War (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Cite this entry Search the SEP • Advanced Search • Tools • RSS FeedTable of Contents• What's New• Archives• Projected ContentsEditorial Information• About the SEP• Editorial Board• How to Cite the SEP• Special CharactersSupport the SEPContact the SEP ©Metaphysics Research Lab,CSLI,Stanford University  Open access to the SEP is made possible by a world-wide funding initiative. Please Read How You Can Help Keep the Encyclopedia FreeWarFirst published Fri Feb 4, 2000; substantive revision Thu Jul 28, 2005War should be understood as an actual, intentional andwidespread armed conflict between politicalcommunities. Thus, fisticuffs between individual persons do not countas a war, nor does a gang fight, nor does a feud on the order of theHatfields versus the McCoys. War is a phenomenon which occursonly between political communities, defined as those entitieswhich either are states or intend to become states (in order to allowfor civil war). Classical war is international war, a war betweendifferent states, like the two World Wars. But just as frequent is warwithin a state between rival groups or communities, like the AmericanCivil War. Certain political pressure groups, like terroristorganizations, might also be considered “politicalcommunities,” in that they are associations of people with apolitical purpose and, indeed, many of them aspire to statehood or toinfluence the development of statehood in certain lands.What's statehood? Most people follow Max Weber's distinction betweennation and state. A nation is a group which thinks of itself as“a people,” usually because they share many things incommon, such as ethnicity, language, culture, historical experience, aset of ideals and values, habitat, cuisine, fashion and so on. Thestate, by contrast, refers much more narrowly to the machinery ofgovernment which organizes life in a given territory. Thus, we candistinguish between the American state and the American people, orbetween the government of France and the French nation. At the sametime, you've probably heard the term “nation-state.”Indeed, people often use “nation” and “state”interchangeably but we'll need to keep them conceptually distinct forour purposes. “Nation-state” refers to the relativelyrecent phenomenon wherein a nation wants its own state, and moves toform one. This started out as a very European trend—an Italianstate for the Italian nation, a German state for the German people,etc., but it has spread throughout the world. Note that in somecountries, such as America, Australia and Canada, the state actuallypresides over many nations, and you hear of “multi-nationalsocieties.” Most societies with heavy immigration aremulti-national. Multi-national countries are sometimes prone to civilwars between the different groups. This has been especially true ofcentral Africa in recent years, as different peoples struggle overcontrol of the one state, or else move to separate themselves from theexisting arrangement (itself often having been put in place by distantimperial powers insensitive to local group and ethnicdifferences).All these distinctions will come in handy as we proceed. For now, wenote how central the issue of statehood is to the essence of warfare.Indeed, it seems that all warfare is precisely, and ultimately,about governance. War is a violent way for determining who gets tosay what goes on in a given territory, for example, regarding: who getspower, who gets wealth and resources, whose ideals prevail, who is amember and who is not, which laws get made, what gets taught inschools, where the border rests, how much tax is levied, and so on. Waris the ultimate means for deciding these issues if a peaceful processor resolution can't be agreed upon.The mere threat of war, and the presence of mutual disdainbetween political communities, do not suffice as indicators of war. Theconflict of arms must be actual, and not merely latent, for itto count as war. Further, the actual armed conflict must be bothintentional and widespread: isolated clashes betweenrogue officers, or border patrols, do not count as actions of war. Theonset of war requires a conscious commitment, and a significantmobilization, on the part of the belligerents in question.There's no real war, so to speak, until the fightersintend to go to war and until they do so with a heavyquantum of force.Let us here cite, by way of support, the views of the one and only(so-called) “philosopher of war,” Carl von Clausewitz.Clausewitz famously suggested that war is “the continuation ofpolicy by other means.” Surely, as a description, this conceptionis both powerful and plausible: war is about governance, using violenceinstead of peaceful measures to resolve policy (which organizes life ina land). This notion fits in nicely with Clausewitz's own generaldefinition of war as “an act of violence intended to compel ouropponent to fulfil our will.” War, he says, is like a duel, buton “an extensive scale.” As Michael Gelven has written morerecently, war is intrinsically vast, communal (or political) andviolent. It is an actual, widespread and deliberate armed conflictbetween political communities, motivated by a sharp disagreement overgovernance. In fact, we might say that Clausewitz was right, butnot quite deep enough: it's not just that war is the continuationof policy by other means; it's that war is about thevery thing which creates policy—i.e., governance itself. Waris the intentional use of mass force to resolve disputes overgovernance. War is, indeed, governance by bludgeon. Ultimately, war isprofoundly anthropological: it is about which group of people gets tosay what goes on in a given territory.War is a brutal and ugly enterprise. Yet it remains central to humanhistory and social change. These two facts together might seemparadoxical and inexplicable, or they might reveal deeply disturbingfacets of the human character (notably, a drive for dominance overothers). What is certainly true, in any event, is that war and itsthreat continue to be forces in our lives. Recent events graphicallydemonstrate this proposition, whether we think of the 9-11 attacks, thecounter-attack on Afghanistan, the overthrow of Iraq's SaddamHussein, the Darfur crisis in Sudan, the bombings in Madrid and London,or the on-going “war on terror” more generally. We all hadhigh hopes going into the new millennium in 2000; alas, this newcentury has already been savagely scarred with warfare.War's violent nature, and controversial social effects, raisetroubling moral questions for any thoughtful person. Is war alwayswrong? Might there be situations when it can be a justified, or even asmart, thing to do? Will war always be part of human experience, or canwe do something to make it disappear? Is war an outcome of unchangeablehuman nature or, rather, of changeable social practice? Is there a fairand sensible way to wage war, or is it all hopeless, barbaricslaughter? When wars end, how should post-war reconstruction proceed,and who should be in charge? What are our rights, and responsibilities,when our own society makes the move to go to war?1. Ethics of War and Peace2. Just War Theory 2.1 Jus ad bellum 2.2 Jus in bello 2.3 Jus post bellum 3. Realism4. Pacifism5. Conclusion6. Guide to the LiteratureBibliographyOther Internet ResourcesRelated Entries1. The Ethics of War and PeaceThree traditions of thought dominate the ethics of war and peace:Realism; Pacifism; and Just War Theory(and, through just war theory, International Law). Perhaps there areother possible perspectives but it seems that very few theories on theethics of war succeed in resisting ultimate classification into one ofthese traditions. They are clearly hegemonic in this regard.Before discussing the central elements of each tradition, let'sdeclare the basic conceptual differences between “the bigthree” perspectives. The core, and controversial, proposition ofjust war theory is that, sometimes, states can have moraljustification for resorting to armed force. War is sometimes, but ofcourse not all the time, morally right. The idea here is not that thewar in question is merely politically shrewd, or prudent, or bold anddaring, but fully moral, just. It is an ethically appropriate use ofmass political violence. World War II, on the Allied side, is alwaystrotted out as the definitive example of a just and good war. Realism,by contrast, sports a profound skepticism about the application ofmoral concepts, such as justice, to the key problems of foreignpolicy. Power and national security, realists claim, motivate statesduring wartime and thus moral appeals are strictly wishfulthinking. Talk of the morality of warfare is pure bunk: ethics has gotnothing to do with the rough-and-tumble world of global politics,where only the strong and cunning survive. A country should tend toits vital interests in security, influence over others, and economicgrowth—and not to moral ideals. Pacifism does not sharerealism's moral skepticism. For the pacifist, moral concepts canindeed be applied fruitfully to international affairs. Itdoes make sense to ask whether a war is just: that is animportant and meaningful issue. But the result of such normativeapplication, in the case of war, is always that war should not beundertaken. Where just war theory is sometimes permissivewith regard to war, pacifism is always prohibitive. For thepacifist, war is always wrong; there's always some better resolutionto the problem than fighting. Now let's turn to the elements of eachof these three traditions.2. Just War TheoryJust war theory is probably the most influential perspective on theethics of war and peace. The just war tradition has enjoyed a long anddistinguished pedigree, including such notables as Augustine, Aquinas,Grotius, Suarez, Vattel and Vitoria. Hugo Grotius is probably the mostcomprehensive and formidable classical member of the tradition; JamesT. Johnson is the authoritative historian of this tradition; and manyrecognize Michael Walzer as the dean of contemporary just wartheorists. Many credit Augustine with the founding of just war theorybut this is incomplete. As Johnson notes, in its origins