Philosophy- Squashed Locke- Essay Concerning Human Understanding - Condensed and Abridged  Glyn Hughes' Squashed Philosophers The Condensed Edition of John Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding ... in 10,000 words "I have always thought the actions of men the best interpreters of their thoughts" INTRODUCTIONThe"Father of English empiricism," was born in 1632 atWrinton in Somerset, son of a Puritan lawyer, and became anOxford academic and advisor to the Whig first earl ofShaftesbury. His Treatises on Government, in which he denied theDivine Right of Kings, were taken to be incitements toShaftesbury's plots and the 'Glorious Revolution', leading him tobe exiled to France and Holland. When the Prince of Orange becomeWilliam III of England, Locke returned to become commissioner ofappeals, and an advisor on coinage.The genius of the 'Essay' is in its assertion that men acquireknowledge not through divine revelation or because they possessinnate ideas, but because the senses permit him to learn from theexternal world, and put him in touch with reality. Like Locke'spolitics, much of this seems accepted wisdom now, but that iswhat genius makes happen.THE VERY SQUASHED VERSIONLet us suppose themind to be a blank paper void of without any ideas. All ourknowledge comes from experiences which enter simple and unmixed,and which the mind has the power to repeat, compare and unite toan almost infinite variety, and so can make at will new complexideas. But it cannot make new ideas, nor destroy those that arethere. Ideas are produced from primary qualities, viz. solidity,extension, figure, motion or rest, and number. Secondaryqualities are colours, sounds, tastes, etc. From whence it iseasy to draw this observation: that the ideas of primaryqualities of bodies are resemblances of them, but the ideasproduced in us by the secondary qualities have no resemblance inthem at all. Light, heat, whiteness, or coldness are no morereally in things than sickness or pain is in manna. Perception isoften altered by our experience, as when we see a globe as acircle, but take it to be spherical, it is the first operation ofour intellectual faculties, and the inlet of all knowledge intoour minds. We can also discern and distinguish between severalideas, if ideas are clear. The comparing of ideas one withanother is the operation of the mind upon which all understandingof relation depends. By composition, the mind puts togetherseveral simple ideas into complex ones. By abstraction we applygeneral terms to similar experiences, as when we call the colourof snow or chalk by the same name. The mind is wholly passive inthe reception of all its simple ideas; even large and abstractideas such as of space, time and infinity, are derived fromsensation or reflection. It is plain that perceptions areproduced by exterior causes affecting our senses, but those thatlack the physical organs of any sense never can have the ideasbelonging to that sense produced in their minds. Or senses bearwitness to the truth of each other's report concerning theexistence of sensible things without us and around us.ABOUTTHIS SQUASHED VERSIONAsthe original extends to some 300,000 words, this is a squashedversion is a severe abridgement, the more so as Locke, unlikemany others, is not especially repetetive.GLOSSARYIdeas:The discrete mental objects which are in our understanding- notthe objects which caused them. Ideas all derive from eithersensation or reflection.Sensation, or Sense-Perception: The process bywhich external objects cause events in the mind.Reflection: The internal mental process ofcomparing ideas initiated by sensation.Primary qualities: "...such as are utterlyinseparable from the body... which I think we may observe toproduce simple ideas in us, viz. solidity, extension, figure,motion or rest, and number."Secondary qualities: "...such qualitieswhich in truth are nothing in the objects themselves but power toproduce various sensations in us by their primary qualities, i.e.by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of their insensibleparts, as colours, sounds, tastes, &c."AnEssay Concerning Human Understandingby John Locke, 1690Squashed version edited byGlyn Hughes © 2003 TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE LORD THOMAS, EARL OF PEMBROKE AND MONTGOMERY; LORD PRESIDENT OF HIS MAJESTY'S MOST HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL MY LORD, THIS Treatise is now come to light. Things in print must stand and fall by their own worth, and the imputation of Novelty is a terrible charge amongst those who judge of men's heads, as they do of their perukes [wigs]. Truth scarce ever yet carried it by vote anywhere at its first appearance: new opinions are always suspected, and usually opposed. But truth, like gold, is not the less so for being newly brought out of the mine. This present I here to your lordship; just as the poor man does to his rich and great neighbour, by whom the basket of flowers or fruit is not ill taken, though he has more plenty of his own growth, and in much greater perfection. MY LORD, Your Lordship's most humble and most obedient servant, JOHN LOCKE Dorset Court, 24th of May, 1689 As thou knowestnot what is the way of the Spirit, nor how the bones do grow inthe womb of her that is with child: even so thou knowest not theworks of God, who maketh all things.- Eccles. 11.5.INTRODUCTIONAn Inquiry into theunderstanding, pleasant and useful. Since it is theunderstanding that sets man above the rest of sensible beings, itis certainly a subject worth our labour to inquire into theorigin, certainty, and extent of human knowledge, together withthe grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent;- I shallnot at present meddle with the physical consideration of themind; or trouble myself to examine wherein its essence consists.These are speculations which, however curious and entertaining, Ishall decline.What "Idea" standsfor. It being that term which, I think, serves best to standfor whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a manthinks, I have used it to express whatever is meant by phantasm,notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employedabout in thinking. I presume it will be easily granted me, thatthere are such ideas in men's minds: every one is conscious ofthem in himself; and men's words and actions will satisfy himthat they are in others. Our first inquiry then shall be how theycome into the mind.BOOK INEITHER PRINCIPLES NOR IDEAS ARE INNATEChapter INo Innate Speculative Principles1. The way shown how we come byany knowledge, sufficient to prove it not innate. It is anestablished opinion amongst some men, that there are in theunderstanding certain innate principles; some primary notions,koinai ennoiai ["common concepts" of theology andmetaphysics], characters, as it were stamped upon the mind ofman; which the soul receives in its very first being, and bringsinto the world with it. It would be sufficient to convinceunprejudiced readers of the falseness of this supposition, if Ishould only show how men, barely by the use of their naturalfaculties, may attain to all the knowledge they have, without thehelp of any innate impressions; and may arrive at certainty,without any such original notions or principles. 