn older notion of liberty that has recently undergone resurgence isthe republican, or neo-Roman, conception of liberty which has it rootsin the writings of Cicero and Niccolo Machiavelli (1950[1513]). According to Philip Pettit, ‘The contrary of theliber, or free, person in Roman, republican usage was theservus, or slave, and up to at least the beginning of thelast century, the dominant connotation of freedom, emphasized in thelong republican tradition, was not having to live in servitude toanother: not being subject to the arbitrary power of another’(Pettit, 1996: 576). On this view, the opposite of freedom isdomination. An agent is said to be unfree if she is ‘subject tothe potentially capricious will or the potentially idiosyncraticjudgement of another’ (Pettit, 1997: 5). The idealliberty-protecting government, then, ensures that no agent, includingitself, has arbitrary power over any citizen. The key method by whichthis is accomplished is through an equal disbursement of power. Eachperson has power that offsets the power of another to arbitrarilyinterfere with her activities (Pettit, 1997: 67).The republican conception of liberty is certainly distinct from bothGreenian positive and negative conceptions. Unlike Greenian positiveliberty, republican liberty is not primarily concerned with rationalautonomy, realizing one's true nature, or becoming one's higherself. When all dominating power has been dispersed, republicantheorists are generally silent about these goals (Larmore2001). Unlike negative liberty, republican liberty is primarilyfocused upon ‘defenseless susceptibility to interference, ratherthan actual interference’ (Pettit, 1996: 577). Thus, in contrastto the ordinary negative conception, on the republican conception themere possibility of arbitrary interference appears toconstitute a limitation of liberty. Republican liberty thus seems toinvolve a modal claim about the possibility of interference, and thisis often cashed out in terms of complex counterfactual claims. It isnot clear whether these claims can be adequately explicated (Gaus,2003; cf. Larmore, 2004).Some republican theorists, such as Quentin Skinner (1998: 113),Maurizio Viroli (2002: 6) and Pettit (1997: 8-11), view republicanismas an alternative to liberalism. Insofar as republican liberty is seenas a basis for criticizing market liberty and market society, this isplausible (Gaus, 2003). However, when liberalism is understood moreexpansively, and not so closely tied to either negative liberty ormarket society, republicanism becomes indistinguishable fromliberalism (Larmore 2001; Dagger, 1997).2. The Debate Between the ‘Old’ and the ‘New’2.1 Classical LiberalismLiberal political theory, then, fractures over the conception ofliberty. But a more important division concerns the place of privateproperty and the market order. For classical liberals —sometimes called the ‘old’ liberalism — liberty andprivate property are intimately related. From the eighteenth centuryright up to today, classical liberals have insisted that an economicsystem based on private property is uniquely consistent withindividual liberty, allowing each to live her life —includingemploying her labor and her capital — as she sees fit. Indeed,classical liberals and libertarians have often asserted that in someway liberty and property are really the same thing; it has beenargued, for example, that all rights, including liberty rights, areforms of property; others have maintained that property is itself aform of freedom (Gaus, 1994; Steiner, 1994). A market order based onprivate property is thus seen as an embodiment of freedom(Robbins, 1961: 104). Unless people are free to make contracts and tosell their labour, or unless they are free to save their incomes andthen invest them as they see fit, or unless they are free to runenterprises when they have obtained the capital, they are not reallyfree.Classical liberals employ a second argument connecting liberty andprivate property. Rather than insisting that the freedom to obtain andemploy private property is simply one aspect of people's liberty, thissecond argument insists that private property is the only effectivemeans for the protection of liberty. Here the idea is that thedispersion of power that results from a free market economy based onprivate property protects the liberty of subjects against encroachmentsby the state. As F.A. Hayek argues, ‘There can be no freedom ofpress if the instruments of printing are under government control, nofreedom of assembly if the needed rooms are so controlled, no freedomof movement if the means of transport are a government monopoly’(1978: 149).Although classical liberals agree on the fundamental importance ofprivate property to a free society, the classical liberal traditionitself refracts into a spectrum of views, from near-anarchist to thosethat attribute a significant role to the state in economic and socialpolicy (on this spectrum, see Mack and Gaus, 2004). Towards the mostextreme ‘libertarian’ end of the classical liberalspectrum are views of justified states as legitimate monopolies thatmay with justice charge for their necessary rights-protectionservices: taxation is legitimate so long as it is necessary to protectliberty and property rights. As we go further ‘leftward’we encounter classical liberal views that allow taxation for (other)public goods and social infrastructure and, moving yet further‘left’, some classical liberal views allow for a modestsocial minimum.