just wartheory is a synthesis of classical Greco-Roman, as well as Christian,values. If we have to “name names”, the founders of justwar theory are probably the triad of Aristotle, Cicero and Augustine.Many of the rules developed by the just war tradition have since beencodified into contemporary international laws governing armedconflict, such as The United Nations Charter and The Hague and GenevaConventions. The tradition has thus been doubly influential,dominating both moral and legal discourse surrounding war. It sets thetone, and the parameters, for the great debate.Just war theory can be meaningfully divided into three parts, whichin the literature are referred to, for the sake of convenience, inLatin. These parts are: 1) jus ad bellum, which concerns thejustice of resorting to war in the first place; 2) jus inbello, which concerns the justice of conduct within war, after ithas begun; and 3) jus post bellum, which concerns the justiceof peace agreements and the termination phase of war.2.1 Jus ad bellumThe rules of jus ad bellum are addressed, first and foremost,to heads of state. Since political leaders are the ones who inauguratewars, setting their armed forces in motion, they are to be heldaccountable to jus ad bellum principles. If they fail in thatresponsibility, then they commit war crimes. In the language of theNuremberg prosecutors, aggressive leaders who launch unjust warscommit “crimes against peace.” What constitutes a just orunjust resort to armed force is disclosed to us by the rules ofjus ad bellum. Just war theory contends that, for any resortto war to be justified, a political community, or state, must fulfileach and every one of the following six requirements:1. Just cause. This is clearly the most importantrule; it sets the tone for everything which follows. A state maylaunch a war only for the right reason. The just causes mostfrequently mentioned include: self-defence from external attack; thedefence of others from such; the protection of innocents from brutal,aggressive regimes; and punishment for a grievous wrongdoing whichremains uncorrected. Vitoria suggested that all the just causes besubsumed under the one category of “a wrong received.”Walzer, and most modern just war theorists, speak of the one justcause for resorting to war being the resistance ofaggression. Aggression is the use of armed force in violation ofsomeone else's basic rights.The basic rights of two kinds of entity are involved here: those ofstates; and those of their individual citizens. International lawaffirms that states have many rights, notably those to politicalsovereignty and territorial integrity. It thus affirms that aggressioninvolves the use of armed forces—armies, navies, air forces,marines, missiles—in violation of these rights. Classic caseswould be Nazi Germany into Poland in 1939, and Iraq into Kuwait in1990, wherein the aggressor used its armed forces to invade theterritory of the victim, overthrow its government and establish a newregime in its place. Crucially, the commission of aggression causes theaggressor to forfeit its own state rights, thereby permitting violentresistance. An aggressor has no right not to be warred against indefence; indeed, it has the duty to stop its rights-violatingaggression.But why do states have rights? The only respectable answer seems tobe that they need these rights to protect their people and to helpprovide them with the objects of their human rights. As John Locke, andthe U.S. Founding Fathers, declared: governments are instituted amongpeople to realize the basic rights of those people. If governments doso, they are legitimate; if not, they have neither right nor reason toexist. This is vital: from the moral point of view, only legitimategovernments have rights, including those to go to war. We need atheory of legitimate governance to ground just war theory, and Aquinasperhaps saw this more clearly than any classical member of thetradition. This connection to legitimacy is consistent with theperspective on war offered so far: war, at its heart, is a violentclash over how a territory and its people are to be governed.Based on international law (see Roth), it seems like there are threebasic criteria for a legitimate government. If these conditions aremet, the state in question has rights to govern and to be left inpeace. They are as follows. First, the state is recognized aslegitimate by its own people and by the international community. Thereis an uncoerced general peace and order within that society, and thestate is not shunned as a pariah by the rest of the world. Second, thestate avoids violating the rights of other legitimate states. Inparticular, legitimate governments don't commit aggressionagainst other societies. Finally, legitimate states make everyreasonable effort to satisfy the human rights of their own citizens,notably those to life, liberty and subsistence. States failing any ofthese criteria have no right to govern or to go to war. We can speak ofstates satisfying these criteria as legitimate, or “minimallyjust,” political communities.Why do we need to talk about these rights? First, to give staterights moral legitimacy and to avoid fetishizing state rights for theirown sake. Second, to describe what is wrong about aggression and why itjustifies war in response. Aggression is so serious because it involvesthe infliction of physical force in violation of the most elementalentitlements people and their communities have: to survive; to bephysically secure; to have enough resources to subsist at all; to livein peace; and to choose for themselves their own lives and societies.Aggression thus attacks the very spine of human civilizationitself. This is what makes it permissible to resist with means assevere as war, provided the other jus ad bellum criteria arealso met. Third, talk of legitimacy is essential for explaining justicein a civil war, wherein there isn't classical, cross-borderaggression between competing countries but, rather, a vicious fightover the one state between rival communities within a formerly unitedsociety. The key to discerning morality in such cases revolves aroundthe idea of legitimacy: which, if any, side has minimal justice? Whichside is defending—or is seeking to establish—a legitimatepolitical structure in our three-fold sense? That's the sidewhich it is permissible to: a) be part of; or b) if you're anoutsider, to support.How does this conception of just cause impact on the issue of armedhumanitarian intervention? This is when a state does not commitcross-border aggression but, for whatever reason, turns savagelyagainst its own people, deploying armed force in a series of massacresagainst large numbers of its own citizens. Such events happened inCambodia and Uganda in the 1970s, Rwanda in 1994, Serbia/Kosovo in1998-9 and in Sudan/Darfur from 2004 to the present. Our definitionsallow us to say it's permissible to intervene on behalf of thevictims, and to attack with defensive force the rogue regime meting outsuch death and destruction. Why? There's no logical requirementthat aggression can only be committed across borders.Aggression is the use of armed force in violation of someoneelse's basic rights. That “someone else” might be: a)another person (violent crime); b) another state (international or“external” aggression); or c) many other people withinone's own community (domestic or “internal”aggression). The commission of aggression, in any of these forms,causes the aggressor to forfeit its rights. The aggressor has no rightnot to be resisted with defensive force; indeed, the aggressor has theduty to stop and submit itself to punishment. If the aggressordoesn't stop, it is entirely permissible for its victims toresort to force to protect themselves—and for anyone else to dolikewise in aid of the victims. Usually, in humanitarian intervention,armed aid from the international community is essential for aneffective resistance against the aggression, since domestic populationsare at a huge disadvantage, and are massively vulnerable, to theviolence of their own state.Terrorists can commit aggression too. There's nothing to theconcept which excludes this: they, too, can deploy armed force inviolation of someone else's basic rights. When they do so, theyforfeit any right not to suffer the consequences of receiving defensiveforce in response. Indeed, terrorists almost always commit aggressionwhen they act, since terrorism is precisely the use of randomviolence—especially killing force—against civilians, withthe intent of spreading fear throughout a population, hoping this fearwill advance a political objective. On 9/11, the al-Qaeda terroristgroup clearly used armed force, both to gain control of the planes andthen again when using the planes as missiles against the targets in ThePentagon and The World Trade Center. This use of armed force was inviolation of America's state rights to political sovereignty andterritorial integrity, and to all those people's human rights tolife and liberty. The terrorist strikes on 9/11 wereaggression—defiantly so, deliberately modelled after PearlHarbor. As such, they justified the responding attack on the Talibanregime in Afghanistan. The Taliban had sponsored and enabledal-Qaeda's attack, by providing resources, personnel and a safehaven to the terrorist group.An important issue in just cause is whether, to be justified ingoing to war, one must wait for the aggression actually tohappen, or whether in some instances it is permissible to launch apre-emptive strike against anticipated aggression. Thetradition is severely split on this issue. Vitoria said you must wait,since it would be absurd to “punish someone for an offense theyhave yet to commit.” Others, like Walzer, strive to define theexceptional criteria, stressing: the seriousness of the anticipatedaggression; the kind and quality of evidence required; the speed withwhich one must decide; and the issue of fairness and the duty toprotect one's people. If one knows a terrible attack is comingsoon, one owes it to one's people to shift from defense tooffense. The best defense, as they say, is a good offense. Why let theaggressor have the upper hand of the first strike? But that'sthe very issue: can you attack first and not, thereby, yourselfbecome the aggressor? Can striking first still be consideredan act of defence from aggression? International law, for itspart, sweepingly forbids pre-emptive strikes unless they are clearlyauthorized in advance by the UN Security Council. These issues, ofcourse, were highlighted in the run-up to the 2003 U.S.