Marsilius of Inghen (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Cite this entry Search the SEP • Advanced Search • Tools • RSS FeedTable of Contents• What's New• Archives• Projected ContentsEditorial Information• About the SEP• Editorial Board• How to Cite the SEP• Special CharactersSupport the SEPContact the SEP ©Metaphysics Research Lab,CSLI,Stanford University  Open access to the SEP is made possible by a world-wide funding initiative. Please Read How You Can Help Keep the Encyclopedia FreeMarsilius of InghenFirst published Thu Aug 16, 2001; substantive revision Tue Oct 23, 2007 Marsilius of Inghen, master at the Universities of Paris (1362-1378)and Heidelberg (1386-1396), wrote a number of treatises on logic,natural philosophy and theology popular at many late medieval andearly modern universities. He adopted the logico-semantic approach ofWilliam of Ockham and John Buridan while at the same time defendingthe traditional views of Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure. His thinkingsheds light on the discussion between nominalists and realists andallows insight into the changing interests of philosophy and theology,from the critical attitude of many fourteenth-century authors to thesearch for tradition which was characteristic of the fifteenthcentury. 1. Life and Works2. Teachings 2.1 Logic and Epistemology2.2 Natural Philosophy2.3 Metaphysics2.4 Theology3. InfluenceBibliographyOther Internet ResourcesRelated Entries1. Life and Works Marsilius of Inghen was born around 1340 in Nijmegen, a city in theeastern part of the Low Countries (Netherlands). In the olderliterature it is often said that he came from one of the villages inthe vicinity of Nijmegen (Inghen), but this view is mistaken. It wasbased on a confused reading of the Oratio Funebris held in1396 by Nicholas Prowin at the funeral of Marsilius and published in1499 at Mainz. From 1362 on, Marsilius was master at the Faculty ofArts at the University of Paris, where he was also rector (1367 and1371), and a student of theology. As a teacher at Paris, Marsilius wasmuch esteemed and his lectures drew large audiences. Among hisstudents were many compatriots, some of whom came from Nijmegen andsurrounding villages. In 1378, Marsilius found himself theUniversity's delegate at the court of Pope Urban VI in Tivoli. In1379, he instructed one of his colleagues, Hugh of Hervort, to lookafter his interests in Paris. After 1379, Marsilius's name is nolonger mentioned in the acts of the University of Paris. He probablyturned away from Paris because of the imbroglio surrounding the GreatSchism of 1378. Meanwhile, he kept in touch with his native city. In1382 the town council of Nijmegen treated him to a banquet. From 1386on, Marsilius was master at the University of Heidelberg. There, as inParis, he held a number of administrative offices. He was one of thefounders of the University of Heidelberg, of which he was rector nofewer than nine times, from 1386-1392 and also in 1396. In 1389-1390,as the University's nuncio together with Conrad of Soltau, hewas responsible for transferring the University register to Rome(Boniface IX). At the beginning of the 1390s, Marsilius again took upthe study of theology. The masters who taught theology were by thenConrad of Soltau (since 1387) and Matthew of Krakow (since 1394), bothfrom the University of Prague. In 1395/1396 Marsilius finished hislectures on the Sentences and so became the first theologianto obtain the doctorate at Heidelberg. He died a short time later, onAugust 20, 1396. Marsilius was a prolific writer. His work was the fruit of histeachings in Paris and Heidelberg. Many of his writings have beenpreserved in manuscripts or early printed editions, although recentlysome have appeared in modern critical editions. His most importantwritings include:Works on Logic and Epistemology Exposition of the Old LogicVarious Questions on the Old and New LogicSummary [Abbreviationes] of the Old and NewLogicTreatises on the Properties of Terms: On Supposition,Ampliation, Appellation, Restriction, Obligation, Insolubles, andConsequences.Works on Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics Summary [Abbreviationes] of Aristotle's‘Physics’Questions on Aristotle's ‘On Generation andCorruption’Questions on Aristotle's ‘De anima’Questions on Aristotle's ‘Metaphysics’Works on Ethics Questions on Aristotle's ‘Nicomachean Ethics’Works on Theology Questions on the ‘Sentences’ of PeterLombard2. Teachings2.1 Logic and Epistemology In his logic and epistemology, Marsilius followed the nominalisttradition of the fourteenth century as exemplified by William ofOckham and John Buridan. Yet Marsilius never qualified himself as anominalist or follower of Ockham. He was an independent thinker whosometimes went back to the older tradition of the thirteenth century(e.g., in Peter of Spain), or advocated theories which were more inline with ordinary speech, as against the highly specialized views ofhis contemporaries. Marsilius employed logical methods and discussedlogical and epistemological issues in almost all of his writings,including