(e.g., Hayek, 1976: 87). Most nineteenth centuryclassical liberal economists endorsed a variety of state policies,encompassing not only the criminal law and enforcement of contracts,but the licensing of professionals, heath, safety and fireregulations, banking regulations, commercial infrastructure (roads,harbors and canals) and often encouraged unionization (Gaus,1983b). Although today classical liberalism is often associated withextreme forms of libertarianism, the classical liberal tradition wascentrally concerned with bettering the lot of the working class. Theaim, as Bentham put it, was to make the poor richer, not the richpoorer (Bentham, 1952 [1795]: vol. 1, 226n). Consequently, classicalliberals reject the redistribution of wealth as a legitimate aim ofgovernment.2.2 The ‘New Liberalism’What has come to be known as ‘new’,‘revisionist’, ‘welfare state’, or perhapsbest, ‘social justice’, liberalism challenges thisintimate connection between personal liberty and a private propertybased market order (Freeden, 1978; Gaus, 1983b; Paul, Miller and Paul,2007). Three factors help explain the rise of this revisionisttheory. First, the new liberalism arose in the late nineteenth andearly twentieth centuries, a period in which the ability of a freemarket to sustain what Lord Beveridge (1944: 96) called a‘prosperous equilibrium’ was being questioned. Believingthat a private property based market tended to be unstable, or could,as Keynes argued (1973 [1936]), get stuck in an equilibrium with highunemployment, new liberals came to doubt that it was an adequatefoundation for a stable, free society. Here the second factor comesinto play: just as the new liberals were losing faith in the market,their faith in government as a means of supervising economic life wasincreasing. This was partly due to the experiences of the First WorldWar, in which government attempts at economic planning seemed tosucceed (Dewey, 1929: 551-60); more importantly, this reevaluation ofthe state was spurred by the democratization of western states, andthe conviction that, for the first time, elected officials could trulybe, in J.A. Hobson's phrase ‘representatives of thecommunity’ (1922: 49). As D.G. Ritchie proclaimed:be it observed that arguments used against‘government’ action, where the government is entirely ormainly in the hands of a ruling class or caste, exercising wisely orunwisely a paternal or grandmotherly authority — such argumentslose their force just in proportion as the government becomes more andmore genuinely the government of the people by the people themselves(1896: 64).The third factor underlying the development of the new liberalism wasprobably the most fundamental: a growing conviction that, so far frombeing ‘the guardian of every other right’ (Ely, 1992: 26),property rights generated an unjust inequality of power that led to aless-than-equal liberty (typically, ‘positive liberty’)for the working class. This theme is central to what is usually called‘liberalism’ in American politics, combining a strongendorsement of civil and personal liberties with, at best, anindifference, and often enough an antipathy, to private ownership. Theseeds of this newer liberalism can be found in Mill's OnLiberty. Although Mill insisted that the ‘so-calleddoctrine of Free Trade’ rested on ‘equally solid’grounds as did the ‘principle of individual liberty’(1963, vol. 18: 293), he nevertheless insisted that the justificationsof personal and economic liberty were distinct. And in hisPrinciples of Political Economy Mill consistently emphasizedthat it is an open question whether personal liberty can flourishwithout private property (1963, vol. 2; 203-210), a view that Rawlswas to reassert over a century later (2001: Part IV).2.3 Liberal Theories of Social JusticeOne of the many consequences of Rawls's great work, A Theory ofJustice (1999 [first published in 1971]) is that the ‘newliberalism’ has become focused on developing a theory of socialjustice. For over thirty-five years liberal political philosophershave analyzed, and disputed, his famous ‘differenceprinciple’ according to which a just