-led pre-emptivestrike on Iraq. The U.S. still maintains, in its National SecurityStrategy, the right to strike first as part of its war on terror. Manyother countries find this extremely controversial.2. Right intention. A state must intend to fightthe war only for the sake of its just cause. Having the right reasonfor launching a war is not enough: the actual motivation behind theresort to war must also be morally appropriate. Ulterior motives, suchas a power or land grab, or irrational motives, such as revenge orethnic hatred, are ruled out. The only right intention allowed is tosee the just cause for resorting to war secured and consolidated. Ifanother intention crowds in, moral corruption sets in. Internationallaw does not include this rule, probably because of the evidentiarydifficulties involved in determining a state's intent.3. Proper authority and public declaration. A statemay go to war only if the decision has been made by the appropriateauthorities, according to the proper process, and made public, notablyto its own citizens and to the enemy state(s). The “appropriateauthority” is usually specified in that country'sconstitution. States failing the requirements of minimal justice lackthe legitimacy to go to war.4. Last Resort. A state may resort to war only ifit has exhausted all plausible, peaceful alternatives to resolving theconflict in question, in particular diplomatic negotiation. One wantsto make sure something as momentous and serious as war is declared onlywhen it seems the last practical and reasonable shot at effectivelyresisting aggression.5. Probability of Success. A state may not resortto war if it can foresee that doing so will have no measurable impacton the situation. The aim here is to block mass violence which is goingto be futile. International law does not include this requirement, asit is seen as biased against small, weaker states.6. Proportionality. A state must, prior to initiatinga war, weigh the universal goods expected to result from it,such as securing the just cause, against the universal evilsexpected to result, notably casualties. Only if the benefits areproportional to, or “worth”, the costs may the war actionproceed. (The universal must be stressed, since often in war statesonly tally their own expected benefits and costs, radicallydiscounting those accruing to the enemy and to any innocent thirdparties.)Just war theory insists all six criteria must each befulfilled for a particular declaration of war to be justified: it's allor no justification, so to speak. Just war theory is thus quitedemanding, as of course it should be, given the gravity of its subjectmatter. It is important to note that the first three of these six rulesare what we might call deontological requirements, otherwise known asduty-based requirements or first-principle requirements. For a war tobe just, some core duty must be violated: in this case, the duty not tocommit aggression. A war in punishment of this violated duty mustitself respect further duties: it must be appropriately motivated, andmust be publicly declared by (only) the proper authority for doing so.The next three requirements are consequentialist: given that thesefirst principle requirements have been met, we must also consider theexpected consequences of launching a war. Thus, just war theoryattempts to provide a common sensical combination of both deontologyand consequentialism as applied to the issue of war.2.2 Jus in belloJus in bello refers to justice in war, to right conduct inthe midst of battle. Responsibility for state adherence to jus inbello norms falls primarily on the shoulders of those militarycommanders, officers and soldiers who formulate and execute the warpolicy of a particular state. They are to be held responsible for anybreach of the principles which follow below. Such accountability mayinvolve being put on trial for war crimes, whether by one's ownnational military justice system or perhaps by the newly-formedInternational Criminal Court (created by the 1998 Treaty of Rome).We need to distinguish between external and internal jus inbello. External, or traditional, jus in bello concernsthe rules a state should observe regarding the enemy and its armedforces. Internal jus in bello concerns the rules a state mustfollow in connection with its own people as it fights war against anexternal enemy.There are several rules of external jus in bello:1. Obey all international laws on weaponsprohibition. Chemical and biological weapons, in particular,are forbidden by many treaties. Nuclear weapons aren't so clearlyprohibited but it seems fair to say a huge taboo attaches to suchweapons and any use of them would be greeted with incredible hostilityby the international community.2. Discrimination and Non-Combatant Immunity.Soldiers are only entitled to use their (non-prohibited) weapons totarget those who are, in Walzer's words, “engaged inharm.” Thus, when they take aim, soldiers must discriminatebetween the civilian population, which is morally immune from directand intentional attack, and those legitimate military, political andindustrial targets involved in rights-violating harm. While somecollateral civilian casualties are excusable, it is wrong totake deliberate aim at civilian targets. An example would besaturation bombing of residential areas. (It is worth noting thatalmost all wars since 1900 have featured larger civilian, thanmilitary, casualties. Perhaps this is one reason why this rule is themost frequently and stridently codified rule in all the laws of armedconflict, as international law seeks to protect unarmed civilians asbest it can.)3. Proportionality. Soldiers may only use forceproportional to the end they seek. They must restrain their force tothat amount appropriate to achieving their aim or target. Weapons ofmass destruction, for example, are usually seen as being out ofproportion to legitimate military ends.4. Benevolent quarantine for prisoners of war(POWs). If enemy soldiers surrender and become captives, theycease being lethal threats to basic rights. They are no longer“engaged in harm.” Thus it is wrong to target them withdeath, starvation, rape, torture, medical experimentation, and so on.They are to be provided, as The Geneva Conventions spell out, withbenevolent—not malevolent—quarantine away from battle zonesand until the war ends, when they should be exchanged for one'sown POWs. Do terrorists deserve such protection, too? Great controversysurrounds the detainment and aggressive questioning of terroristsuspects held by the U.S. at jails in Cuba, Iraq and Pakistan in thename of the war on terror.5. No Means Mala in Se. Soldiers may not useweapons or methods which are “evil in themselves.” Theseinclude: mass rape campaigns; genocide or ethnic cleansing; usingpoison or treachery (like disguising soldiers to look like the RedCross); forcing captured soldiers to fight against their own side; andusing weapons whose effects cannot be controlled, like biologicalagents.6. No reprisals. A reprisal is when country Aviolates jus in bello in war with country B. Country B thenretaliates with its own violation of jus in bello, seeking tochasten A into obeying the rules. There are strong moral andevidentiary reasons to believe that reprisals don't work, andthey instead serve to escalate death and make the destruction of warincreasingly indiscriminate. Winning well is the best revenge.Internal jus in bello essentially boils down to the needfor a state, even though it's involved in a war, neverthelessto still respect the human rights of its own citizens as best itcan during the crisis. The following issues arise: is it just toimpose conscription, or press censorship? Can one curtail traditionalcivil liberties, and due process protections, for perceived gains innational security? Should elections be cancelled or post-poned? Maysoldiers disobey orders, e.g. refuse to fight in wars they believeunjust? A comprehensive theory of wartime justice must includeconsideration of them, and not merely focus on what one may do to theenemy. For some of the worst atrocities in wartime have occurredwithin, and not between, national borders. Some states,historically, have used the cloak of war with foreign powers to engagein massive internal human rights violations, usually against somedisfavoured group. Other states, which are otherwise decent, panicamidst the wartime situation and impose emergency legislation whichturns out to have been complete overkill, and which they later regretand view as the product of fear rather than reason.2.3 Jus post bellumJus post bellum refers to justice during the third andfinal stage of war: that of war termination. It seeks to regulate theending of wars, and to ease the transition from war back to peace.There is little international law here—save occupation law andperhaps the human rights treaties—and so we must turn to themoral resources of just war theory. But even here the theory has notdealt with jus post bellum to the degree it should. There is anewness, unsettledness and controversy attaching to this importanttopic. To focus our thoughts, consider the following proposedprinciples for jus post bellum:1. Proportionality and Publicity. The peacesettlement should be measured and reasonable, as well as publiclyproclaimed. To make a settlement serve as an instrument of revenge isto make a volatile bed one may be forced to sleep in later. In general,this rules out insistence on unconditional surrender.2. Rights Vindication. The settlement should securethose basic rights whose violation triggered the justified war. Therelevant rights include human rights to life and liberty and communityentitlements to territory and sovereignty. This is the main substantivegoal of any decent settlement, ensuring