his Questions on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, which, inaddition to his works specifically dedicated to logic, were also usedas a source for late medieval and early modern treatises on logic.Marsilius's nominalism comes to the fore in his views on the object ofscientific knowledge, the nature of universals, and the logicaldoctrine of supposition. His basic assumption is that there are onlyindividuals and no universals outside the human mind.2.1.1 The Object of Scientific Knowledge According to the Aristotelian standard accepted by Marsilius, theobject of scientific knowledge must be universal and necessarily true.This is not the case with individual things in the external world,since they are subject to change. Only the conclusion of a true andnecessary syllogism can meet the standard. Hence, for Marsilius, theobject of scientific knowledge is not anything outside the mind, butthe mental proposition which refers to individual things and theirqualities. More specifically, the proper object of scientific knowledgeis a proposition in the form of a conclusion that has been deduced fromnecessary premises. 2.1.2 Universals Marsilius argued that universal concepts such as‘humanity’ do not refer to real universals outside thehuman mind. Accordingly, there is no universal essence in singularindividuals. Individuals of one genus or species do resemble eachother, however, and this resemblance is the foundation of universalconcepts in the human mind. The generation of universal concepts is anatural process, which Marsilius described as follows: supposeindividual A of species S evokes concept Xin the human mind. This concept is similar to concept Y whichhas been evoked by B of the same species S. Byabstracting from all the differences between X andY, the human mind is able to produce another concept,Z, which stands for both A andB. Universality is then taken to be a quality of conceptZ, the product of the epistemological operation ofabstraction on concepts X and Y by the humanmind. 2.1.3 Supposition In line with his account of the nature of universals, Marsiliusrejected simple supposition. Logicians such as Peter of Spain had usedthe notion to indicate that a term stood not for an individual but fora universal or common nature in the external world, like the term‘man’ in the proposition, ‘Man is a species’.Since Marsilius rejected the idea of universals existing outside themind, he eliminated simple supposition from the list of differenttypes of supposition. He was critical of some of his contemporaries(e.g., Albert of Saxony) who likewise dismissed the concept of realuniversals, yet kept on using the notion of simple supposition. Theyhad changed the meaning of the term, he said, by claiming that awritten or spoken term had simple supposition if it was used to referto a concept in the human mind. Marsilius wondered whether youngstudents would be able to understand this new meaning of simplesupposition, since they would hardly know what concepts are. To avoidconfusion, Marsilius decided not to deal with simple supposition atall in his logic. 2.1.4 Some Specific Views Marsilius was his own person when it came to assessing the views ofothers. In his analysis of the proposition ‘Socrates is not achimera’ he followed what he called ‘the Parisianmethod’, according to which the proposition is false because theterm ‘chimera’ supposits for nothing, there being no realchimeras to which it can refer. Others, however, considered theproposition to be true. Elsewhere, he departed from the opinions of the Parisian School(scola Parisiensis) and opted for the perspective of ordinarylanguage or common way of speaking (communis modus loquendi).This was the case with his analysis of the proposition ‘TheAntichrist is not, but he will be’. According to the ParisianSchool, the term ‘he’ refers to the thing referred to bythe term ‘Antichrist’. Since there is no Antichrist,neither term has reference. But in ordinary language it is different,for there the term ‘he’ is meant to refer to the futureAntichrist. Marsilius accepted the latter analysis as sound, despitethe authority of the former.Finally, in the definition of ampliation, Marsilius went back tologicians of the thirteenth century such as Peter of Spain, who haddefined ampliation as an extension of supposition, whereasfourteenth-century logicians such as Albert of Saxony did not considerampliation to be a kind of supposition. Marsilius reinterpreted theirdefinition so that it fit better with the older tradition. Such effortsto harmonize older and newer positions were typical of the latefourteenth century.2.2 Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics In natural philosophy and metaphysics Marsilius was an empiricist,meaning that he thought all scientific knowledge must be based oneither sense data or self-evident propositions, i.e., propositions inwhich the meaning of the predicate is included in thesubject. Everyone who knows the meaning of the terms of suchpropositions judges them to be evidently true. This has far-reachingconsequences for the relationship between philosophy andtheology. Since the philosopher uses only sense data and self-evidentpropositions, his inquiry may come to different conclusion than thatof the theologian, who has additional knowledge from Scripture. Thephilosopher makes judgments about the world from a limited humanperspective, whereas the theologian is helped by divinerevelation. Yet Marsilius took the task of the philosopher seriouslybecause he thought the human mind has a natural tendency to search fortruth, which is satisfied (although not ultimately satisfied) innatural philosophy and metaphysics. 