Case Studies in Sanctions and Terrorism: Cuba
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Case Studies in Sanctions and Terrorism: Cuba
Case Studies in Sanctions and Terrorism
<< Case Studies Index
Case 60-3
US v. Cuba (1960- : Castro)
| Chronology of Key Events | Goals of Sender Country | Response to Target Country |
Attitude of Other Countries | Legal Notes | Economic Impact | Assessment |
Author's Summary | Bibliography |
Chronology of Key Events
January 7, 1959
US recognizes government of President Fidel Castro. (Schreiber 390)
1960
In February, Cuba and the Soviet Union sign a trade agreement in which the Soviet Union agrees to buy sugar and other items from Cuba and to supply Cuba with crude oil. On advice of US State Department, US oil firms in Cuba stop refining oil purchased from USSR; Cuba nationalizes refineries; President Dwight D. Eisenhower cancels most of Cuban sugar quota (prior to 1960, sales to US were 3 million tons annually, half of Cuban crop). Cuba then expropriates all US property, valued at about $1 billion, discriminates against imports of US products. (Krinsky and Golove 108; Newfarmer 128; Schreiber 387)
October 19, 1960
US imposes embargo on exports to Cuba (except medicine, food), extends embargo to foreign subsidiaries of US firms, reduces Cuban sugar quota in US market to zero, blacklists vessels carrying cargo to and from Cuba from carriage of US government-financed cargo. (Doxey 35; Losman 21, 26; Lowenfeld 33)
1961
Castro acknowledges Marxist-Leninist affiliation, describes revolution as socialist, anti-imperialist. (Newfarmer 128)
January 1961
US-Cuban diplomatic relations are severed; US restricts travel to Cuba. (Newfarmer 128; Krinsky and Golove 111)
April 1961
US launches unsuccessful Bay of Pigs invasion. (Schreiber 393)
January 1962
Organization of American States (OAS) declares 20 to 1 (Cuba voting against) that adherence to Marxist-Leninist ideology is incompatible with inter-American system; two-thirds majority votes that Cuba has "voluntarily" placed itself outside OAS system. (New York Times, 31 January 1962, A1)
February 7, 1962
By presidential proclamation, US bans virtually all imports from Cuba. (Krinsky and Golove 112; Schreiber 387)
July 1962
OAS votes 16 to 1 (4 abstentions) to suspend trade in military goods with Cuba. Cuba urges UN Security Council to suspend OAS measures; UN takes no decision. (Doxey 35; Schreiber 389)
August 1, 1962
Congress passes the Foreign Assistance Act, including an amendment barring aid to "any country which furnishes assistance to the present government of Cuba." This provision is further amended the following year to withhold foreign aid from countries that allow ships under their flag to carry goods to or from Cuba. (Krinsky and Golove 112-113)
October 23, 1962
During missile crisis, OAS unanimously supports US "quarantine" of Cuba, authorizes members to take measures, including armed force, to ensure hemispheric security. With resolution of missile crisis, quarantine is lifted on 20 November 1962. (Doxey 36)
February 1963
President John F. Kennedy prohibits shipments of cargoes paid for by the US government on foreign-flag ships that have called on a Cuban port. He also encourages maritime unions to boycott ships named on US government blacklist because of their trade with Cuba. (Krinsky and Golove 112-113; Lowenfeld 33; Schreiber 387)
July 1963
Invoking Trading with the Enemy Act, US freezes all Cuban assets in the US (about $33 million). The order also transfers enforcement of the Cuban sanctions from the Department of Commerce to the Treasury Department. In order to avoid conflict with trading partners, the implementing regulations permit trade between foreign subsidiaries of US firms and Cuba, but in an "administrative interpretation," Treasury requires American management employees and officers to oppose such transactions. Under US pressure, NATO countries agree to embargo military items but continue economic trade with Cuba. (Krinsky and Golove 114; Doxey 37; Schreiber 388)
May 14, 1964
The Commerce Department revokes the general license permitting the export of food and medicine, thus subjecting such transactions to specific prior approval. Department policy is to deny license requests for commercial transactions and to approve only humanitarian donations. (Krinsky and Golove 114)
July 1964
Following discovery of arms cache of Cuban origin in Venezuela, and led by US and Venezuela, OAS calls for mandatory sanctions covering all trade except food, medicine (then about $18 million annually); severing of diplomatic relations (Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay, Mexico dissent). (Doxey 37; Schreiber 389)
July 1975
OAS lifts collective sanctions; thereafter, US follows policy of licensing foreign subsidiaries of US firms to trade with Cuba. (Lowenfeld 32)
Late 1975
Cuba deploys 36,000 combat troops in Angola; US threatens military action if Cuba sends more troops elsewhere, makes withdrawal of troops from Angola precondition for normalizing economic relations. (Newfarmer 129)
1977
Some Cuban troops withdraw from Angola; President Jimmy Carter proposes fishing agreement with Cuba, loosens restrictions on travel to Cuba; diplomatic interests sections are opened in Havana, Washington; discussions are initiated on broad range of issues. Congress also repeals the provision of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 banning aid to countries permitting their vessels to trade with Cuba; the National Security Council rescinds the ship blacklist. (Newfarmer 129; Cuban Studies Program, app. C; Krinsky and Golove 118)