that the war will actually havean improving affect. Respect for rights, after all, is a foundation ofcivilization, whether national or international. Vindicating rights,not vindictive revenge, is the order of the day.3. Discrimination. Distinction needs to be madebetween the leaders, the soldiers, and the civilians in the defeatedcountry one is negotiating with. Civilians are entitled to reasonableimmunity from punitive post-war measures. This rules out sweepingsocio-economic sanctions as part of post-war punishment.4. Punishment #1. When the defeated country hasbeen a blatant, rights-violating aggressor, proportionate punishmentmust be meted out. The leaders of the regime, in particular, shouldface fair and public international trials for war crimes.5. Punishment #2. Soldiers also commit war crimes.Justice after war requires that such soldiers, from all sides tothe conflict, likewise be held accountable to investigation andpossible trial.6. Compensation. Financial restitution may bemandated, subject to both proportionality and discrimination. Apost-war poll tax on civilians is generally impermissible, and thereneeds to be enough resources left so that the defeated country canbegin its own reconstruction. To beggar thy neighbor is to pick futurefights.7. Rehabilitation. The post-war environmentprovides a promising opportunity to reform decrepit institutions in anaggressor regime. Such reforms are permissible but they must beproportional to the degree of depravity in the regime. They mayinvolve: demilitarization and disarmament; police and judicialre-training; human rights education; and even deep structuraltransformation towards a minimally just society governed by alegitimate regime. This is, obviously, the most controversial aspect ofjus post bellum.The terms of a just peace should satisfy all these requirements.There needs, in short, to be an ethical “exitstrategy” from war, and it deserves at least as much thought andeffort as the purely military exit strategy so much on the minds ofpolicy planners and commanding officers.Any serious defection, by any participant, from these principles ofjust war settlement should be seen as a violation of the rules of justwar termination, and so should be punished. At the least, violation ofsuch principles mandates a new round of diplomaticnegotiations—even binding international arbitration—betweenthe relevant parties to the dispute. At the very most, such violationmay give the aggrieved party a just cause—but no more than ajust cause—for resuming hostilities. Full recourse to theresumption of hostilities may be made only if all the othertraditional criteria of jus ad bellum—proportionality,last resort, etc.—are satisfied in addition to just cause.Perhaps a few additional thoughts on coercive regime change shouldhere be added, in light of controversial recent events, especially inAfghanistan and Iraq. Can coercive regime change ever be justified, oris it essentially an act of imperialism? In my view, forcible post-warregime change can be permissible provided: 1) the war itselfwas just and conducted properly; 2) the target regime was illegitimate,thus forfeiting its state rights; 3) the goal of the reconstruction isa minimally just regime; and 4) respect for jus in bello andhuman rights is integral to the transformation process itself. Thepermission is then granted because the transformation: 1) violatesneither state nor human rights; 2) its expected consequences are verydesirable, namely, satisfied human rights for the local population andincreased international peace and security for everyone; and 3) thepost-war moment is especially promising regarding the possibilities forreform. And the transformation will be successful when there's:1) a stable new regime; 2) run entirely by locals; which is 3)minimally just. There is extensive historical evidence that this kindof success probably takes from 8 to 12 years to achieve (essentially, adecade). Note that successful, rights-respecting coercive regime changecan be done, contrary to some pessimistic views; it wasactually done in Germany and Japan from 1945-55, and so it is neitherconceptually nor empirically impossible. It's very difficult, tobe sure—and, in some cases, it's not a wise thing todo—but it's not literally impossible.A review of the literature suggests something of a 10-point recipefor transforming a defeated aggressive regime into one which isminimally just:Adhere diligently to the laws of war during the regimetake-down and occupation.Purge much of the old regime, and prosecute its warcriminals.Disarm and demilitarize the society.Provide effective military and police security for thewhole country.Work with a cross-section of locals on a new,rights-respecting constitution which features checks and balances.Allow other, non-state associations, or “civilsociety”, to flourish.Forego compensation and sanctions in favour of investingin and re-building the economy.If necessary, re-vamp educational curricula to purge pastpoisonous propaganda and cement new and better values.Ensure, in a timely fashion, that the benefits of the neworder will be: 1) concrete; and 2) widely, and not narrowly,distributed. The bulk of the population must feel their lives afterthe regime change are clearly better than their former lives for thechange to be sustainable.Follow an orderly, not-too-hasty exit strategy when thenew regime can stand on its own two feet. Again, this will probablytake a decade of intensive effort.To summarize this whole section, just war theory offers rules toguide decision-makers on the appropriateness of their conduct duringthe resort to war, conduct during war and the termination phase of theconflict. Its over-all aim is to try and ensure that wars are begunonly for a very narrow set of truly defensible reasons, that when warsbreak out they are fought in a responsibly controlled and targetedmanner, and that the parties to the dispute bring their war to an endin a speedy and responsible fashion that respects the requirements ofjustice.3. RealismRealism is most influential amongst political scientists, as well asscholars and practitioners of international relations. While realism isa complex and often sophisticated doctrine, its core propositionsexpress a strong suspicion about applying moral concepts, like justice,to the conduct of international affairs. Realists believe that moralconcepts should be employed neither as descriptions of, nor asprescriptions for, state behaviour on the international plane. Realistsemphasize power and security issues, the need for a state to maximizeits expected self-interest and, above all, their view of theinternational arena as a kind of anarchy, in which the will to powerenjoys primacy.Referring specifically to war, realists believe that it is aninevitable part of an anarchical world system; that it ought to beresorted to only if it makes sense in terms of national self-interest;and that, once war has begun, a state ought to do whatever it can towin. In other words, “all's fair in love and war.” Duringthe grim circumstances of war, “anything goes.” So ifadhering to the rules of just war theory, or international law,hinders a state during wartime, it should disregard them and sticksteadfastly to its fundamental interests in power, security andeconomic growth. Prominent classical realists include Thucydides,Machiavelli and Hobbes. Modern realists include Hans Morgenthau,George Kennan, Reinhold Niebuhr and Henry Kissinger, as well asso-called neo-realists, such as Kenneth Waltz.It is important to distinguish between descriptive and prescriptiverealism. Descriptive realism is the claim that states, as a matterof fact, either do not (for reasons of motivation) or cannot (forreasons of competitive struggle) behave morally, and thus moraldiscourse surrounding interstate conflict is empty, the product of acategory mistake. States are simply not animated in terms of moralityand justice: it's all about power, security and national interest forthem. States are not like “big persons”: they arecreations of an utterly different kind, and we cannot expect them tolive by the same rules and principles we require of individualpersons, especially those in peaceful, developed societies. Moralityis a luxury states can't afford, for they inhabit a violentinternational arena, and they've got to be able to get in that gameand win, if they are to serve and protect their citizens in aneffective way over time. Morality is simply not on the radar screenfor states, given their defensive function and the brutal environmentin which they subsist.Walzer offers arguments against this kind of realism, contending thatstates are in fact responsive to moral concerns, even when they failto live up to them. States, because they are the creation ofindividual persons, want to act morally and justly: it could not beotherwise. Walzer goes so far as to say that any state which wasmotivated by nothing more than the struggle to survive and win powercould not over time sustain the support from its ownpopulation, which demands a deeper sense of community andjustice. He also argues that all the pretence regarding “thenecessity” of state conduct in terms of pursuing power isexaggerated and rhetorical, ignoring the clear reality of foreignpolicy choice enjoyed by states in the global arena. Statesare not frequently forced into some kind of dramatic, do-or-diestruggle: the choice to go to war is a deliberate one, freely enteredinto and often hotly debated and agonized over before the decision ismade. And this is leaving unspoken the argument regarding the defiant,Machiavellian amorality behind certain kinds of realism, and the moralcalibre of the actions it might recommend on this basis. For example,if it's all about power and winning in the competitive struggle, doesthat make it alright to unleash weapons of mass destruction? Or tolaunch a mass rape campaign? Commit genocide and just get rid ofthose bastards? Just war theory suggests not, and just war theoristslike Walzer want to claim that the rest of us agree.Prescriptive realism, though, need not be rooted in any form ofdescriptive realism. Prescriptive realism is the claim