2. General assent the greatargument. There is nothing more commonly taken for grantedthan that there are certain principles universally agreed upon byall mankind: which therefore, they argue, must needs be theconstant impressions which the souls of men receive in theirfirst beings.3. Universal consent provesnothing innate. This argument, drawn from universal consent,has this misfortune in it, that if it were true in matter offact, that there were certain truths wherein all mankind agreed,it would not prove them innate.4. "What is, is," and"It is impossible for the same thing to be and not tobe," not universally assented to. I take liberty to say,that these propositions are so far from having an universalassent, that there are a great part of mankind to whom they arenot so much as known.Chapter IINo Innate Practical Principles1. No moral principles so clearand so generally received as the forementioned speculativemaxims. If those speculative Maxims, whereof we discoursed inthe foregoing chapter, have not an actual universal assent fromall mankind, it is much more visible concerning practicalPrinciples, that they come short of an universal reception.2. Faith and justice not ownedas Principles by all men. Whether there be any such moralprinciples, wherein all men do agree, I appeal to any who havelooked beyond the smoke of their own chimneys. Where is thatpractical truth that is universally received, without doubt orquestion, as it must be if innate? Justice, and keeping ofcontracts, is a principle which is thought to extend itself tothe dens of thieves. But it is impossible to conceive that heembraces justice as a practical principle, who acts fairly withhis fellow-highwayman, and at the same time plunders or kills thenext honest man he meets with.3. Objection: "though mendeny them in their practice, yet they admit them in theirthoughts," answered. Perhaps it will be urged, that thetacit assent of their minds agrees to what their practicecontradicts. I answer, first, I have always thought the actionsof men the best interpreters of their thoughts. BOOK IIOF IDEASChapter IOf Ideas in general, and their Original2. All ideas come fromsensation or reflection. Let us then suppose the mind to be,as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without anyideas:- How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by thatvast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has paintedon it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all thematerials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word,from EXPERIENCE. In that all our knowledge is founded; and fromthat it ultimately derives itself. 3. The objects of sensation onesource of ideas. First, our Senses, conversant aboutparticular sensible objects, do convey into the mind severaldistinct perceptions of things, according to those various wayswherein those objects do affect them. And thus we come by thoseideas we have of yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter,sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities. This greatsource of most of the ideas we have, I call SENSATION.4. The operations of our minds,the other source of them. Secondly, the other fountain fromwhich experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas is theperception of the operations of our own mind within us. Thissource of ideas every man has wholly in himself; and thoughhaving nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very likeit, and might properly enough be called internal sense. Thesetwo, I say, viz. SENSATION, and the operations of our own mindswithin, as REFLECTION, are to me the only originals from whenceall our ideas take their beginnings. 5. All our ideas are of the oneor the other of these. Let any one examine his own thoughts,and thoroughly search into his understanding; and then let himtell me, whether all the original ideas he has there, are anyother than of the objects of his senses, or of the operations ofhis mind. 6. Observable in children. Hethat attentively considers the state of a child first coming intothe world, will have little reason to think him stored withplenty of ideas. I think it will be granted easily, that if achild were kept in a place where he never saw any other but blackand white till he were a man, he would have no more ideas ofscarlet or green, than he that from his childhood never tasted anoyster, or a pine-apple, has of those particular relishes.10. The soul thinks not always;for this wants proofs. I confess myself to have one of thosedull souls, that doth not perceive itself always to contemplateideas. But whether that substance perpetually thinks or no, wecan be no further assured than experience informs us. 11. It is not always consciousof it. I grant that the soul, in a waking man, is neverwithout thought. But whether sleeping without dreaming be not anaffection of the whole man, mind as well as body, may be worth awaking man's consideration. If it be possible that the soul can,whilst the body is sleeping, have its thinking, enjoyments, andconcerns, which the man is not conscious of nor partakes in,- itis certain that Socrates asleep and Socrates awake is not thesame person. For, if we take wholly away all consciousness of ouractions and sensations, especially of pleasure and pain, and theconcernment that accompanies it, it will be hard to know whereinto place personal identity.Chapter IIOf Simple Ideas1. Uncompounded appearances. Thoughthe qualities that affect our senses are, in the thingsthemselves, so united and blended, that there is no separation;yet it is plain, the ideas they produce in the mind enter by thesenses simple and unmixed. For, though the sight and touch oftentake in from the same object, at the same time, different ideas;-as a man sees at once motion and colour; the hand feels softnessand warmth in the same piece of wax: yet the simple ideas thusunited in the same subject, are as perfectly distinct as thosethat come in by different senses. The coldness and hardness whicha man feels in a piece of ice being as distinct ideas in the mindas the smell and whiteness of a lily, each in itselfuncompounded, contains in it nothing but one uniform appearance,or conception in the mind, and is not distinguishable intodifferent ideas.2. The mind can neither makenor destroy them. When the understanding is once stored withthese simple ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare, andunite them, even to an almost infinite variety, and so can makeat pleasure new complex ideas. But it is not in the power of themost exalted wit, or enlarged understanding, to invent or frameone new simple idea in the mind, not taken in by the ways beforementioned: nor can any force of the understanding destroy thosethat are there. I would have any one try to fancy any taste whichhad never affected his palate; or frame the idea of a scent hehad never smelt: and when he can do this, I will also concludethat a blind man hath ideas of colours, and a deaf man truedistinct notions of sounds.Chapter IIIOf Simple Ideas of Sense1. Division of simple ideas. First, There are some which come into our minds by one senseonly.Secondly, others that convey themselves into the mind by moresenses than one.Thirdly, Others that are had from reflection only.Fourthly, There are some that make themselves way, and aresuggested to the mind by all the ways of sensation andreflection.There are some ideas which have admittance only through onesense, which is peculiarly adapted to receive them. Thus lightand colours, come in only by the eyes. All kinds of noises, onlyby the ears. The several tastes and smells, by the nose andpalate. The most considerable of those belonging to the touch,are heat and cold, and solidity.Chapter IVIdea of Solidity2. Solidity fills space. Thisis the idea which belongs to body, whereby we conceive it to fillspace. This idea of it, the bodies which we ordinarily handlesufficiently furnish us with.6. What solidity is. If anyone ask me, What this solidity is, I send him to his senses toinform him. Let him put a flint or a football between his hands,and then endeavour to join them, and he will know. If he thinksthis not a sufficient explication of solidity, what it is, andwherein it consists.Chapter VOf Simple Ideas of Divers SensesIdeas received both by seeingand touching. The ideas we get by more than one sense are, ofspace or extension, figure, rest, and motion. For these makeperceivable impressions, both on the eyes and touch; and we canreceive and convey into our minds the ideas of the extension,figure, motion, and rest of bodies, both by seeing and feeling. Chapter VIOf Simple Ideas of Reflection1. Simple ideas are theoperations of mind about its other ideas. The mind receivingthe ideas mentioned in the foregoing chapters from without, whenit turns its view inward upon itself, and observes its ownactions about those ideas it has, takes from thence other ideas,which are as capable to