2.2.1 Creation According to the principles of natural philosophy, creation fromnothing is impossible. The senses show that things always come fromother things. Because there is no serious reason to doubt theinformation given by the senses, the human mind legitimately jumps tothe universal principle that nothing can come from nothing, driven bythe natural tendency to search for truth. Consequently, for the humanmind creation from nothing is impossible. It contradicts the universalprinciple that nothing comes from nothing. That God has created theworld from nothing is therefore only a matter of faith (sola fideest creditum). Revelation shows that human knowledge of creationis limited, but it cannot be aided by natural philosophy at thispoint.2.2.2 Theory of the Human Soul In the later Middle Ages the study of the soul was part of naturalphilosophy. Marsilius treated the human soul in his commentary onAristotle's De anima, in which he followed the Parisiantradition of Buridan and Oresme concerning the particular questionsaddressed. Following Buridan, he argued that there is no natural proofof the immortality of the human soul. For the human natural mind,unaided by revelation, the theory of Alexander of Aphrodisias that thehuman soul is corruptible is the most probable. That Alexander ofAphrodisias is mistaken and that the soul continues to exist after thedeath of the body is known through revelation alone. Faith has moreauthority than human reason and must be accepted in all cases wherethe two conflict since the things we believe on faith come from God,who cannot err. 2.3 Metaphysics Although metaphysics cannot surpass the limits of human knowledge,Marsilius considered it to be the entry point to theology. Naturalreason is capable of forming some adequate and true concepts of God,and also of forming true propositions about God. It is able to provethat God exists and possesses knowledge and will. But it cannotdemonstrate that God has free will or infinite power. This, Marsiliusclaimed, was also true for philosophers such as Aristotle, whoseteachings equal those of natural reason itself. From Buridan, Marsilius took the idea that God according to Aristotleand Averroes is not only the final cause of the heavens and separatesubstances, but also their efficient cause. On this point Buridan andMarsilius were following the view of Scotus and Ockham against that ofJohn of Jandun, Johannes Baconis, and Gregory of Rimini. It is worthnoting in this connection that in the Puncta super libros Metaphysicae(i.e., brief abstracts of Aristotle's Metaphysics for teachingpurposes) attributed to Johannes de Slupcza and written in Krakow in1433, some of the views that Marsilius adopted from Buridan, includingthe one just mentioned, are attributed to Marsilius instead of Buridan-- notwithstanding the fact that the author was familiar with bothMarsilius's and Buridan's commentaries. This illustrates the stronginfluence Marsilius's work exerted on fifteenth-century students andcommentators.On other points, however, Marsilius was critical of Buridan. Forexample, Marsilius considered Buridan's solution to the problem of thepossible separation of accidents from their substance as not inaccordance with the teachings of Aristotle, and therefore not trulymetaphysical (metaphysicaliter), but rather in line with theologicalconcerns. Only miraculously could God take over the supporting powerof the substance, thus separating the accident from its naturalbearer. According to Marsilius, however, such possible divineintervention should not be taken into account in metaphysics, wherethe philosopher must use natural reason alone. 2.4 Theology Marsilius expressed his theological views in a voluminous commentary onthe Sentences. He quoted and often adopted views that were putforward by fourteenth-century theologians such as Adam Wodeham andGregory of Rimini, but was also influenced by earlier thinkers such asThomas Aquinas and Bonaventure. He has serious reservations about theuse of logic in theology. 