January 9, 1978
Treasury regulations are revised to permit remittances up to $500 per quarter to close relatives in Cuba. (Krinsky and Golove 119)
1978
Cuba deploys 20,000 troops in Ethiopia, MiG-23 fighter planes at home; Katangan rebels, inspired by Cuba, attack government forces in Zaire. (Newfarmer 129)
August 1979
Soviet "combat brigade" is observed in Cuba. (Newfarmer 130)
1980
Flotilla of Cuban refugees from port of Mariel arrives in Florida over several months. (Newfarmer 130)
1981
Administration of President Ronald Reagan initiates tighter economic embargo; proposes Radio Martí (anti-Castro information radio); sees Cuba as instigator of Marxist control in Nicaragua, supporter of El Salvador insurgents; characterizes Grenada as "virtual surrogate" of Cuba; attempts to obtain Latin American cooperation against Castro. (Newfarmer 132; Newsweek, 11 November 1982, 49; Enders 2; Washington Post, 27 February 1983, A1; Shultz, 37)
May 1982
US bans business, tourist travel to Cuba. (Newfarmer 33; New York Times, 26 February 1983, A23)
September 1982
Cuba declares inability to repay principal on external debt, estimated at $10.5 billion to $11 billion, including hard-currency debt of about $3 billion. (Wall Street Journal, 2 September 1982, 1; Financial Times, 1 September 1982, 1)
June 1983
Cuba acknowledges continued inability to repay principal due on some $1.3 billion of debt to Western banks. " … [T]he Reagan Administration has let it be known that it would disapprove of too generous terms being conceded to Cuba by Washington's allies." (Financial Times, 1 June 1983, 4)
February 1985
Following Angola's announcement of willingness to phase out Cuban troop presence in return for South African withdrawal from Namibia, Castro expresses support for US mediation effort in region. He also says number of Cuban troops in Ethiopia has fallen to "symbolic" level. Comments hint at "substantial lowering of Cuban military ambitions in Africa" as popular support for involvement wanes. (Washington Post, 6 February 1985, A1)
June 1985
Report prepared by Cuban National Bank for its Paris Club creditors reveals that Cuba has been buying cheap sugar on world market, reselling it to Soviets at several times world price, using profits to purchase cheap Soviet oil, which it then resells for hard currency. (For example, in 1984 the Cubans used $1.3 billion in sugar profits to buy 6.7 million tons of subsidized oil, 4.9 million tons of which was later resold.) Unidentified State Department official confirms authenticity of document, obtained from a European bank and made public by the anti-Castro Cuban-American National Foundation. (Washington Post, 5 June 1985, A29; New York Times, 5 June 1985, D1)
August 1986
The Reagan administration acts to plug holes in embargo by cracking down on circumvention through front companies in third countries, revokes permission for Cubans to obtain US visas in third countries, reduces from $2,000 to $1,200 the value of gifts, remittances that Cubans living in US can send annually to relatives back home. (Wall Street Journal, 25 August 1986, 24; New York Times, 11 August 1986, A1)
December 1988
Cuba, Angola, South Africa reach agreement under which Cuban troops will leave Angola, and South Africa will withdraw troops from Namibia, implement UN plan for Namibian independence. (Department of State Bulletin, January 1989, 16)
1989
Castro, apparently seeking to improve relations with US, offers to cooperate in curbing drug trafficking, other matters of mutual interest. President George Bush, campaigning for Cuban-American congressional candidate in Miami, says he would like to normalize relations with Cuba but not until it "reforms its political system and ends human rights abuses." Political upheaval, attempted economic reforms disrupt Soviet, East European trade and aid relations with Cuba. (Financial Times, 17 August 1989, 4; Washington Post, 22 January 1990, A1; Financial Times, 3 March 1990, 6)
December 1989- January 1990
US invades Panama, deposes General Manuel Antonio Noriega. Action constrains Cuba's ability to use Panama's banking system, free trade zone at Colon to circumvent US trade embargo. (Financial Times, 3 March 1990, 6; Journal of Commerce, 25 May 1990, 5A)
November 1990
President George Bush threatens to veto a bill that contains a provision to ban foreign subsidiaries of US companies from doing business with Cuba, potentially affecting about $320 million annually in two-way trade. Canada and the United Kingdom had expressed strong opposition to the extraterritorial nature of the proposed measure. (International Trade Reporter, 21 November 1990, 1770)
May 24, 1991
Cuba completes the withdrawal of its troops from Angola. (Washington Post, 24 May 1991, A39)
September 11, 1991
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev announces that he will withdraw all Soviet troops from Cuba. (US Department of State, Chronology of Cuban Affairs [1958-1998], 12 January 1998)
December 1991
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia ends all economic assistance to Cuba, including subsidized petroleum deliveries. (US Department of State, Chronology of Cuban Affairs (1958-1998), 12 January 1998; Christian Science Monitor, 9 January 1992, 1)
April 1992