be the objects of its contemplation asany of those it received from foreign things.2. The idea of perception, andidea of willing, we have from reflection. The two great andprincipal actions of the mind, which are most frequentlyconsidered, and which are so frequent that every one that pleasesmay take notice of them in himself, are these two:- Perception, or Thinking; and Volition, or Willing.The power of thinking is calledthe Understanding, and the power of volition is called the Will;and these two powers or abilities in the mind are denominatedfaculties. Of some of the modes of these simple ideas ofreflection, such as are remembrance, discerning, reasoning,judging, knowledge, faith, &c., I shall have occasion tospeak hereafter.Chapter VIIOf Simple Ideas of both Sensation and Reflection1. Ideas of pleasure and pain. Therebe other simple ideas which convey themselves into the mind byall the ways of sensation and reflection, viz. pleasure ordelight, and its opposite, pain, or uneasiness; power; existence;unity.2. Mix with almost all ourother ideas. Delight or uneasiness, one or other of them,join themselves to almost all our ideas both of sensation andreflection.3. As motives of our actions. Ithas therefore pleased our wise Creator to annex to severalobjects, and the ideas which we receive from them, as also toseveral of our thoughts, a concomitant pleasure, and that inseveral objects, to several degrees, that those faculties whichhe had endowed us with might not remain wholly idle andunemployed by us.4. An end and use of pain.Pain has the same efficacy and use to set us on work thatpleasure has, we being as ready to employ our faculties to avoidthat, as to pursue this.7. Ideas of existence andunity. Existence and Unity are two other ideas that aresuggested to the understanding by every object without, and everyidea within. When ideas are in our minds, we consider them asbeing actually there, as well as we consider things to beactually without us. And whatever we can consider as one thing,whether a real being or idea, suggests to the understanding theidea of unity.8. Idea of power. Poweralso is another of those simple ideas which we receive fromsensation and reflection, by observing in ourselves that we canat pleasure move several parts of our bodies which were at rest.9. Idea of succession. Besidesthese there is the idea of succession. For if we look immediatelyinto ourselves, and reflect on what is observable there, we shallfind our ideas always, whilst we are awake, or have any thought,passing in train, one going and another coming, withoutintermission.10. Simple ideas the materialsof all our knowledge. Nor let any one think these too narrowbounds for the capacious mind of man to expatiate in, which takesits flight further than the stars, and cannot be confined by thelimits of the world; that extends its thoughts often even beyondthe utmost expansion of Matter, and makes excursions into thatincomprehensible Inane. Nor will it be so strange to think thesefew simple ideas sufficient to employ the quickest thought, orlargest capacity; and to furnish the materials of all thatvarious knowledge, and more various fancies and opinions of allmankind, if we consider how many words may be made out of thevarious composition of twenty-four letters; or if, going one stepfurther, we will but reflect on the variety of combinations thatmay be made with barely one of the above-mentioned ideas, viz.number, whose stock is inexhaustible and truly infinite: and whata large and immense field doth extension alone afford themathematicians? Chapter VIIISome further considerations concerning our Simple Ideas ofSensation8. Our ideas and the qualitiesof bodies. Whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is theimmediate object of perception, thought, or understanding, that Icall idea; and the power to produce any idea in our mind, I callquality of the subject wherein that power is. Thus a snowballhaving the power to produce in us the ideas of white, cold, andround,-I call qualities.9. Primary qualities of bodies.Qualities thus considered in bodies are, First, such as areutterly inseparable from the body, in what state soever it be.These I call original or primary qualities of body, which I thinkwe may observe to produce simple ideas in us, viz. solidity,extension, figure, motion or rest, and number.10. Secondary qualities ofbodies. Secondly, such qualities which in truth are nothingin the objects themselves but power to produce various sensationsin us by their primary qualities, i.e. by the bulk, figure,texture, and motion of their insensible parts, as colours,sounds, tastes, &c. These I call secondary qualities. 15. Ideas of primary qualitiesare resemblances; of secondary, not. From whence I think iteasy to draw this observation,- that the ideas of primaryqualities of bodies are resemblances of them, and their patternsdo really exist in the bodies themselves, but the ideas producedin us by these secondary qualities have no resemblance of them atall. There is nothing like our ideas, existing in the bodiesthemselves. They are, in the bodies we denominate from them, onlya power to produce those sensations in us: and what is sweet,blue, or warm in idea, is but the certain bulk, figure, andmotion of the insensible parts, in the bodies themselves, whichwe call so.16. Examples. He that willconsider that the fire that, at one distance produces in us thesensation of warmth, does, at a nearer approach, produce in usthe far different sensation of pain, ought to bethink himselfwhat reason he has to say- that this idea of warmth, which wasproduced in him by the fire, is actually in the fire; and hisidea of pain, which the same fire produced in him the same way,is not in the fire. 17. The ideas of the primaryalone really exist. The particular bulk, number, figure, andmotion of the parts of fire or snow are really in them,- whetherany one's senses perceive them or no: and therefore they may becalled real qualities, because they really exist in those bodies.But light, heat, whiteness, or coldness, are no more really inthem than sickness or pain is in manna. Take away the sensationof them; let not the eyes see light or colours, nor the ears hearsounds; let the palate not taste, nor the nose smell, and allcolours, tastes, odours, and sounds, as they are such particularideas, vanish and cease, and are reduced to their causes, i.e.bulk, figure, and motion of parts.20. Pound an almond, and the clearwhite colour will be altered into a dirty one, and the sweettaste into an oily one. What real alteration can the beating ofthe pestle make, but an alteration of texture? 21. Explains how water felt ascold by one hand may be warm to the other. Thus we may beable to account how the same water, at the same time, may producethe idea of cold by one hand and of heat by the other. If thesensation of heat and cold be nothing but the increase ordiminution of the motion of the minute parts of our bodies, it iseasy to be understood, that if that motion be greater in one handthan in the other; if a body be applied to the two hands, whichhas in its minute particles a greater motion than in those of oneof the hands, and a less than in those of the other, it willincrease the motion of the one hand and lessen it in the other;and so cause the different sensations of heat and cold thatdepend thereon.Chapter IXOf Perception2. Reflection alone can give usthe idea of what perception is. What perception is, every onewill know better by reflecting on what he does himself, when hesees, hears, feels, &c., or thinks, than by any discourse ofmine. 