Conspiracy of Silence by Eric Francis, Sierra Magazine
Part of Exhibit
422: Monsanto's 1969 "Pollution Abatement Plan." It reads, "The problem involves
the entire United States, Canada, and sections of Europe especially
the United Kingdom and Sweden. As the investigation broadens
other areas of Europe, Asia and Latin America will surely become
involved. Evidence of contamination have been found in some of
the very remote parts of the world. The involvement could and
most likely will follow the DDT [pesticide] investigations."
Conspiracy of Silence
The story of how
three corporate giants --
Monsanto , GE and Westinghouse -- covered their toxic trail
By ERIC FRANCIS
From
Sierra magazine, cover story, Sept./Oct. 1994. This article
is a synopsis of the fifty-year history of PCBs and dioxins.
It is the first ever report of its kind, though in part based
on my earlier work in the Las Vegas Sun. It has appeared
in different forms in other publications as well.
IN THE BLACKNESS of a freezing
morning in December 1991, a driver lost control of her car on
an isolated road in upstate New York and slammed into an electric-utility
pole. Two miles away, the electrical system at the state-university
campus at New Paltz went haywire. Minutes later, a Westinghouse
electrical transformer cooled with supposedly non-flammable polychlorinated
biphenyls (PCBs) exploded and burned, pouring deadly white smoke
through Gage Residence Hall. Volunteer firefighters, thinking
they were handling a routine electrical fire, searched the dorm
for students - all of whom, fortunately, were away on winter
break.
The chain reaction continued.
Within minutes, PCB transformer explosions, ruptures, and fires
rocked six campus buildings, including four residence halls that
normally house 1,000 students. Polychlorinated biphenyls and
their even-more-toxic by-products, dioxins and dibenzofurans,
poured through the buildings and spilled outside, contaminating
groundwater, storm sewers, utility manholes, lawns, and roads
at levels up to a million times the state's legal limit.
Decontamination crews wearing
respirators and moonsuits soon swarmed over the campus, filling
thousands of 55-gallon drums with toxic waste. Within weeks,
560 students were returned to two of the dormitories. Now, nearly
three years and $35 million later, decontamination work is still
not complete, underground toxic plumes continue to spread, and
thousands of students living and studying in contaminated buildings
continue to be exposed to dangerous chemicals. Some have filed
class-action lawsuits against the state, alleging that the campus
was reopened prematurely.
The New Paltz disaster
is often referred to as an "accident," as are similar
fires and explosions in San Francisco, Santa Fe, Chicago, Shreveport,
and many other cities. It was not, however, a surprise to the
country's largest manufacturer of products that use PCBs.
A 1974 General Electric in-house memo reveals that both GE
and Westinghouse were secretly aware of the possibility of transformer
explosions ten years before the EPA issued warnings about it.
"As you know,"
GE engineer T. L. Mayes cautioned his colleagues, "Westinghouse
had a network transformer explosion recently, resulting in two
fatalities." Mayes also mentioned that some grades of PCBs
apparently create an explosive gas when transformers malfunction
- a danger the company concealed from its customers. Neither
were customers informed that when burned (as in an explosion),
PCBs create dioxins and dibenzofurans - although the manufacturers
knew this by 1970 at the latest. In fact, PCBs were aggressively
marketed as safety products; the manufacturers even convinced
insurance companies to require their customers to use PCB transformers.
Across the country, utilities,
workers, and consumers are suing those who profited from PCBs
for their failure to warn them of the chemical's fatal hazards.
The million pages of internal memos, correspondence, lab reports,
and private studies made public through these lawsuits show that
three of the largest corporations in the United States have known
since the 1930s about many of the horrible health effects associated
with PCBs - and yet concealed this information from the government,
the media, the public, and their own customers.
Moreover, Monsanto (the
source of all PCBs in the United States), Westinghouse, and GE
publicly denied those problems. Monsanto even went so far as
to falsify cancer research and use the fudged results to delay
the federal regulation of PCBs, which did not occur until 1976.
While the companies stonewalled, thousands of workers were exposed
to high levels of PCB contamination, and are now dying of cancer
at a higher-than-average rate. Millions of pounds of PCBs were
used around the country in everything from electrical transformers
to french-fry cookers, yet for decades the companies did little
or nothing to warn the public of the danger.