2.4.1 Attributes and ideas In his discussion of the divine attributes he followed mainly theteachings of Adam Wodeham. God is perfectly one. Divine wisdom and allother perfections attributed to God are in reality as identical to thedivine essence as the divine essence is identical to itself. In thedivine essence itself there is no distinction or non-identitywhatsoever between the attributes of God. Any distinctions betweendivine attributes are necessarily of a rational (rather than real)nature and are made by us. A similarly radical stance on the unity of God was assumed in histreatment of divine ideas. Ideas are not formally distinct in God, assome Scotists would argue, but only extrinsically and objectivelydistinct. Their distinction is a consequence of the differencesbetween the creatures produced by God (which is why Marsilius spoke ofextrinsic distinction), and of the fact that they are known by God asdifferent (which accounts for their objective distinction). God knowsthat he is the cause of infinitely many differences between creatures.That is why his mind contains infinitely many different ideas.Marsilius criticized Ockham's view that God's idea coincides withcreation. If this were true, Marsilius argued, the idea of producing astone must be identical with either the stone itself, or the stoneinsofar as it is known by God. If the former, then God must lookoutside of himself in his idea, which contradicts the position ofAugustine, who is quoted by Ockham. If the latter, then the idea of itsproduction is not the stone itself, but rather God's foreknowledge ofthe stone.2.4.2 Theology and logic Marsilius advanced his criticism of the use of logic in theology inhis discussion of the position of Robert Holcot. Holcot had arguedthat logically, God can be called the cause of evil. If God is thecause of every thing (entitas) and moral evil (malumculpae) is a thing, then God is the cause of evil. Marsiliusacknowledged that the argument is based on true premises, yet theconclusion should not be defended as true because it contradicts faithand therefore might cause confusion among believers. Theologiansshould not flaunt their personal skills in logic, but always write outof reverence for the divine. Their writings should not erode thebeliefs of ordinary people, who are not skilled in logic, but ratheraim to strengthen them spiritually. Marsilius was anxious, however, to avoid the implication that God'sforeknowledge is somehow dependent upon human beings. In hisdiscussion of Adam Wodeham on the causality of the human will, hecomplained that Adam had not been emphatic enough on this point, sincehe allowed the following argument: if an event E will happenin the future, then God knows E from eternity; but ifnot-E will happen, then God knows not-E formeternity; since man is free, he can choose between E andnot-E; therefore, he can change God's foreknowledge. Thisargument is logically sound, Marsilius argued, but it easily leads tothe false conclusion that God's knowledge depends on the free will ofman, which is absurd. The eternal cannot fall under the power of thatwhich is created by it. Therefore, this argument should not beused. It is better to remain on the safe side by maintaining what hasalways been maintained, namely that God through his absoluteomniscience knows the future activities of human beings, but withoutbeing dependent on them.2.4.3 The sacraments In his treatment of the sacraments at the end of his commentary onthe Sentences, Marsilius drew heavily on the writings ofThomas Aquinas and Bonaventure. He defended Thomas's view that theword ‘this’ pronounced by Christ at the Last Supper inuttering ‘This is my body’ (Mk. 14:22) refers to what thebread and body have in common. Thomas of Strasbourg had attacked thisview, but Marsilius showed that the earlier Thomas was right and thelater wrong.In his discussion of the causality of the sacraments, Marsiliusfollowed the exposition of Bonaventure, according to whom thesacraments have no causality of their own. It is God who acts wheneverthe sacraments are administered correctly. Only in a broad sense is ittrue to say that the sacraments have the power to act.3. Influence The influence of Marsilius has been considerable, particularlythrough his logical works and commentaries on Aristotle. This may begathered not only from the large number of manuscripts that have beenpreserved, but also from several other considerations. Marsilius'scommentary on Aristotle's Prior analytics was used in Praguein the 1380s. His logical works, including the Obligationesand the Consequentiae, were used as textbooks in Vienna inthe 1390s. His commentaries on Aristotle's Metaphysics andPhysics were read in Krakow during the first sixty years ofthe fifteenth century. At the universities of Heidelberg, Erfurt,Basle, and Freiburg, his works were studied throughout the fifteenthcentury, in particular as part of the university curriculum. In 1499,the doctors and masters of the Via Moderna at the Universityof Heidelberg published a volume that included epigrams on Marsiliusby well-known humanists such as Jacob Wimpfeling, as well as a defenseof Nominalism in the style of Marsilius (ViaMarsiliana). Praise in the form of epigrams can also be found inthe 1501 Strasbourg edition of Marsilius's commentary on theSentences. The Obligationes, printed in 1489 underthe name of Peter of Ailly, were used by Thomas Bricot, John Major,and Domingo de Soto. The commentary on the Prior Analyticswas quoted by Agostino Nifo. Jodocus Trutvetter and Bartholomew ofUsingen, who consolidated nominalism in Erfurt, repeatedly