An Assessment of the Aldrich H. Ames Espionage Case and Its Implications for U.S. Intelligence - Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - 01 November 1994 - Part One
 Congressional Documents
An Assessment of the Aldrich H. Ames Espionage Case and Its Implications for U.S. Intelligence
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
01 November 1994
Part One
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INTRODUCTION
On February 21, 1994, agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
arrested a 52-year old employee of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
Aldrich Hazen Ames, outside his Arlington, Virginia residence, on charges of
conspiracy to commit espionage on behalf of Russia and the former Soviet
Union. According to the affidavit supporting the arrest warrant, these
activities had begun in April 1985, and continued to the time of the arrest.
Ames's wife, Maria del Rosario Casas Ames, was arrested inside the residence
on the same charges shortly after her husband was taken into custody.
Announced publicly the following day, the arrests prompted outrage and alarm
across the country. Ames had been an employee of CIA for 31 years, with most
of his career spent in the Directorate of Operations, which is responsible for
carrying out CIA clandestine operations around the globe. While the precise
extent of Ames's espionage activities was unclear at the time of his arrest,
Justice Department officials confirmed that Ames was believed to have caused
the death or imprisonment of a number of Soviets who had been sources of the
CIA and FBI. There were calls in Congress for curtailing aid to Russia, and
legislative proposals were introduced within days of the arrests to bolster
government security practices. A CIA team was sent to Moscow to speak with the
Russian intelligence services, but returned empty handed.
President Clinton directed that the senior intelligence officer at the Russian
Embassy in Washington be expelled from the United States in retaliation, while
at the same time cautioning against treating the episode as a cause for
disrupting the fragile political relationship with Russia.
The affidavit made public at the time of the arrests also confirmed that Ames
had received substantial payments for the information he had provided -- money
that he had used years earlier to purchase a new Jaguar automobile and a
$540,000 home, with cash, in Arlington. Apparently, these seemingly large
expenditures by an employee making less than $70,000 a year had not raised
questions at the CIA.
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (hereinafter "the Committee")
received its initial briefing regarding the case on the day the arrests were
publicly announced. The facts contained in the affidavit supporting the arrest
and search warrants were summarized by representatives of the FBI. While
recognizing the need to avoid actions that might complicate or hamper the
ongoing FBI investigation and ultimately the Justice Department's prosecution
of the case, the Committee was deeply concerned that Ames had been able to
carry out his espionage activities without detection for a period of nine
years, despite the presence of circumstances which indicated a security
problem. What had gone wrong?
To answer this question, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Committee wrote
to Frederick P. Hitz, the Inspector General of the CIA on February 23, 1994,
requesting a comprehensive investigation of the Ames case. On March 1, the
Committee met in closed session with Mr. Hitz to discuss the plans to
investigate the Ames case.
In the meantime, the Committee continued to receive off-the-record briefings
from the FBI and CIA regarding the progress of the ongoing investigation. The
searches of Ames's office and residence conducted after the arrests yielded
additional evidence of his relationship with the KGB and, since 1991, with its
successor intelligence service, the SVR. Indeed, it appeared that Ames may
have received approximately $2.5 million for the information he provided. It
was clear the case represented a security breach of disastrous proportions.
On March 10, 1994, the Committee heard testimony in executive session from
Director of Central Intelligence, R. James Woolsey, about the interim actions
he was taking in light of the Ames case. This testimony was supplemented by a
letter from the Director on March 24, 1994, advising the Committee that he
would not promote, advance to a more responsible position, or provide any job-
related recognition to, those responsible for supervising Ames or for dealing
with issues related to the Ames investigation until the Inspector General had
submitted his report on the case. Additional steps to tighten security at the
CIA were also outlined in the letter.
On April 13, 1994, the Committee held another closed session regarding the
Ames case specifically to obtain the response of the CIA to certain stories
which had appeared in the press. In particular, CIA witnesses denied press
accounts that Ames had been warned by a superior that he was under
investigation for espionage.
On April 28, 1994, Ames and his wife, Rosario, pled guilty to charges stemming
from their espionage activities. Entered into the record at the time the pleas
were made was an agreed-upon "Statement of Facts" which provided new details
regarding the Ames's espionage activities. Meetings with the Soviets in
Washington, D.C., Vienna, Bogota, and Caracas were acknowledged for the first
time. Ames also acknowledged that as of May 1, 1989, he had been paid over
$1.8 million by the KGB and that $900,000 more had been set aside for him.
In a statement read to the court at the time the plea agreements were entered,
Ames admitted having compromised "virtually all Soviet agents of the CIA and
other American and foreign services known to me" and having provided to the
Soviet Union and to Russia a "huge quantity of information on United States
foreign, defense and security policies." Ames went on to say:
For those persons in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere who may have
suffered from my actions, I have the deepest sympathy even empathy. We made
similar choices and suffer similar consequences.
As part of their plea agreements, both defendants agreed to cooperate fully
with the government to explain the nature and extent of their espionage
activities. Both signed agreements forfeiting the proceeds of their espionage
activities to the U.S. Government. Ames was sentenced to life in prison, his
wife later received 63 months in prison.
With a trial of the Ameses obviated by the plea agreements, the Committee was
no longer constrained in its inquiry by the possibility of interfering with
the criminal prosecution. At closed hearings held on May 6, June 16, and June
28, the Committee focused upon Ames's espionage activities as well as the
handling of the case by the CIA and FBI. On July 18 a full day was devoted to
a staff briefing by representatives of the CIA and FBI, who covered the case
from start to finish.
These proceedings were supplemented by an interview of Ames by Chairman
DeConcini which occurred on August 5, 1994, at a secure facility in Northern
Virginia. In mid August, copies of the transcripts of the debriefings of Ames
by the FBI were provided to the Committee, as well as copies of the interview
summaries performed by the FBI during the criminal investigation.
On September 24, 1994, the Inspector General of the CIA submitted the report
of his investigation to the Committee. Over 450 pages in length, the report
provided a comprehensive, thorough, and candid assessment of how the CIA had
handled the Ames case. Based upon interviews with over 300 people, including
several interviews with Ames himself, and documentary evidence totaling over
45,000 pages, the report provided a wealth of new information. The Committee,
in fact, relied heavily on this extraordinary report in the preparation of
this report.
Factual Summary Of The Ames Case
A. Ames's Professional and Personal Life Prior to his Espionage Activities
1. 1941 to 1969
Aldrich Hazen ("Rick") Ames was born in River Falls, Wisconsin on May 26,
1941, to Carleton Cecil Ames and Rachel Aldrich Ames. Aldrich Ames was the
oldest of three children and the only son. Carleton Ames received his
doctorate from the University of Wisconsin and taught at River Falls State
Teacher's College; Rachel Ames taught English at a local high school.
According to the IG report, the elder Ames came to work for the CIA's
Directorate of Operations (DO) in 1952. The family moved to the northern
Virginia suburbs, and his wife secured a job teaching English in the Fairfax
County public schools.
The elder Ames had one overseas tour -- accompanied by his family, including
Rick -- in Southeast Asia from 1953 until 1955. CIA records reflect Carleton
Ames received a particularly negative performance appraisal from this tour,
and that the elder Ames had a serious alcohol dependency. Carleton Ames
returned to CIA Headquarters after his overseas tour, and after a 6-month
probationary period, remained in the Directorate of Operations until his
retirement from the CIA in 1967 at the age of 62. Carleton Ames died five
years later of cancer in 1972.
In 1957, after his sophomore year at McLean (Virginia) High School, Rick Ames
secured a summer job at the CIA as a General Schedule (GS)-3 on the federal
government salary scale. (The federal government GS scale is a matrix of
standard salaries from the lowest, GS-1, to the highest, GS-15). He served as
a Records Analyst, where he marked classified documents for filing. He
returned to the same job each summer through 1959.
After graduating from high school, Ames entered the University of Chicago in
the fall of 1959, where he pursued a long time passion for drama, and where he
intended to study foreign cultures and history. In the summer of 1960, he
again obtained employment at the CIA, working as a laborer/painter at a
facility in Virginia. He returned to the University of Chicago in the fall of
1960, but because of failing grades resulting from his devotion to the
theater, he did not finish out the school year. Instead, he worked as an
assistant technical director at a Chicago theater until February 1962, when he
returned to the Washington, D.C. area and obtained full time employment at the
CIA as a GS-4 clerk typist. At this time he performed essentially the same
type of clerical duties he had performed during his summers in high school.
During his March 23, 1962 "entrance on duty" polygraph examination, Ames
admitted that in November 1961 he and a friend, while inebriated, had
"borrowed" a delivery bicycle from a local liquor store, were picked up by the
police, and subsequently released with a reprimand. The polygraph examiner
noted that Ames was "not sparkling, but a friendly, direct type" who was
generally cooperative during the interview. Ames passed the polygraph
examination, and his initial Background Investigation (BI), completed on May
18, 1962, revealed no negative information from police or credit bureau
records.
Ames remained a document analyst at the Agency within the Directorate of
Operations (DO) for the next five years while attending George Washington
University on both a part time and full time basis. In September 1967, he
graduated with a B minus average and a bachelors' degree in history. During
this period, Ames was arrested for intoxication in the District of Columbia in
April 1962. The following year, Ames was arrested for speeding, and again for
reckless driving in 1965. According to Ames, at least one of these latter
incidents was alcohol related. By 1967, Ames had attained the grade of GS-7,
having received good performance appraisals from his supervisors.
According to the IG report, Ames originally viewed his work as a records
analyst as a stopgap measure to finance his way through college. Once he
obtained his diploma, however, Ames applied and was accepted into the Career
Trainee Program at the CIA in 1967. During this training, the CIA taught Ames
the skills necessary for CIA officers to recruit and manage agents those
individuals who provide the CIA with information or other forms of assistance.
Such officers are known within the CIA as "operations officers" or "case
officers."
The CIA conducted a psychological assessment of Ames prior to his training as
an operations officer, a routine procedure for all successful applicants. Ames
placed on the low end of the spectrum in terms of the qualities necessary for
a successful career as an operations officer. Ames appeared to be an
intellectual and a loner, rather than a gregarious person capable of meeting
and recruiting people of diverse backgrounds and cultures. But at the
conclusion of his training, Ames was assessed as a "strong" trainee, depicted
as intelligent, mature, enthusiastic, and industrious.
During this period, Ames met his first wife, also a participant in the CIA's
Career Trainee Program. They were married in May of 1969.
Upon his graduation from the trainee program in October 1968, Ames was
promoted to GS-10 and in October 1969 was given his first overseas assignment
to Ankara, Turkey.
2.1969 to 1981
Ames's Tour In Ankara:
Ames was accompanied by his wife to Turkey where he worked as an operations
officer. Pursuant to CIA policy, his wife was required to resign from the
Agency, but continued to perform part-time administrative work in her
husband's office.
During his first year in Ankara, Ames was rated as a "strong" performer and
was promoted to GS-11 in 1970. His performance during the second and third
years gradually declined. At the end of the second year, he was rated as
"proficient," and by the end of the third year, Ames's superiors considered
him unsuited for field work and expressed the view that perhaps he should
spend the remainder of his career at CIA Headquarters in Langley -- a
devastating assessment for an operations officer. Ames's overall evaluation
was "satisfactory." Ames was deeply bothered and discouraged by this critical
assessment of his job performance. Indeed, Ames would subsequently reflect to
colleagues in 1988 that his Ankara tour was "unhappy" and "unsuccessful" and
he seriously considered leaving the CIA.
