Giles of Rome (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Cite this entry Search the SEP • Advanced Search • Tools • RSS FeedTable of Contents• What's New• Archives• Projected ContentsEditorial Information• About the SEP• Editorial Board• How to Cite the SEP• Special CharactersSupport the SEPContact the SEP ©Metaphysics Research Lab,CSLI,Stanford University  Open access to the SEP is made possible by a world-wide funding initiative. Please Read How You Can Help Keep the Encyclopedia FreeGiles of RomeFirst published Fri Dec 21, 2001; substantive revision Wed Aug 18, 2004Giles of Rome (who died in 1316 as archbishop of Bourges) was one ofthe most productive and influential thinkers active at the end of the13th century, who played a major role also in the political events ofhis time. Giles of Rome was an extremely prolific author and left avery large corpus of writings, encompassing commentaries on Aristotle,theological treatises, questions, and sermons. In recent years, aresearch group led by Francesco Del Punta (Scuola Normale Superiore,Pisa, Italy) has been devoting a lot of energy to the project ofpublishing his Opera Omnia and deepening our knowledge of histhought. Although this group has produced extremely significantresults, an assessment of Giles' whole work is still in progress. Forthis reason, the present entry only aims at providing insight into anongoing process of research and will focus on recent studies onGiles.1. Life2. Logic and Rhetoric3. Metaphysics4. Natural Philosophy5. Between Philosophy and Medicine6. Ethics and Political TheoryBibliographyOther Internet ResourcesRelated Entries1. LifeBorn in Rome most probably in the fifth decade of the thirteenthcentury, Giles was the first outstanding theologian of the relativelyrecently founded Order of the Augustinian Hermits. Nothing more isknown about his origins: the statement that he belonged to the famousRoman family of the Colonna seems to go back to Jordan of Saxony'sLiber Vitasfratrum (second half of the 14th century), but iscompletely missing from contemporary, 13th-century sources. From Giles'will we know that he was sent to Paris to study in the convent of hisOrder. At the beginning he must have followed the courses either of asecular master or of a theologian belonging to a different Order, asthe Augustinian friars did not have a regent master at the time.Probably he was a pupil of Aquinas' in the years 1269-1272. Hecommented on the Sentences at the beginning of the 1270's. In followingyears he probably wrote also a large number of his commentaries onAristotle.The year 1277 marked a turning-point in his career: Giles wasinvolved in the condemnation of the heterodox Aristotelianism issued bythe Parisian bishop Etienne Tempier, although the process against himmust be distinguished from the famous decree of the 7 of March 1277, asRobert Wielockx has shown. After 1277 Giles must have abandoned Paris,but his presence is attested in Italy not earlier than 1281. Beforeleaving Paris he completed his De regimine principum, which isdedicated to the young Philip, the future Philip the Fair.Between 1281 and 1284 Giles played an important role in thegovernment of his Order, taking part in various chapters held in Italy.At the provincial chapter of Tuscania (nowadays in Lazio, Italy) in1285 he acted as vicar of the prior general of his Order, Clement ofOsimo.In 1285, Giles'doctrine was examined again; after recanting only apart of what had been previously condemned in 1277, he was allowed toteach again; by 1287 he is referred to as a master of theology. Thissuccess enhanced Giles of Rome's authority even more in his Order,whose general chapter of Florence decreed that Giles' works (evenfuture ones) should be considered as the official doctrine of theOrder, to be defended by all Augustinian bachelors and masters. In1292, at the General Chapter of Rome he was elected prior general ofhis Order.Benedict Caetani's election to the papal see marked a furtherradical change in his career, as Boniface VIII appointed him archbishopof Bourges in 1295. As a matter of fact, Giles was very often absentfrom his see, spending extended periods of time at the papal curia. Inhis De renuntiatione, he defended the legitimacy ofCelestine's