Strategic Forum No. 181
A Military for the 21st Century: Lessons from the Recent Past
Anthony C. Zinni
Key Points
The post-Cold War world environment has complicated
rather than simplified the missions, strategy, and organization of the Armed
Forces. Rapid downsizing after the fall of the Soviet Union and the Allied
victory in the Persian Gulf War left a military lacking strategic direction, a
thoughtful force structure, and a logical threat upon which to base future force
structure.
This environment will not permit the luxury of a strategic
pause. Allowing the new world order to arrange itself could present the Nation
with an unforeseen threat that it cannot handle. To prevent such an eventuality,
the military must address several challenges: the number of nontraditional
threats, financing a military capable of meeting all the potential challenges it
may face, the need to reform itself to handle rapid developments in technology,
and interagency reform in coordination with military reform so that the full
weight of national power can be brought to bear against adversaries.
A
deliberate process of military transformation must account for the need for
public support, which is essential for such a process to succeed. Transformation
would encompass several areas: developing a realistic strategic direction;
reviewing personnel recruitment and retention; understanding the implications of
joint and combined warfare for organization, structure, core competencies, and
operational concepts; revamping national security advisory and decisionmaking
processes; and assessing the effects of technological and social changes on the
military.
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989,
more than any other event, marked the collapse of the Soviet Union. I remember
crossing through a vacant Checkpoint Charlie into East Berlin. No one on either
side knew quite what we could or could not do, since it all happened so fast. The
confusion and stark contrast between East and West Berlin made it hard to believe
that we had once feared this collapsed Warsaw Pact or seen it as a serious global
competitor. The West always contended that communism was a fundamentally flawed
system that would eventually fail. Despite that belief, we were caught by
surprise by the sudden and total end of the Soviet empire and the system that
governed half the world. At the time, our President proudly drew what appeared to
be the logical conclusion from these events: that there was to be a new world
order. Others talked of reaping a peace dividend, since defense spending surely
could be reduced.
Our Nation made a half-hearted attempt to reprise the
Marshall Plan by trying to help the former Soviet Union, as it was then known,
through the looming political and economic crisis that it faced. The effort was
called Operation Provide Hope. It was conceived by the Secretary of State
to encourage international contribution of resources and advisors to help the
former Soviet Union enter the world of democracy and free market economy. Also
established was a military-to-military program designed to build relations with
the Russian military and help it through the transition. Those of us involved
were disappointed as interest in these efforts by nations, including our own,
seemed to fizzle. The lessons of two world wars seemed forgotten as our attention
turned inward to domestic concerns and as the world breathed a collective sigh of
relief after a half-century under the threat of global destruction. Provide
Hope seemed to be an uneasy recognition that the world just might not reorder
itself in positive ways.
Cold War Finale
As
if to punctuate the end of this historic era and mark the last days of the most
powerful forces ever fielded, we were given one final chance to demonstrate the
might of our Cold War-era military machine against the forces of Saddam Hussein.
The superiority of our technology, soldier skills, and military leadership
completely dominated the Soviet surrogate force fielded by the Iraqis. I recall
being in Eastern Europe shortly afterward visiting military schools and commands
where the officers seemed awed and amazed at the total dominance by the U.S.
military in the Gulf War. It seemed a fitting last act for our powerful Cold War
military as it exited the world stage after decades of standing tall and
preventing a devastating global conflict.
The American military came down
rapidly--too rapidly--after these events. Suddenly, careers were terminated, units
were disbanded, and bases were closed. I remember the personal trauma I witnessed
while stationed in Europe as massive reductions in force were announced, good
soldiers were eliminated from the ranks, and proud units furled their colors.
There did not seem to be any logic to the drawdowns. It appeared that we would
just have a smaller version of our Cold War force. Despite a bottom-up review and
other bureaucratic quick studies, no sense could be made of the residual force.
We lacked strategic direction, a forward-looking force design, and a logical
future threat base on which to build our new military for the upcoming century.