On the contrary, great
effort was spent covering it up. While an internal Monsanto "Pollution
Abatement Plan" in 1969 admitted that "the evidence
proving the persistence of these compounds and their universal
presence as residues in the environment is beyond questioning,"
it warned that "the corporate image of Monsanto as a responsible
member of the business world genuinely concerned with the welfare
of our environment will be adversely affected with increased
publicity." More to the point, "direct lawsuits are
possible" because "all customers using these products
have not been officially notified about known effects nor [do]
our labels carry this information." Now that such lawsuits
are being filed across the country, we are getting our first
glimpse of what happens behind the scenes when a poison is too
profitable to give up.
Peter Montague of the Environmental
Research Foundation
describes the invention of PCBs as an outgrowth of this century's
infatuation with the automobile. "As gasoline was extracted
from crude oil," he writes in Rachel's Health and Environment
Weekly, "great quantities of other chemicals, like benzene,
were left over. Chemists started playing around with these chemicals,
to see if something useful could be made." Heating and pressurizing
chlorine and benzene under the right conditions, they found,
yielded PCBs, a range of compounds (209 in all) that generally
take the form of a heavy, syrupy liquid. Because PCBs are stable,
conduct heat but not electricity, and are not water-soluble,
they proved extremely useful, most prominently as insulation
fluid in electrical transformers and capacitors. They have also
been made into plastics and mixed with adhesives, inks, paper,
paints, and fabric dyes, with many more tons employed as hydraulic
liquids, heat-transfer fluids, and lubricating oil in everything
from natural-gas pipelines to food-packing plants. They were
once the heating medium of choice in the coils of industrial
deep fryers for fish and potato chips, and were even mixed with
pesticides and sprayed directly onto crops.
When Congress regulated
the manufacture of PCBs in 1976, it merely closed the lid on
Pandora's box. The evil is still loose in the world: up to two-thirds
of all PCBs ever manufactured remain in use, and much of the
rest has escaped into the environment. Since PCBs are fat-soluble,
they bio-accumulate as one species eats another, passing up the
food chain in magnified form. These poisons are now ubiquitous,
and are especially concentrated in the flesh of predators. Potentially
dangerous levels of PCBs can be found in the fatty tissues of
seals, whales, eagles, many fish, and virtually every human on
earth.
This summer, crucial sections
of the EPA's fundamental reassessment of PCBs and their chlorinated-chemical
cousins, dioxins, were leaked. The judgment is dire. Once lodged
in the human body, PCBs are implicated in breast cancer, brain
cancer, malignant melanoma, non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, and soft-tissue
sarcomas. Even at current background levels, the EPA found, PCBs
can damage the body's immune and reproductive systems. The average
amount of dioxin-like substances in the body is 9 nanograms (a
nanogram is a billionth of a gram) per kilogram (ng/kg), although
burdens vary widely due to diet, workplace exposure, proximity
to toxic-waste dump, and so on. At 13 ng/kg, sex hormones are
diminished in men; at 47 ng/kg, decreased growth is observed
in children. [This information is updated in a newer article. -ef]
The latter effect is now
held to be the chemical's most serious danger, because PCBs mimic
natural hormones such as estrogen and can severely disrupt the
body's endocrine system, resulting in birth defects and sterility.
(Among other species, raptors and large marine mammals are particularly
vulnerable to the hormonal effects of PCBs, which have been linked
to catastrophic crashes in their populations.) Some 42 varieties
have been identified in human fat, and the 65 varieties polluting
breast milk are passed on to nursing infants at crucial stages
of their development, causing learning disorders and disrupting
the child's developing immune system.
Scientific knowledge about
the dangers of PCBs has advanced along two tracks, one private
and one public. The secret studies began in 1936 when many workers
at the Halowax Corporation in New York City exposed to PCBs (then
called chlorinated diphenyls) and related chemicals called chlorinated
napthalenes started coming down with chloracne, a painful, disfiguring
skin disease. Three workers died. Autopsies of two revealed severe
liver damage. Halowax asked Harvard University researcher Cecil
K. Drinker to investigate.
Drinker presented his results
at a 1937 meeting at Harvard attended by Monsanto, GE, Halowax,
the U.S. Public Health Service, and state health officials from
Massachusetts and Connecticut. Like the Halowax workers, Drinker's
test rats had suffered severe liver damage. "These experiments
leave no doubt as to the possibility of systemic effects from
the chlorinated napthalenes and chlorinated diphenyls,"
he concluded.