that a stateought (prudential “ought”) to behave amorally in theinternational arena. A state should, for prudence's sake, adhere to anamoral policy of smart self-regard in international affairs. A smartstate will leave its morality at home when considering what to do onthe international stage. Why? Because if it's too moral, it will beexploited by other states more ruthless. Nice guys finish last. Or, amoralized and moralizing state will offend other communities, whosecommunities sport different values. Better to stick to the sobercalculus of national interests and leave ethics out of it.It's important to note that a prescriptive realist might, in the end,actually endorse rules for the regulation of warfare, much like thoseoffered by just war theory. These rules include: “Wars shouldonly be fought in response to aggression”; and “Duringwar, non-combatants should not be directly targeted with lethalviolence.” Of course, the reason why a prescriptiverealist might endorse such rules would be very different from thereasons offered by the just war theorist: the latter would talk aboutabiding moral values whereas the former would refer to useful ruleswhich help establish expectations of behaviour, solve coordinationproblems and to which prudent bargainers would consent. Just warrules, the prescriptive realist might claim, do not have independentmoral purchase on the attention of states. These rules are whatDouglas Lackey calls “salient equilibria”, stableconventions limiting war's destructiveness which all prudent statescan agree on, assuming general compliance. There might even be someroom for overlap between this kind of realism and just war theory.4. PacifismIt seems best to rely on Jenny Teichman's definition of pacifism as“anti-war-ism.” Literally and straightforwardly, a pacifistrejects war in favour of peace. It is not violence in all its formsthat the most challenging kind of pacifist objects to; rather, it isthe specific kind and degree of violence that war involves which thepacifist objects to. A pacifist objects to killing (not just violence)in general and, in particular, she objects to the mass killing, forpolitical reasons, which is part and parcel of the wartime experience.So, a pacifist rejects war; she believes that there are no moralgrounds which can justify resorting to war. War, for the pacifist, isalways wrong.Mention should straight away be made of a very popular just warcriticism of pacifism which will not be used here. This criticism isthat pacifism amounts to an indefensible “clean handspolicy.” The pacifist, it is said, refuses to take the brutalmeasures necessary for the defense of himself and his country, for thesake of maintaining his own inner moral purity. It is contended thatthe pacifist is thus a kind of free-rider, gathering all the benefitsof citizenship while not sharing all its burdens. Another inferencedrawn is that the pacifist himself constitutes a kind of internalthreat to the over-all security of his state.This “clean hands” argument is easily, and frequently,over-stated. It is important to note that, to the extent to which anymoral stance will commend a certain set of actions or intentionsdeemed morally worthy, and condemn others as being reprehensible, the“clean hands” criticism is so malleable as to apply tonearly any substantive doctrine. Every moral and political theorystipulates that one ought to do what it deems good or just and toavoid what it deems bad or unjust. So this popular just war criticismof pacifism is not strong. The very idea of a selfish pacifist simplydoes not ring true: many pacifists have, historically, paid a veryhigh price for their pacifism during wartime (through severe ostracismand even jail time) and their pacifism seems less rooted in regard forinner moral purity than it is in regard for constructing a lessviolent and more humane world order. So, this argument againstpacifism fails; but what of others?Walzer contends that pacifism's idealism is excessively optimistic.In other words, pacifism lacks realism. More precisely, the nonviolentworld imagined by the pacifist is not actually attainable, at leastfor the foreseeable future. Since “ought implies can”, theset of “oughts” we are committed to must express a moraloutlook on war less utopian in nature. While we are committed tomorality in wartime, we are forced to concede that, sometimes in thereal world, resorting to war can be morally justified. It's hard tosee, e.g., how anything but war could've defeated the Nazis.Another objection to pacifism is that, by failing to resistinternational aggression with effective means, it ends up rewardingaggression and failing to protect people who need it. Pacifists replyto this argument by contending that we do not need to resort to war inorder to protect people and punish aggression effectively. In theevent of an armed invasion by an aggressor state, an organized andcommitted campaign of non-violent civil disobedience—perhapscombined with international diplomatic and economicsanctions—would be just as effective as war in expelling theaggressor, with much less destruction of lives and property. Afterall, the pacifist might say, no invader could possibly maintain itsgrip on the conquered nation in light of such systematic isolation,non-cooperation and non-violent resistance. How could it work thefactories, harvest the fields, or run the stores, when everyone wouldbe striking? How could it maintain the will to keep the country in theface of crippling economic sanctions and diplomatic censure from theinternational community? And so on.Though one cannot exactly disprove this pacifistproposition—since it is a counter-factual thesis—there arepowerful reasons to agree with John Rawls that such is “anunworldly view” to hold. For, as Walzer points out, theeffectiveness of this campaign of civil disobedience relies on thescruples of the invading aggressor. But what if the aggressor isutterly brutal, remorseless? What if, faced with civil disobedience,the invader “cleanses” the area of the native population,and then imports its own people from back home? What if, faced witheconomic sanctions and diplomatic censure from a neighbouring country,the invader decides to invade it, too? We have some indication fromhistory, particularly that of Nazi Germany, that such pitiless tacticsare effective at breaking the will to resist of even very principledpeople. The defence of our lives and rights may well, against suchinvaders, require the use of political violence. Under suchconditions, Walzer says, adherence to pacifism might even amount to“a disguised form of surrender.”Pacifists respond to this accusation of “unworldliness” byciting what they believe are real world examples of effectivenon-violent resistance to aggression. Examples mentioned includeMahatma Ghandi's campaign to drive the British Imperial regime out ofIndia in the late 1940s and Martin Luther King Jr.'s civil rightscrusade in the 1960s on behalf of African-Americans. Walzer repliescurtly that there is no evidence that non-violent resistance has ever,of itself, succeeded. This may be rash on his part, though it isclear that Britain's own exhaustion after WWII, for example, had muchto do with the evaporation of its Empire. Walzer's maincounter-argument against these pacifist counter-examples is thatthey only illustrate his main point: that effectivenon-violent resistance depends upon the scruples of those it is aimedagainst. It was only because the British and the Americans had somescruples, and were moved by the determined idealism of the non-violentprotesters, that they acquiesced to their demands. But aggressorswill not always be so moved. A tyrant like Hitler, for example, mightinterpret non-violent resistance as weakness, deserving contemptuouscrushing. “Non-violent defense”, Walzer suggests,“is no defense at all against tyrants or conquerors ready toadopt such measures.”As sensible as Walzer's remarks might seem, they remain quite narrow,by no means constituting an all-things-considered refutation ofpacifism. Generally, there are two kinds of modern secular pacifism toconsider: (1) a more consequentialist form of pacifism (or CP), whichmaintains that the benefits accruing from war can never outweigh thecosts of fighting it; and (2) a more deontological form of pacifism (orDP), which contends that the very activity of war is intrinsicallywrong, since it violates foremost duties of justice, such as notkilling human beings. Most common amongst contemporary secularpacifists, such as Robert Holmes, is a doctrine which attempts tocombine both CP and DP. (No discussion will be made here as toreligious forms of pacifism. While they have been very influentialhistorically, especially their Christian variants, as theoreticalpropositions I believe they rest on core premises which are toocontentious and exclusionary. But the Christian pacifist literature isa very rich source of information for those interested.)What arguments might a just war theorist employ to overcome CP and DP?A just war theorist might, for starters, focus on the relationship inCP between consequentialism and the denial of killing. Pacifism ineither form places overriding value on respecting human life, notablythrough its injunction against killing. But this value seems to restuneasily with consequentialism, for there is nothing inherent toconsequentialism which bans killing as such. There is no absoluterule, or side-constraint, that one ought never to kill another person,or that nations ought never to deploy lethal armed force in war. Withconsequentialism, it's always a matter of considering the latest costsand benefits, of choosing the best option amongst feasiblealternatives. Consequentialism therefore leaves conceptual space opento the claim that under these conditions, at this time and place, andgiven these alternatives, killing and/or war appearspermissible. After all, what if killing x people (say,soldiers in an aggressive army) appears the best option if we are tosave the lives of x + n people (say, fellow citizenswho would perish under the brutal heel of an unchecked aggressor)? Itis at least conceivable that a quick and decisive resort to