We settled on a two major theater war or major regional contingency concept as a
basis for our military structure. Originally designed to be a rough force-sizing
construct, this concept became our strategy in the absence of serious strategic
thinking and analysis. Basically, it described the military requirement as a
force sufficient to fight a Desert Storm and a Korean conflict nearly
simultaneously, whatever that meant. The force remained fundamentally structured,
equipped, organized, and trained as it had been for the Cold War period, with
some evolutionary modernization for certain capabilities.
New World Order
Something strange began to happen, however,
as Congressional neo-isolationists proudly declared their lack of possession of
passports and disinterest in foreign policy. The new world order was turning into
the new world disorder. The world suddenly seemed to be exploding in conflicts
based on ethnic, religious, and historic hatreds that had been simmering under
the superpower bipolar lid. Some nation-states collapsed into anarchy and chaos;
others showed alarming signs of becoming incapable or failed states. Some of
these collapsed states provided sanctuaries to extremist groups, which used these
bases to plan, train, and organize for strikes against U.S. forces and other
targets. Natural and manmade humanitarian catastrophes were on the rise, along
with civil strife that seemed out of control in some parts of the world. Regional
hegemons and rogue states that had learned the lessons of the Gulf War began to
develop what has become known as asymmetric capabilities, or threats that were
designed to go against our evident military vulnerabilities or gaps. These
asymmetric threats ranged from weapons of mass destruction and long-range
missiles to low-tech sea mines and terrorist tactics. All were designed to
challenge a perceived weakness in our military, political, or psychological
ability to use force.
The new world order also was changing in other
ways. Globalization and the explosion of information technology were making the
world more interdependent and interconnected. Geographic obstacles, such as
oceans and mountain ranges, no longer provided impenetrable boundaries. Economic,
political, or security-related instability in remote parts of the world was
having a greater effect on our security interests and well-being on this
shrinking planet. In addition, the rise of nonstate entities, such as
nongovernmental organizations, transnational criminal groups, extremist
organizations, global corporations, and warlord groups, brought a new and
confusing dimension to a world previously dominated by nation-state
interaction.
Remote places such as Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and East
Timor became flashpoints that required our intervention at some level. At
the same time, the need to contain regional threats such as Iran, Iraq, and North
Korea remained a major military requirement. These states also were becoming more
threatening as they developed greater military capabilities that were aimed at
denying us access to regions and our allies within those regions. More and more,
our security interests seemed to be drawn into remote, unstable parts of the
world.
Changing Missions
As a result of these
sorts of events throughout the last decade of the 20th century, our
shrinking and adjusting Armed Forces were hit by an onslaught of strange,
nontraditional missions that pressured their dwindling ranks and resources with
an unsustainable operational and personnel tempo. They were called upon to keep
the peace, provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, fight the drug
war, patrol our borders, counter terrorists, contain regional hegemons, rebuild
nations, and meet domestic emergencies. These were consuming tasks that were
unpopular in a military readjusting from the Cold War and meeting the challenges
of an increasing number of imposed social changes and other internal
difficulties.
With some exceptions, the U.S. military resisted these
missions and the adjustments that it should have made in doctrine, organization,
training, and equipment needed to meet this new mix of growing commitments. These
missions had significant political, economic, humanitarian, cultural, and social
dimensions that brought into question the appropriate role of the military in
problems that seemed better suited to other agencies. Traditional military
leaders insisted on holding the line to fighting the Nation’s wars and hoped to
go back to "real soldiering" as they were mending a transitioning force suffering
from all the pressures on it. One senior officer was quoted as saying, "Real men
don’t do MOOTW," or military operations other than war, a term that became the
title for all these messy little low-end commitments.
The stress of the
changes, confusion over missions, poor readiness conditions, constant
deployments, lack of direction, and atrophying benefits, compensation, and
quality of life impacted the critical areas of recruitment and retention. With a
booming economy, even the most dedicated service members were finding it
difficult to remain in the services under these conditions. It became evident as
the 20th century closed that the military was in dire need of direction and
reform. It was difficult for our political leaders to commit the resources
necessary for change, since there were pressing domestic needs, and the American
military still looked like the most powerful force in the world.