abdication, and, consequently, of Boniface’ selection. When the contrast between Boniface VIII and Philip IV reachedits most critical point, he continued to side staunchly with the pope.An important sermon defending the papal position has been recentlydiscovered by Concetta Luna, and Giles' De ecclesiasticapotestate undoubtedly ranks among the sources of UnamSanctam.Giles' prestige decreased after Boniface’ death, and even morewith the rise of Clement V to the papal throne. Before being electedpope, Betrand de Got, as archbishop of Bourdeaux, had had seriousconflicts with Giles. This unfavorable change, however, did not preventGiles from playing a significant role in the debates of his time.Around 1305-6 he took part in a commission which examined and condemnedthe eucharistic doctrine of John of Paris, a former adversary of Giles'during the conflict between Philip the Fair and Boniface. In thediscussions concerning the Templars which eventually led to the violentsuppression of the Order, Giles sided with Philip the Fair, attackingthe Templars and devoting a whole tract, Contra exemptos, tothe thesis that their exemption from episcopal jurisdiction was thecause of their abuses. During the Council of Vienne Giles was asked todraw a list of errors extracted from the works of Peter John Olivi:three of them were officially condemned by the Council. On December 22,1316 he died at the papal Curia at Avignon (For further details see DelPunta-Donati-Luna 1993).2. Logic and RhetoricAfter René Antoine Gauthier identified in the masterGuillaume Arnauld the real author of the Lectura supra logicamveterem attributed to Giles of Rome (Tabarroni 1988), interest inlogical works focused mainly on his Commentary on the SophisticiElenchi. In his treatment of the fallacia figuraedictionis Giles proves to be a brilliant and originalrepresentative of “modistic logic”, who bases his solutionsmainly on the semantics of intentiones (Tabarroni 1991).Alessandro Conti (1992) investigated Giles' Commentary on PosteriorAnalytics as an example of his theory of truth, which brings tocompletion Aquinas' shift from Augustine's influence to theAristotelian approach . Giles of Rome also authored the most importantCommentary on the Rhetoric of the Latin medieval tradition, whichearned him the honorific title of expositor of this book andinfluenced all later medieval commentaries. Costantino Marmo studiedGiles' approach to the different translations to which he had accessand showed how he developed Aquinas' theory of passions in commentingon the relevant portions of Aristotle's text (Marmo 1991), trying tosolve some problems left open by Aquinas. It has been suggested thatGiles considers rhetoric to be a sort of “logic” of ethicsand politics: this brilliant interpretation still awaits, however, fulldevelopment and articulation (Staico 1992). Janet Coleman (2000) alsomaintains that Aristotle's rhetorical method determines the substanceof Giles' De regimine principum.3. MetaphysicsTraditionally, Giles was described as a “faithful”disciple of Aquinas'. As a matter of fact, his “philosophicalproject” tends to discuss critically Aquinas' position in orderto improve the solutions he offered, without, however, trying todiscard them radically. This holds true, e. g., for one of the mostfamous topics of his discussion with Henry of Ghent, the distinctionbetween “essence” and “existence”. In thiscase, Giles radicalizes Aquinas' doctrine of the real distinction,asserting that existence must be conceived as a “resaddita” to essence. Although the final result of his theorywas considered closer to Avicenna's solution than to that of Aquinas,Giles nevertheless develops it starting from Aquinas' own position(Wippel 1981). The connection of this issue with the discussion withHenry of Ghent about the concept of “creation” was deeplyinvestigated by Giorgio Pini (1992), who could show how Giles, whiledefending Aquinas and thereby the possibility of using someAristotelian principles in an orthodox account of creation, goes beyondthe positions of the Dominican master, e. g. asserting the identity of“esse” and “creatio”.As to the debate about the unicity of substantial form, Giles'position evolves during time. If we leave aside the Erroresphilosophorum, since the authenticity