Ames's Subsequent Assignment in the U.S:
In 1972, Ames returned to CIA headquarters where he spent the next 4 years in
the Soviet-East European (SE) Division of the DO. In 1973, he was given
Russian language training, and thereafter was assigned to a position where he
supported CIA operations against Soviet officials in the U.S. While at
Headquarters, Ames won generally enthusiastic reviews from his supervisors,
apparently because he was more proficient in managing paperwork and planning
field operations than being "on the front lines" as an agent recruiter.
Yet evidence of Ames's drinking problems also surfaced during this period. At
a Christmas party on December 20, 1973 Ames became so drunk that he had to be
helped to his home by employees from CIA's Office of Security. The following
Christmas, Ames also became intoxicated and was discovered by an Agency
security officer in a compromising position with a female CIA employee. Each
incident resulted in an Office of Security "eyes only" memorandum being placed
in his security file, but it does not appear that his supervisors were made
aware of these incidents.
Ames served as a desk officer supporting field operations through June 1976.
He received four evaluations rating him as a "strong performer" and one as
"proficient," and there were occasional commendations for his motivation and
effectiveness. However, these favorable evaluations also noted Ames's
procrastination and inattention to detail -- issues that would become chronic
problems.
Following his tour at CIA headquarters, Ames was assigned to New York City
from 1976 until 1981, where he handled two important Soviet assets for the
CIA. The performance appraisals Ames received during this period were the
highest of his career. Rated four of the five years as "superior" or
"invariably exceeding work standards," Ames's supervisors regarded him as
interested, articulate, and capable. As a result of these evaluations, Ames
received several promotions and a bonus. At the conclusion of his New York
tour in 1981, he was ranked near the top of all operations officers at his
grade level (GS-13). Subsequently, in May 1982, largely on the basis of his
performance in New York, Ames received what was to become his last promotion
to GS-14.
Despite his generally favorable performance in New York, Ames's supervisors
continued to note his tendency to procrastinate, particularly in terms of his
late submissions of his financial accountings and operational contact reports.
Ames's inattention to detail led to two significant security violations during
this period. In an incident which occurred in 1976 when Ames was on his way to
meet a Soviet asset, he left his briefcase on a subway train. The briefcase
contained classified operational materials which could have compromised the
Soviet asset concerned. Within hours, the FBI retrieved the briefcase from a
Polish emigre who had found it, but it was unclear to what extent the
information may have been compromised. Although Ames himself later reflected
that the incident made him consider leaving the CIA, it appears that he
received only a verbal reprimand. Several years later, in October 1980, Ames
was cited for leaving TOP SECRET communications equipment unsecured in his
office, but this, too, did not result in an official reprimand.
During Ames's assignment to New York, it also appears his marital relationship
grew strained. He turned down several overseas assignments because his wife
preferred to stay in New York. Realizing, however, that frequent rejections of
overseas assignments would negatively impact on his career, Ames accepted an
assignment in September 1981 for Mexico where he believed he could stay in
fairly close contact with his wife, who remained in New York.
3. 1982 to 1983
In Mexico, Ames continued to specialize in Soviet cases. While his first
performance appraisal was generally positive, his second and final evaluations
grew progressively weaker. As in Turkey, Ames appeared stronger handling
established sources rather than developing new ones. While in Mexico, Ames
spent little time working outside the office, developed few assets, and was
chronically late with his financial accountings. Ames's evaluations were
"generally unenthusiastic," and focused heavily on his poor administrative
work. Nevertheless, Ames's superiors gave him overall grades which indicated
he "occasionally exceeds the work standards" and his "performance is good."
CIA records reflect that in 1982, Ames was considered for a Deputy Chief of
Station assignment in another Latin American country. Yet neither of his
immediate supervisors supported the assignment, primarily because of his
mediocre job performance.
Ames Meets Rosario:
While he had hoped that his marriage could endure during his unaccompanied
tour in Mexico, Ames engaged in at least three extramarital affairs during the
early part of this assignment. Toward the end of 1982, Ames realized he had no
desire to salvage his marriage. It was during this period in late 1982 that he
met Maria del Rosario Casas Dupuy (hereinafter referred to as "Rosario"), the
cultural attaché at the Colombian Embassy in Mexico City.
They were introduced through a CIA colleague of Ames who had recruited Rosario
in October 1982 as a paid source. By virtue of her membership on the board of
the local diplomatic association, she knew diplomats from many of the
embassies in Mexico, including a KGB officer who served on the same board.
Ames's relationship with Rosario grew increasingly serious until he eventually
proposed marriage to her. Despite Agency regulations, Ames did not report his
romance with a foreign national to his superiors. Some of Ames's colleagues
were aware of the relationship, but this did not prompt Ames to file the
necessary report.
Ames's Drinking Problem:
Ames's lackluster performance appraisals during the Mexico assignment were
partially due to a growing pattern of heavy drinking. In an interview with
Chairman DeConcini, Ames noted that he had a reputation for "regularly going
out with a group of people, taking long lunches, and having too much to
drink." He recalled one particular episode at a diplomatic reception at the
American Embassy in Mexico City, where he had had too much to drink and became
involved in a loud and boisterous argument with a Cuban official. On another
occasion, Ames was involved in a traffic accident in Mexico City and was so
drunk he could not answer police questions or recognize the U.S. Embassy
officer sent to help him.
According to Ames, the episode with the Cuban official "caused alarm" with his
superiors. He was counseled by one superior, and another supervisor sent a
message to CIA headquarters recommending that Ames undergo an assessment for
alcohol abuse when he returned to the United States.
On Ames's return from Mexico, he had one counseling session but there was no
follow up program of treatment. Ames was administered blood tests which proved
normal, and he denied to the counselor that he had a drinking problem. The IG
report indicates that the medical office was not aware of, and did not
request, additional information about Ames's drinking habits, either from the
Office of Security or the DO, prior to the counseling session.
Ames said in an interview after his arrest that there were "many much more
serious problems of alcohol abuse" within the directorate. He said that his
alcohol problem had "slopped over" only once during a formal occasion (at the
embassy reception in Mexico City), and only on "a couple of less formal
occasions."
In February 1983, the CIA Office of Security conducted a routine background
investigation of Ames. The investigative report noted that Ames was a social
drinker who was inclined to become a bit enthusiastic when he overindulged in
alcohol. But no serious alcohol problem was identified.
Furthermore, although Ames's supervisor in Mexico City had recommended to CIA
headquarters that Ames be counseled for his drinking problem, this was not
made known at the time to his prospective supervisors in the SE Division, who
were unaware of this growing personal problem.
In April 1983, a former colleague of Ames, who had served with him in New York
and was now in a supervisory position in the SE Division of the DO, requested
that Ames be assigned to a position in the SE Division after his tour in
Mexico. Despite his poor performance and alcohol problem, Ames's Mexico City
supervisors did not object to his new assignment, which placed him in the most
sensitive element of the DO -- responsible for the Agency's Soviet
counterintelligence activities.
4. September 1983 to April 1985
When Ames returned to headquarters in September 1983, he was made
counterintelligence branch chief for Soviet operations, responsible for
analyzing selected CIA operations involving Soviet "assets." Ames was
regularly involved in reviewing whether asset cases were genuine, whether
there were security problems evident, or whether a particular agent had been
compromised.
In this counterintelligence function, Ames was in a position to gain access to
all CIA operations involving Soviet intelligence officers worldwide. His
assignment also gave him access to all CIA plans and operations targeted
against the KGB and GRU intelligence services.
In March 1984, in addition to his full time responsibilities as chief of the
Soviet counterintelligence branch, Ames began providing intermittent support
to a CIA field office responsible for developing Soviet sources in Washington,
D.C. area. He met occasionally with one Soviet official to assess that
individual as a potential source, and when that individual returned to the
Soviet Union, Ames established a new relationship with another Soviet embassy
official, Sergey Dmitriyevich Chuvakhin, also to assess him.
Ames conducted these contacts with the approval of the CIA local field office,
the FBI, as well as the approval of his immediate supervisor in SE Division.
Ames was required to report all such contacts to the CIA, and the CIA was
required to coordinate these activities with the FBI. The Committee was
advised that it was not unusual for CIA officers, posted to headquarters, to
support other ongoing CIA operations in this manner.
Judging from his performance appraisals, Ames performed well in his new
assignment in the SE Division. His ratings were noticeably improved over those
in Mexico City. He was judged "above average" and described as "something of a
Soviet scholar...(with) considerable experience in working sensitive cases."
He was also cited as a good manager. His supervisor -- the same one who had
given him the highest possible ratings in New York downgraded Ames slightly to
a rating which indicated he "frequently exceeds the work standards" and his
"performance is excellent." There was no evidence in his file of the drinking
problem that had surfaced in Mexico.
In November 1983, Ames submitted an "outside activity" report to the Office of
Security, noting his relationship with Rosario Casas. This was shortly before
Rosario came to the United States and began living with Ames in his Falls
Church apartment.
On April 17, 1984, Ames notified the CIA of his intention to marry Rosario. In
accordance with CIA policy, this triggered a background investigation of
Rosario. On August 27, 1984, Rosario was given a polygraph exam, which is
standard procedure for a foreign national marrying a CIA officer. She passed
the exam with no indication of deception. The Office of Security completed a
background investigation of Rosario on November 5, 1984 which included
interviews with five of her friends and associates, some of whom commented
that "she came from a prominent, wealthy family in Colombia." However, CIA did
not conduct any specific financial checks in Colombia to verify these
statements.
While the polygraph examination and background investigation did not turn up
any derogatory information concerning Rosario, the counterintelligence staff
of the DO nonetheless recommended that in light of Ames's intent to marry a
foreign national, he be transferred from his position as branch chief in the
counterintelligence section of the SE Division to a less sensitive position in
the Directorate of Operations. This recommendation was accepted by the Deputy
Director for Operations (DDO), but there is no record of any further action by
DO management.
In the summer of 1984 or 1985, after consuming several alcoholic drinks at a
meeting with his Soviet contact, Ames continued to drink at a CIA FBI softball
game until he became seriously inebriated. Ames had to be driven home that
night and "left behind at the field his badge, cryptic notes, a wallet which
included alias identification documents, and his jacket." Some recall that
senior SE Division managers were either present or later made aware of this
incident, but the record does not reflect any action was taken as a result.
Ames was involved in another breach of security in the fall of 1984, this time
involving Rosario. Ames had been temporarily detailed to work in New York. It
had been arranged that Ames and two other officers would travel to New York
and stay at Agency-provided housing. Ames showed up with Rosario. One of the
other officers complained to a local CIA officer that Rosario's presence in
the Agency housing compromised the cover of the other case officers as well as
their activities. A second CIA officer confronted Ames and reported the matter
to senior CIA management in New York. Ames says he complied with a management
instruction to move to a hotel room. There is no record that any disciplinary
action was taken against Ames in this matter, but both Ames and a Headquarters
officer recall that Ames was told that he had exercised bad judgment when he
returned to Washington.