Minutes of a discussion
held later that day include a telling remark by GE official F.
R. Kaimer: "We had 50 other men in very bad condition as
far as the acne was concerned," he told the group. "The
first reaction that several of our executives had was to throw
[the PCB] out - get it out of our plant. But that was easily
said but not so easily done. We might just as well have thrown
our business to the four winds and said, 'We'll close up', because
there was no substitute and there is none today in spite of all
the efforts we have made through our own research laboratories
to find one."
Sanford Brown, the president
of Halowax, concluded the meeting with another thought that would
echo through the next five decades. Brown stressed the "necessity
of not creating mob hysteria on the part of workmen in the plants"
where chemical-safety inspections were being made. Problems with
PCBs and napthalenes, he predicted, "may continue, probably
will continue for years." The silence of those at the meeting
ensured that effect.
Meanwhile, the damning
evidence continued to spill out of corporate laboratories. A
1938 study of PCB-oil mixtures manufactured by Westinghouse and
GE demonstrated that liver damage could be caused by skin contact
alone, and called for the "greatest personal hygiene"
in minimizing exposure. In further research for Monsanto, Drinker
warned that adequate ventilation was necessary when handling
the chemicals. By 1951, Monsanto also had in its files a 1947
scientific finding that there was "need to give warning"
about PCBs because "the toxicity of those compounds has
been repeatedly demonstrated."
Yet this "need to
give warning" was ignored. A 1950 GE instruction manual
for PCB transformers assured utilities that "transformer
Pyranol [GE's trade name for PCBs] may be handled in the same
manner as mineral oil." Even though by 1956 GE's own files
contained a bibliography of 43 references on the health dangers
and possible lethality of PCBs and PCB component chemicals, the
company seems never to have retracted this statement.
Monsanto also knew by 1956
that PCB products could be contaminated with dioxins and dibenzofurans
from the time they were shipped from the factory -- a piece of
information it sat on until the late 1960s, when independent
researchers discovered this hazard. According to the record of
one lawsuit, new PCB oil can be contaminated with dibenzofurans
at concentrations of up to 10 parts per million. As the oil ages,
according to documents from Monsanto's files, the concentration
becomes considerably higher. The company knew in 1965 that dioxin
"can be a potent carcinogen."
It is curious, in this
light, that Monsanto's R. E. Keller should have noted in an October
20, 1970, internal memo that specially prepared PCB samples sent
to a lab for animal toxicity testing were free of troublesome
dibenzofurans "which might bias the results." As an
aside, he added that they were free from dioxin contamination
as well. According to attorney Paul Merrell, "The implication
is that the PCBs they tested did not contain the toxic material,
but that it was common in their product. It's evidence of a cover-up."
Merrell is an attorney
in a far-reaching lawsuit challenging the informed silence of
the PCB manufacturers. His client, the Nevada Power Company,
is charging GE, Westinghouse, and Monsanto in federal district
court with fraud and deliberate failure to warn the utility and
its customers about product defects and negative health effects
associated with PCBs. The companies' initial defense was to argue
that the utility was aware of the dangers long before it filed
its suit in 1988 and should have suspected fraud earlier, but
that the statute of limitations had now passed. "Nevada
Power actually knew of the product defects and of facts contrary
to those represented" by the PCB manufacturers at the time
of sale, argued Monsanto attorney Bruce Featherstone in 1991.
"They had actual knowledge of the facts constituting a fraud."
In more-recent pleadings,
the manufacturers have taken an alternative tack, denying that
they committed fraud or failed to warn their customers, and maintaining
- numerous scientific studies to the contrary - that their products
pose no genuine threat to human health.
"Monsanto's actions
involving PCBs have always been responsible," spokesperson
Diane Herndon wrote in a 1993 statement. According to GE's Jack
Batty, "Public perception about the health risks of PCBs
and the scientific facts are in conflict. Most scientists agree
that PCBs are not the hazard to human health that was feared
in the 1970s." [Actually, the EPA's reassessment found them
to be a greater hazard than was feared then.] "PCBs have
produced tumors in some laboratory animals, but there is no proof
- based on human exposure of more than 40 years - that PCBs cause
cancer or any other serious health problems in people."