of this work has beencontested with serious arguments (Bruni 1935, Koch 1944, Donati 1990b,Luna 1990), we can notice that Giles changes his position from theContra gradus et pluralitatem formarum (between the end of1277 and the beginning of 1278), where he denies plurality offorms for every compound, to later works, where he takes a morecautious stance in particular concerning man. The principle ofindividuation is identified, as in Aquinas, with “materia signataquantitate”, that is, matter designated by its dimensions.According to Giles, who criticizes Richard of Mediavilla on this point,matter is pure potentiality and therefore cannot be distinguished intodifferent kinds. For this reason, he cannot accept Aquinas' doctrinethat the incorruptibility of celestial bodies derives from the peculiarnature of their matter (Donati 1986). In Giles' opinion celestialbodies are not incorruptible because their matter is different from thematter of sublunar bodies, but rather because their quantitasmateriae cannot change its determinate dimensions. This is but oneapplication of Giles' famous doctrine of “indeterminatedimensions”. Modifying Averroes' doctrine in this respect, Gilesargues that a portion of matter, in order to be able to receive a form,needs to possess already a sort of quantity. Such quantity, however,should not be identified with the determinate dimensions a bodypossesses, but is rather a quantitas which remains the sameduring processes such as rarefaction and condensation. Giles' notion ofquantitas materiae , which is not only generically extensionor three-dimensionality, but seems to represent an unchangeable given“amount” of matter pertaining to a body, has beenconsidered comparable, some difficulties notwithstanding, to the modernnotion of mass (Donati 1988).After the condemnation of 1277, a significant change can be noticedin Giles' position also in his solution of the problem of the eternityof the world. At the beginning of his career he admitted thetheoretical possibility of the eternity of the world, althoughrejecting Aristotle's arguments proving the actual eternity of theworld. Later he shifted to a more “ Augustinian” stance,rejecting the hypothesis of a creation “abaeterno” and admitting that it is possible to prove thetemporality of creation, although he finds that no conclusive argumenthas been advanced so far. Giles was much more steadfast in hisopposition to another major tenet of “Averroistic”doctrine, that is the unicity of the possible intellect. He maintainedthat the possibility of actual knowledge on the part of the individualdepends necessarily on the fact that each body is informed by its ownintellective soul, which is its form. For the same reasons Giles alsorejected the unicity of the agent intellect, a doctrine he attributedto Avicenna (Del Punta-Donati-Luna 1993).4. Natural PhilosophyRecent studies concerning Giles' natural philosophy focused mainlyon his treatment of some pivotal concepts of Aristotle's Physics.Cecilia Trifogli opened new perspectives in this field, devoting herattention to the notions of place and motion (especially in the void,see Trifogli 1992), underlining that “Giles’ emphasis onthe role of place in the description of motion seems to lead to aquantitative and relational notion of place. Giles, however, does notcompletely substitute the Aristotelian notion of place for that ofplace as distance. Place as distance is only one of the two notions ofplace which appear in his commentary. The other, which is related tomaterial place, assumes an intrinsic connection between place and thelocated body that cannot be founded on distance alone” (Trifogli1990a, 350). Trifogli also investigated Giles' notions of time andinfinity, emphasizing that his whole approach to natural philosophy isdistinguished by a tendency towards a metaphysical interpretation ofAristotelian concepts, as opposed to a physical and quantitative one(Trifogli 1990b, 1991). For example, Giles conceives of time not as aquantity pertaining to every kind of motion, but rather as a mode inwhich motion exists. His concept of time rests in fact essentially on abroad notion of succession, which allows him on one hand to retain theunity of the concept of time, but, on the other hand, to