5. Children, though they mayhave ideas in the womb, have none innate. Therefore I doubtnot but children, by the exercise of their senses about objectsthat affect them in the womb, receive some few ideas before theyare born.8. Sensations often changed bythe judgment. We are further to consider concerningperception, that the ideas we receive by sensation are often, ingrown people, altered by the judgment, without our taking noticeof it. When we set before our eyes a round globe of any uniformcolour, v.g. gold, alabaster, or jet, it is certain that the ideathereby imprinted on our mind is of a flat circle, variouslyshadowed, with several degrees of light and brightness coming toour eyes. But we having, by use, been accustomed to perceive whatkind of appearance convex bodies are wont to make in us; whatalterations are made in the reflections of light by thedifference of the sensible figures of bodies;- the judgmentpresently, by an habitual custom, alters the appearances intotheir causes. So that from that which is truly variety of shadowor colour, collecting the figure, it makes it pass for a mark offigure, and frames to itself the perception of a convex figureand an uniform colour; when the idea we receive from thence isonly a plane variously coloured, as is evident in painting. Ishall here insert a problem of that very ingenious and learnedMr. Molyneux, which he did send me in a letter:- "Suppose aman born blind, learned by touch to distinguish between a cubeand a sphere of metal. Could he, if his sight be restored, sodistinguish them by sight alone? No. For though he has obtainedthe experience of how a globe, how a cube affects his touch, yethe has not yet obtained the experience that what affects histouch must affect his sight." I agree with this thinkinggentleman, whom I am proud to call my friend. This I leave withmy reader, to consider how much he may be beholden to experience,and acquired notions, where he thinks he had not the least helpfrom them.Chapter XOf Retention1. Contemplation. The nextfaculty of the mind, whereby it makes a further progress towardsknowledge, is that which I call retention; or the keeping ofthose simple ideas which from sensation or reflection it hathreceived. This is done two ways.First, by keeping the idea whichis brought into it, for some time actually in view, which iscalled contemplation.2. Memory. The other way ofretention is, the power to revive again in our minds those ideaswhich, after imprinting, have disappeared, or have been as itwere laid aside out of sight. And thus we do, when we conceiveheat or light, yellow or sweet,- the object being removed. Thisis memory, which is as it were the storehouse of our ideas. Chapter XIOf Discerning, and other operations of the Mind1. No knowledge withoutdiscernment. Another faculty we may take notice of in ourminds is that of discerning and distinguishing between theseveral ideas it has. It is not enough to have a confusedperception of something in general. Unless the mind had adistinct perception of different objects and their qualities, itwould be capable of very little knowledge, though the bodies thataffect us were as busy about us as they are now, and the mindwere continually employed in thinking. On this faculty ofdistinguishing one thing from another depends the evidence andcertainty of several, even very general, propositions, which havepassed for innate truths;- because men, overlooking the truecause why those propositions find universal assent, impute itwholly to native uniform impressions; whereas it in truth dependsupon this clear discerning faculty of the mind, whereby itperceives two ideas to be the same, or different. But of thismore hereafter.4. Comparing. The COMPARINGthem one with another, in respect of extent, degrees, time,place, or any other circumstances, is another operation of themind about its ideas, and is that upon which depends all thatlarge tribe of ideas comprehended under relation.5. Brutes compare butimperfectly. It seems to me to be the prerogative of humanunderstanding, when it has sufficiently distinguished any ideas,so as to perceive them to be perfectly different, and soconsequently two, to cast about and consider in whatcircumstances they are capable to be compared.6. Compounding. The nextoperation we may observe in the mind about its ideas isCOMPOSITION; whereby it puts together several of those simpleones it has received from sensation and reflection, and combinesthem into complex ones. 9. Abstraction. The use ofwords then being to stand as outward marks of our internal ideas,and those ideas being taken from particular things, if everyparticular idea that we take in should have a distinct name,names must be endless. To prevent this, the mind makes theparticular ideas received from particular objects to becomegeneral; which is done by considering them as they are in themind such appearances,- separate from all other existences, andthe circumstances of real existence, as time, place, or any otherconcomitant ideas. This is called ABSTRACTION, whereby ideastaken from particular beings become general representatives ofall of the same kind. Thus the same colour being observed to-dayin chalk or snow, which the mind yesterday received from milk, itconsiders that appearance alone, makes it a representative of allof that kind; and having given it the name whiteness, it by thatsound signifies the same quality wheresoever to be imagined ormet with; and thus universals, whether ideas or terms, are made.Chapter XIIOf Complex Ideas1. Made by the mind out ofsimple ones. The mind is wholly passive in the reception ofall its simple ideas, so it exerts several acts of its own,whereby out of its simple ideas, the others are framed. (1)Combining several simple ideas into one compound one; and thusall complex ideas are made. (2) Bringing two ideas, whethersimple or complex, together, and setting them by one another, soas to take a view of them at once, without uniting them into one;by which way it gets all its ideas of relations. (3) Separatingthem from all other ideas that accompany them in their realexistence: this is called abstraction: and thus all its generalideas are made. ChapterXXI Of Power2. Power, active and passive.Power is two-fold, viz. as able to make, or able to receive anychange. The one may be called active, and the other passivepower. Thus we say, Fire has a power to melt gold, and gold has apower to be melted.7. Whence the ideas of libertyand necessity. Every one, I think, finds in himself a powerto begin or forbear, continue or put an end to actions inhimself. From the consideration of the extent of this power,arise the ideas of liberty and necessity.14. Liberty belongs not to thewill. Whether man's will be free or no? If I mistake not, thequestion itself is altogether improper; and it is asinsignificant to ask whether man's will be free, as to askwhether his sleep be swift, or his virtue square: liberty beingas little applicable to the will. 23. How a man cannot be free towill. As freedom consists in a power of acting or not acting,a man in respect of willing cannot be free. The reason whereof isvery manifest. For, it being unavoidable that the actiondepending on his will should exist or not exist, he cannot avoidwilling the existence or non-existence of that action; it isabsolutely necessary that he will the one or the other. So that,in respect of the act of willing, a man in such a case is notfree, nor is any being, as far I can comprehend beings above me,capable of such a freedom of will that it can forbear to will.65. Men may err in comparingpresent and future. Were the pleasure of drinkingaccompanied, the very moment a man takes off his glass, with thatsick stomach and aching head which, in some men, are sure tofollow not many hours after, I think nobody, whatever pleasure hehad in his cups, would, on these conditions, ever let wine touchhis lips.Chapter XXIIIOf our Complex Ideas of Substances2. Our obscure idea ofsubstance in general. If any one will examine himselfconcerning his notion of substance, he will find he has only asupposition of he knows not what. If any one should be asked,what is the subject wherein colour or weight inheres, he wouldhave nothing to say, like the Indian who, saying that the worldwas supported by a great elephant, was asked what the elephantrested on; to which his answer was- a great tortoise: but beingagain pressed to know what gave it support, replied- something,he knew not what.11. The now secondary qualitiesof bodies would disappear, if we could discover the primary onesof their minute parts. Blood, to the naked eye, appears allred; but by a