Divorce and Financial Pressures:
In October 1983, Ames formally separated from his first wife, who by this time
had found new employment and continued to live in New York. The couple
ratified a "Property Stipulation" in which Ames agreed to pay her $300 per
month for 42 months, beginning in June 1985 and continuing through November
1989. This placed a new cumulative debt on Ames of $12,600. Ames also agreed
as part of the separation agreement to pay all the outstanding credit card and
other miscellaneous debts, which totaled $33,350.
The IG report indicates that Ames believed his divorce settlement threatened
to bankrupt him. At the same time, Ames acknowledged that his indebtedness had
grown since Rosario came to live with him in December 1983. He faced a new car
loan, a signature loan, and mounting credit card payments.
On September 19, 1984, Ames's wife filed for divorce on grounds of mental
cruelty. Divorce proceedings began the following month and lasted into the
next year.
Ames later told Senator DeConcini that these financial difficulties led him to
first contemplate espionage between December 1984 and February 1985:
I felt a great deal of financial pressure, which, in retrospect, I was clearly
overreacting to. The previous two years that I had spent in Washington, I had
incurred a certain amount of personal debt in terms of buying furniture for an
apartment and my divorce settlement had left me with no property essentially.
Together with a cash settlement of about $12,000 to buy out my pension over
time, I think I may have had about $10,000 or $13,000 in debt. It was not a
truly desperate situation but it was one that somehow really placed a great
deal of pressure on me... Rosario was living with me at the time...I was
contemplating the future. I had no house, and we had strong plans to have a
family, and so I was thinking in the longer term...
It was these pressures, says Ames, which in April 1985, led him to conceive of
"a scam to get money from the KGB."
B. Ames's Espionage and the Government's Attempts to Catch a Spy
1 April 1985 to July 1986
Ames Offers His Services:
With his considerable knowledge of Soviet operations and experience in
clandestine operations, Aldrich Ames conceived of a plan to obtain money from
the Soviets without being detected by the CIA or the FBI.
As summarized in the previous section, Ames routinely assisted another CIA
office which assessed Soviet embassy officials as potential intelligence
assets. His SE Division manager agreed to and sanctioned his work in this area
in late 1983 or early 1984, even though Ames was in a counterintelligence job
which gave him access to both former and active CIA operational cases
involving Soviet intelligence officers. Ames initially coordinated his
contacts with the FBI, and he worked out the operational details with the
local CIA office responsible for such operations.
According to Ames, he contacted selected Soviet officials using an assumed
name and fake job description identifying himself as a Soviet Union expert
with the Intelligence Community Staff.
Using this cover, he met with a particular Soviet official for almost a year.
When this official returned to Moscow, he suggested Ames continue his contacts
with a Soviet Embassy official Sergey Dmitriyevich Chuvakhin, a member of the
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs who specialized in arms control matters. In
April 1985, Ames arranged a meeting with Chuvakhin. Chuvakhin thought the
meeting was to discuss broad U.S.-Soviet security concerns, and the CIA
thought Ames was meeting with Chuvakhin to assess the Soviet as a possible
source for U.S. intelligence. In fact, Ames planned to offer the Soviets
classified information in exchange for money.
Ames entered the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. on 16 April 1985 and
handed an envelope to the duty officer at the reception desk, while asking for
Chuvakhin by name. The message was addressed to the Russian officer he knew to
be the most senior KGB officer at the embassy. Although unspoken, it was
implied that Ames wanted the letter delivered to the KGB officer. The duty
officer nodded his understanding. Ames then had a short conversation with
Chuvakhin and departed the embassy.
Inside the envelope left with the duty officer at the Soviet Embassy was a
note which described two or three CIA cases involving Soviets who had
approached the CIA to offer their services. The CIA believed each to be
controlled by the KGB, (i.e. "double agents") and thus, Ames thought that
disclosing to the KGB that these Soviets were working with the CIA was
"essentially valueless information." Nonetheless, he thought providing such
information would establish his bona fides as a CIA insider. (Later, Ames
disclosed to the KGB that, in fact, the CIA believed these Soviets were
controlled "double agents.")
To further establish his bona fides, Ames included a page from an internal SE
Division directory with his true name highlighted. He also listed an alias he
had assumed when meeting Soviet officials earlier in his career. Finally, he
requested a payment of $50,000. Ames has stated he did not ask for a follow up
meeting or suggest possible future means of communication with the KGB in this
initial letter. Several weeks later, however, Chuvakhin scheduled another
luncheon with Ames. According to Ames, he entered the Soviet Embassy on May
15, 1985 and asked for Chuvakhin, but instead was escorted to a private room.
A KGB officer came in and passed him a note which said that the KGB had agreed
to pay him $50,000. The KGB note also stated that they would like to continue
to use Chuvakhin as an intermediary between the KGB and Ames. Two days later,
on 17 May, Ames met Chuvakhin and received a payment of $50,000 cash.
Motivation for Continuing his Espionage Activities:
Ames has admitted that his motivation to commit treason changed over time.
Because of his perception of his growing financial problems, Ames say he
initially planned a one time "con game" to provide the Soviets with the
identities of their own double agent operatives, in return for a one-time
payment of $50,000 to cover his debts. He guessed the KGB would pay him the
$50,000 and thought this would solve most of his outstanding financial
problems.
What motivated Ames to continue the relationship with the KGB after the
$50,000 payment is not altogether clear, even to Ames himself. In an interview
with Senator DeConcini, Ames observed that he viewed his request for $50,000
as a "one time deal." Ames stated that " ...(a)t that time in May when I had
got the money, I figured I was finished." Ames elaborated in the interview:
I'm still puzzled as to what took me to the next steps. The main factor, on
balance I think, was a realization after I had received the $50,000, was a
sense of the enormity of what I had done. I think I had managed under the
stress of money and thinking, conceiving the plan I had carried out in April,
I saw it as perhaps a clever, ...not a game, but a very clever plan to do one
thing. ...(I)t came home to me, after the middle of May, the enormity of what
I had done. The fear that I had crossed a line which I had not clearly
considered before. That I crossed a line I could never step back. And...I
think in retrospect, it is very difficult for me to reconstruct my thoughts at
the time. Before April, I can very well. It was a very rational, clever plan,
cut between the middle of May and the middle of June ...it was as if I were
sleepwalking. I can't really reconstruct my thinking. It was as if I were in
almost a state of shock. The realization of what I had done. But certainly
underlying it was the conviction that there was as much money as I could ever
use. If I chose to do that.
Ames has also told FBI investigators involved in his debriefings that, in
retrospect, he left his initial communication with the Soviets open ended so
that they would expect his continued cooperation. After the KGB paid him the
$50,000, according to an FBI official, Ames "decided that he wasn't going to
stop at that point."
Increased Espionage Activities:
Ames's next step dealt a crippling blow to the CIA's Soviet operations.
According to interviews with Ames, without any prompting or direction by the
KGB or any promise of additional money, he met again with Chuvakhin on June
13, 1985, and provided copies of documents which identified over ten top-level
CIA and FBI sources who were then reporting on Soviet activities. CIA
officials have testified that Ames provided the "largest amount of sensitive
documents and critical information, that we know anyway, that have ever been
passed to the KGB in one particular meeting..." Ames wrapped up five to seven
pounds of message traffic in plastic bags and hand carried them out of the CIA
Headquarters building for delivery to the KGB, knowing that the CIA no longer
examined packages carried out of the building by Agency employees. Ames would
use this simple and straightforward method at both CIA Headquarters and during
his Rome assignment to provide information to the KGB. In court documents
filed for this case, Ames admitted he disclosed the identities of Russian
military and intelligence officers who were cooperating with the CIA and
friendly foreign intelligence services. Some of these officials held high
level jobs within the Soviet military and intelligence services. For example,
the court documents stated, one particular asset was "a KGB officer stationed
in Moscow who had provided valuable intelligence including, the revelation
that the KGB used an invisible substance referred to as `spy dust' to surveil
U.S. officials in Moscow." Ames has also admitted that part of his rationale
for exposing these operations to the KGB was because he sought to protect his
own role as KGB informant by eliminating those KGB assets who could be in the
best position to tell the CIA of Ames's espionage.
The CIA Recognizes a Problem:
In the months ahead, the CIA would begin to learn of the loss of the sources
identified by Ames on June 13, 1985.
But unbeknownst to the CIA, at virtually the same time Ames began his
relationship with the KGB, a former CIA employee, who had had access to some
of the same Soviet cases which were disclosed by Ames, was himself cooperating
with the Soviets.
Edward Lee Howard:
The CIA had hired Edward Lee Howard in 1981, and as part of his training for
an initial assignment in Moscow, Howard had been given access to the details
of certain CIA operations in the Soviet Union, including identifying
information on several CIA sources. In 1983, after Howard made damaging
admissions during a polygraph examination which indicated serious suitability
problems, the CIA abruptly terminated Howard's employment with the CIA. His
bitterness toward the CIA gradually increased over the next year. Late in
1984, Howard decided to retaliate by compromising several CIA operations to
the KGB. He is believed to have met with the KGB in January 1985, and again
several months later in May 1985, and presumably disclosed the details of
several CIA operations.
For CIA officials, the recognition of the source and extent of the losses of
its Soviet operations took months to piece together. In May 1985 -- several
weeks before Ames passed his list of sources to the KGB -- officials in the
Directorate of Operations began to sense a possible security problem when a
CIA source was suddenly recalled to the Soviet Union. Later that summer, the
CIA became aware that a Soviet source handled by British intelligence had been
recalled to Moscow and was accused of spying.
Then on June 13, 1985 the same day that Ames gave the list of CIA and FBI
sources to the KGB in Washington the KGB thwarted a planned meeting between
one of the sources disclosed by Ames and a CIA officer in the Soviet Union,
indicating to CIA officials that the Soviet asset had been compromised.
(Although it is now presumed that Howard had enabled the KGB to identify this
source, the source was also among those identified by Ames in his 13 June 1985
transmittal to the KGB.)
The CIA began to focus on Howard as the source of these compromises in August
1985 when a high-level KGB defector, Vitaly Yurchenko, told CIA he had seen
cables in 1984 which identified a former CIA employee named "Robert" as a KGB
source. Soon afterward, as a result of the debriefings of Yurchenko, the CIA
deter mined that "Robert" was, in fact, Edward Lee Howard.
While Yurchenko was being debriefed in Washington, Howard was meeting with the
KGB in Vienna. At that meeting the KGB warned him that one of their officers
with knowledge of his case was missing. On September 21, 1985, two days after
a meeting with the FBI where he was confronted with Yurchenko's allegations,
Howard eluded FBI surveillance and fled the United States for Helsinki,
Finland, and ultimately settled in the Soviet Union. He has effectively eluded
U.S. authorities ever since.
More Losses Surface:
As the Howard case was unfolding, the CIA learned in September 1985 that a
source in Moscow had been arrested for espionage. In October 1985, the CIA
learned that a second intelligence asset in a European country, who returned
to Moscow in August on home leave, had never returned to his post. In December
of that year, the CIA learned that this asset had also been arrested. In
January of 1986, the CIA learned that a third source posted in a European
country had been taken into custody by Soviet authorities in November and
returned to Moscow. These assets, whose arrests were reported in the fall of
1985, were regarded among the most important CIA human sources at the time.
All of these sources were later executed.
