20th WCP: The Reference of Theoretical Terms
Philosophy of Language
The Reference of Theoretical Terms
Renate Duerr
Karlsruhe; Germany
Renate.duerr@geist-soz.uni-karlsruhe.de
ABSTRACT: A popular explanation of the success of theories of science is that
of scientific realism. It maintains, besides that the theories of a
mature science are typically approximately true, that observational
terms and theoretical terms refer to or denote entities. Therefore it is
part of the realistic claim that "reference" explains "success." But if
the realist is not able to clarify "reference" and a fortiori the
reference on theoretical objects, the realist comes to a vicious circle,
for there is no further criterion as the success of the theory to show
that the term is referential. So it is necessary to clarify the notion
"reference." Needless to say, "reference" is a relational term; but it
easily becomes a problem that we are not only habituated to imagine the
elation but we are convinced that a relation is just a relation between
entities in a strict (viz., Quinian) sense. There are different kinds of
references. For example, one is usually called "intentionality." If we,
considering the traditional separation between reference and meaning,
analyze meaning, we will find at least one referential component
(intentional object). Such a referential process is not a meaningless
aspect of linguistic reference, but now and then is the subject of the
kind of relation called "denotation." The notion of meaning and the
concept of reference are nonsubstantial constructions of interpretation.
Nevertheless, I argue for a reference-theoretical approach.
A popular explanation for the success of scientific
theories is made by presupposing scientific realism. The realist's thesis
maintains that typically the theories of "mature" science are
approximately true and that observational terms and theoretical terms do
actually refer, i.e. they denote entities.
Therefore, it is part and parcel of the realistic claim
that it is "reference" which explains theory "success". But if we or the
realist are not able to clarify what "reference" is and a fortiori cannot
specify the reference to theoretical "objects", we, and especially the
realist, become entangled in a vicious circle, without any further
independent criterion — apart from the success of the theory — which shows
that the term is indeed a referring term.
It is therefore clearly necessary to clarify the notion
of reference.
Needless to say, "reference" is a relational term; but
immediately a problem arises here namely, that we not only habitually
imagine the relata, but we are also convinced that a relation can only be
a relation between entities in a strict (Quinean) sense.
There are various kinds of references resp. relations
described as referential. This applies, e.g., to the referential relation
which is usually called "intentionality". If we consider the traditional
distinction between reference and meaning and analyze the meaning of a
term we always find at least one referential component (intentional or
intended object). This referential mapping process is not an unimportant
aspect of linguistic reference, but in the present context we are
considering the kind of relation called "denotation" or "extension".
The notion of meaning and the concept of reference are
nonsubstantial constructions of interpretation; yet nevertheless I would
like to argue in favor of a reference-theoretical approach.
Theoretical terms have often caused diverse problems for
theoretical scientists, depending on their particular "metaphysical"
background. At first sight, an elegant solution appears to be given by Rom
Harré's approach (1986): Harré understands the reference to theoretical as
well as to empirical entities as a "material practice". He offers two
explications for "material practice":
Observers (materially embodied [Harré, 102]) are involved
in a physical/physicalistic relation to a material object;
experimentators produce parts of reality on a theoretical
basis.
Regarding the production of reference it turns out to be
indifferent whether the object is an object in the world or just "in" a
theory, for it is trivial that no one is able to think of objects without
conceptual mediation. However, the distinction between physical and
theoretical entities is theory-dependent itself, as is also the idea that
a speaker might refer to something and how he would do so.
Secondly, Harré advocates a so called referential
realism, i.e. he tries to develop his concept of realism further than
traditional truth realism (1) and metaphysical realism. Within the range of
his scientific program he distinguishes three kinds of scientific theories
dependent on three different levels of being and their respective
associated cognitive or operational-experimental practices: type 1
theories contain descriptions and definitions of observable phenomena,
they reach therefore beyond the level R1 of the directly observable. In
type 2 theories "objects" are represented or postulated, which are — in
Harré's opinion — not presently (not yet actually),but in principle,
observable; while the entities postulated in type 3 theories (covariances,
symmetries, hence mathematical features) are principally beyond all
observation (Harré 70).
Harrés conception aims at a transformation of type 2
theories to type1 theories. It is feasible to consider the method he
suggests for this explicitly within the scope of this paper. Let me only
indicate here that Harré (referring to L. Roberts) distinguishes two kinds
of reference production: the so-called DC- and IP-references. ("DC" stands
for the demonstrative pronoun and complement: it could be called deixis as
well, in connection with a general term.) DC-references achieve the
selection of an object out of an extension set, determined by the general
terminus, by pointing at, referring to something by similar procedures.
They differ from the IP-references in that in the DC-associations the
general termini indicate perceivables. The IP-references are so-called
after the "I" for "indefinite pronouns" and "P" for the "individuing
predicate". In a way, the IP-references are also dependent on perceptions,
the "I" refers to a that; it's true that this perception is not
explained by some other perception, but the predicate level is defined by
mere theoretical constructs.