good microscope shows only some few globules ofred, swimming in a pellucid liquor.ChapterXXVII Of Identity and Diversity2. Identity of substances.We have the ideas but of three sorts of substances: First, God. Secondly, Finite spirits. Thirdly, Matter.4. Identity of vegetables.An oak tree, for instance, continues to be the same plant as longas it partakes of the same life.5. Identity of animals. Thecase is not so much different in brutes, or in machines such as awatch. There is this difference, in an animal motion comes fromwithin; but in machines the force comes from without.6. The identity of man. Theidentity of man consists likewise in nothing but a participationof the same continued life, by constantly fleeting particles ofmatter, in succession vitally united to the same organized body.He that shall place the identity of man in anything else, willfind it hard to make an embryo, one of years, mad and sober, thesame man, by any supposition that will not make it possible forSeth, Socrates, Pilate, and Caesar Borgia, to be the same man. 8. Same man. I think I maybe confident, that, whoever should see a creature of his ownform, though it had no more reason than a parrot, would call himstill a man; or whoever should hear a parrot discourse, andphilosophize, would call it nothing but a very intelligentrational parrot. 23. Consciousness alone unitesremote existences into one person. Nothing but consciousnesscan unite remote existences into the same person: the identity ofsubstance will not do it; for whatever substance there is,however framed, without consciousness there is no person.Chapter XXXIIIOf the Association of Ideas5. Wrong connexion of ideas.Some of our ideas have a natural correspondence and connexion onewith another, which it is for our reason to trace. But there isanother connexion of ideas that are not all of kin.8. Influence of association inyoung children. Those who have the charge of children shoulddiligently prevent the undue connexion of ideas in their minds.10. An instance. The ideasof goblins and sprites have really no more to do with darknessthan light: but let a foolish maid inculcate these on a child andpossibly he shall never be able to separate them again so long ashe lives.11. Another instance. A manreceives a sensible injury from another, strongly thinks on theman and that action over and over, and so cements those twoideas, and never thinks on the man, but the pain he suffered.14. A friend of mine knew oneperfectly cured of madness by a very harsh and offensiveoperation. The gentleman had a great sense of gratitude, butnever could bear the sight of the operator.15. Many children, imputing thepain they endured at school to their books they were correctedfor, so join those ideas together, that reading becomes a tormentto them, which otherwise might have made the great pleasure oftheir lives. BOOK III OF WORDSChapter IIOf the Signification of Words1. Words are sensible signs,necessary for communication of ideas. The comfort andadvantage of society not being to be had without communication ofthoughts, it was necessary that man should find out some externalsensible signs of invisible ideas, that his thoughts might bemade known to others. The use, then, of words, is to be sensiblemarks of ideas; and the ideas they stand for are their proper andimmediate signification.3. Examples. A child havingtaken notice of nothing in the metal he hears called gold, butthe bright shining yellow colour, he applies the word gold onlyto his own idea of that colour, and nothing else; and thereforecalls the same colour in a peacock's tail gold. Another that hathbetter observed, adds to shining yellow great weight. Anotherfusibility, another, malleability. Each of these uses equally theword gold, when they have occasion to express the idea which theyhave applied it to: but it is evident that each can apply it onlyto his own idea; nor can he make it stand as a sign of such acomplex idea as he has not.Chapter IIIOf General Terms6. How general words are made.Words become general by being made the signs of general ideas:and ideas become general, by separating from them thecircumstances of time and place, and any other ideas that maydetermine them to this or that particular existence.7. Shown by the way we enlarge ourcomplex ideas from infancy. There is nothing more evident, thanthat the ideas of the persons children converse with are like thepersons themselves, only particular. Afterwards, they come tohave a general name, and a general idea. Wherein they makenothing new; but only leave out of the complex idea they had ofPeter and Jane, retaining only what is common to them all.15. Since the essences of thingsare thought by some (and not without reason) to be whollyunknown, it may not be amiss to consider the severalsignifications of the word essence.Real essences. Essence maybe taken for the very being of anything, whereby it is what it isand whereon their discoverable qualities depend. Nominal essences. Thelearning and disputes of the schools hath applied thesignification of 'essence', not unto the real constitution ofthings, but to the artificial constitution of genus and species. 20. To conclude. All thebusiness of the Schools, of genera and species, and theiressences, amounts to no more but this:- That men making abstractideas, and settling them in their minds with names annexed tothem, do thereby enable themselves to consider things, anddiscourse of them, as it were in bundles, for the easier andreadier improvement and communication of their knowledge, whichwould advance but slowly were their words and thoughts confinedonly to particulars.Chapter IVOf the Names of Simple Ideas5. If all names were definable, itwould be a process in infinitum. I think it is agreed that adefinition is nothing else but the showing the meaning of oneword by several other not synonymous terms.7. Simple ideas, whyundefinable. This being premised, I say that the names ofsimple ideas, and those only, are incapable of being defined. Thereason whereof is this, that the several terms of a definition,signifying several ideas, they can all together by no meansrepresent an idea which has no composition at all: and thereforea definition can in the names of simple ideas have no place.Chapter VIOf the Names of Substances1. The common names of substancesstand for sorts.2. The essence of each sort ofsubstance is our abstract idea to which the name is annexed.3. The nominal and real essencedifferent. Had we such a knowledge of that constitution of man,as his Maker has, we should have an idea of his essence as fardifferent from what it is now, as is his who knows all thesprings and wheels within of the famous clock at Strasburg, fromthat which a gazing countryman has of it, who observes only thehands and chimes of it.13. If I should ask any onewhether ice and water were two distinct species of things, Idoubt not but I should be answered in the affirmative. But if anEnglishman bred in Jamaica, who had never seen ice, coming intoEngland in the winter, find the water in his basin a great partfrozen, and, not knowing any peculiar name it had, should call ithardened water; I ask whether this would be a new species to him,different from water? And I think it would be answered, It wouldnot be to him a new species. And if this be so, it is plain thatour distinct species are nothing but distinct complex ideas, withdistinct names annexed to them.20. Names independent of realessences. By all which it is clear, that our distinguishingsubstances into species by names, is not at all founded on theirreal essences; nor can we pretend to range and determine themexactly into species, according to internal essentialdifferences.22. Our abstract ideas are to usthe measures of the species we make: instance in that of man.There are creatures, as it is said, that, with language andreason and a shape agreeing with ours, have hairy tails; otherswhere the males have no beards, and others where the femaleshave. If it be asked whether these be all human men? it is plain,the question refers only to the nominal essence: for those ofthem to whom the definition