According to a CIA analysis, Howard had known of none of these agents. Thus,
while Howard's treachery had initially clouded the picture, it was clear to
the SE Division of the Directorate of Operations by the end of 1985 that the
defection of Howard alone could not explain the disastrous events which were
unfolding.
Indeed, throughout 1986, CIA continued to learn of Agency operations that had
been compromised to the Soviets. As one CIA officer put it, "they were
wrapping up our cases with reckless abandon." This was, by all accounts,
highly unusual behavior for the KGB. If the KGB had recruited an agent within
the CIA, the last thing they would likely do -- according to the prevailing
wisdom among the Agency's professional "spy catchers" -- would be to draw
attention to the agent by suddenly "rolling up" all the cases he knew about.
According to the CIA IG report, Ames says that his KGB handlers recognized the
dangers of what they had done. They told Ames that they regretted putting him
in such a position, but believed their political leadership felt they had
little choice but to take those steps.
In all, there were over 20 operations compromised to the Soviets during this
period, less than half of which could plausibly be attributed to Edward Lee
Howard. In addition, other U.S. intelligence activities which had clearly not
been known to Howard were also compromised during this time period.
The compromise of the identities of these intelligence agents amounted to a
virtual collapse of the CIA's Soviet operations.
The CIA's Initial Response:
Each of the cases the CIA learned had been compromised in the fall of 1985 was
separately analyzed by the counterintelligence element of the SE Division to
attempt to ascertain the reason for the compromise.
The CIA first suspected that the KGB had penetrated its communications with
the field, using either technical means or a human source. To ascertain
whether this was true, the CIA in late 1985, ran probes and tests which
elicited no discernible response from the KGB.
In reaction to the compromises that had occurred, the SE Division in January
1986, put in place "draconian measures" to limit access to its ongoing Soviet
operations and to ensure that communications from the field were accessible
only to the few employees of SE Division working on the operations. SE
Division greatly limited the number of personnel who had access to the new
agent cases.
It is also clear that by January 1986, Director Casey had been apprised of the
situation. His initial response appears to have been to request a senior CIA
official, a former Inspector General and Deputy Director for Operations, to
review each of the cases known to have been compromised and to analyze the
reasons for the failures.
According to individual recollections, the senior official concerned provided
a 9-10 page memorandum which concluded that each of the compromised cases
could be attributed to problems evident in each case. The possibility of a
technical penetration of CIA facilities or communications also was apparently
noted. (The 1994 CIA IG report notes that the theory that each case might have
held "the seeds of its own destruction" was "never totally rejected as the
answer to the compromises despite the rate at which the SE Division was losing
cases, which pointed to more than sheer coincidence."
Apparently motivated by the report from the senior official, DCI Casey
convened what is believed to be the first meeting with senior staff of the
Directorate of Operations in April 1986 to discuss the compromised cases.
According to individual recollections, Casey was told that the SE Division was
reviewing the files pertaining to the cases and was exploring the potential
for a technical compromise, but no further action resulted from the meeting.
In fact, the SE Division was continuing to get new Soviet cases by this time
which appeared to be surviving. This development appears to have led some to
conclude several years later that whatever the source of the compromises had
been, it no longer seemed to be causing problems.
Ironically, around the same time, the CIA Inspector General and the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) issued assessments of
the CIA's handling of the Howard case, which specifically identified serious
institutional and attitudinal problems in the CIA's handling of
counterintelligence cases. The PFIAB report noted in particular that "senior
CIA officers continued to misread or ignore signs that Howard was a major CIA
problem. This myopia was partially ascribed to a fundamental inability of
anyone in the SE Division to think the unthinkable -- that a DO employee could
engage in espionage." The report went on to recommend that CIA component heads
report counterintelligence information to the Office of Security, and that the
Office of Security serve as focal point for informing the FBI of such matters.
In June 1986, (as SE Division officers reviewed various alternatives to
explain the Ames losses,) DCI Casey reacted strongly to the CIA IG and PFIAB
findings. He sent a June 4 memorandum to the Deputy Director for Operations
(DDO) Clair George saying that he was appalled by the DO's handling of the
Howard case, especially the Directorate's "unwillingness to accept even as a
possibility a DO officer committing espionage for the Soviet Union." He stated
that the DDO and the SE Division Chief were deserving of censure, and DO
division and staff chiefs were to be instructed that "the DO must be more
alert to possible CI cases in the ranks." In the future, any suggestion of
such a development was to be shared with the Director, Office of Security and
Chief, Counterintelligence Staff. The memorandum from Casey held the DDO
personally responsible for correcting "deficiencies in process, organization
and attitude that contributed to (the Howard) catastrophe." Also, the DCI
charged the Chief, SE Division to take personal responsibility in the future
for the selection of division officers for particularly sensitive posts. The
DCI's memorandum was forwarded to the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs for information.
While Casey reacted strongly to the criticisms of the Agency's handling of the
Howard case, his admonitions to the DO do not appear to have significantly
affected the efforts to resolve the 1985 compromises.)
Ames Continues His Double Life:
While the CIA attempted to sort out what had gone so drastically wrong with
its Soviet operations, Ames continued to provide the KGB with classified
information from May 1985 until he left for an overseas assignment in Rome in
July 1986. Ames met repeatedly with Chuvakhin, his intermediary, and passed a
wealth of detail about Soviets targeted by the CIA, double agent operations,
the identity of other CIA agents, background information on his past tours,
and CIA modus operandi. In the end, the FBI identified over 14 occasions
between May 1985 and July 1986 when Chuvakhin met with Ames, although Ames
believes there were probably a few more meetings which were not detected by
the Bureau.
In order to maintain a plausible cover for his frequent lunches with
Chuvakhin, Ames filed reports with the CIA which summarized his meetings, and
he met occasionally with CIA and FBI officials to discuss the progress of his
recruitment operation targeted against Chuvakhin.
According to testimony from CIA officials, Ames was walking a difficult line:
Rick was trying to play a funny game, you know, because in one sense he was --
he wanted to make it look good enough so that everybody would want to continue
the operation, but on the other hand not to make it look so good that people
would start to focus on it. And not to make it look so good that when Rick
decided to withdraw from it, that someone else would want to take over the
case.
By July 1985, Ames stopped reporting to the FBI and the CIA on his meetings
with Chuvakhin. He verbally reported some of his contacts to the CIA office he
was supporting, and the CIA office passed on the relevant operational details
to the FBI. The FBI was aware that the meetings continued and requested that
the CIA follow-up to ensure that Ames submitted formal reports of the
meetings, as required by both organizations. The FBI presumed that the CIA
knew of the meetings and that Ames was simply slow in getting the paper work
done. According to FBI officials:
There were two or three times that our people either went over there and
finally actually sent a communication over asking CIA why aren't we receiving
any of the reports of these meetings. But the reports were never forthcoming
and neither CIA nor FBI, followed up. Also, the reports that were made were
not shown to his current bosses in SE.
The CIA did attempt to get Ames to provide reports of his meetings with
Chuvakhin after he had been reassigned to Rome, but Ames never responded and
no further action appears to have been taken.
In fact, there appears to have been a breakdown in the monitoring of Ames's
operational relationship with Chuvakhin. Ames's immediate supervisor in SE
Division had given his approval for the contacts between Ames and the Soviet
Embassy official in early 1984. On the other hand, this manager did not have
supervisory authority over the operation against Chuvakhin, a role correctly
assumed by the officers in the CIA field office responsible for monitoring CIA
contacts with Soviets within the U.S. (These officers had also approved Ames's
contacts with Chuvakhin.) Yet the field officers did not monitor his contacts
closely, and did not keep Ames's SE Division management well informed about
the case, or alert Ames's direct supervisors when Ames failed to report
regularly on his meetings.
Senior SE Division supervisors in 1985 who were in positions to know both
about Ames's counterintelligence role at headquarters, as well as about CIA
field office operations targeted against Soviet Embassy officials in
Washington, have stated that they were unaware of his meetings with Soviet
Embassy officials and would have disapproved such meetings had they known of
them, in light of Ames's sensitive position in the counterintelligence branch.
Ames received, in addition to the initial payment of $50,000, regular cash
payments during his subsequent luncheons with Chuvakhin, in amounts ranging
between $20,000 and $50,000. At some point between October and December 1985,
the Soviets told him he would be paid an additional $2 million, above and
beyond the recurring cash payments. He was advised that the Soviets would hold
the money for him. Ames has said he did not solicit this money and never made
any additional request for money beyond his first meeting, but that the KGB
promise of $2 million "sealed his cooperation."
Ames maintained several local bank accounts in his name, as well as in his new
wife's name, where he would regularly deposit the cash he received from the
Soviets. When Ames received a payment from the KGB, he generally broke it down
into smaller cash deposits -- in increments under $10,000 in order to avoid
bank reporting requirements which might have led to inquiries by banking
regulators.
Sometime after his marriage to Rosario, Ames developed a cover story to
explain his increased wealth in order to hide the true source of the funds.
His co-workers recalled that Ames did not dispel the notion that Rosario came
from a wealthy and established family in Colombia. Ames explained to several
colleagues that Rosario had a share of the inheritance and the family
business, which continued to generate substantial revenue. Ames claims that he
did not express this in the presence of Rosario or close friends since they
would know that this was untrue. However, at least one colleague recalls
Rosario being present during conversations in Rome when Ames discussed
Rosario's family wealth.
Personal and Professional Developments:
In addition to initiating his relationship with the KGB, Ames's personal life
and CIA career also changed during this period. On 1 August 1985, Ames was
given final approval for his divorce from his first wife. On 10 August he
married Maria de Rosario Casas Dupuy in the Unitarian Church in Arlington,
Virginia.
At the same time Ames's personal life was taking a new course, there was a
significant development in his professional responsibilities. On August 1,
1985, Vitaly Yurchenko, a colonel in the KGB, defected to the United States,
and Ames was selected as one of three CIA officers to conduct the debriefings
of Yurchenko. Yurchenko was considered one of the most important Soviet
defectors in the CIA's history and provided a wealth of information regarding
KGB operations targeted against the United States (including the information
which led to the identification of Edward Lee Howard, as explained above). In
all, Ames debriefed Yurchenko on 20 occasions during August and September
1985. At times he was left alone with Yurchenko. But there is nothing on the
record to indicate either that Yurchenko was aware of Ames's relationship with
the KGB or that Ames communicated this information to Yurchenko. Ames does
admit to advising his KGB contacts at the Soviet Embassy of everything
Yurchenko was providing in his debriefings.
During the course of these debriefings, Ames took Rosario to the safe house
where Yurchenko was staying, again violating CIA regulations. While the Chief,
SE Division was upset by this, it does not appear to have prompted any
official action.
In October 1985, Ames left the debriefing effort to begin full-time language
training for a new assignment in Rome. During this training, as previously
noted, Ames continued to meet with Soviet Embassy official Chuvakhin. Ames had
requested assignment in Rome in 1984, but this request was not approved until
July 1985, after Ames had begun his espionage activities. While the new
assignment did not offer the same level of access to CIA operations as his job
in the SE Division, Ames said the KGB never suggested that he attempt to
change it.
In early November 1985, shortly after Ames had begun language training,
Yurchenko had a change of heart and turned himself in at the Soviet Embassy in
Washington. He was soon on his way back to Moscow. There is no evidence that
Ames played any direct role in this episode.