basic structure of societyarranges social and economic inequalities such that they are to thegreatest advantage of the least well off representative group (1999b:266). For Rawls, the default is an equal distribution of (basically)income and wealth; only inequalities that best enhance the long-termprospects of the least advantaged are just. As Rawls sees it, thedifference principle constitutes a public recognition of the principleof reciprocity: the basic structure is to be arranged such that nosocial group advances at the cost of another (2001: 122-24). Manyfollowers of Rawls have focused less on the ideal of reciprocity thanthe commitment to equality (Dworkin, 2000). Indeed, what waspreviously called ‘welfare state’ liberalism is now oftendescribed as ‘egalitarian’ liberalism. And in one waythat is especially appropriate: in his later work Rawls insists thatwelfare-state capitalism does not constitute a just basic structure(2001: 137-38). If some version of capitalism is to be just it must bea ‘property owning democracy’ with a wide diffusion ofownership; a market socialist regime, in Rawls's view, is more justthan welfare-state capitalism (2001: 135-38). Not too surprisingly,classical liberals such as Hayek (1976) insist that the contemporaryliberal fixation on ‘the mirage of social justice’ leadsthem to ignore the way that freedom depends on a decentralized marketbased on private property, the overall results of which areunpredictable. In a similar vein, Robert Nozick (1974: 160ff) famouslyargued that any attempt to ensure that market transactions conform toany specific pattern of holdings will involve constant interferenceswith individual freedom.3. The Debate About the Comprehensiveness of Liberalism3.1 Political LiberalismAs his work evolved, Rawls (1996: 5ff) insisted that his liberalismwas not a ‘comprehensive’ doctrine, that is, one whichincludes an overall theory of value, an ethical theory, anepistemology, or a controversial metaphysics of the person andsociety. Our modern societies, characterized by a ‘reasonablepluralism’, are already filled with such doctrines. The aim of‘political liberalism’ is not to add yet another sectariandoctrine, but to provide a political framework that is neutral betweensuch controversial comprehensive doctrines (Larmore, 1996: 121ff). Ifit is to serve as the basis for public reasoning in our diversewestern societies, liberalism must be restricted to a core set ofpolitical principles that are, or can be, the subject of consensusamong all reasonable citizens. Rawls's notion of a purely politicalconception of liberalism seems more austere than the traditionalliberal political theories discussed above, being largely restrictedto constitutional principles upholding basic civil liberties and thedemocratic process.As Gaus (2004) has argued, the distinction between‘political’ and ‘comprehensive’ liberalismmisses a great deal. Liberal theories form a broad continuum, fromthose that constitute full-blown philosophical systems, to those thatrely on a full theory of value and the good, to those that rely on atheory of the right (but not the good), all the way to those that seekto be purely political doctrines. Nevertheless, it is important toappreciate that, though liberalism is primarily a political theory, ithas been associated with broader theories of ethics, value andsociety. Indeed, many believe that liberalism cannot rid itself of allcontroversial metaphysical (Hampton, 1989) or epistemological (Raz,1990) commitments.3.2 Liberal EthicsFollowing Wilhelm von Humboldt (1993 [1854]), in On LibertyMill argues that one basis for endorsing freedom (Mill believesthat there are many), is the goodness of developing individuality andcultivating capacities:Individuality is the same thing with development,and…it is only the cultivation of individuality which produces,or can produce, well-developed human beings…what more can besaid of any condition of human affairs, than that it brings humanbeings themselves nearer to the best thing they can be? or what worsecan be said of any obstruction to good, than that it prevents this?