war couldprevent even greater killing and devastation in the future. Historiansspeculate, e.g., that an earlier confrontation with Hitler would'veprevented World War II from ending up being so widespread anddestructive. These are two telling points: CP does not, of itself,ground the categorical rejection of killing and war which isthe essence of pacifism; and CP is open to counter-examples whichquestion whether consequentialism would reject killing and war at allunder certain conditions. Consequentialism might even, in aparticular case, go so far as to recommend war under certainconditions.Casting doubt on DP is a complicated procedure. Only a sketch ofplausible just war theory arguments can here be offered. The firstquestion to ask is: which foremost duty does DP understand beingviolated by warfare? If the DP response is the duty not to killanother human being, then contention can be made that this is by nomeans uncontroversial. Consider the most obvious counter-example:aggressor A attacks B for no defensible reason,posing a serious threat to B's life. Some would suggest, ingood faith, that B is not duty-bound not to kill Aif such seems necessary to stop A's aggression. Indeed, theywould argue that B may kill A in legitimateself-defence. The DP pacifist, however, might reply that extendingB moral permission to kill A, even in self-defence,violates the human rights of A. He might contend that justwar theory merely compounds the wrongness of the situation byparadoxically permitting lethal force to stop lethal force. There's aclever phrase nowadays: an eye for an eye leaves us both blind.One just war theory rejoinder to this DP contention is this:B does no wrong whatsoever—violates no humanrights—by responding to A's aggression with lethalforce if required. Why does B do nothing wrong? First, it isA who is responsible for forcing B tochoose between her own life and rights and those of A. We canhardly blame B for choosing her own. For if she does notchoose her own, she loses an enormous amount, perhaps everything. Andit is patently unreasonable to expect creatures like us tosuffer catastrophic loss by default. Consider also the issue offairness: if B is not allowed to use lethal force,if necessary, against A in the event of A'saggression, then B loses everything while A losesnothing. Indeed, A gains whatever object he desired inviolating or killing B. Such is an unfair reward of awfulbehaviour. Finally, B's having rights at all provides herwith an implicit entitlement to use those means necessary tosecure her rights, including the use of force in the face of a seriousphysical threat. These powerful considerations of responsibility,reasonableness, fairness and implicit entitlement come together insupport of the just war claims that: B may respond withneeded lethal force to A's initial aggression; Bdoes no wrong in doing so; it would be wrong to prohibit B'sdoing so; and that A bears all of the blame for thesituation. It is A who should stop, not B who shouldsuccumb.DP pacifists are not, at this point, out of options. Holmes, forexample, suggests that the foremost duty of justice violated by war isnot the duty not to kill aggressors, but rather the duty not to killinnocent, non-aggressive human beings. To be innocent here means tohave done nothing which would justify being harmed or killed; inparticular, it means not constituting a serious threat to the livesand rights of other people. It is this sense of innocence that justwar theory invokes when it claims that civilians should not bedirectly attacked during wartime. Even if civilians support the wareffort politically, or even in terms of their personal attitudestowards the war, they clearly do not pose serious threats toothers. Only armed forces, and the political-industrial-technologicalcomplexes which guide them, constitute serious threats against whichthreatened communities may respond in kind. Civilian populations, justwar theory surmises, are morally off-limits as targets. Holmescontends that this just war (and international law) rule ofnon-combatant immunity can never be satisfied. For all possible warsin this world—given the nature of military technology andtactics, the heat of battle, and the limits of human knowledge andself-discipline—involve the killing of innocents, thusdefined. We know this to be true from history and have no good reasonfor expecting otherwise in the future. But the killing of innocents,Holmes says, is always unjust. So no war can ever be fought justly,regardless of the nature of the goal sought after, such as nationaldefence from an aggressor's attack. The very activities needed tofight wars are intrinsically corrupt, and cannot be redeemed by thesupposed justice of the ends they are aimed at. How is a just wartheorist to respond to this DP challenge?Some respond by casting doubt on the concept of innocence inwartime. But a just war theorist subscribing to the rule ofnon-combatant immunity will neither want, nor logically be at liberty,to argue in this fashion. It is hard to see, for example, how infantscould be anything other than innocent during a war, and as suchentitled not to be made the object of direct and intentionalattack. It is only those who, in Walzer's phrase, are “involvedin harming us”—i.e. those who pose serious threats to ourlives and rights—that we can justly target in a direct andintentional fashion during wartime.The more appropriate just war response invokes, alongside Walzer, thedoctrine of double effect (or DDE). The DDE, invented by Aquinas, is acomplex idea. In spite of its apparent technicality, though, the DDEis closely related to our ordinary ways of thinking about morallife. The DDE assumes the following scenario: agent X isconsidering performing an action T, which X foreseeswill produce both good/moral/just effects J andbad/immoral/unjust effects U. The DDE permits X toperform T only if: 1) T is otherwise permissible; 2)X only intends J and not U; 3) Uis not a means to J; and 4) the goodness of J isworth, or is proportionately greater than, the badness of U.Assume now that X is a country and T is war. Thegovernment of X, contemplating war in response to an attackby aggressor country Y, foresees that, should it embark onwar to defend itself, civilian casualties will result, probably inboth X and Y. The DDE stipulates that X maylaunch into this defensive (and thus otherwise permissible) war onlyif: 1) X does not intend the resulting civilian casualtiesbut rather aims only at defending itself and its people; 2) suchcasualties are not themselves the means whereby X's end isachieved; and 3) the importance of X's defending itself andits people from Y's aggression is proportionately greaterthan the badness of the resulting civilian casualties. The DDE, inmaking these claims, refers to common shared principles regarding themoral importance of intent, of appealing to better expectedconsequences, and insisting that bad not be done so that good mayfollow from it.Just war theorists claim that civilians are not entitled to absoluteimmunity from attack during wartime. Civilians are owed neither morenor less than what Walzer calls “due care” from thebelligerent governments that they not be made casualties of the waraction in question. “Due care” involves fighting only incertain ways, applying limited force to specific targets. Essentially,“due care” means fighting in adherence with jus inbello. But does this just war claim simply beg the questionagainst the latest DP principle? DPs insist on absoluteimmunity for civilians, which in our world would result in banningwarfare, whereas just war theorists, acknowledging the threat, seem tododge it by re-defining the immunity to which civilians are entitled,demoting it to mere “due care.” Despite appearances, it isnot question-begging but principled disagreementwhich roots the difference. Just war theorists will argue thatcivilians cannot be entitled to absolute immunity because that wouldoutlaw all warfare. But outlawing all warfare would ignoreboth the responsibility for interstate aggressionand the implicit entitlement of a state to use necessarymeans (including armed force) to secure the lives and rights of itscitizens from serious and standard threats to them. In the real world,it is neither reasonable nor fair to require a political community notto avail itself of the most effective means available for resisting anaggressive invasion which threatens the lives and rights of itscitizens. It is simply not reasonable to require a state to stand downwhile an aggressor—be it state or terrorist—wreaks havoc,murder and mayhem upon its people.This is not a complete defeat for DP, merely a suggestion of howsuch defeat might be sought. DP probably constitutes the mostformidable moral challenge to just war theory (whereas prescriptiverealism constitutes the most formidable prudential challenge to justwar theory). Suffice it for our purposes to say that the DDE is thejust war principle most frequently employed to defeat the DP pacifist'sassertion that it is always wrong to kill innocent human beings. Justwar theorists prefer to substitute, for this DP claim, the followingproposition: what is always wrong, both in peace and war, is to killinnocent human beings intentionally and deliberately.Unintended, collateral civilian casualties can be excused during theprosecution of an otherwise just war, wherein the end is the repulsionof aggression and the means are aimed at legitimate militarytargets.5. ConclusionThis entry provides a sample of the rich and controversialargumentation surrounding philosophical discourse on war. Thisdiscourse is dominated by three major traditions of thought: just wartheory (and its international law subsidiary); realism; and pacifism.The interaction between these three traditions structures thecontemporary discussion of wartime issues, at the same time as it fuelsfascinating debate about them. While just war theory occupies anespecially large and influential space within the discourse, itsrealist and pacifist alternatives endure as provocative challenges tothe philosophical mainstream which it represents.6. Guide to the LiteratureI discuss all these issues