1986 Polygraph Examination:
At the conclusion of language training and prior to departing for Rome, Ames
was required to take a routine polygraph examination on May 2, 1986. This was
his first polygraph since 1976. Ames would subsequently state that he might
not have made the decision to commit espionage in April of 1985 if he had
known that he was going to be polygraphed the next year. Ames recalls being
"very anxious and tremendously worried" when he was in formed that he was
scheduled for a polygraph exam in May of 1986, one year after he had begun his
espionage activity for the KGB.
Ames was tested on a series of issues having to do with unauthorized contacts
with a foreign intelligence service, unauthorized disclosure of classified
information, and financial irresponsibility.
Ames gave consistently deceptive responses to issues related to whether he had
been "pitched" (i.e. asked to work for) by a foreign intelligence service. The
CIA examiner noted Ames's reaction to the "pitch" issue but apparently
detected no reaction to the other counterintelligence issues covered by the
test. When Ames was asked about his reaction during the session, he explained
that he was indeed sensitive to the "pitch" issue because, he stated, "we know
that the Soviets are out there somewhere, and we are worried about that."
Next the CIA examiner asked a follow on series of questions relating to the
"pitch" issue, in order to ascertain why Ames had appeared to give a deceptive
response. Ames responded that since he had worked in CIA's Soviet and Eastern
Europe (SE) Division, he had been involved in pitches to potential assets.
Also, he hypothesized that he might be known to the Soviets because of a
recent defector. He further stated that he thought he might be reacting
because he was preparing to go to Rome in July 1986, and had some concerns
that he might be pitched there. From this, the polygrapher surmised that Ames
had gotten his concerns off his chest, and there was nothing more to tell.
Once again, the polygrapher went through the CI questions on the polygraph
machine, focusing on the pitch issue. This time, the CIA examiner deemed Ames
truthful and concluded the examination, characterizing Ames as "bright [and]
direct." The examiner's supervisors concurred with the assessment that Ames
was non-deceptive.
According to the FBI, which examined Ames's polygraph charts in June 1993, the
deception indicated in Ames's response to the pitch issue in 1986 was never
resolved, even though the CIA examiner passed Ames on this exam. Also in the
opinion of the FBI, significant deceptive responses by Ames were detectable to
questions dealing with unauthorized disclosure of classified material. No
additional testing or explanations for these deceptive responses, however,
were noted in Ames's polygraph file.
2. July 1986 to July 1989
Ames's Rome Assignment:
Ames's managers generally judged his performance in the SE Division as
successful, yet in order to advance as an operations officer, Ames needed
overseas experience.
According to the CIA IG report, Ames's supervisor had recommended a Rome
assignment to him. Ames applied for a position in Rome dealing with Soviet
operations, and in July 1985, was approved for the job. Ironically, the
European Division Chief who approved Ames's assignment was one of the senior
officers who, when stationed in Ankara in 1972 as Ames's supervisor,
recommended that Ames was better suited to work at headquarters because of his
poor performance.
A message from CIA headquarters to Rome, advising of Ames's forthcoming
assignment there, described him as "highly regarded by SE Division
management....," but a senior SE Division officer who knew Ames told the CIA
IG that his transfer overseas was seen as a good way to move a weak performer
out of headquarters.
Ames's Access to Information:
After completing Italian language training, Ames, accompanied by Rosario,
arrived in Rome in July 1986, where he began his assignment as chief of a
branch which, among other things, dealt with Soviet operations. As a branch
chief, Ames had access to the true identities of CIA agents, the details of
planned agent meetings, and copies of the intelligence reports produced by
these agents. He participated in weekly staff meetings where intelligence
assets and potential asset recruitments were discussed. He coordinated double
agent operations of the U.S. military services and received sensitive
intelligence reports about worldwide events.
Ames provided whatever he felt was important to the Soviets. Ames has stated
that he routinely carried shopping bags full of classified documents out of
the office. After Ames's arrest, the FBI was able to confirm that during his
tour in Rome, Ames also received and responded to specific tasking by the KGB
about past CIA penetrations of the Soviet intelligence services. In recent
debriefings, Ames also admi practices and procedures for
compartmenting information relating to clandestine operations to ensure that
only those officers who absolutely need access can obtain such information.
Further, the Director should establish and maintain a detailed, automated
record of the access granted to each of its employees.
Coordination of Security and Counterintelligence:
The Ames case demonstrated a serious division between security and
counterintelligence activities in the CIA. Even though an investigator from
the Office of Security (OS) participated in the investigation of the 1985-86
compromises under the auspices of the Counterintelligence Center (CIC), he
failed to coordinate properly with OS with respect to Ames' 1991 polygraph
examination. OS had initiated a background investigation of Ames in March
1991, but went ahead with the polygraph in April without the benefit of the
background investigation. As it turned out, the background investigation
provided significant information about Ames that was largely ignored by the
investigator assigned to the CIC in light of Ames' passing the polygraph
examination.
Citing senior security officials, the Inspector General's report noted there
had always been a "fault line" in communications between the CIC and its
predecessors, and the OS. The CIC had not always shared information regarding
its counterintelligence investigations and had failed to make use of OS's
investigative expertise. Indeed, the search to find the cause of the 1985
compromises might have moved more quickly from analysis to investigation if
there had been better coordination between security and counterintelligence.
The Inspector General's report also found "a gradual degradation" of the
resources and authority given the security function since 1985, concluding
that "this degradation has adversely affected the Agency's ability to prevent
and deter activities such as those engaged in by Ames..." The Committee
shares the vigulations, and his
supervisors do not appear to have closely monitored this relationship.
Some of Ames's colleagues in Rome began to suspect that Ames was not reporting
all of his meetings with the Russians. According to the CIA IG report, Ames's
supervisor was aware that Ames was in contact with a Soviet embassy officer,
but apparently did not query him about the relationship or ensure that he was
documenting all of his contacts. One of Ames's subordinates in Rome told the
FBI after Ames's arrest that she had suspected Ames was not fully documenting
the relationship between himself and the Soviet official. In fact, she had
searched the office data base to see whether Ames was reporting all of his
contacts. Although she concluded that he was not, she did not notify any
senior manager.
KGB Meetings and Payments:
In addition to his regular meetings with his Soviet embassy contact "Sam II,"
Ames met three times in Rome with a KGB official from Moscow, whom he called
"Vlad," whom he had previously met in Bogota, Colombia in December 1985.
"Vlad" would travel to Rome for the meeting. "Sam II" would pick up Ames in
his car, and drive him into a Soviet compound for an evening rendezvous. Ames
has said he used a light disguise for these car rides, pulling a hat over much
of his face, and crouching low in the car when they drove through the streets
of Rome and into the Soviet compound gates.
During these meetings in the Soviet compound, which took place without the
knowledge of U.S. officials, Ames and "Vlad" would typically talk for three to
four hours about the information Ames provided, and future meeting plans. Then
Ames would be driven out of the compound. Ames has claimed that he often drank
heavily before and during these meetings.
At most of his meetings with "Sam" and "Vlad," Ames received cash payments
that typically varied from $20,000 to $50,000 per meeting. In order to handle
this large influx of cash, Ames opened two bank accounts in Credit Suisse Bank
in Zurich -- one in his name, and one in the name of his mother in law. In the
latter account, Ames was listed as the primary trustee. Many of his cash
deposits in these accounts were in large amounts for example, one deposit was
for over $300,000. The CIA investigation later determined that Ames deposited
a total of at least $950,000 into the Swiss bank accounts while he served in
Rome.
In order to discourage undue scrutiny of his finances by banking officials,
Ames avoided frequent or high dollar electronic bank transfers from Rome into
his Swiss bank accounts, instead traveling to Switzerland on several occasions
with large amounts of cash which he deposited directly into his accounts. Some
of these trips were made without the knowledge of his CIA superiors, in
violation of regulations requiring that all overseas personal or business
travel by CIA employees be approved by CIA officials.
Aldrich and Rosario Ames also spent a considerable amount of his KGB earnings
while in Italy. Recent debriefings of officers who served with him indicate
there was a general awareness among his co-workers that Ames was affluent. One
officer has described Ames's spending as "blatantly excessive," and stated
that everyone knew and talked about it. Many of his colleagues were aware that
Ames and his wife took numerous personal trips throughout Europe -- to
Switzerland, London and Germany. One colleague knew that the Ameses had
telephone bills totaling $5,000 monthly. In fact, according to the CIA IG
report, the Rome security officer brought Ames's spending and drinking habits
to the attention of the senior CIA officer in Rome, but the perception that
Ames had created -- that Rosario came from a wealthy family seemed to diffuse
any security concern over the Ames's extravagant spending habits. No mention
of these issues was included in Ames's personnel or security file.
Ames's Professional Record in Rome:
Ames's job performance in Rome was mediocre to poor. Of the four job
performance evaluations Ames received during his Rome tour, the first two
commented positively on Ames's personnel management skills, but noted he
needed to do more work in developing new leads. In his second evaluation,
Ames's supervisor wrote, "He handles no ongoing cases; his efforts to initiate
new developmental activity of any consequence have been desultory.." This was
an extremely critical evaluation of an operations officer. The last
performance appraisal in Rome, written by a different supervisor, noted Ames's
performance was inconsistent and that "his full potential has not been
realized here in Rome." One of Ames's senior managers recently commented that
he felt Ames had been a "terminal GS-14" and a lackluster, "middleweight" case
officer.
As in previous tours, Ames was persistently late in filing financial
accountings of his official expenditures. According to the CIA IG report, Ames
blames this on sheer procrastination on his part. This problem was widely
known among Ames's supervisors. In fact, Ames's supervisor in Rome confronted
him with this problem, leading Ames to close out his account and use his
personal funds to pay for job related expenditures. He submitted his expenses
for reimbursement, but Ames's new supervisor in Rome made him reopen his
operational account.
Ames's job performance was further marred by his alcohol dependency, which
resurfaced in Rome and was well known within the office. Once again, however,
there was no official record made of his drinking problems. In post arrest
debriefings, former Ames's colleagues stated that Ames would go out for long
lunches and return to the office too drunk to work. One of his Rome
supervisors recalled that Ames was drunk about three times a week between 1986
and 1988. Another colleague commented that in 1987 Ames was very upset when he
failed to get promoted, and he began to drink even more heavily. One of Ames's
supervisors reportedly once described Ames to a colleague as "one of the worst
drunks in the outfit."
On at least two occasions, Ames's alcohol problem came directly to the
attention of his supervisors. In the first instance, Ames returned from a
meeting with "Sam II" unable to write a message for transmission to
Washington, as directed by his supervisors. On the second occasion, Ames
became drunk at an embassy reception in 1987. He got into a loud argument with
a guest, left the reception, passed out on the street, and woke up the next
day in a local hospital.
Ames's supervisor orally reprimanded him for this latter incident. According
to the CIA IG report, Ames recalls that his boss came to his office after the
incident, and "in an almost sheepish way" attempted to counsel him. The
official recalled that he warned Ames another such incident would result in
his being sent back to Washington. But no official action was taken as a
result of the incident.
Ames's drinking apparently took a personal toll as well. According to the CIA
IG report, Rosario Ames told FBI debriefers that alcohol was partly to blame
for damaging her marriage to Rick. She said her marriage had fallen to pieces
during their Rome tour, and they had numerous fights.