(Mill, 1963, vol. 18: 267)This is not just a theory about politics: it is a substantive,perfectionist, moral theory about the good. And, on this view, theright thing to do is to promote development or perfection, and only aregime securing extensive liberty for each person can accomplish this(Wall, 1998). This moral ideal of human perfection and developmentdominated liberal thinking in the latter part of the nineteenth, andfor most of the twentieth, century: not only Mill, but T.H. Green,L.T. Hobhouse, Bernard Bosanquet, John Dewey and even Rawls showallegiance to variants of this perfectionist ethic and the claim thatit provides a foundation for endorsing a regime of liberal rights(Gaus, 1983a). And it is fundamental to the proponents of liberalautonomy discussed above, as well as ‘liberal virtue’theorists such as William Galston (1980). That the good life isnecessarily a freely chosen one in which a person develops his uniquecapacities as part of a plan of life is probably the dominant liberalethic of the past century.The main challenge to Millian perfectionism as the distinctly liberalethic comes from moral contractualism, which can be divided into whatmight very roughly be labeled ‘Kantian’ and‘Hobbesian’ versions. According to Kantian contractualism,‘society, being composed of a plurality of persons, each withhis own aims, interests, and conceptions of the good, is best arrangedwhen it is governed by principles that do not themselvespresuppose any particular conception of thegood…’(Sandel, 1982: 1). On this view, respect for theperson of others demands that we refrain from imposing our view of thegood life on them. Only principles that can be justified to allrespect the personhood of each. We thus witness the tendency of recentliberal theory (Reiman, 1990; Scanlon, 1998) to transform the socialcontract from an account of the state to an overall justification ofmorality, or at least a social morality. Basic to such ‘Kantiancontractualism’ is the idea that suitably idealized individualsare motivated not by the pursuit of gain, but by a commitment ordesire to publicly justify the claims theymake on others (Reiman, 1990; Scanlon, 1982). A moral codethat could be the object of agreement among such individuals isthus a publicly justified morality.In contrast, the Hobbesian version of contractualism supposes onlythat individuals are self-interested, and correctly perceive that eachperson's ability to effectively pursue her interests is enhanced by aframework of norms that structure social life and divide the fruits ofsocial cooperation (Gauthier, 1986; Kavka, 1986). Morality, then, iscommon framework that advances the self-interest of each. The claim ofHobbesian contractualism to be a distinctly liberal conception ofmorality stems from the importance of individual freedom and propertyin such a common framework: only systems of norms that allow eachperson great freedom to pursue her interests as she sees fit could, itis argued, be the object of consensus among self-interest agents. Thecontinuing problem for Hobbesian contractualism is the apparentrationality of free-riding: if everyone (or enough) complies with theterms of the contract, and so social order is achieved, it would seemrational to defect, and act immorally when one can gain by doing so.This is essentially the argument of Hobbes's ‘Foole’, andfrom Hobbes (1948 [1651]: 94ff) to Gauthier (1986: 160ff), Hobbesians publicly justifyhave tried to reply to it.3.3 Liberal Theories of ValueTurning from rightness to goodness, we can identify three maincandidates for a liberal theory of value. We have already encounteredthe first: perfectionism. Insofar as perfectionism is a theory ofright action, it can be understood as an account ofmorality. Obviously, however, it is an account of rightness thatpresupposes a theory of value or the good: the ultimate human value isdeveloped personality or an autonomous life. Competing with thisobjectivist theory of value are two other liberal accounts: pluralismand subjectivism.In his famous defence of negative liberty, Berlin insistedthat values or ends are plural, and no interpersonally justifiableranking among these many ends is to be had. More than that, Berlinmaintained that the pursuit of one end necessarily implies that otherends will not be achieved. In this sense ends collide or, in the moreprosaic terms of economics, the pursuit of one end necessarily entailsopportunity costs in relation to others which cannot be impersonallyshown to be less worthy. So there is no interpersonally justifiable wayto rank the ends, and there is no way to achieve them all. The upshotis that each person must devote herself to some ends at the cost ofignoring others. For the pluralist, then, autonomy, perfection ordevelopment are not necessarily ranked higher than hedonisticpleasures, environmental preservation or economic equality. All competefor our allegiance, but because they are incommensurable, no choice canbe interpersonally justified as correct.The pluralist is not a subjectivist: that values are many, competingand incommensurable does not imply that they are somehow dependent onsubjective experiences. But the claim that what a person values restson experiences that vary from person to person has long been a part ofthe liberal tradition. To Hobbes, what one values depends on what onedesires (1948 [1651]: 48). Locke advances a ‘taste theory ofvalue’:The Mind has a different relish, as well as the Palate; andyou will as fruitlessly