After Democratic presidential candidate Bill Clinton endorses the Cuban Democracy Act while on a Florida campaign stop, President Bush issues an executive order restricting access to US ports of third-country vessels servicing Cuba. In order to limit Cuba's hard-currency earnings, President Bush also permits direct air charters between Miami and Havana for shipments of humanitarian packages. Previously, the Cuban government received high fees for US packages routed through Mexico. (International Trade Reporter, 22 April 1992, 717)
October 5, 1992
The Cuban Democracy Act (CDA), introduced by Representative Robert Torricelli (D-NJ), passes both the House (276-135) and the Senate (61-24). The bill forbids foreign subsidiaries of US companies from dealing with Cuba, prohibits any ship that has docked in Cuban harbors from entering US ports for 180 days, and calls for a termination of aid to any country that provides assistance to Cuba. However, the legislation also encourages reaching out to the Cuban people and permits reducing certain sanctions (namely, telecommunications) "in carefully calibrated ways in response to positive developments in Cuba." Reversing his earlier opposition, President Bush signs the bill into law. (Inside US Trade, 9 October 1992, 8; United States Information Service [USIS], 19 November 1993)
October 15, 1992
The UK and Canada bar US subsidiaries located in their countries from complying with CDA provisions. (Inside US Trade, 16 October 1992, 11; Journal of Commerce, 22 October 1992, 4A)
November 1992
Russia signs a series of trade agreements with Cuba, including a new oil-for-sugar barter agreement under which Russia is expected to deliver 2.3 million tons of oil in exchange for 1.5 millions tons of sugar in 1993, down from 13 million tons of oil in 1990 and 10 million tons in 1991. (Christian Science Monitor, 9 January 1992, 1; 9 November 1992, 1; 22 June 1993, 1)
November 28, 1992
The UN General Assembly votes 59 to 3, with 79 abstentions, to urge the lifting of economic sanctions against Cuba. Only Romania and Israel join the US in opposing the measure. Opposition to the embargo increases each year, with only Israel consistently voting with the US. (Washington Post, 29 November 1992, C6; 27 October 1994, A18; New York Times, 3 November 1995, A1)
July 1993
Consistent with "track II" of the Cuban Democracy Act, the Clinton administration announces that it will permit companies to invest in improving telephone service between Cuba and the US. (USIS, 26 July 1993)
February 16, 1994
US lifts a ban on the import of nickel from states of the former Soviet Union, which had been banned because of the inability of US customs officials to determine whether nickel sold from the Soviet Union was reexported from Cuba. (Journal of Commerce, 17 February 1994, 6B)
June 1994
In an effort to improve ties with its neighbors, Cuba joins the Association of Caribbean States. (Journal of Commerce, 12 December 1994, 2C)
June 14, 1994
Mexican President Carlos Salinas announces that a Mexican company, Grupo Domos, is investing $1.5 billion to purchase a 49 percent share of Cuba's national telephone company. Cuba needs foreign technology to update its antiquated telecommunications infrastructure. (Economist, 25 June 1994, 41)
June 20, 1994
Canadian Foreign Ministry announces that it will resume development assistance to Cuba after a 16-year ban, but that the aid will be channeled through private relief organizations. (Associated Press, 9 June 1994; Associated Press, 21 June 1994)
August 1994
Food shortages lead to political disturbances in Cuba, which in turn result in large numbers of refugees attempting to enter the US. Reversing previous favorable treatment, the US bars entry of Cuban refugees fleeing the island by sea and begins to intern them at its Guantanamo Naval Base in southeastern Cuba. More than 27,000 Cubans are eventually detained. In response to Cuba's refusal to stem the tide of refugees, the Clinton administration tightens controls on travel to Cuba and bans dollar remittances from Cuban-Americans to family members in Cuba. (Washington Post, 9 September 1994, A34; 1 October 1994, A17; 10 October 1994, A13; 8 March 1995, A18; Jenkins and Haines, 40; The Age, 22 August 1994, 8)
September 9, 1994
Cuba and the US sign an immigration accord to stem the exodus of refugees. The US will not accept Cuban refugees who flee over water, but agrees to grant at least 20,000 immigrant visas at its diplomatic offices in Havana each year, up from an average of 11,000 issued annually over the previous decade. (Financial Times, 26 September 1995, 2)
September 6, 1995
The Cuban National Assembly passes a foreign investment law that permits foreign companies and individuals, including Cuban exiles, to own 100 percent of equity in Cuban investments, replacing joint-venture requirements involving the Cuban government. All sectors except health, education, and defense will be open under the new regulations. However, most foreign employers will still be required to hire employees through the Cuban government and to pay employees in dollars through the government, which will then pay the individuals in pesos. (Economist, 9 September 1995, 45)
October 6, 1995
President Clinton eases restrictions on travel to Cuba for educational, religious, and human rights purposes. The move is strongly criticized by anti-Castro members of Congress, who pledge to redouble their efforts to tighten sanctions on Cuba. (Washington Post, 7 October 1995, A1)
October 16, 1995
Cuba and Russia extend bilateral barter deal in which Russian oil is exchanged for Cuban sugar; Russia also agrees to finance and continue cooperation on the Juragua nuclear power plant, which had stalled with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. (Financial Times, 17 October 1995, 8; US Department of State, Background Notes-Cuba, 1994)