A New Century
We have now entered the 21st century, and our
military must address several serious questions and challenges. The first deals
with the growing number of these nontraditional threats. Will these continue to
increase, with new types added to the confusing mix, and will we rely on the
military as our principal instrument to deal with them? Second, can we afford the
kind of military that can meet all the potential challenges ahead, which could
span the spectrum from dealing with an emerging global power, to confronting
strong regional powers with significant capabilities such as weapons of mass
destruction, to responding to the growing list of transnational threats? The
third question relates to the much-needed military reform. Can the military
change, reform, or transform to meet the challenges of the new century and adapt
to the rapid development of new technologies that could radically alter the
military as we know it today? The fourth issue deals with interagency reform,
which must move in parallel with military reform. Can we meet the demand for
better decisionmaking and the integration of all instruments of power (political,
economic, and informational) to solve the multidimensional challenges ahead?
No one can predict the future, but we can make some judgments on the growing
number of threats at the beginning of this century. Some of these will not be the
ones that we prepared for in the last century. All of them will challenge a
positive new world order and the realization of a peace dividend.
Our
security interests will require that we have a military prepared to respond
to:
a global power
with sophisticated military capabilities
regional hegemons with asymmetric
capabilities, such as weapons of mass destruction and missiles, designed to deny
us access to vital areas and regional allies
transnational threats that include
terrorist groups, international criminal and drug organizations, warlords,
environmental security issues, health and disease problems, and illegal
migrations
problems
of failed or incapable states that require peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance,
disaster relief, or national reconstruction
overseas crises that threaten U.S.
citizens and property
domestic emergencies that exceed the capacity of other Federal and
local government agencies to handle
threats to our key repositories of
information and our systems for moving information
This is a demanding
list of requirements to place on the military, and it does not include many of
the clean, clear warfighting missions that our military would prefer. But
military leaders are sworn to defend "against all enemies foreign and domestic,"
and the enemies that threaten our well-being may include some strange,
nontraditional ones.
The destabilizing environment in which we may commit
forces to confront many of these threats may be further degraded by the effects
of urbanization, economic depression, overpopulation, and the depletion of basic
resources. The world has become reliant on natural resources and raw materials
that come from increasingly unstable regions with the compounding problems of a
poor infrastructure and environment. Access to energy, water, timber, rare gems,
metals, and other resources is becoming a growing rationale for intervention and
conflict in many parts of the world.
We also will require that our
forces continue to meet the peacetime demands of engagement and shaping.
Maintaining stability by building viable, interoperable coalitions with the
forces of regional allies will remain a necessity to ensure a positive security
environment in key areas of the world. Military engagement efforts produce
dividends in deterrence, confidence-building, and burdensharing. They also
demonstrate our commitment and resolve. However, these tasks will continue to tax
our thinly stretched forces.
Transformation
Some proposals have been made to cut force structure drastically, remove
forward-based and deployed forces from overseas, and stop modernization to afford
transformation. Advocates of a strategic pause who think we can withdraw from the
world or opt out of interventions that threaten our interests are not facing the
reality of the current world situation. We cannot gamble on a self-ordering
world, since the risk to us could be great if we are not militarily capable of
dealing with an unforeseen threat that emerges from this disordered global
environment.
These considerations point out the critical need to
transform our military in a deliberate and significant way. Americans must
acknowledge this need and support investment in this transformation to achieve
success. The transformation must be major in scope to meet the challenges of this
new century; however, it will not be given adequate resources if the American
people do not understand the need. This will require a stronger and closer
relationship between Americans and their military. The relationship has cooled,
and even been strained at times, since the end of the Vietnam War and the
inception of the all-volunteer force.