endeavour to delight all Man with Riches orGlory, (which yet some Men place their Happiness in,) as you wouldsatisfy all men's Hunger with Cheese or Lobsters; which, though veryagreeable and delicious fare to some, are to others extremely nauseousand offensive: And many People would with reason preferr [sic] thegriping of an hungry Belly, to those Dishes, which are a Feast toothers. Hence it was, I think, that the Philosophers of old did in vainenquire, whether the Summum bonum consisted in Riches, orbodily Delights, or Virtue, or Contemplation: And they might have asreasonably disputed, whether the best Relish were to be found inApples, Plumbs or Nuts; and have divided themselves into Sects upon it.For…pleasant Tastes depend not on the things themselves, buttheir agreeableness to this or that particulare Palate, wherein thereis great variety…(1975 [1706]: 269).The perfectionist, the pluralist and the subjectivist concur on thecrucial point: the nature of value is such that reasonable people pursuedifferent ways of living. To the perfectionist, this is because eachperson has unique capacities, the development of which confers value onher life; to the pluralist, it is because values are many andconflicting, and no one life can include them all, or make theinterpersonally correct choice among them; and to the subjectivist, itis because our ideas about what is valuable stem from our desires ortastes, and these differ from one individual to another. All threeviews, then, defend the basic liberal idea that people rationallyfollow very different ways of living. But in themselves, such notionsof the good do not constitute a full-fledged liberal ethic, for anadditional argument is required linking liberal value with norms ofequal liberty. To be sure, Berlin seems to believe this is a very quickargument: the inherent plurality of ends points to thepolitical preeminence of liberty. Guaranteeingeach a measure of negative liberty is, Berlin argues, the most humaneideal, as it recognises that ‘human goals are many’, and noone can make a choice that is right for all people (1969: 171). But themove from diversity to equal liberty and individual rights seems acomplicated one; it is here that both subjectivists and pluralistsoften rely on versions of moral contractualism. Those who insist thatliberalism is ultimately a nihilistic theory can be interpreted asarguing that this transition cannot be made successfully: liberals, ontheir view, are stuck with a subjectivistic or pluralistic theory ofvalue, and no account of the right emerges from it.3.4 The Metaphysics of LiberalismThroughout the last century, liberalism has been beset bycontroversies between, on the one hand, those broadly identified as‘individualists’ and, on the other,‘collectivists’, ‘communitarians’ or‘organicists’ (for skepticism about this, though, seeBird, 1999). These vague and sweeping designations have been appliedto a wide array of disputes; we focus here on controversies concerning(i) the nature of society; (ii) the nature of the self.Liberalism is, of course, usually associated with individualistanalyses of society. ‘Human beings in society’, Millclaimed, ‘have no properties but those which are derived from,and which may be resolved into, the laws of the nature of individualmen’ (1963, Vol. 8: 879; see also Bentham: 1970 [1823]: chap. I,sec. 4). Herbert Spencer agreed: ‘the properties of the mass aredependent upon the attributes of its component parts’ (1995[1851]: 1). In the last years of the nineteenth century thisindividualist view was increasingly subject to attack, especially bythose who were influenced by idealist philosophy. D. G. Ritche,criticizing Spencer's individualist liberalism, explicitly rejectedthe idea that society is simply a ‘heap’ of individuals,insisting that it is more akin to an organism, with a complex internallife (1896: 13). Liberals such as L. T. Hobhouse and Dewey refused toadopt radically collectivist views such as those advocated by BernardBosanquet (2001), but they too rejected the radical individualism ofBentham, Mill and Spencer. Throughout most of the first half of thetwentieth century such ‘organic’ analyses of society heldsway in liberal theory, even in economics (see A.F Mummery andJ. A. Hobson, 1956: 106; J.M. Keynes, 1972: 275). During and after the Second World War the idea that liberalism wasbased on inherently individualist analysis of humans-in-society aroseagain. Karl Popper's The Open Society and its Enemies (1945)presented a sustained critique of Hegelian and Marxist theory and itscollectivist and historicist, and to Popper, inherently illiberal,understanding of society. The reemergence of economic analysis inliberal theory brought to the fore a thoroughgoing methodologicalindividualism. Writing in the early 1960s, James