Fall 1995
National Bank of Cuba allows citizens to purchase foreign currency at floating rates in response to flourishing black market fueled by illegal remittances from Cubans living in the US. Cuban government also announces reinstatement of a national income tax, the first such measure since shortly after the revolution in 1959. (New York Times, 9 November 1995, A3; Financial Times, 27 November 1995, 1)
February 24, 1996
A Cuban MiG-29 fighter downs two civilian planes belonging to a Cuban-American exile group, "Brothers to the Rescue," that Cuba claims was violating its airspace. President Clinton condemns the action, suspends charter travel from the US, and pledges to reach an agreement with Congress on the Helms-Burton Act. (New York Times, 27 February 1996, A1; Washington Post, 27 February 1996, A8)
March 1996
1996 On March 5, the Senate passes (74-22) a compromise version of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, referred to as the Helms-Burton Act, after its sponsors Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) and Representative Dan Burton (R-IN). A similar measure passed the House the previous September but had stalled in the Senate because of opposition from the State Department and major US allies. Title III of the bill permits Americans with claims to property expropriated by the Cuban government to sue for damages foreign corporations or individuals that "traffick" in such property. Under Title IV, the US must deny entry to the executives and major shareholders, as well as their immediate families, of firms found to be "trafficking" in expropriated property. The legislation also seeks to restrict US aid to independent states of the former Soviet Union if they provide assistance for intelligence facilities in Lourdes, Cuba, or for completion of the Juragua nuclear facility, but also provides waivers for humanitarian aid or aid to promote market reforms and democratization. Title I codifies existing federal regulations and reaffirms the embargo under the Trading with the Enemy Act and the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992. Importantly, Titles I and III contain provisions for presidential waivers, but Title IV does not. On March 6 the House passes the revised legislation (336-86). President Clinton signs the bill into law on March 12. (New York Times, 6 March 1996, A7; Washington Post, 7 March 1996, A30; CSIS Business Alert, 14 May 1996; Financial Times, 7 March 1996, 5; Journal of Commerce, 21 September 1995, 1A; 22 September 1995, 8A)
March 12, 1996
Canadian Trade Minister Art Eggleton announces that Canada will seek consultations with the US under Chapter 12 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) regarding the legality of the Helms-Burton bill. Mexico soon joins in the request. Canadian officials also say they will try to include provisions in the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) that would prevent the US from imposing secondary sanctions on its trading partners. (Inside US Trade, 10 May 1996, 20-21; 15 March 1996, 8)
May 1996
The European Union suspends discussions with Havana on an economic cooperation agreement because of Cuba's failure to enact political reforms and economic liberalization. (Financial Times, 22 May 1996, 7)
July 10, 1996
The US denies visas to some shareholders and senior executives of the Canadian mining company Sherritt International under Title IV of the Helms-Burton law. (Reuters, 11 July 1996)
July 16, 1996
President Clinton asserts that US companies have the right under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act to sue foreign companies that are using Cuban assets formerly owned by Americans. But, to placate trading partners, he invokes the national interest waiver and imposes a moratorium of at least six months on the filing of suits. (Financial Times, 17 July 1996, 1)
August 19, 1996
The State Department informs a number of executives of the Mexican telecommunications company Grupo Domos that they will be banned from the US under Title IV of the Helms-Burton Act. (International Herald Tribune, 20 August 1996, 8)
August 26, 1996
The other 34 members of the OAS pass a resolution declaring that the Helms-Burton Act "does not conform to international law." (Financial Times, 29 August 1996, 4)
October 1, 1996
The Mexican Congress overwhelmingly approves a Helms-Burton "antidote" law that imposes fines of up to $301,000 on Mexican companies that comply with the US legislation. (New York Times, 2 October 1996, A9)
October 19/20, 1996
Hurricane Lili inflicts considerable damage on the sugar harvest in Cuba. Estimated losses for the affected provinces are 20 percent, or a minimum of 70,000 tons. Washington announces that aircraft carrying emergency relief supplies to Cuba will be allowed to fly directly from US territory. The European Commission approves a $10.5 million humanitarian aid package for Cuba. (Journal of Commerce, 24 October 1996, 9B; Financial Times, 24 October 1996, 4; Journal of Commerce, 28 October 1996, 3A)
October 28, 1996
The European Union (EU) Council of Ministers approves antiboycott legislation that forbids compliance with the Helms-Burton Act unless an EU firm receives a waiver on grounds that refusing to comply will seriously injure either a company's or the EU's interests. US court awards under Helms-Burton will not be recognized, and can be recovered in the EU if a successful American claimant has property there. (European Union News, 29 October 1996)