Conclusion of Ames's Tour in Rome:
Although Ames's performance had been mediocre at best and his alcohol abuse
well known, Ames's superiors extended his two year assignment in Rome for
another year. CIA headquarters officials approved the extension to July 1989.
Near the end of his Rome assignment, between May and July 1989, the KGB
provided Ames with two documents which were later retrieved during the FBI
investigation into Ames's activities. The first was a financial accounting
which indicated that the KGB had provided Ames by that time with approximately
$1.8 million dollars, and that $900,000 more had been set aside in his name in
Moscow. CIA officials have since speculated that the KGB probably provided
this influx of funds to motivate Ames to continue spying for them after he
returned to Washington.
The second document was a nine-page letter which showed that Ames would be
given another $300,000 in two meetings prior to his departure from Rome. The
letter also listed KGB questions for Ames to answer once he returned to
headquarters from his Rome assignment. The KGB's top priority was "information
about the Soviet agents of CIA and other (security services) of your country."
Other priorities included information about double agent operations and leads
on possible recruits for the KGB within the CIA. This document also included a
new communications plan for Ames's use when he returned to Washington, D.C.
Known as an "impersonal" communications plan, the new guidelines were
established to increase the security of Ames's communications with the KGB.
They proposed dates in the coming year for Ames to pass documents and receive
money through impersonal clandestine communication sites, also known as "dead
drops."
The new communications plan also called for Ames to meet with his senior KGB
officer at least once yearly outside of the United States. Meetings were
planned for Bogota, Colombia on the first Tuesday of every December, with
additional meeting sites, such as Vienna, Austria, listed as alternative sites
if needed.
On July 20, 1989 Aldrich and Rosario Ames returned to Washington, D.C. from
Rome.
Compromises Confirmed:
By the fall of 1986, as Ames was beginning his tour in Rome, CIA officials had
learned of numerous additional intelligence sources who had been arrested or
executed. The magnitude of the disaster was apparent. In the words of one CIA
officer: "There was a huge problem, (a perception) shared all the way up to
the top of the Agency, including Mr. Casey."
According to the CIA IG report, Agency officials now knew that as many as 30
CIA and FBI Soviet operations had been compromised or had developed problems
between 1985 and 1986. (Each case represented an individual who was providing
useful information, but who may or may not have been a fully recruited
individual).
After his arrest, Ames acknowledged that he informed the Soviets about
approximately ten top level cases as part of the information he passed on June
13, 1985. Overall, Ames has acknowledged providing the Soviets with
information on over a hundred Soviet and East European cases during his
espionage. In addition, Ames had access to several hundred other Soviet and
East European operational endeavors that he may have passed to the Soviets,
but he says he is unable to remember specifics. Even in the fall of 1986, the
damage to CIA's Soviet program was seen as immeasurable. In November 1986, the
chief of the Soviet Counterintelligence Group in the SE Division wrote a
memorandum to his senior management outlining his concerns. The memo described
"45 Soviet and East European cases and two technical operations that were
known to have been compromised or were evidencing problems." Further, in a
January 22, 1987 memo to CIA managers, he added, "It seems clear, if only from
the statistics, that we have suffered very serious losses recently and that
not all these compromises can be attributed to (Edward Lee) Howard. In fact I
am not aware of any Soviet case we have left that is producing anything
worthwhile." It is not clear whether and to what extent either of these
memoranda was sent outside SE Division.
Even though the magnitude of the losses was clear, CIA's initial responses (as
described earlier in the report) were limited to reviewing the compromised
cases, examining the possibility of a technical penetration, and tightening
the compartmentation of ongoing Soviet cases within the SE Division.
It was not until October 1986, that CIA management took its first significant
step to resolve the 1985 compromises. The Chief of the Counterintelligence
Staff named a four person analytical group known as the "Special Task Force"
(STF) within the counterintelligence staff of the Directorate of Operations.
Two of the team members were experienced Soviet operations officers who also
had significant counterintelligence experience. The remaining two team members
were annuitants, who were retired operations and counterintelligence
specialists, one of which had significant Soviet operations experience. The
senior CIA managers who ordered the creation of the Special Task Force did not
require that the team include individuals trained in investigative techniques
or financial reviews. Rather they were looking for seasoned officers who had
operational or counterintelligence experience, and who understood the
Directorate of Operations. According to the CIA IG report, there was a
commonly held belief, apparently shared by successive Deputy Directors for
Operations, that a small team was preferable because it reduced the chance
that a potential "mole" would be alerted to the investigation.
The STF was tasked to look at all the cases known to be compromised and to
identify any commonalities among them. Some of the questions the Task Force
considered were:
- What CIA offices had been involved in the compromised cases, or had known
about them?
- Within these offices, which CIA employees had access to the information?
- How many of the compromises could be accounted for by the Edward Lee Howard
betrayal and, of those remaining, how many could be explained by other
factors, such as poor operational procedures by CIA officers?
The Task Force analyzed all of the compromised cases, searching for patterns
or other indicators which could shed light on the catastrophe. The CIA IG
report indicates, however, that the STF did not create a formal list of
suspects who had access to the compromised information and did not initiate
investigations of specific individuals who were considered likely suspects.
The IG report also notes that the team did not conduct a comprehensive
analysis of cases that had not been compromised, which might have shed light
on the similarities among those cases that had been compromised. According to
the then Chief of Counterintelligence in the SE Division, CIA management was
supportive of the special task force review, but did not apply pressure on
them or attach undue urgency to the investigation:)
People ask me whether (my supervisors) bugged me about it (the investigation).
I said, no, they didn't bug me about it because they don't call up their
doctor every five minutes and say, do I have cancer. But we kept them
informed. I mean, they did not put a lot of pressure on us, but they
encouraged us...The problem was that we didn't make progress in it and we
didn't get any answers.
In October 1986, the same month the CIA established the Special Task Force,
the CIA and FBI learned that two Soviet sources who had worked closely with
the FBI had been arrested, and were about to be executed. The FBI responded by
creating its own six person analytical team known as the "ANLACE Task Force"
which worked full time to analyze the compromise of its two sources.
CIA and FBI Cooperation:
The CIA and the FBI task forces shared some information informally, and in
December 1986, held the first of eight "off-site" conferences (conducted
between 1986 1988) to discuss the compromised intelligence sources. The CIA
briefed the FBI regarding the compromises it was aware of, and the FBI in turn
provided briefings on a series of investigative leads it had received in the
mid-1970s, but could not resolve, which related to possible penetrations of
the CIA. The FBI believed these old leads might hold the key to the 1985-86
compromises. The December 1986 "off-site" meeting with the FBI prompted at
least one CIA participant to raise concerns to the Chief of the CIA's SE
Division about the FBI's inquisitiveness regarding CIA organization and
activities. Pointing out that the FBI had disclosed its own "dirty linen" at
this meeting, the CIA participant wrote "a conscious decision has to be made
here concerning the degree to which we are going to cooperate with, and open
ourselves up to, the FBI..."
In general, throughout the 1986-1988 period when the joint agency meetings
were held, the CIA gave the FBI information pertinent to its cases and gave
detailed summaries of its own compromises as it learned of them. On the other
hand, the CIA did not give the FBI open access to its operational files. It
was explained to the Committee that this had been standard operating procedure
between the two agencies where there was no information indicating a specific
human penetration of the CIA.
Indeed, in opening the second joint meeting between the CIA and the FBI in
March 1987, the head of the CIA's counterintelligence staff praised the
cooperation between FBI and CIA officials and noted that "the concept of SE
Division, Office of Security, CI Staff, and the FBI working together is
something previously unheard of." The IG report on Ames also concluded that,
while the CIA and FBI had experienced problems in dealing together in the
past, the Ames case was an exception. It stated, "All-in-all, coordination
between CIA and the Bureau on the Ames case was exemplary."
The Lonetree Case:
In late December 1986, several months after the CIA and FBI had created their
respective task forces, a Marine security guard at the U.S. Embassy in Vienna,
Austria, Clayton Lonetree, confessed to a CIA officer that while previously
serving at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, he had had a relationship with the KGB.
In February 1987, in the course of the ensuing espionage investigation by the
Naval Investigative Service, a Marine guard who had served with Lonetree,
Corporal Arnold Bracey, told investigators that Lonetree had told him that he
(Lonetree) had let the KGB into the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.
This information had an immediate and dramatic impact upon the Special Task
Force at the CIA. Task Force members hypothesized that had KGB officials been
able to enter the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, they may have been able to obtain
access to CIA operational records maintained there. The Task Force (and many
other U.S. Government elements) spent several months trying to deter mine
whether such an entry had occurred, and whether the KGB had gained access to
CIA records.
In the meantime, Bracey had recanted his earlier statement to investigators,
and Lonetree, in debriefings following his criminal conviction, denied he had
ever allowed the KGB into the Embassy -- an assertion confirmed by polygraph
examinations. By the end of August 1987, most of the Special Task Force was
persuaded that the Lonetree case was a "dry hole" in terms of explaining the
1985 86 Soviet compromises. The CIA IG Report on Ames indicates that while the
STF was able to rule out Lonetree as the cause of the compromises, the
possibility of a human penetration remained. According to the head of the
team, the STF was forced to go "back to square one." The "mole hunt" was not
renewed until 1991.
Ames, then serving in Rome, saw the Lonetree case as a fortuitous development.
In September 1987, Ames wrote a message to the KGB on his personal home
computer speculating that Clayton Lonetree would divert attention from his own
case.
KGB Efforts to Divert Attention from Ames:
Beginning in October 1985 and continuing sporadically over the next several
years, the KGB undertook a concerted effort to make the CIA and the FBI
believe that the sources compromised by Ames were either still alive and well
or had been lost because of problems unrelated to a human penetration of the
CIA.
According to testimony of CIA officials, over time these efforts took several
forms:
- The KGB appears to have made a conscious effort to spread the word inside
the KGB that Howard was principally to blame for the sudden compromises;
- The KGB deliberately gave misinformation to sources, whom they knew from
Ames were working for the CIA, to explain why other sources had previously
been arrested. Subsequently, the sources who passed this misinformation were
themselves arrested;
- The KGB used those sources, already compromised by Ames and under arrest, in
various operational schemes to make it look as if the individuals were alive
and well. For instance, one compromised source under Soviet arrest contacted
an individual in the United States, in an effort to lead the FBI to believe
that he was having no security problems; and)
- The KGB had Soviet officials pass information in contacts with CIA officers
which suggested that some of the previous compromises had resulted from poor
tradecraft or from personal shortcomings on the part of CIA employees.
For the officers in the CIA and FBI task forces, each of these ploys had to be
evaluated on its own merits. Some were viewed with skepticism by the CIA at
the outset; others appeared more plausible and required additional time to
evaluate. Some proved unverifiable altogether, their significance becoming
clear only with the hindsight provided by Ames's arrest. As these ploys were
occurring, CIA counterintelligence staff realized that something unusual was
taking place, but did not know precisely what these diversionary ploys meant.
The recognition that these diversionary tactics could be part of a pattern of
KGB behavior developed as early as late 1986.
Minutes of the off site meetings between the FBI ANLACE Task Force and the CIA
Special Task Force document that the two agencies shared information about
these ploys, and, indeed, that the two task forces expended considerable
energy attempting to re solve the discrepancies during the 1986-1990 time
period. Yet it does not appear from the record that even when investigators
saw a ploy as a ploy -- a phony effort to mislead the CIA did they move any
closer to concluding that the KGB was trying to divert attention from a human
penetration of the CIA.)