The type 2 theories deal mainly with IP-references (e.g.,
"Whatever is the cause of this phenomenon is an X") and Harré's "aim" in
science is to transform (or reduce) IP-references to DC-references.
Therefore, he introduces the beautiful metaphor of referent hunting
with which — in my opinion — he unnecessarily imputes that one can speak
about "reference" only when there is a referent in quite a specific sense —
and, according to Harré, that would be an observable existence. Of
course, Harré doesn't assume that one could somehow see or taste
neutrinos. Obviously, these are merely indirectly perceivable through
specific technically produced effects or phenomena. Secondhand reference,
however, is reference-theoretically "indecent", since it is not direct
reference. There is, in principle, no direct acquaintance with the
"object" and, therefore, it is difficult — to say the least — to find a
distinction (in this relation) between Harré's "reference chase" and
Carnap's correspondence rules, except, perhaps, by pointing to the fact
that retransformating R2-entities to R1-entities would in the long run
hinder the progress of cognition in the case where the re- or
transformation attempts are made indiscriminatey, firstly, in all theories
of various disciplines and, secondly, independently of the respective
intended function of the theory (explanation, prediction, "production
instruction"). When reference is seen functionally — and I think this is
the only way to view it — we can attribute a functional status to the
"objects" of reference. That means that certain "objects" of reference
"exist" only within the reference act itself, and are therefore only
dependent on the respective intended function.
For a long time it has been generally accepted that the
distinction between observational and theoretical terms is, if not
questionable in principle, nevertheless highly dependent on aims,
formulations of the question, conventions, practices of speech and not
least on levels of technology, especially of measurement technology.
Our entire world access is conceptually defined
(dependent on our cognition equipment), is so to speak
interpretation-infused. Thus, Pegasus, bald present French kings, unicorns
and wooden irons, nouns originating from adjectives like redness and
blueness, phlogiston, neutrinos and their mass, Snow White, as well as the
objects of direct perception themselves are — metaphorically spoken — in
the same boat. Nevertheless, it is necessary and possible to make
distinctions. There remains particularly the (practically) necessary
distinction between observable and theoretical terms, as well as the
determination of a demarcation criterion between theoretical and other
non-observable entities.
The thesis states that possible objects of reference are
generated on different levels of interpretation, (2) become reference objects
by speaking acts, which means that on the one hand a succeeding reference
procedure presupposes its objects, and on the other, that this "object" is
not given independently (from interpretation), but necessarily drafted in
the form of an interpretation result, formed and structured in processes
of explanation, which partly (IS1+2) cannot take place in any other way,
i.e. independently from interpretation "grasps", which are at least partly
influenced by a given (already found) speech practice (IS3) and partly
quite consciously and purposefully constructed for certain aims.
Not only the objects of terms which are traditionally not
understood as being of a referring type, but also theoretical entities
should be understood as higher level interpretative constructs, and thus
as something rather linguistically introduced, that "exists" only by
dependence on a certain language. On the other hand, the referent is,
partially because of linguistically independent conceptions, types of
action, practices, etc., definitely and correctly to be understood as not
being of just a linguistic type in the narrow sense.
In summary: Theoretical terms are insofar referring terms
as they, occuring in hypotheses or laws, are used to explain reality (i.e.
real events and objects), make predictions possible and to develop
technological procedures. Their objects of reference ("referents") are
given only under a description: more specifically, they are significantly
(selected and selectable) indepently of a description. This is however —
following Frege and Russell — , a serious obstacle for at least direct
reference. Nota bene, the distinction between direct and nondirect
reference is difficult to specify: Referring terms are characterized by
objects being imputed (hypostatized) or projected outside of the mind; and
this makes reference basically indirect. There may be reasons for
distinguishing reference to perception-based objects as a direct
reference. But theoretical terms can also be understood as directly
referring — therefore you need only to refer to the definition that a term
is only referring in the case that the truth — and realization conditions
are understood as being singular; and this is what they are — as is
well-known — when there is an x, that makes a sentence exactly true, if x
fulfils the predicate F ( ): Whether this is a theoretical, empirical or
even mystical predicate, is unimportant in this context.
Bibliography
Harré, Rom, Varieties of Realism. A Rationale for the Natural Sciences,
Oxford 1986.
Lenk, Hans, Philosophie und Interpretation, Frankfurt am Main,
1993.
Notes
(1) I regard a referential realism without truth realism as
conceptually impossible, but that is not the topic here.
(2) I distinguish with Lenk (1993) six levels of
interpretation: IS1: practically unchangeable primitive or pimary
interpretation; IS2: habitual, uniformity establishing (behavior) pattern
interpretations; IS3: linguistic-conventional term and norm forming; IS4:
consciously formed concept classification interpretations; IS5:
explaining, theoretically founding or justifying interpretations; IS6:
methodological (meta)interpretation.
Paideia logo design by Janet L. Olson. All Rights Reserved
|
|