November 19, 1996
The World Trade Organization (WTO) agrees to establish a dispute settlement panel to review the EU's complaint about the Helms-Burton law. (USIS, 20 November 1996)
November 28, 1996
The Canadian Parliament passes into law anti-Helms-Burton legislation penalizing companies for obeying the US law, allowing the attorney general to issue blocking orders of US court judgments, and allowing Canadians to recoup penalties. (Ottawa Citizen, 17 September 1996, online; International Trade Reporter, 4 December 1996, 1865)
December 2, 1996
EU conditions further improvement in political and economic relations with Cuba on progress in human rights and democratic reforms in Cuba. Shortly after, President Clinton responds by waiving Title III of the Helms-Burton Act for another six months. (Washington Post, December 17, 1996, A1; 4 January 1996, A1)
December 1996
The Canadian Federation of Students, together with religious and other activist groups in Canada, urges Canadian tourists to boycott Florida and consider Cuba when planning their winter vacations. (Washington Post, 15 December 1996, A34)
January 10, 1997
The Cuban government passes a law that permits Cuban citizens to sue the US for damages from the 34-year embargo. (New York Times, 11 January 1997, 5)
January 29, 1997
The administration releases a report describing the economic aid that would be available to Cuba once Castro is out of power and the island moves toward a multiparty democracy. Castro angrily accuses the US of "trying to purchase the day of would-be surrender." (International Herald Tribune, 30 January 1997)
February 20, 1997
WTO Director General Renato Ruggiero names a three-member panel to rule on the Helms-Burton dispute. Within hours, the Clinton administration announces that the US will not "show up" for such proceedings, arguing that Helms-Burton is based on foreign policy rather than commercial concerns and therefore should not be judged in the WTO. (Journal of Commerce, 21 February 1997, A1)
April 11, 1997
The EU agrees to suspend the WTO dispute panel hearing on Helms-Burton until October in return for US efforts to limit application of Title IV to European companies. The US also agrees to "make efforts to shelter European companies from provisions of the D'Amato law," which sanctions companies that invest in Iran or Libya (see cases 84-1 and 78-8). (Financial Times, 12 April 1997, 1; Journal of Commerce, 14 April 1997, 3A)
June 16, 1997
Cuba's government establishes a new central bank as part of its modernization program in the finance and banking sectors, but denies that the bank reflects a move toward a market economy. (Financial Times, 16 June 1997, 4)
June 27, 1997
Noting that Cuba has failed to improve its human rights record, the EU extends by six months its freeze on cooperation with Cuba. (Journal of Commerce, 27 June 1997, 5A)
June-July 1997
Citing financial problems, the Mexican company Grupo Domos relinquishes its investment in Cuba's telecommunications system, which was expropriated from ITT Corporation of New York. After negotiating a financial compensation deal with ITT in order to avoid Title III sanctions, the Italian company Stet announces that it will replace Grupo Domos in the Cuban telephone joint venture. Despite protests from the Cuban American National Foundation, which insists on the imposition of sanctions, Stet reaches an understanding with the US State Department exempting it from Title III sanctions for 10 years. Senator Jesse Helms welcomes the accord, noting that "the price of doing business in Castro's tropical gulag has just gone up." (New York Times, 30 June 1997, D2; Financial Times, 24 July 1997, 1)
July 17, 1997
President Clinton waives Title III of the Helms-Burton Act for the third time. Clinton states that he will continue to waive the provision as long as he is making progress at raising international pressure on the Castro regime. (Washington Post, 17 July 1997, A23)
August 19, 1997
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), chairman of the House Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, introduces legislation that would deny foreign aid (other than humanitarian assistance) and trade preferences to countries that sign free trade agreements with Cuba. Caribbean Community and Common Market (Caricom) countries respond that their relationship with Cuba will not be affected by the proposed legislation. (Financial Times, 19 August 1997, 12)
August 19, 1997
The US government agrees to ease temporarily its travel ban and embargo against Cuba during the visit of Pope John Paul II to Cuba in January 1998. Catholics will be allowed to travel to Cuba from the US, and Catholic churches and charities will be able ship supplies and equipment to help organize the visit. (New York Times, 19 August 1997, A4)
November 17, 1997
The State Department declares a third foreign company, B.M. Group of Israel, in violation of the Helms-Burton Act and bars the firm's officials from US territory. (Washington Post, 18 November 1997, A6)
January 24-25, 1998
The Pope visits Cuba for the first time since Castro came to power; attributes Cuba's "material and moral poverty" to "limitations to fundamental freedoms" and "discouragement of the individual," as well as to "restrictive economic measures-unjust and ethically unacceptable-imposed from outside the country." (New York Times, 26 January 1998, A1)
End February 1998