Buchanan and GordonTullock adamantly defended the ‘individualistic postulate’against all forms of ‘organicism’: ‘This[organicist] approach or theory of the collectivity….is essentiallyopposed to the Western philosophical tradition in which the humanindividual is the primary philosophical entity’ (1965:11-12). Human beings, insisted Buchanan and Tullock, are the only realchoosers and decision-makers, and their preferences determine bothpublic and private actions. The renascent individualism oflate-twentieth century liberalism was closely bound up with theinduction of Hobbes as a member of the liberal pantheon. Hobbes'srelentlessly individualistic account of society, and the manner inwhich his analysis of the state of nature lent itself togame-theoretical modeling, yielded a highly individualist, formalanalysis of the liberal state and liberal morality.Of course, as is widely known, the last twenty-five years havewitnessed a renewed interest in collectivist analyses of liberalsociety —though the term ‘collectivist’ is abjuredin favor of ‘communitarian’. Writing in 1985, Amy Gutmannobserved that ‘we are witnessing a revival of communitariancriticisms of liberal political theory. Like the critics of the 1960s,those of the 1980s fault liberalism for being mistakenly andirreparably individualistic’ (1985: 308). Starting with MichaelSandel's (1982) famous criticism of Rawls, a number of critics chargedthat liberalism was necessarily premised on an abstract conception ofindividual selves as pure choosers, whose commitments, values andconcerns are possessions of the self, but never constitute the self.Although the now famous, not to say infamous,‘liberal-communitarian’ debate ultimately involvedwide-ranging moral, political and sociological disputes about thenature of communities, and the rights and responsibilities of theirmembers, the heart of the debate was about the nature of liberalselves. For Sandel the flaw at the heart of Rawls's liberalism was itsimplausibly abstract theory of the self, the pure autonomous chooser.Rawls, he charges, ultimately assumes that it makes sense to identifyus with a pure capacity for choice, and that such pure choosers mightreject any or all of their attachments and values and yet retain theiridentity. From the mid-1980s onwards various liberals sought to show howliberalism may consistently advocate a theory of the self which findsroom for cultural membership and other non-chosen attachments andcommitments which at least partially constitute the self (Kymlicka,1989). Much of liberal theory has became focused on the issue as tohow we can be social creatures, members of cultures and raised invarious traditions, while also being autonomous choosers who employour liberty to construct lives of our own.4. The Debate About The Reach of Liberalism4.1 Is Liberalism Justified in All Political Communities?In On Liberty Mill argued that ‘Liberty, as a principle,has no application to any state of things anterior to the time whenmankind have become capable of being improved by free and equaldiscussion’ (1963, vol. 18: 224). Thus ‘Despotism is alegitimate form of government in dealing with barbarians, provided theend be their improvement…. ’(1963, vol. 18: 224). This passage— infused with the spirit of nineteenth century imperialism— is often ignored by defenders of Mill as anembarrassment. Nevertheless, it raises a question that still dividesliberals: are liberal political principles justified for all politicalcommunities? In The Law of Peoples Rawls argues that they arenot. According to Rawls there can be a ‘decent hierarchicalsociety’ which is not based on the liberal conception of allpersons as free and equal, but instead views persons as‘responsible and cooperating members of their respectivegroups’ but not inherently equal (1999a: 66). Given this, thefull liberal conception of justice cannot be constructed out of sharedideas of this ‘people’, though basic human rights,implicit in the very idea of a social cooperative structure, apply toall peoples. David Miller (2002) develops a different defense of thisanti-universalistic position, while those such as Thomas Pogge (2002:ch. 4) and Martha Nussbaum (2002) reject Rawls's position, insteadadvocating versions of moral universalism: they claim that liberalmoral principles apply to all states.4.2 Is Liberalism a Cosmopolitan or a State-centered Theory?The debate about whether liberal principles apply to all politicalcommunities should not be confused with the debate as to whetherliberalism is a state-centered theory, or whether, at least ideally,it is a cosmopolitan political theory for the community of allhumankind. Immanuel Kant — a moral universalist if ever therewas one — argued that all states should respect the dignity oftheir citizens as free and equal