Substitute "cigarettes" for "PCBs," and it
could be the tobacco industry talking.
FOR THREE DECADES, the
PCB problem remained invisible to the public -- and indeed to
everyone except the top managers of the companies that produced
and used the chemical. That changed suddenly in 1966 with the
accidental discovery of global PCB pollution by Swedish chemist
Soren Jensen.
In 1964 Jensen was trying
to study DDT levels in human blood when a mysterious group of
chemical compounds kept recurring in his samples, interfering
with his analyses. The chemical was so pervasive that his first
task was to determine whether it was natural or synthetic. Finally
concluding that it was some sort of artificial pollutant, Jensen
set to work to find out what it was.
A two-year investigation
established that the mystery compound was chlorine-based and
chemically similar to DDT. Jensen knew it wasn't a pesticide,
though, because he found it in wildlife specimens collected in
1935, years before chlorine-based pesticides were in general
use. All of Sweden and its adjacent seas were contaminated, he
discovered; even hair samples taken from his wife and three children
showed traces of the compound, with the highest levels in his
nursing infant daughter. The mystery pollutant was everywhere
he looked.
Eventually, Jensen says,
"I was convinced that what I had to deal with were chlorinated
biphenyls, but I didn't have the faintest idea where such compounds
were used in the society." Searching the literature, Jensen
learned of PCBs' industrial uses. A German chemical manufacturer
provided Jensen with a sample, which he analyzed and found to
match the "peaks," or chemical readings, found in a
massively contaminated white-tailed eagle.
"The circle was closed,"
Jensen said. "There was no doubt that the unknown peaks
came from the use of polychlorinated biphenyls, which I gave
the name PCB."
Jensen's discovery, first
reported in 1966 in the English journal New Scientist,
set in motion the chain of events that Monsanto, GE, and Westinghouse
had hoped to avoid. The European press took notice immediately,
and other scientists soon began investigating PCBs. Industry
also took note: by January 1967, according to Monsanto telephone
logs, Shell Oil had called to inform the company of the Swedish
press reports, and to ask for PCB samples for its own analytical
studies.
Widespread PCB contamination
of the food chain in the United States was first demonstrated
in 1969 by Dr. Robert Riseborough of the University of California
at Berkeley, who happened upon it in the course of his research
on peregrine falcons. San Francisco Chronicle reporter
David Perlman learned about Riseborough's findings; his story,
"A Menacing New Pollutant," ran on February 24, 1969,
and was picked up by numerous other papers.
Monsanto launched its public-relations
defense the next day by denying that the chemicals were PCBs.
"The Swedish and American scientists . . . imply that polychlorinated
biphenyls are 'highly toxic' chemicals," Monsanto said in
a statement widely distributed to its customers and the press.
"This is simply not true. The source of marine-life residue
identified as PCB is not yet known. It will take extensive research,
on a worldwide basis, to confirm or deny the initial scientific
conclusions."
Monsanto, however, had
all the information it needed to confirm or deny the claim itself.
Shortly after Jensen's 1966 discovery, Monsanto executives visited
him in Sweden, and company records indicate that Monsanto obtained
an unpublished 1968 paper he wrote with two colleagues detailing
the analytical method for detecting PCBs in the environment.
Neither did Riseborough's findings take the company by surprise:
a January 18, 1968, internal memo about PCBs in shorebirds warns
a Canadian colleague to "expect publication from California."
Riseborough's results were published a year later.
There was also plenty of
evidence by this time that PCBs were "highly toxic."
The first known mass food-poisoning by PCBs occurred in Japan
in February 1968, when PCB fluid leaked into a batch of rice-bran
oil, or yusho. More than 1,600 people were initially exposed,
with many showing immediate symptoms including severe chloracne,
respiratory ailments, and failing vision. It was from the "Yusho
Incident" that scientists would soon document birth defects,
low birth weights, and numerous other chronic effects from PCB
exposure. Nine years after the Yusho Incident, there was a sixfold
increase in liver-cancer deaths among affected men and threefold
among women.
Despite international attention
to the Yusho Incident, just two months later Monsanto's corporate-development
committee set a four-year goal of increasing by 20 times its
sales of Therminol heat-transfer fluid - essentially the same
PCB product that poisoned the Japanese victims. In the United
States, Therminol was used as a heating medium inside the coils
of deep-fat fryers.