and more, with extensive reference tocases, in my forthcoming book, The Morality of War (Broadview,2006).All the works cited in this entry, plus relevant other works, arelisted below. It may be helpful to first locate and emphasize some ofthe major and most influential sources.For scholarship on the history and development of just war theory,consult the works of James T. Johnson. Hugo Grotius is often cited asthe most formidable classical just war theorist (though I'd rankVitoria up there myself). A translation of his works can be found in J.Scott's edition of Classics of International Law. The majorcontemporary statement of just war theory remains Michael Walzer'sJust and Unjust Wars. For other comprehensive contemporarystatements, see the works of: Paul Christopher; J.B. Elshtain; MichaelIgnatieff; Doug Lackey; Brian Orend; and Richard Regan. Works criticalof just war theory can be found in the pacifist and realist tractsbelow.Other important articles on particular aspects of just war theoryinclude: on jus ad bellum, D. Luban, “Just War andHuman Rights”; on jus in bello, T. Nagel's “Warand Massacre” and R. Fullinwinder's “War andInnocence”; and on jus post bellum, Kant's“Perpetual Peace” (in his Political Writings) andB. Orend's “Justice After War”.Hans Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations remains anoften-cited defense of realism, as does G. Kennan's Realities ofAmerican Foreign Policy. Henry Kissinger's Diplomacyprovides the same outlook in perhaps more accessible form. Two of themost focused and effective criticisms of the realist approach to waroccur at: Chapter 1 of Walzer's Just and Unjust Wars; andChapters 1-3 of R. Holmes' On War and Morality.The three best contemporary, secular works defending pacifism are:R. Holmes, On War and Morality; J. Teichman, Pacifism andthe Just War; and R. Norman, Ethics, Killing andWar. Two renowned critical essays on pacifism, both reprinted inR. Wasserstrom, ed. War and Morality, are G.E.M. Anscombe's“War and Murder” and Jan Narveson's “Pacifism: APhilosophical Analysis”.One prominent writer on the philosophy of war who resists easyclassifcation into any of these categories is Carl von Clausewitz.Clausewitz wrote On War, one of the most influential generalsources, cited by soldiers and statesmen as often as by philosophers orinternational lawyers. M. Gelven's War and Existence is aninteresting contemporary piece on the meaning and experience of war,with a Clausewitzian flavor to it.In terms of international law, I strongly recommend the web-sitesbelow. For hard copy sources, see especially: W. Reisman and C.Antoniou, eds. The Laws of War: A Comprehensive Collection ofPrimary Documents Governing Armed Conflict and A. Roberts and R.Guelff, eds., Documents on The Laws of War.BibliographyArendt, H. On Violence. New York: Harcourt BraceJovanovich, 1970.Axinn, S. A Moral Military. Philadelphia, PA: TempleUniversity Press, 1989.Bailey, S. Prohibitions and Restraints in War. Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1972.Barry, J. The Sword of Justice: Ethics and Coercion inInternational Politics. London: Praeger, 1998.Best, G. Humanity in Warfare. New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1980.-----. War and law since 1945. Oxford: Clarendon,1994.Boucher, D. Political Theories of International Relations.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.Brady, James and N. Garver, eds. Justice, Law andViolence. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991.Brandt, R.B. “Utilitarianism and the Rules ofWar”. Philosophy and Public Affairs (1971/72),145-65.Brierly, J.L. The Law of Nations. New York: Waldock, 6thed., 1963.Brownlie, I. International Law and the Use of Force byStates. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963.-----. System of the Law of Nations. Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1983.Bull, H. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in WorldPolitics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.Cady, D. From Warism to Pacifism: A Moral Continuum.Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1989.Cahill, L.S. Love Your Enemies: Discipleship, Pacifism and JustWar Theory. Minneapolis: Fortress, 1994.Campbell, D. and M. Dillon, eds. The political subject ofviolence. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993.Ceadel, M. Thinking about Peace and War. Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1987.Childress, J. “Just-War Theories” in TheologicalStudies 39 (1978), 427-45.Christopher, P. The Ethics of War and Peace: An Introduction toLegal and Moral Issues. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall,1994.Cimbala, S. and K. Dunn, eds. Conflict termination and militarystrategy: coercion, persuasion and war. Boulder, CO: Westview,1987.Clausewitz, Carl von. On War, trans. by A. Rapoport.Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1995.Coates, A.J. The ethics of war. Manchester, UK: Universityof Manchester Press, 1997.Cohen, M. “Moral Skepticism and InternationalRelations” in Beitz, ed. International Ethics,3-50.Damrosch, L. “The Collective Enforcement of InternationalNorms Through Economic Sanctions”, Ethics and InternationalAffairs (1994), 60-80.Damrosch, L. ed. Enforcing Restraint: Collective Interventionin Internal Conflicts. New York: Council on Foreign Relations,1993.Davis, G. Warcraft and the Fragility of Virtue. Lincoln,NA: University of Nebraska Press, 1992.Davis, G.S. Religion and Justice in the War over Bosnia.New York: Routledge, 1996.Detter Delupis, I. The law of war. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1987.Dinstein, Y. War, aggression and self-defence. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1995.Dombrowski, D. Christian Pacifism. Philadelphia, PA:Temple University Press, 1991.Doyle, M. “Kant, Liberal Legacies and ForeignAffairs”, Philosophy and Public Affairs (1984), 204-35and 323-53.-----. Ways of War and Peace. New York: Norton,2000.Dubik, J. “Human Rights, Command Responsibility and Walzer'sJust War Theory”. Philosophy and Public Affairs (1982),354-71.Dyer, G. War. New York: Crown, 1985.Ellis, A. ed. Ethics and International Relations.Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986.Elshtain, J.B. Just War Against Terror. New York: Basic,2003.Elshtain, J.B. ed. Just War Theory. Oxford: BasilBlackwell, 1992.Elshtain, J.B. et al., But was it just? Reflections onthe Morality of the Persian Gulf War (ed. by D. DeCosse). NewYork: Doubleday, 1992.Filice, C. “Pacifism: A Philosophical Exploration”,Journal of Philosophical Research (1992), 119-53.Franck, T. The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations.Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.Freedman, L and E. Karsh, eds. The Gulf Conflict (1990-91):Diplomacy and War in the New World Order. Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1993.Frey, R.G. and C.W. Morris, eds. Violence, Terrorism, andJustice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.Frost, M. Ethics in International Relations. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1996.Fullinwinder, R. “War and Innocence”, Philosophyand Public Affairs (1975), 90-7.Gallie, W.B. Understanding War. London: Routledge,1991.Gelven, M. War and Existence. Philadelphia, PA:Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994.Geyer, A. Lines in the Sand: Justice and the Gulf War.Louisville, KY: John Knox Press, 1992.Glossop, R.J. Confronting War: An Examination of Humanity'sMost Pressing Problem. London: McFarland, 3rd ed., 1994.Gowa, J. Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive DemocraticPeace. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999.Gray, J.G. The Warriors: Reflections of Men in Battle. NewYork: Harper and Row, 1970.Griffiths, M. Realism, Idealism and InternationalPolitics. London: Routledge, 1992.Hallett, B. ed. Engulfed in War: Just War and the PersianGulf. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991.Hampson, F.O. Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeedor Fail. Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace,1996.Hare, R.M. “Rules of War and MoralReasoning”. Philosophy and Public Affairs (1971/72),166-81.Hauerwas, S. Should War be Eliminated? Philosophical andTheological Investigations. Milwaukee, WI: Marquette UniversityPress, 1984.Held, V., S. Morgenbesser and T. Nagel, eds. Philosophy,Morality and International Affairs. New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 1974.Henkin, L. How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy. NewYork: Columbia University Press, 2nd ed., 1979.Hoffman, S. Duties Beyond Borders. Syracuse, NY: SyracuseUniversity Press, 1981.-----. The Ethics and Politics of HumanitarianIntervention. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press,1996.Holmes, R. On War and Morality. Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1989.Holsti, K. Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and Internationalorder, 1648-1989. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1991.-----. The State, War and The State of War. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1996Howard, M. The laws of war: constraints on warfare in theWestern world. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994.Human Rights Watch, Slaughter Among Neighbours. New Haven:Yale University Press, 1995.Huntington, S. The Soldier and the State. Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press, 1957.Ignatieff, M. The Lesser Evil. Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 2004.-----. The Warrior's Honour. New York:Viking, 1998.-----. Virtual War. New York: Viking, 2000.Johnson, J. T. Can Modern War Be Just?. New Haven, CT:Yale University Press, 1984.-----. Ideology, Reason and Limitation of War:Religious and Secular Concepts, 1200-1740. Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 1981.-----. Morality and Contemporary Warfare. New Haven, CT:Yale University Press, 1999.-----. The Just War Tradition and the Restraint ofWar. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981.-----. The Quest for Peace. Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 1987.