mentionedMarsilius in their works. Both Leonardo da Vinci and Galileo Galileireferred to Marsilius's commentary on De Generatione etCorruptione. The theological views of Marsilius appear to have had some circulationas well. His commentary on the Sentences was known in Krakowin the first half of the fifteenth century, and was used by Thomas deStrampino in his Principia (1441-1442). The University ofSalamanca had a theological chair (Cátedra de Nominales) forcommentary on the works of Marsilius of Inghen and Gabriel Biel. Hiscommentary on the Sentences was quoted by Spanish theologianssuch as Francisco de Vitoria, Domingo de Soto, Luis de Molina, andFrancisco Suárez, usually in connection with questions aboutdivine foreknowledge and grace.There are nine extant manuscripts of Marsilius's commentary on theSentences. Among the former owners of these manuscripts weretwo libraries for preachers (Ansbach and Isny), and two libraries offaculties of arts (Erfurt and Leipzig). The education in Erfurt andLeipzig included the reading of nominalist authors. In all probability,the artists became interested in Marsilius's theological work afterstudying his writings on logic and physics. The presence of Marsilius'scommentary on the Sentences in preachers' libraries bearswitness to the fact that the impact of his work was felt beyonduniversity circles.BibliographyCatalogue of works and bibliographyHoenen, M. J. F. M., "Marsilius von Inghen:Bibliographie. Appendix zu der geplanten Edition der wichtigsten Werkdes Marsilius von Inghen," Bulletin de PhilosophieMédiévale 31 (1989), 150-167.Hoenen, M. J. F. M., Marsilius von Inghen: "Bibliographie.Ergänzungen," Bulletin de PhilosophieMédiévale 31 (1990), 191-195.Lohr, Ch. H., "Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries. Authors:Johannes de Kanthi-Myngodus," Traditio 27 (1971),251-351.Markowski, M.,"Katalog dziel Marsyliusza z Inghen z ewidencjarekopisow," Studia Mediewistyczne 25 (1988), 39-132.Modern editionsMarsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones super quattuor librosSententiarum, vol. 1: Super primum, quaestiones 1-7, ed. G.Wieland, M. Santos Noya, M. J. F. M. Hoenen, M. Schulze, Studies in theHistory of Christian Thought 87, ed. M. Santos Noya, Leiden 2000.Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones super quattuor librosSententiarum, vol. 2: Super primum, quaestiones 8-21, ed. G.Wieland, M. Santos Noya, M. J. F. M. Hoenen, M. Schulze, Studies in theHistory of Christian Thought 88, ed. M. Santos Noya, Leiden 2000.Marsilius of Inghen, Treatises on the Properties of Terms.A First Critical Edition of the Suppositiones, Ampliationes,Appellationes, Restrictiones and Alienationes with Introduction,Translation, Notes, and Appendices, ed. E. P. Bos, Synthese HistoricalLibrary 22, Dordrecht 1983.Secondary LiteratureBakker, P. J. J. M., "Inhérence, univocité etséparabilité des accidents eucharistiques", Laservante et la consolatrice. La philosophie dans des rapports avec lathéologie au Moyen Âge, ed. J.-L- Solère andZ. Kaluza, Textes et Traditions 3, Paris 2002, 193-245 [containspartial editions of works of Buridan and Marsilius].Braakhuis, H. A. G., and M. J. F. M. Hoenen (eds.), Marsilius ofInghen, Artistarium Supplementa 7, Nijmegen 1992 [containspartial editions of works of Marsilius].Hoenen M. J. F. M., "Der Sentenzenkommentar des Marsilius vonInghen (1396). Aus dem Handschriftenbestand des TübingerWilhelmsstifts," Theologische Quartalschrift, 171 (1991),114-129.Hoenen, M. J. F. M., and P. J. J. M. Bakker (eds.),Philosophie und Theologie des ausgehenden Mittelalters. Marsiliusvon Inghen und das Denken seiner Zeit, Leiden 2000 [containspartial editions of works of Marsilius].Hoenen, M. J. F. M., Marsilius of Inghen. Divine Knowledge in LateMedieval Thought, Studies in the History of ChristianThought, 50, Leiden 1993.Marshall, P., "Parisian Psychology in the Mid-Fourteenth Century,"Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du MoyenAge, 50 (1983), 101-193.Möhler, W., Die Trinitätslehre des Marsilius vonInghen. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Theologie desSpätmittelalters, Limburg/Lahn 1949.Reina, M. E., "Comprehensio veritatis. Una questione di Marsiliodi Inghen sulla Metafisica," Filosofia e teologia nel trecento. Studiin ricordo di Eugenio Randi, ed. L. Bianchi, Textes etÉtudes du Moyen Age, 1 (1994): Louvain-la-Neuve,283-335.Reina, M. E., Hoc Hic et Nunc. Buridano, Marsilio di Inghen e laConoscenza del Singolare, Firenze 2002.Ritter, G., Studien zur Spätscholastik I: Marsilius vonInghen und die okkamistische Schule in Deutschland, Heidelberg1921.Wielgus, S. (ed.), Marsilius von Inghen. Werk und Wirkung. Aktendes Zweiten Internationalen Marsilius-von-Inghen-Kongresses, Lublin1993 [contains partial editions of works of Marsilius].Other Internet Resources[Please contact the author with suggestions.] Related Entries Buridan, John [Jean] | Gregory of Rimini | Ockham [Occam], William Copyright © 2007 byMaarten Hoenen<maarten.hoenen@philosophie.uni-freiburg.de> |
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