A Related Counterintelligence Investigation:
At about the same time, the CIA and FBI task forces also concerned themselves
with the progress being made in a separate but possibly related
counterintelligence investigation. CIA had received vague information,
believed to be reliable, which appeared to suggest that the KGB might have
been able to penetrate a particular office of the CIA which did not have
access to the Soviet operations known to have been compromised. The CIA
hypothesized, however, that if a penetration had occurred, the person working
there might later have moved into a position with such access. The ensuing
investigation consumed considerable attention and resources within the CIA,
and the minutes of the meetings of the CIA and FBI task forces reflect that
the task forces regularly reviewed its progress.
The case remained unresolved, however, and in 1990, became a serious
distraction at a crucial juncture in the inquiry involving Ames.
CIA and FBI Attempt to Identify New Sources:
In September 1987, at about the time the CIA Special Task Force had begun to
conclude that the Lonetree case could not explain the earlier compromises, the
FBI ANLACE Task Force concluded that it could go no further with its own
analysis. While it believed that Edward Lee Howard could have been the source
for one of its two compromised operations, it found no explanation for the
compromise of the other source.
In May 1987, a joint meeting was held to discuss progress on solving the
mystery of the compromises. In an effort to develop new leads, CIA and FBI
officers agreed to launch a new initiative to recruit Soviet intelligence
officers who could shed some light on the problem. The two agencies would
attempt to identify Soviet intelligence officers worldwide who might currently
be, or may formerly have been, in positions that gave them access to
information regarding the 1985-86 compromises. It was recognized that such
information might well come only at a high price.
This recruitment initiative, began in 1987, continued until the time of Ames's
arrest in 1994. Despite repeated efforts to develop sources, the program
succeeded in producing relatively marginal results over the period of its
existence. Meanwhile, the news on the 1985-86 compromises worsened when,
towards the end of 1987, the CIA learned that three additional Soviet sources,
all recruited before 1985, had been arrested, and that one had been executed.
Investigative Developments in 1988 and 1989:
In February 1988, yet another joint conference was held between the FBI and
the CIA task forces. Minutes of the meeting indicate that while the task
forces had concluded that Lonetree in all likelihood had not allowed the
Soviets to enter the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, the conferees remained focused on
the possibility that a technical penetration of the Embassy could explain the
majority of the earlier compromises. It is also clear from the minutes that
the joint meetings of the CIA and FBI task forces now covered a wide range of
counterintelligence topics, not all of which related to the 1985 86
compromises. A representative of the CIA Special Task Force did note a
continuing effort to analyze Soviet operations by computer to determine the
reason for the 1985 86 compromises, but little tangible progress was cited.
In the spring of 1988, CIA opened an investigation of an SE Division employee
who had access to some, though not all, of the compromised cases. The employee
had made numerous damaging admissions during the course of previous polygraph
examinations (none relating to security issues per se), and had difficulty
generally getting through routine polygraph examinations over the course of
his CIA employment. Relying upon a 1988 tip from a CIA employee that this
officer was spending large amounts of money at a level not explained by his
salary, the CIA Office of Security (OS) opened a financial investigation of
the individual. While the investigator determined that the employee had,
indeed, spent far in excess of his salary, the employee was able to
demonstrate that the money had come from a spouse's inheritance. The CIA
decided to remove this individual from access to sensitive operations. This
year-long investigation, which proved to be unrelated to the 1985-86
compromises, had significantly diverted the sole investigator assigned to the
compromised cases.
The staff of the Special Task Force was also diverted during this period by
the effort required to create a new coordinating office for
counterintelligence. Announced on April 1, 1988 by DCI William Webster, a new
DCI Counterintelligence Center (CIC) was established to improve the planning,
coordination, management, and effectiveness of counterintelligence (CI)
activities within the CIA and the Intelligence Community. Centralized
management of CI issues was considered essential to provide clear focus and
direction to fragmented internal CIA efforts and provide a CIA focal point for
dealing with other U.S. departments, agencies, and foreign liaison services
regarding CI matters.
As part of the reorganization of counterintelligence into the CIC, the CIA
Special Task Force looking into the 1985-86 compromises, which had been part
of the CI Staff of the Directorate of Operations, was subsumed within a new
Investigations Branch of the Security Group within the Counterintelligence
Center. This branch had responsibility for all cases involving possible human
penetrations of the CIA. The Deputy Chief of the Security Group and,
concurrently, head of the new Investigations Branch, was the same CIA officer
who had previously been in charge of the Special Task Force.
In June 1988 -- three years after Ames's most damaging disclosures to the KGB --
the KGB instituted the most elaborate of its ploys to direct attention away
from Ames. The KGB had one of its officers pass information to the CIA
concerning five of the cases Ames had compromised. In essence, the information
suggested that each of the cases had been compromised due to poor tradecraft
on the part of either the sources itself or the CIA officers involved. While
the opinion of CIA officers varied as to whether the new information was
genuine, it clearly created a stir and required time consuming analysis over
the next two years. (For the denouement of this episode, see below.)
Recognition of this diversionary tactic also appears to have motivated a
briefing of Deputy DCI Robert Gates on the compromises of 1985 86 by the head
of the Investigations Branch on July 1, 1988.
When the CIA-FBI task forces met again on 20 July 1988, the minutes reflected
that "not much has transpired" due primarily to the efforts required in
setting up the new Counterintelligence Center. But the minutes did include a
more detailed status report on where the investigative effort stood than had
previous records of such meetings. The minutes indicate the CIA had concluded
(in mid-1988) that 16 recruited assets had been compromised in the 1985 1986
period. The memo noted that the CIA had concluded that Edward Lee Howard had
certain knowledge of only three of the cases, and potentially might have known
details about seven others. That left six cases that he could not have known
anything about. The minutes reflected that the CIA had been interviewing all
employees with access to the compromised cases, and "some...appear more or
less likely to be possible suspects." In any event, the minutes reflected that
"the conference was concluded with the note that something had happened, of
either a human or technical nature, which caused the KGB to take action not
only against newer sources but also against others who had been under
investigation (by the KGB) for a long time."
On October 13, 1988, the CIA and FBI task forces held another meeting to
discuss the compromises. The minutes of this meeting (which recite for the
most part only the results of the meeting) reflected that the purpose of the
meeting had been to review the results of the one or more investigations into
leads that might explain the compromises.
At this meeting, officials discussed the progress of the related
counterintelligence investigation, described above, which was attempting to
ascertain whether the KGB had been able to penetrate a particular office of
the CIA. The investigator assigned to the case reported that he had thus far
reviewed the access of 90 employees assigned to the office in question. While
reporting the investigation had produced 10 suspects, the investigator noted
"there are so many problem personalities...that no one stands out."
According to the minutes of the meeting, it was reported that none of the 10
suspects could be connected at that point to the 1985-86 compromises. It was
clear, however, that this investigation was occupying a large proportion of
the investigative effort allocated to the compromises at that time. The lone
investigator involved was at the same time the only investigator assigned to
the investigations of the compromises.
The record reflects no significant developments from the standpoint of the
investigation from December 1988, until the return of Ames from Rome in
September 1989.
August 3, 1989 to February 1994
Ames Career Progression at the CIA:
Despite his mediocre to poor performance in Rome, and the evidence of flagrant
alcohol abuse, Ames returned to CIA headquarters in September 1989, to fill a
position in the SE Division.
The IG report notes that according to one officer, the Chief of the SE
Division had strong negative feelings about Ames's return. One individual
recalls that when a personnel placement board met to discuss the assignments
for numerous officers in the summer of 1989, including Ames's request to serve
in the SE Division, the Chief of SE Division advised the senior personnel
officer that he did not want Ames in his Division, he would not have him, and
the personnel officer was to get rid of him. Despite the negative reaction by
the SE Division Chief, however, Ames managed to be assigned as Chief of the
Western Europe branch of the Division. According to the IG report, no one
recalls how this occurred. Ames served in this position for three months.
During this period he was exposed to virtually all SE Division operations in
this region, and was in a position to compromise numerous operations involving
Soviets or Eastern Europeans who traveled to, or lived in, Western Europe.
Ames later remarked that this position should have been one of the last places
he should have been assigned to if the CIA had suspicions about him.
Because the SE Division was reorganizing, Ames served only a short time as the
Western European Branch Chief, and instead was made Chief, Czechoslovakia
Operations Branch. Ames served in this position from December 1989 until
August 1990.)
With the collapse of the Communist government in Czechoslovakia, however, Ames
found his new assignment too mundane, and, sometime after December 1989,
approached his supervisors saying he wanted to return to a position where he
could handle sensitive Soviet cases again. His supervisor subsequently stated
that he thought Ames approach was "brazen," and advised Ames he would get back
to him. The supervisor never did. In fact, the post arrest investigation found
that Ames tried several times to improve his access to CIA's most sensitive
Soviet cases. For example, soon after his return from Rome he advised his
management that he would be willing to create a special analysis group which
would look at all CIA Soviet cases from a counterintelligence perspective.
Ames also approached another supervisor and stated his desire to become the
Deputy Chief of Station in Moscow, a position Ames characterized as a "fitting
finale" to his career.
In October 1990, Ames was reassigned to the Counterintelligence Center
Analysis Group. According to the IG report, the Chief of the SE Division
wanted Ames out of the division, both because of the security concerns that
had been raised about him and because of his poor performance. He thus
selected another officer to fill Ames's position as Chief of the
Czechoslovakia Branch, forcing Ames to find a position elsewhere.
Before Ames left the Czechoslovakia Branch, however, he was appointed to a
promotion panel for all GS-12 operations officers of the Directorate of
Operations, thus giving him access to the identities and personnel records of
all GS-12 operations officers of the Directorate of Operations.
Following service on the promotion panel, Ames located a position in the
Counterintelligence Center (CIC). Although the Chief of the CIC and the Chief
of the Analysis Group were aware of the security concerns related to Ames as
well as his poor performance record, the Analysis Group was in need of a case
officer from the Directorate of Operations. The head of the Analysis Group was
told in vague terms by the Deputy Chief of CIC of the general suspicions
regarding Ames's trustworthiness but believed Ames's assignment was
"manageable."
Ames remained in this position for almost a year, until August 1991. As part
of this assignment Ames had access to extremely sensitive data, including data
on U.S. double agent operations, i.e. cases involving controlled U.S. agents
who had ostensibly been recruited by foreign intelligence services.
In September 1991, despite having been effectively forced out of the SE
Division a year earlier, Ames managed to obtain the approval of the same
Division Chief to be Chief of a KGB Working Group in the SE Division. While
this position did not entail access to ongoing operations, it did give Ames
access once again to SE Division personnel and records.
Ames's return to the SE Division lasted for only three months. He was
reassigned in December 1991 to the CIA's Counternarcotics Center (CNC) where
he remained until his arrest February 1994. This appears to have been the
first assignment Ames was given that took into account the security concerns
that had been raised about him. However, Ames's supervisors in the CNC were
not made aware that he was the subject of a counterintelligence investigation
until shortly before the FBI opened an intensive investigation on him.
According to the CIA IG report, even after the special task force involved in
the "mole hunt" had firm information implicating Ames, no conscious effort was
made to limit his access to classified information while he was in CNC.