-----. “Towards Reconstructing the Jus adBellum”, Monist (1973), 461-88.Johnson, J.T. and G. Weigel, eds. Just War and Gulf War.Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1991.Kane, B. Just War and the Common Good: Jus ad Bellum Principlesin 20th century Papal Thought. San Francisco: Catholic ScholarsPress, 1997.Kant, I. Political Writings, trans. H. Nisbit and ed. H.Reiss. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.-----. The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. M. Gregor.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.Kelsay, J. Islam and War: A Study in Comparative Ethics.Louisville, KY: Knox, 1992.Kelsay, J. and J.T. Johnson, eds. Just War and Jihad. NewYork: Greenwood, 1991.Kelsen, Hans. Principles of International Law. New York:Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966.Kennan, G. Realities of American Foreign Policy.Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1954.Keohane, R., ed. Neorealism and Its Critics. New York:Columbia University Press, 1986.Laberge, P. “Humanitarian Intervention: Three EthicalPositions”, Ethics and International Affairs 9 (1995),15-35.Lackey, D. “A Modern Theory of JustWar”,Ethics (April 1982), 540-6.-----. The Ethics of War and Peace. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:Prentice Hall, 1989.Lauterpacht, H. International Law, Vols. 3 and 4: TheLaw of Peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977-78.-----. International Law and Human Rights. New York:Archon Books, 1968.Levinson, S. “Responsibility for the Crimes of War”,Philosophy and Public Affairs (1972-73), 244-73.Little, D. “The ‘Just War’ Doctrine andU.S. Policy in Vietnam”, in S. Albert and E. Luck, eds. Onthe Endings of Wars (London: Kennikat Press, 1980), 157-71.Luban, D. “Just War and Human Rights”. Philosophyand Public Affairs (1979/80), 160-81.Mavrodes, G. “Conventions and the Laws of War”,Philosophy and Public Affairs (1975), 117-31.Miller, R., ed. The Law of War. Lexington, MA: LexingtonBooks, 1975.Miller, R.B. Interpretations of Conflict: Ethics, Pacifism andthe Just War Tradition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1991.Moore, J.N. Crisis in the Gulf: Enforcing the Rule of Law.Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana, 1992.Moore, J.N. ed. Law and Civil War in the Modern World.Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974.Morgenthau, H. Politics Among Nations. New York: Knopf,5th ed., 1973.Myers, R.J. “Notes on the Just War Theory: Whose Justice,Which Wars?”, Ethics and International Affairs (1996),116-30.Nagel, T. “Ruthlessness in Public Life”, in hisMortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1979. pp. 75-90.-----. “War and Massacre”. Philosophy and PublicAffairs (1971/72), 123-43.Nardin, T. Law, Morality and the Relations of States.Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983.Nardin, T, ed. The Ethics of War and Peace: Religious andSecular Perspectives. Princeton: Princeton University Press,1996.Nardin, T and D. Mapel, eds. Traditions of InternationalEthics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.Narveson, J. “Violence and War” in T. Regan,ed. Matters of Life and Death. Philadelphia, PA: TempleUniversity Press, 1980. pp. 109-47.Norman, R. Ethics, killing and war. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1995.O'Brien, W. The Conduct of Just and Limited War. NewYork: Praeger, 1981.-----. The Law of Limited Armed Conflict. Washington,DC: Georgetown University Press, 1965.-----. U.S. Military Intervention: Law and Morality.Beverly Hills, CA: 1979.O'Connell, Robert L. Of Arms and Men: A History of War,Weapons, and Aggression. Oxford: Oxford University Press,1989.Oren, N. Termination of War: Processes, Procedures andAftermaths. Jerusalem: Hebrew University Press, 1982.Orend, Brian. Human Rights: Concept and Context.Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2002.-----. “Justice After War”, Ethics andInternational Affairs (2004).-----. Michael Walzer on War and Justice.Cardiff, UK: University of Wales Press, 2000.-----. The Morality of War. Peterborough: BroadviewPress, forthcoming 2006.-----. War and International Justice: A KantianPerspective. Waterloo, ONT: Wilfrid Laurier University Press,2000.Osgood, Robert and Robert Tucker, eds. Force, Order andJustice. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967.Paskins, B. and M. Dockrill, The Ethics of War.Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1979.Paulson, S.L. “Classical Legal Positivism at Nuremberg”,Philosophy and Public Affairs (174/75), 132-58.Peirce, A. “Just War Principles and EconomicSanctions”, Ethics and International Affairs (1996),99-113.Peppers, D.P. “War Crimes and Induction: A Case for SelectiveNonconscientious Objection”, Philosophy and Public Affairs(1973/74), 129-66.Phillips, R. War and Justice. Oklahoma City, OK:University of Oklahoma Press, 1984.Pogge, T. “An Institutional Approach to HumanitarianIntervention”, Public Affairs Quarterly (1992),89-103.-----. “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty”, Ethics(1992), 48-75.-----. Realizing Rawls. Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press, 1989.-----. “The Bounds of Nationalism” in J. Couture, etal, eds. Rethinking Nationalism. Calgary, AB: Universityof Calgary Press, 1998. pp. 463-504.-----. World Poverty and Human Rights. Cambridge:Polity, 2002.Porter, B. War and the Rise of the Modern State. New York:Macmillan, 1994.Ramsbotham, O. and T. Woodhouse. Humanitarian Intervention inContemporary Conflict. Cambridge: Polity, 1996.Ramsey, Paul. The Just War: Force and PoliticalResponsibility. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968.Rawls, J. A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1971).-----. Untitled, in Dissent's Summer 1995 symposium onthe bombing of Hiroshima.-----. The Law of Peoples. Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1999.Regan, R. The Moral Dimensions of Politics. New York:Oxford University Press, 1986.-----. Just War: Principles and Cases. Washington, DC:Catholic University of America Press, 1996.Reiff, D. Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and The Failure of TheWest. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995.Reisman, M. and C. Antoniou, eds. The Laws of War. NewYork: Vintage, 1994.Roth, B. Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law.Oxford: Clarendon, 2001.Ryan, C. “Self-Defence, Pacifism and Killing”,Ethics (1983).Scott, James Brown, ed. Classics of International Law.Washington, DC: Carnegie Institute, 1917. (Contains Grotius, Vattel,Vitoria and Suarez).Shue, Henry. Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and U.S.Foreign Policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2nded., 1996.Taylor, A.J.P. How Wars End. London: Hamilton, 1985.-----. Origins of The Second World War. London: Hamilton,1961.Teichman, J. Pacifism and the Just War. Oxford: BasilBlackwell, 1986.Thompsnon, K.W. Political Realism and the Crisis of WorldPolitics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960.Tucker, Robert. The Just War: A Study in Contemporary AmericanDoctrine. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press,1960.Van Glahen, G. Law Among Nations. New York: Macmillan,1986.Vaux, K. Ethics and the Gulf War. Boulder, CO: Westview,1992.Waltz, K. Man, The State and War. Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 1978.Walzer, M. Arguing About War. New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 2004.-----. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument withHistorical Illustrations. New York: Basic Books, 3rd ed.,2000.-----. “Justice and Injustice in the Gulf War”, inD. DeCosse, ed. Reflections, 2-25.-----. Obligations: Citizenship, War andDisobedience. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1970.-----. “Moral Judgment in Time of War” inR. Wasserstrom, ed. War and Morality, 54-62.-----. “Nation and Universe” in G.B. Peterson,ed. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values. Salt Lake City, Utah:Utah University Press, 1990. pp. 507-56.-----. “Political Action: The Problem of DirtyHands”, Philosophy and Public Affairs (1972/73),160-80.-----. “Untitled” contribution to the summersymposium on the 50th anniversary of the bombing ofHiroshima,Dissent (1995), 330-1.-----. “War and Peace in the Jewish Tradition” inT. Nardin, ed. The Ethics of War and Peace: Religious and SecularPerspectives. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. pp.95-112.-----. “World War II: Why Was This War Different?”,Philosophy and Public Affairs (1971/72), 3-21.Walzer, M. and D. Miller, eds. Pluralism, Justice andEquality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.Wasserstrom, R. “The Relevance of Nuremberg”,Philosophy and Public Affairs (1971-72), 22-46.Wasserstrom, R. ed. War and Morality. Belmont, CA:Wadsworth, 1970.Wells, D.A. An Encyclopedia of war and ethics. Westport,CT: Greenwood, 1996.Williams, H. International relations and the limits ofpolitical theory. New York: St. Martin's, 1996.-----. International relations in political theory.Philadelphia, PA: Open University Press, 1992.Yoder, John. When War is Unjust: Being Honest in Just-WarThinking. Minneapolis, Augsburg Press, 1984.Other Internet ResourcesEthics of War, Peace and Terrorism (Ethics Updates, edited by Larry Hinman, U. of San Diego).JustWarTheory.com, annotated aid to research and instruction in philosophical studies ofwarfare, maintained by Mark Rigstad (Oakland University).JustWar Theory, by Alex Moseley, in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.Military Law and Legal Links, hosted by the Air War College.The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, contains digital documents relevant to the fields of Law, History, Economics, Politics, Diplomacy and Government.Law of Armed Conflict, Human Rights Library (University of Minnesota). Related Entries cosmopolitanism | justice: international | Kant, Immanuel: social and political philosophy | nationalism | responsibility: collective | rights: human | secession | self-determination, collective | sovereignty | world government Copyright © 2005 byBrian Orend<bdorend@watarts.uwaterloo.ca> |
|