of the word man agrees, are men, andthe other not. But if the inquiry be made concerning the supposedreal essence and of the the internal constitution of thesecreatures, it is wholly impossible for us to answer.26. It is evident they essencesmade by the mind, and not by nature: for were they Nature'sworkmanship, they could not be so various and different inseveral men as experience tells us they are.29. Our nominal essences ofsubstances usually consist of a few obvious qualities observed inthings. Yet, imperfect as they thus are, they serve for commonconverse.34. Instance in Cassowaries.Were I to talk with of a sort of birds I lately saw in St.James's Park, about three feet high, with feet of three claws,and without a tail; I must make this description of it, and somay make others understand me. But when I am told that the nameof it is cassuaris, I may then use that word to stand indiscourse for all my that description; though by that word, Iknow no more of the real essence or constitution of that animalsthan I did before.BOOK IVOF KNOWLEDGE AND PROBABILITYChapter IOf Knowledge in General1. Since the mind hath no otherimmediate object but its own ideas, it is evident that ourknowledge is only conversant about them.2. Knowledge is the perception ofthe agreement or disagreement of two ideas. Knowledge then seemsto me to be nothing but the perception of the connexion of andagreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas. Inthis alone it consists. For when we know that white is not black,what do we else but perceive, that these two ideas do not agree?This agreement or disagreement may be any of four sorts: I. Identity, or diversity. II. Relation. III. Co-existence, or necessary connexion. IV. Real existence.4. As to the first sort ofagreement or disagreement, viz. identity or diversity. It is thefirst act of the mind, when it has any sentiments or ideas atall, to perceive its ideas; and so far as it perceives them, toknow each what it is, and thereby also to perceive theirdifference, and that one is not another. This is so absolutelynecessary, that without it there could be no distinct thoughts atall. If there ever happen any doubt about it, it will always befound to be about the names, and not the ideas themselves.5. The sort of agreement ordisagreement called relative, since all distinct ideas musteternally be known not to be the same, there could be no room forany positive knowledge at all, if we could not perceive anyrelation between our ideas, and find out the agreement ordisagreement they have one with another, in several ways the mindtakes of comparing them.6. The third sort of agreement ordisagreement to be found in our ideas, which the perception ofthe mind is employed about, is co-existence or non-co-existencein the same subject; and this belongs particularly to substances.Thus when we pronounce concerning gold, that it is fixed, ourknowledge of this truth amounts to no more but this, thatfixedness, or a power to remain in the fire unconsumed, is anidea that always accompanies and is joined with that particularsort of yellowness, weight, fusibility, malleableness, andsolubility in aqua regia, which make our complex idea signifiedby the word gold, 7. The fourth and last sort isthat of actual real existence agreeing to any idea.Within these four sorts ofagreement or disagreement is, I suppose, contained all theknowledge we have, or are capable of.Chapter IIOf the Degrees of our Knowledge1. Of the degrees, or differencesin clearness, of our knowledge:I. Intuitive. The differentclearness of our knowledge seems to me to lie in the differentway of perception the mind has of the agreement or disagreementof any of its ideas. For if we will reflect on our own ways ofthinking, we will find, that sometimes the mind perceives theagreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves,without the intervention of any other: and this I think we maycall intuitive knowledge. For in this the mind is at no pains ofproving or examining, but perceives the truth as the eye dothlight, only by being directed towards it. Thus the mind perceivesthat white is not black or that a circle is not a triangle. Hethat demands a greater certainty than this, demands he knows notwhat, and shows only that he has a mind to be a sceptic, withoutbeing able to be so. Certainty depends so wholly on thisintuition, that, in the next degree of knowledge which I calldemonstrative, this intuition is necessary in all the connexionsof the intermediate ideas, without which we cannot attainknowledge and certainty.II. Demonstrative. The nextdegree of knowledge is, where the mind perceives the agreement ordisagreement of any ideas, but not immediately. The reason whythe mind cannot always perceive presently the agreement ordisagreement of two ideas, is, because those ideas, concerningwhose agreement or disagreement the inquiry is made, cannot bythe mind be so put together as to show it.Chapter IIIOf the Extent of Human Knowledge1. Extent of our knowledge.Knowledge, lying in the perception of the agreement ordisagreement of any of our ideas, it follows from hence that, itextends no further than we have ideas. 2. It extends no further than wecan perceive their agreement or disagreement. Which perceptionbeing: 1. Either by intuition, or the immediate comparing any twoideas; or, 2. By reason, examining the agreement or disagreementof two ideas, by the intervention of some others; or, 3. Bysensation, perceiving the existence of particular things: henceit also follows: 3. Intuitive knowledge extendsitself not to all the relations of all our ideas.4. Nor does demonstrativeknowledge. 5. Sensitive knowledge reaching nofurther than the existence of things actually present to oursenses, is yet much narrower than either of the former.6. From all which it is evident,that the extent of our knowledge comes not only short of thereality of things, but even of the extent of our own ideas11. Especially of the secondaryqualities of bodies. The ideas that our complex ones ofsubstances are made up of are those of their secondary qualities;which depending all upon the primary qualities of their minuteparts; or upon something yet more remote from our comprehension;it is impossible we should know which have union or inconsistencyone with another.13. We have no perfectknowledge of primary qualities. We are so far from knowingwhat figure, size, or motion of parts produce a yellow colour, asweet taste, or a sharp sound, that we can by no means conceivehow any size, figure, or motion of any particles, can possiblyproduce in us the idea of any colour, taste, or sound whatsoever:there is no conceivable connexion between the one and the other.18. Morality capable ofdemonstration. The idea of a supreme Being, infinite inpower, goodness, and wisdom, whose workmanship we are, and onwhom we depend; and the idea of ourselves, as understanding,rational creatures, being such as are clear in us, would affordsuch foundations of our duty and rules of action as might placemorality amongst the sciences capable of demonstration."Where there is no property there is no injustice," isa proposition as certain as any in Euclid: for the idea ofproperty being a right to anything, and the idea to which thename "injustice" is given being the invasion orviolation of that right, it is evident that I can as certainlyknow this proposition to be true, as that a triangle has threeangles equal to two right ones. Again: "No government allowsabsolute liberty." The idea of government being theestablishment of society upon certain rules which requireconformity to them; and the idea of absolute liberty being forany one to do whatever he pleases; I am as capable of beingcertain of the truth of this proposition as of any in themathematics.Chapter IVOf the Reality of Knowledge1. Objection."Knowledge placed in our ideas may be all unreal orchimerical." I doubt not but my reader, by this time, may beapt to think that I have been only building a castle in the air;and be ready to say to me: "To what purpose all this stir?Knowledge, say you, is only the perception of the agreement ordisagreement of our own ideas: but who knows what those ideas maybe? Is there anything so extravagant as the imaginations of men'sbrains? Where is the head that has no chimeras in it? If it betrue, that all knowledge lies only in the perception of agreementor disagreement of our own ideas, the visions of an enthusiastand the reasonings of a sober man will be equally certain. It isno matter how things are: so a man observe but the agreement ofhis own imaginations, and talk conformably, it is all truth, allcertainty. Such castles in the air will be as strongholds oftruth, as the demonstrations of Euclid. That an harpy is not acentaur is by this way as certain knowledge, and as much a truth,as that a square is not a circle." "But of what use isall this fine knowledge of men's own imaginations, to a man thatinquires after the reality of things? It matters not what men'sfancies are, it is the knowledge of things that is only to beprized: it is this alone gives a value to our reasonings, andpreference to one man's knowledge over another's, that it is ofthings as they really are, and not of dreams and fancies." 