Canadian company Sherritt International, one of the few firms currently sanctioned under the Helms-Burton law, announces that it will build a $150 million natural gas generating plant and invest $38 million in a cell phone company in Cuba. (Associated Press, 27 February 1998)
March 20, 1998
The Clinton administration eases controls on humanitarian shipment of food and medicine and reinstates the provision allowing Cuban-Americans to send up to $1,200 a year to their relatives in Cuba. (USIS, 20 March 1998; New York Times, 20 March 1998, 1; Washington Post, 20 March 1998, 1)
March 26, 1998
Cuba reaches an agreement to reschedule its $769 million debt with Japanese private banks, eliminating a major obstacle to improvement of bilateral trade and investment relations with Japan. (Inter Press Service, 26 March 1998)
March 28, 1998
Cuban Foreign Minister Roberto Robaína says that Havana will refuse all direct humanitarian aid from the US as long as the US government maintains its embargo on Cuba. (International Herald Tribune, 28-29 March 1998, 1)
April 7, 1998
Clinton administration announces that it is up to the members of Caricom to decide whether Cuba should become a member of their organization, signaling a softening of US policy toward Cuba. (Financial Times, 7 April 1998, 4)
April 7, 1998
Eleven Cuban political prisoners, whose release had been requested by Pope John Paul II, are freed and sent to Canada. (New York Times, 7 April 1998, A12)
April 20, 1998
EU lets its WTO challenge to Helms-Burton lapse. (New York Times, 21 April 1998, 1)
April 21, 1998
For the first time in seven years, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights fails to pass a resolution condemning the Castro regime for its human rights violations. The move is interpreted as a major setback for US foreign policy. (USIS, 6 May 1998; Journal of Commerce, 29 April 1998, 9A)
April 21, 1998
Cuba and the Dominican Republic normalize diplomatic relations, which had been broken off in 1959. This move follows Cuba's restoration of diplomatic relations with Guatemala in 1996, and Haiti and Spain in 1998. (Agence France-Presse, 21 April 1998)
April 28, 1998
Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien makes a two-day visit to Havana. The two countries start negotiations toward a bilateral investment treaty and the settlement of expropriation issues. Human rights violations and reform issues are also raised by the Canadian prime minister. (Financial Times, 28 April 1998, 16; Washington Post, 29 April 1998, A27)
May 6, 1998
A report of the Defense Intelligence Agency concludes that Cuba does not pose "a significant military threat to the US and to other countries in the region." (USIS, 6 May 1998)
May 18, 1998
The Clinton administration and EU officials reach an agreement that provides for penalties to be imposed on companies that invest in expropriated property, including denial of government export credits and other assistance. In exchange for EU action on expropriated property, US officials agree to seek changes to the Helms-Burton law to allow for a waiver of Title IV. The agreement will go into effect only after Title IV is amended by US Congress and Title III is permanently waived for European companies. In addition, an international registry will be established allowing for the submission of claims on expropriated property, which will then serve as the basis for possible government action against subsequent investors. Senator Helms condemns the understanding, labeling it a "dilution of Helms-Burton in exchange for a lot of hot air." (Inside US Trade, 22 May 1998, 10 July 1998, 16; Journal of Commerce, 26 May 1998, 8A; Financial Times, 2 June 1998, 8)
September 1, 1998
World Food Program Executive Director Catherine Bertini calls for $20.5 million in assistance to Cuba because of drought. The US will contribute only if the aid is not disbursed through the Cuban government, but Castro rejects funding not disbursed through Cuban authorities. (Washington Post, 1 September 1998, A8)
Late September 1998
A visit by EU External Relations Commissioner Leon Brittan fails to advance US-EU agreement over Helms-Burton in Congress. Opponents maintain that the US-EU agreement is not effective enough in preventing investment in expropriated property in Cuba. (Inside US Trade, 2 October 1998, 14)
October 14, 1998
The UN General Assembly, for the sixth year in a row, passes a resolution calling for an end to the US embargo against Cuba. The vote of 157 to 2 (US and Israel, 12 abstentions) is the most lopsided yet. (USIS, 14 October 1998; New York Times, 15 October 1998, A12)
Mid-October 1998
A number of senators and a group of former foreign relations officials, including former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and Lawrence Eagleburger, urge President Clinton to authorize a bipartisan commission to review US Cuba policy. (Journal of Commerce, 15 October 1998, 1A; Reuters, 11 November 1998)
January 5, 1999
President Clinton rejects the plan for a bipartisan commission to review Cuba policy, but allows the resumption of direct postal services, increased air service, authorization of any US citizen, not just family members, to send as much as $1,200 a year to Cuba, and permits, on a case-by-case basis, sales of food and agricultural inputs to private and nongovernmental organizations in Cuba. (Washington Post, 5 January 1999, A1, A12; Financial Times, 6 January 1999, 6; USIS, 6 January 1999)
February 17, 1999