acknowledgethe existence of different temporal forms (Trifogli 1990b). Thisattitude emerges also from the analysis of Giles' controversy onangelic time with Henry of Ghent (Porro 1988, Porro 1991, but see alsoFaes de Mottoni 1983). Both authors thought that the time in whichangels exist, unlike sublunar time, is a discrete succession ofinstants. Giles and Henry disagreed, however, on the relationshipexisting between angelic and sublunar time. In particular, Henryrejected Giles' thesis that more instants of angelic time cancorrespond to one and the same instant of sublunar time. Thisdifference of opinion rested in part on diverging concepts of angelicmotion, which can be istantaneous according to Henry, but not accordingto Giles.5. Between Philosophy and MedicineBetween 1285 and 1290, Giles took a stance in the much debatedquestion of the respective roles of male and female parents inconception. The Galenist view, going back to Hippocrates, was that bothmale and female contributed sperm, so that the offspring could havecharacteristics from both parents. On the contrary, Aristotle had heldthat only the male alone contributed sperm containing an active andformal principle to conception, while the female provided only thematter of the fetus. Giles was well acquainted with these differentpositions and with the efforts to reconcile the diverging approaches ofmedici and philosophi, which could be traced back toAvicenna. Leaning on Averroes' Colliget, however, Gilesrejected any attempt to attribute a formal role to the female sperm,even if it is conceived as subordinate to the male one. On the contraryhe maintained that it can contribute only in a passive way toconception, while what was called “female sperm”, i.e., thevaginal secretion, has a subservient, helpful but by no means necessaryfunction. It helps the male sperm to inseminate female matter, but doesnot add anything essential to the new being. In this way, Gilesintended to stress the superiority of the philosophical, theoreticalapproach to such problems with respect to the traditions of medicallearning, even when they seemed to be supported by empirical evidence(Hewson 1975; Martorelli Vico 1988). Empirical evidence such as theresemblance of the offspring to the mother was e.g., explained away asan example of stronger resistance of female matter to the action ofform (Martorelli Vico 2002). After conception the human embryo begins adevelopment which goes through different stages. Comparing these stagesto the embryos of various animals Giles, like Thomas Aquinas, supportedan interpretation of the fetal development which would be exploitedmany centuries later by the so-called “recapitulationtheory” (Hewson 1975, 99). Giles maintained, however, that“the organic fetal body is not to be called a pig, a bear, or amonkey, but something immediately disposed to becoming man”(Hewson 1975, 100). This position apparently implies that human lifedoes not fully begin at the moment of conception. Although such athesis can be brought to bear on the moral judgment concerningabortion, Giles does not seem interested in tackling from this point ofview an issue which would become central for what nowadays is calledbioethics.6. Ethics and Political TheoryIn the debate on the respective roles of intellect and will in thedetermination of human action Giles is known to have taken andintermediate position, a sort of compromise between the theory of Henryof Ghent and that of Geoffrey of Fontaines. Giles maintains, in fact,that will is a passive potency and can not “move” itself,but always needs an object, a “bonum apprehensum”. Thisstarting point however, does not rule out its freedom, because will,once “moved” by its object, can determine itself and otherpotencies with regard to action. This view of Giles' is consistent withhis interpretation of the relationship existing between knowledge andwill in the sinner. Committing a sin implies an ignorance of the realgood, but this ignorance is not the primary cause of the wrongbehavior, because it is an effect of the will, which, affected bymalicia, corrupts the judgment of the reason (Macken1977).Giles of Rome exerted considerable influence also in other fields ofethics, such as the theory of virtues. The most developed expression ofhis