2. Answer: I hope, before Ihave done, to make it evident, that this way of certainty, by theknowledge of our own ideas, goes a little further than bareimagination: and I believe it will appear that all the certaintyof general truths a man has lies in nothing else.3. I think, there be two sorts ofideas that we may be assured agree with things.4. The first are simple ideas,which since the mind can by no means make to itself, mustnecessarily be the product of things operating on the mind, in anatural way. From whence it follows, that simple ideas are butthe natural and regular productions of things without us. Thusthe idea of whiteness, or bitterness, as it is in the mind,exactly answering that power which is in any body to produce itthere, is sufficient for real knowledge.5. All complex ideas, except ideasof substances, are their own archetypes. Secondly, All ourcomplex ideas, except those of substances, being archetypes ofthe mind's own making, not intended to be the copies of anything,cannot want any conformity necessary to real knowledge. For thatwhich is not designed to represent anything but itself, can neverbe capable of a wrong representation.6. Hence the reality ofmathematical knowledge. It will be easily granted that theknowledge we have of mathematical truths is not only certain, butreal knowledge: and yet, if we will consider, we shall find thatit is only of our own ideas. The mathematician considers thetruth and properties belonging to a rectangle or circle only asthey are in idea in his own mind. For it is possible he neverfound either of them existing mathematically, i.e. preciselytrue, in his life.7. And of moral. And henceit follows that moral knowledge is as capable of real certaintyas mathematics. For certainty being but the perception of theagreement or disagreement of our ideas, and demonstration nothingbut the perception of such agreement, by the intervention ofother ideas or mediums; our moral ideas, as well as mathematical,being archetypes themselves, and so adequate and complete ideas;all the agreement or disagreement which we shall find in themwill produce real knowledge.11. Our complex ideas ofsubstances have their archetypes without us; and here knowledgecomes short. From whence it comes to pass, that they may, andoften do, fail of being exactly conformable to things themselves.12. So far as our complex ideasagree with those archetypes without us, so far our knowledgeconcerning substances is real. 16. Monsters. Shall adefect in the body make a monster; yet a defect in the mind (thefar more noble part) not? Shall the want of a nose, or a neck,make a monster, and put such issue out of the rank of men; thewant of reason and understanding, not? For, since there have beenhuman foetuses produced, half beast and half man; and others inall the variety of approaches to the one or the other shape, Iwould gladly know what are those precise lineaments, which are orare not capable of a rational soul to be joined to them. Sonecessary is it to quit the common notion of species andessences, if we will truly look into the nature of things, andexamine them by what our faculties can discover in them as theyexist.18. Recapitulation.Wherever we perceive the agreement or disagreement of any of ourideas, there is certain knowledge: and wherever we are sure thoseideas agree with the reality of things, there is certain realknowledge. Chapter VIOf Universal Propositions: their Truth and Certainty1. Treating of words necessaryto knowledge. Though the examining and judging of ideas bythemselves, their names being quite laid aside, be the best andsurest way to clear and distinct knowledge: yet, through theprevailing custom of using sounds for ideas, I think it is veryseldom practised. Every one may observe how common it is fornames to be made use of, even when men think and reason withintheir own breasts. This makes the consideration of words andpropositions so necessary a part of the Treatise of Knowledge.3. But that we may not be misled,it is fit to observe that certainty is twofold: certainty oftruth and certainty of knowledge. Certainty of truth is, whenwords are so put together in propositions as exactly to expressthe agreement or disagreement of the ideas they stand for.Certainty of knowledge is to perceive the agreement ordisagreement of ideas, as expressed in any proposition. This weusually call knowing, or being certain of the truth of anyproposition.4. No proposition can be certainlyknown to be true, where the real essence of each speciesmentioned is not known. Now, because we cannot be certain of thetruth of any general proposition, unless we know the precisebounds and extent of the species its terms stand for, it isnecessary we should know the essence of each species, which isthat which constitutes and bounds it.This, in all simple ideas andmodes, is not hard to do. For in these the real and nominalessence being the same, or, which is all one, the abstract ideawhich the general term stands for being the sole essence andboundary that is or can be supposed of the species, there can beno doubt how far the species extends.But in substances, wherein a realessence is supposed to determine the species, the extent of thegeneral word is very uncertain; because, not knowing this realessence, we cannot know what is. And thus, speaking of a man, orgold, or any other species of natural substances, to suppose thatthe species of things are anything but the sorting of them undergeneral names, is to confound truth, and introduce uncertaintyinto all general propositions that can be made about them. Thosewrong notions of essences or species having got root in mostpeople's minds, are to be discovered and removed, to make way forthat use of words which should convey certainty with it.Chapter IXOf our Threefold Knowledge of Existence2. A threefold knowledge ofexistence. But, leaving the nature of propositions, anddifferent ways of predication to be considered more at large inanother place, let us proceed now to inquire concerning ourknowledge of the existence of things, and how we come by it. Isay, then, that we have the knowledge of our own existence byintuition; of the existence of God by demonstration; and of otherthings by sensation.3. As for our own existence, weperceive it so plainly and so certainly, that it neither needsnor is capable of any proof. For nothing can be more evident tous than our own existence. In every act of sensation, reasoning,or thinking, we are conscious to ourselves of our own being; and,in this matter, come not short of the highest degree ofcertainty.Chapter XOf our Knowledge of the Existence of a God1. We are capable of knowingcertainly that there is a God. Though God has given us noinnate ideas of himself; though he has stamped no originalcharacters on our minds, wherein we may read his being; yethaving furnished us with those faculties our minds are endowedwith, he hath not left himself without witness: since we havesense, perception, and reason, and cannot want a clear