In 1969, while publicly
denying the problems linked to PCBs, Monsanto privately acknowledged
them in its internal "Pollution Abatement Plan," which
admitted that "the problem involves the entire United States,
Canada and sections of Europe, especially the United Kingdom
and Sweden.... [O]ther areas of Europe, Asia and Latin America
will surely become involved. Evidence of contamination [has]
been shown in some of the very remote parts of the world."
The Pollution Abatement
Plan (really more of a liability abatement plan) proposed
three options, with charts showing their potential profits and
liabilities. Should Monsanto "Do Nothing," profits
would likely decline and liability extend into the future. "We
cannot deny the findings and the accusations of various agencies,"
the plan said. "If we took no action we would likely face
numerous suits."
Under the "Discontinue
Manufacture of PCB" option, profits would cease and liability
would soar because "we would be admitting guilt by our actions."
But with the "Responsible
Approach," which involved acknowledging certain aspects
of the problem, tightening restrictions, and continuing to manufacture
and sell PCBs, profits theoretically would increase and liability
slowly decline, all but vanishing by the mid-1970s. It was this
latter approach that Monsanto chose, making some adjustments
to its business practices but going to battle with the government
to keep PCBs on the market, despite growing scientific evidence
that they constituted a public-health menace and an environmental
nightmare.
Henceforth, Monsanto required
its customers to sign indemnity agreements to hold it harmless
from any future liability. Monsanto also vowed to sell PCBs only
to customers who would use them in "totally enclosed systems"
- even as it continued to market PCBs in products that directly
contacted food. On March 30, 1970, Monsanto physician Emmett
Kelly revealed to W. B. Papageorge (who would eventually take
on the role of Monsanto's PCB czar) that tons of cattle feed
from several Ohio silos had been contaminated by leaching and
flaking paint based on the company's Aroclor 1254 PCB-oil. As
a result, the milk from three herds was tainted. Kelly estimated
that up to 50 other silos in the state were painted with the
same PCB-based formulation.
"All in all, this
could be quite a serious problem, having legal and publicity
overtones," the Monsanto doctor warned. "This brings
us to a very serious point. When are we going to tell our customers
not to use any Aroclor in any paint formulation that contacts
food, feed, or water for animals or humans? I think it is very
important that this be done.... I think we should make a blanket
recommendation against these uses." Despite years of discovery
in lawsuits, the manufacturers have not produced any evidence
that such a warning was issued.
Between July 1969 and August
1971, at least nine major PCB contaminations of food occurred.
Shredded wheat contaminated by packaging material was shipped
all over the country; in upstate New York, Campbell Soup had
to destroy 140,000 tainted chickens. Monsanto continued to view
the crisis as a public-relations problem. In 1971, Papageorge
addressed a special committee of the American National Standards
Institute that was searching for ways to extend the use of PCBs.
"We cannot overlook the emotions that have set in,"
he said, "and believe me, there are many and they are deep.
As you know, the references in the popular press to hazardous
poisons and birth defects, which have not been substantiated,
are most difficult to overcome."
At Westinghouse, another
special committee met to discuss the growing PCB crisis. The
December 28, 1971, minutes of the meeting (stamped "PROPRIETARY
CLASS 1 -- DESTROY BY BURNING OR SHREDDING") acknowledged
the problems of PCB accumulation in wildlife, and indicated that
PCBs caused reproductive disorders in chickens and birth defects
in victims of the Yusho Incident. They also acknowledged that
Yusho might have involved dibenzofurans, which are created when
PCB oil is heated.
AT THIS POINT, the crisis
entered its darkest hour. In order to maintain its 1971 position
that "PCBs are not and cannot be classified as highly toxic,"
Monsanto engaged Industrial Bio-Test Labs of Northbrook, Illinois,
to do safety studies on its Aroclor PCB products. Seven years
later, IBT Labs would be at the center of one of the most far-reaching
scandals in modern science, as thousands of its studies were
revealed through EPA and FDA investigations to be fraudulent
or grossly inadequate. One of IBT's top executives was Dr. Paul
Wright, a Monsanto toxicologist who took a job at IBT Labs in
part to supervise the PCB tests, and then returned to Monsanto.
Wright was eventually convicted of multiple counts of fraud in
one of the longest criminal trials in U. S. history - with his
legal fees paid by Monsanto.