position is not to be found in a Commentary on Aristotle, butrather in his De regimine principum, the most successful“mirror of princes” of medieval political thought, which isstill conserved in more than 300 manuscripts in its original Latinversion, to which many translations in European vernaculars must beadded. Written most probably between 1277 and 1280 the Deregimine is acknowledged to be one of the most successful attemptsat mediating Aristotle's practical philosophy, and in particular his“ethical and political language” to the Latin West. Gileswas the first to structure a mirror of princes in three books along thelines of a scheme -- ethica-oeconomica-politica -- whichplayed an important role in the reception of Aristotle's moral andpolitical philosophy in the Middle Ages (Lambertini 1988). The authortakes great care to give the impression that he is mainly relying onAristotle's text, providing numerous quotations from theNichomachean Ethics, from the Politics and from theRethoric. Scholars should not overlook, however, that hisreception of Aristotle is not as direct as it can seem and that Gilesis deeply influenced by a tradition in the interpretation ofAristotle's practical philosophy. In this tradition Aquinas plays avery important role for Giles, so that, while Aristotle is theauthority who is quoted on almost every occasion, it is the unnamedAquinas who, with his Sententia libri Politicorum, Deregno, Summa Theologiae, exerts a really decisiveinfluence on De regimine. While discussing particular topics,Giles skillfully adapts Aristotle to his own purposes. This emergeswith clarity in the first book, devoted to ethics, where Giles'classification of virtues is heavily dependent on the SummaTheologiae and, therefore, on Aquinas' reinterpretation of theAristotelian heritage. For example, Giles here definesprudentia as a virtus media, sharing the nature ofmoral as well as of intellectual ones, a doctrine which can by no meansbe traced back to the Stagirite (Lambertini 1991, 1992, 1995,2000).The most famous example of this selective attitude towardsAristotle's works, however, belongs rather to the field of politicaltheory. In the third book of De regimine Giles wants to provethat Monarchy is the absolutely best form of government. The firstarguments he puts forward in favor of monarchy are not taken fromAristotle's Politics, but from Aquinas' De regno.Then some arguments against monarchy which could be read in thePolitics are presented as objections that Aristotle puts forthfor subsequent refutation. At the end, Giles states squarely thatAristotle supports monarchy as the absolutely best form of monarchy andcorroborates his assertion with an argument, which, in thePolitics, actually goes in the opposite direction (Lambertini1990). One could provide several other examples to show that the Deregimine succeeded in presenting itself as a simplified expositionand explanation of Aristotle's thought in practical philosophy, but atthe same time transmitted to Giles' readers a strongly biasedinterpretation of the Stagirite. The fact that the De regiminewas often used as a tool to have easier access to Aristotle's politicaltheory deeply influenced, therefore, the way the Latin West read andunderstood Aristotle's Politics in the Late Middle Ages.Recent codicological studies on the diffusion of Deregimine’ manuscripts do in fact show that many possessorsof the manuscripts most probably used them for study (See OperaOmnia I.1/11, Catalogo dei manoscritti, De regimine;Briggs 1999).While in the De regimine Giles carefully avoids anyreference to the thorny problem of the relationship between secular andecclesiastical power, his later writings which are relevant forpolitical theory deal first and foremost with ecclesiological problems.This holds true for his treatise De renuntiatione papae(1297-1298) where Giles defends the lawfulness of Celestine'sabdication against the arguments put forward by the Colonna cardinalsin their first appeal against Boniface VIII. From the point of view ofthe history of political thought it is relevant that Giles argues thatpapal power, although of divine origin, is conferred on a particularindividual by a human act, namely, by the election of the cardinals.Here Giles is countering