Further, no direction was provided to CNC management in this regard by anyone
and none was sought. For example, CIA officials did not take any specific
precautions to minimize Ames's computer access to information within the scope
of his official duties. In fact, in the fall of 1993, as a result of changes
in the CIA computer system, Ames obtained additional classified CIA
information. He used his work computer to electronically download onto floppy
disks CIA operational cables and finished intelligence only marginally related
to his office responsibilities. Ames was able, through his computer, to access
cables dealing with world events, and electronically selected cables dealing
with Russian and European political and economic events. Fortunately FBI and
CIA records show Ames did not have a personal meeting with any KGB contacts
between November 1993 and when he was arrested, and he was unable to pass this
windfall of information to his Soviet contacts.
Ames's Personnel Evaluations by the CNC:
While Ames displayed serious personal flaws and poor work habits, the
performance evaluations by his CNC supervisors continued to portray an
employee who was more than adequate. According to the CIA IG report, while
Ames's immediate supervisors in CNC were aware of his occasional problems with
alcohol abuse, his proclivity to sleep at this desk, and his unwillingness to
handle issues and projects that did not interest him, his annual performance
appraisals consistently rated him a strong performer.
According to the recollections of Ames's colleagues, Ames became so
intoxicated during a liaison meeting with foreign officials in September 1992
that he made inappropriate remarks about CIA operations and personnel, and
passed out at the table.
Nonetheless, his immediate supervisors failed to make this and similar actions
a part of any official record, or to recommend counseling for him. He
continued to be judged as meeting the norms for an operations officer of his
grade, and, in fact, received strong narratives and overall grades that
indicated he exceeded the work standard. On the other hand, at annual reviews
of all GS-14 operations officers, which determined promotions, Ames continued
to be ranked in the bottom sixth.
Rosario's Knowledge of Ames's Relationship with the Russians:
In interviews with CIA officers, both Aldrich and Rosario Ames claim that she
did not learn of Ames's relationship with the KGB until the summer of 1992. At
that time, she found a vague note in her husband's wallet. From that, she
concluded that Rick had involved her or her family in an intelligence
operation. Rosario admitted to FBI officials that Rick told her he had
received cash from the Russians for providing CIA information to the Russians.
Ames has said that eventually Rosario understood the true nature of this
relationship with the KGB. He claims she begged him to sever the tie, but he
convinced her that they would be endangered by doing so, and that her mother
in Colombia would be financially disadvantaged.
In 1993, the FBI monitored telephone conversations between Ames and Rosario
which indicated that she knew about two prior face-to-face meetings with the
KGB and confirmed her knowledge of Rick's unsanctioned espionage links to the
Soviets. These conversations also showed she was aware Ames was employing
impersonal means of communicating with the Soviets, using dead drop sites and
leaving chalk signals for the Soviets to read. According to FBI officials, the
telephone intercepts of conversations between Rosario and Rick Ames indicate
that Rosario was a supportive conspirator encouraging the crimes of her
husband in order to allow her to continue to enjoy the financial benefits.
Ames's Contacts with the KGB:
Once he returned from Rome, after years of regularly passing classified
information via face-to-face meetings with his Soviet intermediaries, Ames no
longer had such meetings in the United States. Instead he began relying on
"dead drops" and signal sites, and personal contacts abroad. Ames would leave
a signal -- such as a chalk mark on a mailbox to indicate to the Soviets that
he would "load" a dead drop site. Then he would provide classified information
and messages to the KGB by placing a package somewhere in a hidden, secure
area in the Washington, D.C. area. Similarly, the KGB used signals and dead
drop sites to pass money and instructions to Ames. Ames and the KGB identified
the sites in messages back and forth by using cover names to protect their
locations in case a dead drop site was ever compromised.
From 1990 until 1993, face-to-face meetings with his KGB handlers took place
only outside the United States. Ames met "Vlad" in Vienna in June 1990, but
missed an October 1990 meeting because Ames mistakenly went to Zurich rather
than Vienna. In December 1990, Ames made his next contact in Bogota, where he
was introduced to his second KGB case officer, called "Andre." A few months
later, Ames was scheduled to meet Andre again in Vienna but the meeting never
occurred again, because Ames confused the meeting place. Ames did see Andre
again in Bogota in December 1991 and in Caracas in October 1992, and had his
last operational meeting with the KGB in Bogota in November 1993.
The material collected by the FBI during the investigation and after Ames's
arrest, much of it from Ames's personal computer, provided a wealth of detail
and illustrated the nature of Ames's relationship with the KGB in these later
years. In June 1992, according to documents recovered by the FBI from Ames's
home computer, he wrote a note to his Soviet contacts which stated, in part:
My most immediate need, as I pointed out in March, is money. As I have
mentioned several times, I do my best to invest a good part of the cash I
received, but keep part of it out for ordinary expenses. Now I am faced with
the need to cash in investments to meet current needs a very tight and
unpleasant situation! I have had to sell a certificate of deposit in Zurich
and some stock here to help make up the gap. Therefore, I will need as much
cash delivered in Pipe [document drop site] as you think can be accommodated
[sic] -- it seems to me that it could accommodate [sic] up to $100,000.
FBI records indicate Ames left his message at dead drop site "BRIDGE" and he
left a signal at site "SMILE."
Ames wrote another letter to his contacts on August 18, 1992. He agreed to a
personal meeting with the KGB in Caracas, Venezuela, and provided information
on the level of CIA operations in Moscow, U.S. conclusions about Russian
technical penetrations of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and CIA recruitment
plans for Russian officials.
Ames placed this material at the drop site and signaled the Soviets that it
was ready for retrieval on August 19, 1992. He placed a pencil mark at signal
site HILL in the morning and left the documents and letter at dead drop GROUND
at 4:00 p.m. When he returned to the signal site the next day, he saw the KGB
had not erased the signal as arranged for if the collection had occurred.
Accordingly, Ames retrieved his package. On September 1, 1992 Ames typed
another letter to the KGB telling them he had retrieved his earlier package,
and would place the material at dead drop GROUND on a specified date in
September.
Apparently Ames had some problems with this form of impersonal communication.
Among other things, the size of the dead drop site limited the amount of
information he could pass. In Rome, he routinely delivered inches of data at
each meeting. These procedures also limited the amount of cash he could
receive in each transfer. Ames complained in a letter to the KGB dated in
August or September 1992:
Besides getting cash in Carascus [sic] (I have mentuoned [sic] how little I
like this method, though it is acceptable), I still hope that you will have
decided on some safer, paper transfer of some sort of a large amount.
He also advised the KGB, "My lack of access frustrates me, since I would need
to work harder to get what I can to you. It was easier to simply hand over
cables!"
On March 9, 1993 Ames typed a letter on his computer which began by saying,
"All is well with me -- I have no indications that anything is wrong or
suspected." In the letter he also discussed the morale of the CIA SE Division,
personnel changes, and information about the CIA budget. He included a variety
of classified documents.
On May 26, 1993 Ames sent an "urgent" message, which he passed through a dead
drop in the Washington, D.C. area, to the KGB asking for money immediately.
Employing dead drop site BRIDGE, the KGB forwarded a package of cash to Ames
four days later. The FBI obtained records later which show Ames deposited
approximately $22,800 into various accounts between June 1-7, 1993.
In July 1993, the KGB provided more money through a dead drop. An accompanying
KGB message discussed an upcoming personal meeting and informed Ames that they
planned to test the security of a selected dead drop to ensure the site
remained viable. The KGB also told Ames more money would soon be provided,
unless the money was postponed due to the "diplomatic pouch schedule." Ames
deposited approximately $16,500 into local back accounts between July 20 and
August 4, 1993.
By September 1993, Ames and his wife's movements and conversations were being
closely monitored by the FBI. On September 9, 1993, Ames and his wife attended
a meeting at their son's school in Alexandria, Virginia, and then drove to the
intersection of Garfield Street and Garfield Terrace in Northwest Washington
to see if the KGB had placed a signal. At other times in September, Ames
passed and received messages, in preparation for a personal meeting with the
KGB in November in Bogota.
In October 1993, FBI agents observed that Ames left his residence around 6:22
a.m. and returned around 6:44 a.m. giving him time to place a mark on a signal
site. Around 7:00 a.m., FBI agents observed that a horizontal chalk mark had
appeared on a mailbox at the corner of 37th and R Street, N.W., Washington,
D.C. They knew from other recovered documents that this mailbox served as
signal site SMILE.
On November 1, 1993, Ames traveled to Bogota for another personal meeting with
a KGB official. The official gave him a large amount of cash, and an updated
impersonal communications plan for 1994. It included new signal and dead drop
sites in the Washington, D.C. area and times for exchanges in February, March,
May, August, and September. Personal meetings were scheduled for Caracas,
Venezuela or Quito, Ecuador for November 1994. For 1995, they planned for
meetings in Vienna or Paris. At the Bogota meeting the Soviets also told Ames
they were holding $1.9 million for him. After Ames returned to the U.S., the
FBI detected large financial deposits totaling approximately $43,200 between
November 3-10, 1993.
While Ames was in Bogota, the FBI monitored several telephone calls between
Ames and Rosario, who remained in Arlington, Virginia. On November 1, 1993,
Ames told his wife that he had a "short meeting" that day and would have "more
meetings" the following day.
Ames's Official Travel:
During 1992 and 1993, while working for the CNC, Ames made several official
trips overseas, including visits to Moscow and Turkey. In a message delivered
to the KGB through a dead drop around September 3, 1993, Ames referred to the
Moscow trip and wrote, "You have probably heard a bit about me by this time
from your (and now my) colleagues..."
On the trip to Turkey in September 1993, where he attended a conference on
regional narcotics matters, Ames took an extraordinary risk which could have
fully exposed his spying activities. Ames took with him a personal laptop
computer which contained unauthorized classified information, personal files
and several game programs. His superior, who had accompanied him to the
conference, asked Ames's permission to use the computer to access the games,
and Ames agreed. The FBI interviewed this officer in November 1993, several
months before Ames's arrest, and he reported being "overwhelmed at the
incredible amount of classified info that Ames brought to the
conference.....large sub files containing classified cables and memos..." This
officer also saw a file titled "VLAD" which he did not try to access. CIA
regulations prohibit CIA officers from using personal computers for the
storage of classified material, but Ames apparently was oblivious to the risk
he was running by letting his boss use his laptop. The CIA officer who saw the
classified information reported it to the CIA and FBI upon his return. Ames
continued to be sloppy about security even when it risked exposing his own
espionage activities.
Ames's Personal Wealth:
Evidence developed by the FBI indicated that between April 1985 and November
1993 Ames spent at least $1,397,300. On August 1, 1989 Ames paid $540,000 in
cash for a house in northern Virginia. The Ames's advised their title
insurance agent that they bought the house with funds obtained from an
inheritance from Rosario Ames's family. Ames also apparently told close
friends that Rosario's uncle in Colombia was so pleased at the birth of the
Ames's son that he decided to buy the house for them as a gift. Ames
embellished this story by telling this friend that the cash purchase of the
house allowed Ames to spend an extra $1,000 to $1,500 per month on personal
expenses, because he was saving on regular mortgage payments. Ames obfuscated
the electronic money trail of these funds by moving funds from Credit Suisse,
through Citibank and an ac | |