proof ofhim, as long as we carry ourselves about us. But, though this bethe most obvious truth that reason discovers, and though itsevidence be (if I mistake not) equal to mathematical certainty:yet it requires thought and attention.2. For man knows that hehimself exists. If any one pretends to be so sceptical as todeny his own existence, (for really to doubt of it is manifestlyimpossible,) let him for me enjoy his beloved happiness of beingnothing, until hunger or some other pain convince him of thecontrary.3 He knows also that nothingcannot produce a being; therefore something must have existedfrom eternity.4. This eternal source, then, ofall being must also be the source and original of all power; andso this eternal Being must be also the most powerful.5. And most knowing. Again, a manfinds in himself perception and knowledge. We have then got onestep further; and we are certain now that there is not only somebeing, but some knowing, intelligent being in the world.6. And therefore God. Thus, fromthe consideration of ourselves, and what we infallibly find inour own constitutions, our reason leads us to the knowledge ofthis certain and evident truth,- That there is an eternal, mostpowerful, and most knowing Being; which whether any one willplease to call God, it matters not. Chapter XIOf our Knowledge of the Existence of Other Things1. Knowledge of the existenceof other finite beings is to be had only by actual sensation.It is the actual receiving of ideas from without that gives usnotice of the existence of other things, and makes us know, thatsomething doth exist at that time without us, which causes thatidea in us; though perhaps we neither know nor consider how itdoes it. 3. This notice by our senses,though not so certain as demonstration, yet may be calledknowledge, and proves the existence of things without us. Thenotice we have by our senses of the existing of things withoutus, though it be not altogether so certain as our intuitiveknowledge, or the deductions of our reason employed about theclear abstract ideas of our own minds; yet it is an assurancethat deserves the name of knowledge. It is plain thoseperceptions are produced in us by exterior causes affecting oursenses: because those that want the organs of any sense, nevercan have the ideas belonging to that sense produced in theirminds. 5. Because sometimes I find that Icannot avoid the having those ideas produced in my mind. Forthough, when my eyes are shut, or windows fast, I can at pleasurerecall to my mind the ideas of light, or the sun, which formersensations had lodged in my memory; so I can at pleasure lay bythat idea, and take into my view that of the smell of a rose, ortaste of sugar. But, if I turn my eyes at noon towards the sun, Icannot avoid the ideas which the light or sun then produces inme. Besides, there is nobody who doth not perceive the differencein himself between contemplating the sun, as he hath the idea ofit in his memory, and actually looking upon it: of which two, hisperception is so distinct, that few of his ideas are moredistinguishable one from another. And therefore he hath certainknowledge that they are not both memory, or the actions of hismind, and fancies only within him; but that actual seeing hath acause without.Add to this, that many of thoseideas are produced in us with pain, which afterwards we rememberwithout the least offence. Our senses in many cases bear witnessto the truth of each other's report, concerning the existence ofsensible things without us. He that sees a fire, may, if he doubtwhether it be anything more than a bare fancy, feel it too; andbe convinced, by putting his hand in it. ChapterXVII Of Reason2. Wherein reasoning consists.Sense and intuition reach but a very little way. The greatestpart of our knowledge depends upon deductions and intermediateideas: and in those cases where we are fain to substitute assentinstead of knowledge, and take propositions for true, withoutbeing certain they are so, we have need to find out, examine, andcompare the grounds of their probability. In both these cases,the faculty which finds out the means, and rightly applies them,to discover certainty in the one, and probability in the other,is that which we call reason. For, as reason perceives thenecessary and indubitable connexion of all the ideas or proofsone to another, in each step of any demonstration that producesknowledge; so it likewise perceives the probable connexion of allthe ideas or proofs one to another, in every step of a discourse,to which it will think assent due. This is the lowest degree ofthat which can be truly called reason. 23. Above, contrary, andaccording to reason. By what has been before said of reason,we may be able to make some guess at the distinction of thingsinto those that are according to, above, and contrary to reason. 1. According to reason are suchpropositions whose truth we can discover by examining and tracingthose ideas we have from sensation and reflection; and by naturaldeduction find to be true or probable.2. Above reason are suchpropositions whose truth or probability we cannot by reasonderive from those principles. 3. Contrary to reason are suchpropositions as are inconsistent with or irreconcilable to ourclear and distinct ideas. Thus the existence of one God isaccording to reason; the existence of more than one God, contraryto reason; the resurrection of the dead, above reason. 24. Reason and faith. Thereis another use of the word reason, wherein it is opposed tofaith: which, though it be in itself a very improper way ofspeaking. Faith is nothing but a firm assent of the mind: which,if it be regulated, as is our duty, cannot be afforded toanything but upon good reason; and so cannot be opposite to it. ChapterXIX Of Enthusiasm1. Love of truth necessary.He that would seriously set upon the search of truth ought in thefirst place to prepare his mind with a love of it. And yet onemay truly say, that there are very few lovers of truth, fortruth's sake, even amongst those who persuade themselves thatthey are so. 7. What is meant by enthusiasm.This I take to be properly enthusiasm, which, though foundedneither on reason nor divine revelation, but rising from theconceits of a warmed or overweening brain. 10. The supposed internal lightexamined. But to examine a little soberly this internallight, if I mistake not, these men receive it for true, becausethey presume God revealed it. Does it not, then, stand them uponto examine upon what grounds they presume it to be a revelationfrom God? or else all their confidence is mere presumption: andthis light they are so dazzled with is nothing but an ignisfatuus, that leads them constantly round in this circle; It is arevelation, because they firmly believe it; and they believe it,because it is a revelation.11. Enthusiasm fails ofevidence, that the proposition is from God. But how shall itbe known that any proposition in our minds is a truth infused byGod? Here it is that enthusiasm fails of the evidence it pretendsto. For men thus possessed, boast of a light whereby they saythey are enlightened, and brought into the knowledge of this orthat truth. But if they know it to be a truth, they must know itto be so either by its own self-evidence to natural reason, or bythe rational proofs that make it out to be so. The strength ofour persuasions is no evidence at all of their own rectitude:crooked things may be as stiff and inflexible as straight: andmen may be as positive and peremptory in error as in truth. Howcome else the untractable zealots in different and oppositeparties? 14. Revelation must be judgedof by reason. God when he makes the prophet does not unmakethe man. He leaves all his faculties in the natural state. Reasonmust be our last judge and guide in everything. If reason mustnot examine their truth by something extrinsical to thepersuasions themselves, inspirations and delusions, truth andfalsehood, will have the same measure, and will not be possibleto be distinguished.THE END John Locke 1632-1704Locke's memorial in ChristChurch Cathedral, Oxford |
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