the Colonna arguments that papal dignitycannot cease to reside in a pope until he dies, because the pontificatedepends on God's will, and stresses the fact that divine intention inthis case becomes effective through the mediation of human agents, thatis, through the consent of the electors and of the elected. Ajurisdiction which is given by the consent of men, however, can also beremoved by their consent through a reverse procedure. This does notamount to saying that the pope can be deposed (except in case ofheresy), because, according to Giles, the pope is above the law and hasno earthly authority above him. He can however, depose himself, thatis, abdicate. Just as for his election the consent of his electors andof the elected was necessary, so also for the removal of the pope fromoffice his consent is decisive (Eastman 1989, 1990, 1992). In this wayGiles could dismiss arguments against the validity of Celestine'sabdication without admitting the possibility that the pope can bedeposed, e. g., by the Council, as Boniface's adversariesmaintained.Much better known than De renuntiatione is Giles' Deecclesiastica potestate, a treatise also composed in defense ofBoniface VIII. Most probably in 1302, Giles systematically expounded inthis work the views on the relationship between regnum andsacerdotium he had already put forward in a recentlyre-discovered sermon held at the papal curia (Luna 1992). The maintenet of his fully fledged argumentation is that the pope, supremeauthority of the Church but also of the whole of mankind, is the onlylegitimate origin of every power on earth, be it exercised -- asjurisdiction -- on persons, or -- as property -- on things. In hisplenitude of power, the pope possesses an absolute supremacy both inthe ecclesiastical and in the temporal sphere, and delegates theexercise of the temporal “sword” to lay sovereigns only inorder to fulfill most properly his higher religious duties. Anyauthority that does not recognize its dependence on the papal power isbut usurpation. In Giles' view, there is no space even for a partiallyautonomous temporal order. Coherently, Giles maintains that no propertyrights are valid if they are not legitimated by papal authority.Interestingly enough, such a claim is also supported by his account ofthe origin of property, according to which property is not a naturalinstitution, but only the consequence of human agreements, which lackany legitimacy unless they are recognized by the supreme religiouspower (Miethke 2000).BibliographyPrimary SourcesThe most complete list of Giles' works can be found in DelPunta--Donati--Luna 1993 together with the most reliable attempt atdating them (see also Donati 1990b as far as commentaries on Aristotleare concerned). The same article by Del Punta, Donati and Luna alsocontains the best available bibliography, which can be complementedwith Lezcano 1995, 32-50.It is impossible to reproduce all thatinformation in the present entry. Standard older editions werereprinted in Frankfurt 1967-1970. Among the texts edited in our centuryI would mention the following:De ecclesiastica potestate, ed. R. Scholz, Weimar 1929(English translation in R. W. Dyson, Giles of Rome onEcclesiastical Power. The De ecclesiastica potestate of AegidiusRomanus, Woodbridge 1986)Theoremata de esse et essentia, ed. H.Hocedez, Louvain1930De differentia ethicae, politicae et rhetoricae, ed. G.Bruni, The New Scholasticism 6 (1932), 5-12.Errores philosophorum, ed. J. Koch, Milwaukee, Wisconsin1944Quaestio de medio demonstrationis, ed. J.Pinborg,“Diskussionen um die Wissenschaftstheorie an derArtistenfakultät”, Die Auseinandersetzungen an derPariser Universität im XIII. Jahrhundert.