While fraud on the PCB
tests was not raised in the IBT trial, it is strongly suggested
by memos and letters that came to light in later civil lawsuits.
Several of these show how, at Monsanto's request, IBT Labs customized
its studies. "I think we are surprised (and disappointed?)
at the apparent toxicity at the levels studied," Monsanto's
Elmer Wheeler wrote in March 1970 to IBT president Joseph Calandra.
"I doubt that there is any explanation for this but I do
think that we might exchange some new thoughts."
In a letter to IBT Labs
two months later commenting on a set of PCB test results, Wheeler
wrote, "We would hope that we might find a higher 'no effect'
level with this sample as compared to the previous work."
In later years, Monsanto's
requests would become even more blatant. "In two instances,
the previous conclusion of 'slightly tumorigenic' was changed
to 'non-carcinogenic,'" Monsanto wrote in July 1975. "The
latter phrase is preferable. May we request that the Aroclor
1254 report be amended to say 'does not appear to be carcinogenic.'"
Two weeks later, Calandra
responded: "We will amend our statement in the last paragraph
on page 2 of the Aroclor 1254 report to read, 'does not appear
to be carcinogenic' in place of 'slightly tumorigenic' as requested."
Testimony about the IBT Labs scandal in a Texas lawsuit against
Monsanto indicates that IBT was aware that PCBs caused extremely
high numbers of tumors in test rats, with 82 percent developing
tumors when fed Aroclor 1254 at 10 parts per million and 100
percent at 100 parts per million. Yet with a stroke of a pen,
IBT Labs certified PCBs a noncarcinogen.
Working behind the scenes
of such scientific miracles was Paul Wright. In July 1976, after
returning to Monsanto, he was given a $1,000 award for "forestalling
EPA's promulgation of unrealistic regulations to limit discharges
of polychlorinated biphenyls." A year later, IBT Labs was
found out, and Wright, Calandra, and another IBT exec were eventually
convicted of federal fraud charges.
The first proposal for
a total ban on PCBs was made by Representative William Fitz Ryan
(D-N.Y.) in 1970. But partly due to the IBT tests, the substance
stayed on the market until the Toxic Substances Control Act of
1976. Before the lid clamped down, industry continued to minimize
reports of PCB toxicity. "The low order of toxicity to man
is supported by several decades experience in the U.S. electrical
industry," GE wrote the EPA in November 1973, urging the
agency not to regulate PCBs. In its comments, Monsanto stated
that "PCB has always been considered less hazardous than
many other chemicals in everyday use."
Denials of the dangers
would continue even after the ban. "There has never been
a single document case in this country where PCBs have been shown
to cause cancer or any other serious human health problems,"
said Monsanto toxicologist John Craddock in a January 30, 1981,
speech. "In the classical short term exposure, or acute
toxicity sense, PCBs are classified as 'slightly toxic' by oral
ingestion." Their toxicity was similar, he said, to table
salt. "Monsanto, the government and the electrical industry
together concluded that the benefits to society of continued
PCB use far outweighed the risk." Decades after the Drinker
study demonstrated PCBs' toxicity, 25 years after Monsanto's
files indicated that dioxin and dibenzofurans were contaminants
in PCBs, and with a former Monsanto official standing trial for
fraud, Monsanto still claimed that PCBs were safe.
Six days after Craddock's
speech, a PCB transformer from GE filled with Monsanto's Aroclor
1254 exploded and burned in Binghamton, New York - the first
such U.S. explosion that was publicly acknowledged to involve
PCBs. "Binghamton's tallest building, centerpiece of a modern,
multi-million-dollar downtown government complex, is now a landmark
of the Chemical Age, an empty monolith filled with deadly dioxins,"
wrote the Associated Press. "What started out as a routine
electrical fire eventually released some of the most toxic chemicals
on Earth throughout the interior of the 18-story structure."
Thirteen years later, the building is still closed to the public.
Although sale of PCBs has
been banned in the United States for 18 years, billions of pounds
are still with us: in electrical transformers, leaking from landfills,
and lodged in the fatty tissues of humans and other animals,
passed on to new generations through mother's milk and contaminated
food, causing cancer, birth defects, and sterility. For the few
extra years of profit for Monsanto, GE, and Westinghouse, we
are all now paying the price.++
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