Cuban government launches a crackdown on political opponents. National Assembly passes a new law restricting access to, possession of, and dissemination of "subversive" information produced by the US or seeking to assist the US in "subverting the revolution and reinforcing the embargo." OAS strongly criticizes this move by Cuba. (Financial Times, 16 February 1999, 16; Washington Post, 23 February 1999, A13; USIS, 23 February 1999)
March 1999
For the first time since 1953, Major League Baseball comes to Cuba when the Baltimore Orioles play an all-star Cuban team in Havana. The game is authorized by the Clinton administration as part of its effort to improve relations with the Cuban people but only with assurances that the Cuban government will not receive any revenues from the game. (USIS, 8 March 1999; Washington Post, 30 March 1999, A8)
8 July 1999
European Communities lodge WTO complaint against the US for a provision of the FY1999 Department of Commerce and Related Agencies Appropriations Act that bars US courts from recognizing trademarks that are used in connection with businesses or assets confiscated in Cuba (unless the original trademark owner consents). In 2002, the WTO rules for the EC, concluding that the US grants access to its courts in trademark cases in a discriminatory manner by excluding Cuban nationals and foreign successors-in-interest. The US and EC eventually reach an agreement that the EC would not request WTO authorization to retaliate, but reserves the right to do so. The law stems from a dispute between the French spirits company, Pernod Ricard, and the Bermuda-based Bacardi Ltd. Bacardi believes it retains the rights to the trademark for Havana Club rum. Pernod Ricard, having entered into a joint venture with the Cuban government to produce and export Havana Club, believes that it holds the rights, and wants to protect them in the event that the US trade embargo is lifted. (Rennack and Sullivan 2005, 21-22; CRS 2006, 19)
July 1999
Cuba mandates that the euro be used in transactions with countries in the euro-zone. The Cuban central bank claims that the move to the euro will simplify financial operations and bring multiple benefits. Castro proclaims that use of the euro will help to free Cuba “from the privileges and tyranny of the dollar.” (Financial Times, 3 July 1999, 4)
June 2000
Five-year old Cuban Elian Gonzalez is returned to Cuba. US public attention had centered on Elian’s legal journey after he was found clinging to an inner tube off the coast of Fort Lauderdale. His mother had drowned on the voyage; his father, still in Cuba, called for Elian’s return. Ultimately the US recognized Elian’s father as the sole authority to speak on the boy’s behalf. Elian’s return to Cuba comes in spite of legal appeals from his relatives in Miami. (Rennack and Sullivan 2005, 286)
28 October 2000
Congress passes the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (Title IX of the Agriculture Appropriations Act of 2000), which provides for the granting of one-year export licenses for shipping food and medicine to Cuba. No export assistance is to be made available, and all transactions must be conducted in advance with cash or through third country financing. The law also creates a specific license to permit travel for those conducting business related to the newly permitted food and medicine sales. (Rennack and Sullivan 2005, 22)
13 July 2001
President Bush instructs US Treasury to augment the Office of Foreign Assets Control so as to better enforce US sanctions against Cuba. He emphasizes the importance of preventing “unlicensed and excessive travel” to Cuba, limiting remittances, and ensuring that humanitarian and cultural exchanges actually reach pro-democracy activists in Cuba. (Rennack and Sullivan 2005, 2)
16 July 2001
President Bush follows the previous Clinton policy and suspends for an additional six months Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (Helms-Burton Act). He continues to issue these waivers every six months. (New York Times, 17 July 2001, A1; CRS 2006, 15)
10 May 2002
Oswaldo Paya, leader of the Varela Project, delivers a petition to the Cuban National Assembly; 11,000+ Cubans had signed the document to call for a national referendum on restoring freedom of speech and association, free enterprise, the release of political prisoners, and genuine multiparty elections. (Washington Post, 19 June 2002, A20; Washington Post, 25 July 2002, A15)
12 May 2002
Former US President Jimmy Carter arrives in Havana to meet with Fidel Castro. In a speech broadcast live on state-run television and radio, with Castro in attendance, Carter declares that the revolution had failed to protect human rights and endorses greater freedom in Cuba. Carter also calls for an end to the US trade embargo on Cuba. (Washington Post, 13 May 2002, A7; New York Times, 19 May 2002, 2)
20 May 2002
“ ‘President Bush announce[s] an “Initiative for a New Cuba” that include[s] several measures designed to reach out to the Cuban people: facilitating humanitarian assistance to the Cuban people by U.S. religious and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs); providing direct assistance to the Cuban people through NGOs; calling for the resumption of direct mail service between the United States and Cuba; and establishing scholarships in the United States for Cuban students and professionals involved in building civil institutions, and for family members of political prisoners.’ ” (Rennack and Sullivan 2005, 2)
President Bush also sets forth the political and economic measures that Cuba could take to convince the US to ease trade and travel sanctions, including holding free and fair National Assembly elections and adopting market-oriented reforms. (Rennack and Sullivan 2005, 2-3)