(Miscellanea medievalia, 10), ed. A. Zimmermann, Berlin-NewYork 1976, 240-268.Quaestio de subiecto theologiae, ed. C. Luna, “Unanuova questione di Egidio Romano ‘De subiectotheologiae’”, Freiburger Zeitschrift fürPhilosophie und Theologie 37 (1990), pp.397-439.Super librum I Sententiarum (reportatio), ed. C. Luna,“Fragments d'une reportation du commentaire de Gilles de Rome surle premier livre des Sentences. Les extraits des mss. Clm. 8005 etParis, B. N. Lat. 15819”, Revue des sciences philosophiqueset théologiques, 74 (1990), 205-254; 437-456.Super librum III Sententiarum (reportatio), ed. C. Luna,“La Reportatio della lettura di Egidio Romano sul libro III delleSentenze e il problema dell'autenticità dell'Ordinatio”,Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale I(1990), 113-225, II (1991)75-146.Super librum IV Sententiarum (reportatio), ed. C. Luna,“La lecture de Gilles de Romes sur le quatriéme livre desSentences. Les extraits du Clm. 8005”, Recherches deThéologie ancienne et médievale LVII (1990),183-255.De renuntiatione papae, ed. J. R. Eastman,Lewinston-Queenston-Lampeter 1992.Of the planned critical edition, Aegidii Romani Operaomnia, Firenze 1985- have already appeared: III, 1, Apologia, ed. R. Wielockx, Firenze 1985III, 2, Reportatio Lecturae superlibros I-IV Sententiarum,Reportatio monacensis, ed. C. Luna,Firenze 2003I.1/1, Catalogo dei manoscritti, Città del Vaticano,Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, a cura di B. Faes de Mottoni -- C.Luna, Firenze 1987.I.1/3*, Catalogo dei Manoscritti, Francia(Dipartimenti), a cura di F. Del Punta e C. Luna, Firenze1987.I.1/3**, Catalogo dei Manoscritti, Francia(Dipartimenti), a cura di C. Luna, Firenze 1988.I.1/2*, Catalogo dei Manoscritti, Italia (Firenze,Padova, Venezia), a cura di F. Del Punta e C. Luna, Firenze1988.I.1/2** Catalogo dei manoscritti, Italia (Assisi-Venezia),a cura di F. Del Punta, B. Faes de Mottoni e C.Luna, Firenze 1998.I.1/5*, Catalogo dei Manoscritti, Repubblica Federaledi Germania (Monaco), a cura di B. Faes de Mottoni, Firenze1990.I.1/11, Catalogo dei manoscritti, De regimine principum(Città del Vaticano- Italia), a cura di F. del Punta eC.Luna, Firenze 1993I.6 Repertorio dei sermoni, a cura di C.Luna, Firenze1990.Secondary LiteratureBriggs, Ch. F. 1999: Giles of Rome's De regimine principum.Reading and Writing Politics at Court and University, c.1275-c.1525, Cambridge et alibi.Bruni, G. 1935: “Di alcune opere inedite e dubbie di EgidioRomano”, Recherches de théologie ancienne etmédiévale 7, 174-196.Coleman, J. 2000:“Political Thought. From the Middle Ages tothe Renaissance “, Oxford and Malden, 64-71.Conti, A. D. 1992: “Conoscenza e verità in EgidioRomano”, Documenti e Studi sulla tradizione filosoficamedievale III, 305-361.Del Punta, F. -- Donati, S. -- Luna, C. 1993: “EgidioRomano”, in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, 42,Roma, 319-341.Donati, S. 1986: “La dottrina di Egidio Romano sulla materiadei corpi celesti. Discussioni sulla natura dei corpi celesti alla finedel tredicesimo secolo”, Medioevo XII, 229-280.Donati, S. 1988: “La dottrina delle dimensioni indeterminatein Egidio Romano”, Medioevo XIV, 149-233.Donati, S. 1990a: “Ancora una volta sulla nozione diquantitas materiae in Egidio Romano”, Knowledge and theSciences in Medieval Philosophy. Proceedings of the EighthInternational Congress of Medieval Philosophy (SIEPM), II, edd. S.Knuttila- R. Työrinoja -- S. Ebbesen, Helsinki,Donati, S. 1990b: “Studi per una cronologia delle opere diEgidio Romano. I: Le opere prima del 1285. I commenti aristotelici”, Documenti e Studi sulla tradizione filosoficamedievale I, 1-112.Eastman, J. R. 1989: Papal Abdication in Later MedievalThought, Lewinston-Queenston- Lampeter.Eastman, J. R. 1990: “Giles of Rome and Celestine V: TheFranciscan Revolution and the Theology of Abdication”, TheCatholic Historical Review 76, 195-211Eastman, J. R. 1992: “Giles of Rome and His Fidelity toSources in the Context of Ecclesiological Political Thought asExemplified in De renuntiatione papae”, Documenti eStudi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale III,145-165.Faes de Mottoni, B. 1983: “Mensura im Werk De mensuraangelorum des Aegidius Romanus”, Mensura, Mass, Zahl,Zahlensymbolik im Mittelalter (Miscellanea Medievalia, 16/1), ed.A. Zimmermann, Berlin-New York 1983, 86-102.Hewson, M. A. 1975: Giles of Rome and the medieval Theory ofConception: a Study of the ‘De formatione corporis humani inutero’, London.Koch, J. 1944: Introduction to: Giles of Rome, ErroresPhilosophorum,ed. J. Koch, English translation J. O. Riedl,Milwaukee, Wisconsin.Lambertini, R. 1988: “A proposito della costruzionedell'Oeconomica in Egidio Romano”, Medioevo XIV,315-370.Lambertini, R. 1990: “Philosophus videtur tangere tresrationes. 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