Strategy The transformation should begin with the development of a realistic strategic
direction. Never in our history has the need been greater for a national strategy
that clearly spells out interests, goals, priorities, and resource allocations.
From this a national military strategy can be drawn that provides the necessary
guidance and direction to our defense leadership. They, in turn, must take a hard
look at every aspect of our military and the agencies that support it. Their
decisions should be made honestly and without the influences of service bias or
sentimentality. Decisions to eliminate capabilities are never easy, but they must
be made. Some assets will have to be phased out over time as new, innovative
systems come on line through the process of transformation. Other capabilities
based on sound concepts and technology that have future viability should be
retained and programmed for modernization.
Personnel This process of change has to be extensive and should include a review of our
personnel system. Leader development must produce leaders with broader and more
sophisticated educational and service experience. It may be time to age the force
by retaining more troops with longer service, more time in grade, and greater
experience. The policies that foster careerism should be removed or overhauled.
Quality-of-life areas, compensation, benefits, personal development, challenging
experiences, and personnel stability have to be key considerations in getting and
keeping the best and brightest our society has to offer. The future military will
be an even more complex institution and will require truly competent and
dedicated members.
Joint Warfare We must seriously address
joint and combined warfare and recognize it as synonymous with the operational
level of war; it requires a true capability to integrate forces, not just
deconflict and coordinate their efforts. True coherence will come in these
operations when we can think past service component integration to think about
integrating forces within the domains of maneuver, fire, information, and
sustainment. Services must eliminate interservice bickering and corrosive
competition that result in dysfunctional force applications or the absence of
needed warfighting doctrine and procedures. Acquisition, readiness measurements,
requirement definition, doctrine development, and other processes are all in need
of reform. The military’s organization, structure, core competencies, and
operational concepts need review.
Decisionmaking Our
organization and methods for providing military advice and recommendations for
national security policy have to be examined. History has not been kind to the
structure created by the 1947 National Security Act, as criticism after each
conflict since has been severe. The interagency mechanism for dealing with crisis
and providing crucial decisions must be revamped to remove the ad hoc nature of
the process and the organization.
Military Culture We have
to come to grips with the issue of an appropriate ethos for our service members.
Are they still warriors requiring values much like those of their uniformed
forefathers, or have technology and changing social attitudes made that outdated?
It is hard to imagine that the coming age of cyberwarriors and remote control
battle has removed the need for a warrior culture. The kinds of conflicts that we
still face require a long look at what the forces of political correctness and
social change have done to morale, good order and discipline, and combat
effectiveness. Related to this are the attitudes and atmosphere that generate a
zero-defects mentality and a casualty- and risk-aversion approach to tasks that
jeopardize our ability to accomplish vital missions.
Change would be difficult in any military that has not suffered a disastrous
defeat or faced an immediate threat to the existence of the nation. Fortunately,
the U.S. military does not face those conditions, but their absence can serve to
mask the need for change. In the past, legislation has been required to impose
significant change without these conditions. The military bureaucracy and
politicians with vested interests in preserving status quo infrastructure,
systems, organizational structures, and programs will resist change or will
support only change on the margin. This will further complicate needed
reform.
It is evident that there will be some change in defense
structure. Certainly the projected global challenges to American interests seem
to require a different kind of military to deal with them. Both sides in the last
presidential election took positions advocating transformation and change, and
the American public seems generally supportive. The question is whether there
will be significant change or whether politics, bureaucracy, traditional
thinking, and other demands on resources will limit our ability to realize the
full benefits of a true transformation.
General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC (Ret.), is a
distinguished senior advisor at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies. He retired in September 2000 as
Commander in Chief, Central Command, after 39 years of service. His earlier
assignments included Chief of Staff and Deputy Commanding General of Combined
Task Force Provide Comfort during the Kurdish relief effort in Turkey and Iraq.
He also served as Military Coordinator for Operation Provide Hope, the relief
effort for the former Soviet Union. General Zinni also was Director for
Operations for Unified Task Force Somalia during Operation Restore
Hope.
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