persons, yet denied that humanityforms one political community. Thus he rejected the ideal of auniversal cosmopolitan liberal political community in favor of a worldof states, all with internally just constitutions, and united in aconfederation to assure peace (1970 [1795]).On a classical liberal theory, the difference between a world ofliberal communities and a world liberal community is not offundamental importance. Since the aim of government in a community isto assure the basic liberty and property rights of its citizens,borders are not of great moral significance in classical liberalism(Lomasky, 2007; but cf. Pogge, 2002: ch. 2). In contrast under the‘new’ liberalism, which stresses redistributive programsto achieve social justice, it matters a great deal who is includedwithin the political or moral community. If liberal principles requiresignificant redistribution, then it is crucially important whetherthese principles apply only within particular communities, or whethertheir reach is global. Thus a fundamental debate between Rawls andmany of his followers is whether the difference principle should onlybe applied within a liberal state such as the United States (where theleast well off are the least well off Americans), or whether it shouldbe applied globally (where the least well off are the least well offin the world) (Rawls, 1999a: 113ff; Beitz, 1973: 143ff; Pogge, 1989:Part Three).4.3 Liberal Interaction with Non-Liberal Groups: InternationalLiberal political theory also fractures concerning the appropriateresponse to groups (cultural, religious, etc.) which endorse illiberalpolicies and values. These groups may deny education to some of theirmembers, advocate female genital mutilation, restrict religiousfreedom, maintain an inequitable caste system, and so on. When, ifever, is it reasonable for a liberal group to interfere with theinternal governance of an illiberal group? Suppose first that the illiberal group is another political communityor state. Can liberals intervene in the affairs of non-liberal states?Mill provides a complicated answer in his 1859 essay ‘A FewWords on Non-Intervention’. Reiterating his claim from OnLiberty that civilized and non-civilized countries are to betreated differently, he insists that ‘barbarians have no rightsas a nation, except a right to such treatment as may, at theearliest possible period, fit them for becoming one. The only morallaws for the relation between a civilized and a barbarous government,are the universal rules of morality between man and man’ (1963,vol. 21: 119). Although this strikes us today as simply a case for anobjectionable paternalistic imperialism (and it certainly was such acase), Mill's argument for the conclusion is more complex, including aclaim that, since international morality depends on reciprocity,‘barbarous’ governments that cannot be counted on toengage in reciprocal behavior have no rights quagovernments. In any event, when Mill turns to interventions among‘civilized’ peoples he develops an altogether moresophisticated account as to when one state can intervene in theaffairs of another to protect liberal principles. Here Mill isgenerally against intervention. ‘The reason is, that there canseldom be anything approaching to assurance that intervention, even ifsuccessful, would be for the good of the people themselves. The onlytest possessing any real value, of a people's having become fit forpopular institutions, is that they, or a sufficient proportion of themto prevail in the contest, are willing to brave labour and danger fortheir liberation’ (1963, vol. 21: 122).In addition to questions of efficacy, to the extent that peoples orgroups have rights to collective self-determination, intervention by aliberal group to induce a non-liberal community to adopt liberalprinciples will be morally objectionable. As with individuals,liberals may think that peoples or groups have freedom to makemistakes in managing their collective affairs. If people'sself-conceptions are based on their participation in such groups, eventhose whose liberties are denied may object to, and perhaps in someway harmed by, the imposition of liberal principles (Margalit and Raz,1990; Tamir, 1993). Thus rather than proposing a doctrine ofintervention many liberals propose various principles oftoleration which specify to what extent liberals must toleratenon-liberal peoples and cultures. As is usual, Rawls's discussion issubtle and enlightening. In his account of the foreign affairs ofliberal peoples, Rawls argues that liberal peoples must distinguish‘decent’ non-liberal societies from ‘outlaw’and other states; the former have a claim on liberal peoples totolerance while the latter do not (1999a: 59-61). Decent peoples,argues Rawls, ‘simply do not tolerate’ outlaw states whichignore