2003
Subsequent to its crackdown against dissidents, the Cuban government requires that US diplomats traveling outside of Havana Province must request advance approval; as a result, similar restrictions were placed on Cuban diplomats in the United States. In August 2003, the US State Department imposes “a series of reciprocal terms and conditions on diplomats at the Cuban Interest Section in Washington with respect to the purchase, lease or sale of motor vehicles.” These events cap several years of diplomatic tensions; since 2000 the US has expelled nearly 20 Cuban diplomats for espionage. (Rennack and Sullivan 2005, 281-82)
March 2003
Cuba begins a widespread campaign against democracy advocates, including journalists, librarians, and leaders of independent labor unions. A total of 75 individuals are arrested, given summary trials and sentenced to prison terms ranging from six to 28 years. The Cuban government maintains that the crackdown was justified because those arrested were supported by the US Interests Section in Havana. (CRS 2006, 4)
11 April 2003
Cuban government executes three men who had hijacked a ferry in Havana with the intention of fleeing to the US. (Rennack and Sullivan 2005, 286; CRS 2005, 5)
September 2003
President Bush determines that Cuba has not met the minimum requirements of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000. This finding triggers a prohibition on funding to Cuban government officials to participate in cultural exchange programs. The President also notes that it is the policy of the US to vote against Cuban loans from international financial institutions. (Rennack and Sullivan 2005, 24)
10 October 2003
In the aftermath of Cuba’s crackdown on human rights, President Bush announces a tightening of sanctions through increased border inspections of shipments and travelers to and from Cuba. He also takes steps to make it easier for Cubans wishing to migrate to the US. (Rennack and Sullivan 2005, 3)
2004
For health reasons, the Cuban government releases 14 of the “group of 75” political dissidents that were imprisoned in 2003. (CRS 2005, 4)
February 2004
President Bush instructs the Department of Homeland Security to increase its presence in the waters between Florida and Cuba. (CRS 2006, 13)
9 February 2004
US Treasury designates ten entities owned or controlled by the government of Cuba that violate the US embargo. US citizens are barred from doing business with the group. Nine of the entities are travel companies specializing in Cuba travel; the tenth entity is a gift forwarder to Cuba. (State Department press release, 9 February 2004; New York Times, 10 February 2004, 3)
May–June 2004
Following the recommendations of the Colin Powell-led Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, President Bush allocates $59 million for democracy-building policies, including support for Radio and TV Marti. In June, US Departments of Treasury and Commerce act on other Commission recommendations to further restrict family visits and private humanitarian assistance to Cuba. A State Department Transition Coordinator will be selected later to implement proposed pro-democracy, civil-society building, and public diplomacy projects. (CRS 2006, 13; White House Press Release, 6 May 2004)
September 2004
US Treasury fines Spanish airline Iberia for violation of the Cuban embargo, alleging that Iberia is guilty of the “transportation and importations of Cuban goods to the United States.” This occurred in 2000 when Iberia carried goods between the Spanish-owned Canary Islands and Central America through its Miami hub. Iberia is one of several European firms on which the US has imposed fines for breaking the Cuban embargo laws. Several Italian and Spanish banks and airlines have also been fined for actions such as “transferring funds to Cuba” and “shipping Cuban goods for a third person.” (Financial Times, 2 September 2004, 9; Financial Times, 3 September 2004, 6)
25 October 2004
In a televised address, Cuban President Castro announces that within two weeks the US dollar will be banned from all commercial transactions. Banks will terminate dollar transactions and convert dollar accounts into pesos, and Cuban citizens will pay a 10 percent fee for the exchange. Castro claims that the decision came in response to US sanctions against banks that have transferred dollars to Cuba and US limits on the amount of remittances people can send to relatives in Cuba. US Assistant Secretary of Treasury Juan Carlos Zarate characterizes the act as a scheme for Castro to enrich himself at the expense of the Cuban people. (New York Times, 27 October 2004, A5; Financial Times, 27 October 2004, 6; Treasury press release, 26 October 2004)
July 2005
Hurricane Dennis strikes Cuba, killing 16 people and causing $1.4 billion in damages to housing, infrastructure and agriculture. Three months later in October, Hurricane Wilma hits Cuba, causing $700 million in damage. (CRS 2006, 8-9)
20 January 2006
OFAC issues a license to allow a Cuban team to come to the US to participate in the World Baseball Classic tournament. The license had been denied in 2005 due to concerns that the Cuban government could have benefited financially from the team’s participation. The decision to grant the license came after an assurance that any proceeds earned by the Cuban team would go to benefit victims of Hurricane Katrina. (CRS 2006, 1)
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