human rights: such states may be subject to ‘forcefulsanctions and even to intervention’ (1999a: 81). In contrast,Rawls insists that ‘liberal peoples must try to encourage[non-liberal] decent peoples and not frustrate their vitality bycoercively insisting that all societies be liberal’ (1999a:62). Chandran Kukathas (2003) — whose liberalism derives fromthe classical tradition — is inclined to almost completetoleration of non-liberal peoples, with the proviso that there must beexit rights.4.4 Liberal Interaction with Non-Liberal Groups: DomesticThe status of non-liberal groups within liberal societies hasincreasingly become a subject of debate, especially with respect tosome citizens of faith. We should distinguish two questions: (i) towhat extent should non-liberal cultural and religious communities beexempt from the requirements of the liberal state? and, (ii) to whatextent can they be allowed to participate in decision-making in theliberal state?Turning to (i), liberalism has a long history of seeking toaccommodate religious groups that have deep objections to certainpublic policies, such as the Quakers, Mennonites or Sikhs. The mostdifficult issues in this regard arise in relation to children andeducation (see Galston, 2003). Because cultural and religiouscommunities raise and educate children, they cannot be seen as purelyvoluntary opt-outs from the liberal state: they exercise coercivepower over children, and so basic liberal principles about protectingthe innocent from unjustified coercion come into play. We thusconfront a deep conflict between parental authority and childern'srights. Because the groups live within the liberal state, fulltoleration (even with a right of exit) is usually seen as lessattractive than in the international case. Still some such as LucasSwaine (2006) have argued that liberals ought to grant a sort ofquasi-sovereignty to such domestic non-liberal groups, allowing themgreat latitude to conduct their own affairs in their own away. Question (ii) — the extent to which non-liberal beliefs andvalues may be employed in liberal political discussion— hasbecome the subject of sustained debate in the years following Rawls'sPolitical Liberalism. According to Rawls's liberalism —and what we might call ‘public reason liberalism’ moregenerally — because our societies are characterized by‘reasonable pluralism’, coercion cannot be justified onthe basis of comprehensive moral or religious systems of belief. Butmany friends of religion (e.g., Eberle, 2002; Perry, 1993) argue thatthis is objectionably ‘exclusionary’: conscientiousbelievers are barred from voting on their deepest convictions. Againliberals diverge in their responses. Some such as Stephen Macedo takea pretty hard-nosed attitude: ‘if some people…feel“silenced” or “marginalized” by the fact thatsome of us believe that it is wrong to shape basic liberties on thebasis of religious or metaphysical claims, I can only say “growup!”’ (2000: 35). Rawls, in contrast, seeks to be moreaccommodating, allowing that arguments based on religiouscomprehensive doctrines may enter into liberal politics on issues ofbasic justice ‘provided that, in due course, we give properlypublic reasons to support the principles and policies that ourcomprehensive doctrine is said to support’ (1999a: 144). ThusRawls allows the legitimacy of religious-based arguments againstslavery and in favor of the United States civil rights movement,because ultimately such arguments were supported by public reasons.Others (e.g., Greenawalt, 1995) hold that even this is toorestrictive: it is difficult for liberals to justify a moralprohibition on a religious citizen from voicing her view in liberalpolitical debate.5. ConclusionGiven that liberalism fractures on so many issues — the natureof liberty, the place of property and democracy in a just society, thecomprehensiveness and the reach of the liberal ideal — one mightwonder whether there is any point in talking of‘liberalism’ at all. It is not, though, an unimportant ortrivial thing that all these theories take liberty to be the groundingpolitical value. 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Liberalism, Perfectionism andRestraint. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Other Internet ResourcesLiberty Fund Online Library of LibertyRelated Entries Berlin, Isaiah | contractarianism | Hobbes, Thomas: moral and political philosophy | justice: distributive | justice: international | justification, political: public | Kant, Immanuel: social and political philosophy | libertarianism | liberty: positive and negative | Locke, John: political philosophy | property | republicanism Copyright © 2007 byGerald Gaus<ggaus@email.arizona.edu>Shane D. Courtland<scourtla@tulane.edu> |
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