Plato's Middle Period Metaphysics and Epistemology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Cite this entry Search the SEP • Advanced Search • Tools • RSS FeedTable of Contents• What's New• Archives• Projected ContentsEditorial Information• About the SEP• Editorial Board• How to Cite the SEP• Special CharactersSupport the SEPContact the SEP ©Metaphysics Research Lab,CSLI,Stanford University  Open access to the SEP is made possible by a world-wide funding initiative. Please Read How You Can Help Keep the Encyclopedia FreePlato's Middle Period Metaphysics and EpistemologyFirst published Mon Jun 9, 2003Students of Plato and other ancient philosophers divide philosophyinto three parts: Ethics, Epistemology and Metaphysics. While generallyaccurate and certainly useful for pedagogical purposes, no rigidboundary separates the parts. Ethics, for example, concerns how oneought to live and focuses on pleasure, virtue, and happiness. Since,according to Plato (and Socrates), virtue and happiness requireknowledge, e.g., knowledge of goods and evils, Plato's ethics isinseparable from his epistemology. Epistemology is, broadly speaking,the study of what knowledge is and how one comes to have knowledge.Among the many topics included in epistemology are logic, belief,perception, language, science, and knowledge. (‘Science’derives from the Latin ‘scientia’, which in turntranslates the Greek ‘episteme’, from whichEnglish derives ‘epistemology’.) Integral to all of thesenotions is that they (typically) are directed at something. Words referto something; perception (aesthesis in Greek) involvesperceptibles; knowledge requires a known. In this respect, epistemologycannot be investigated without regard to what there is.Metaphysics, or alternatively ontology, is that branch of philosophywhose special concern is to answer the question ‘What isthere?’ These expressions derive from Aristotle, Plato's student.In a collection of his works, the most detailed treatise on the generaltopic of things that are comes after a treatise on natural things,ta phusika (from which English derives‘physics’). Since the Greek for ‘after’ ismeta, this treatise is titled ‘Metaphysics’. Inthat work one finds the famous formula that (first) philosophy studiesbeing- the Greek for which is on--, qua being. Hence theaccount of being is ‘ontology’ -- the English suffix‘-ology’ signifying ‘study of’: e.g., biologyis the study of living things.Metaphysics, then, studies the ways in which anything thatis can be said or thought to be. Leaving to sciences like biology orphysics or mathematics or psychology the task of addressing the specialways in which physical things, or living things, or mathematicalobjects, e.g., numbers, or souls (minds) come to have the peculiarqualities each, respectively, has, the subject-matter of metaphysicsare principles common to everything. Perhaps the most general principleis: to be is to be something. Nothing just exists, we might say. Thisnotion implies that each entity/item/thing has at least some onefeature or quality or property. Keeping at a general level, we canprovisionally distinguish three factors involved when anything iswhatever it is: there is that which bears or has the property, oftencalled the ‘subject’, e.g., Socrates, the number three, ormy soul; there is the property which is possessed; e.g., being thin,being odd, and being immortal; and there is the manner or way in whichthe property is tied or connected to the subject. For instance, whileSocrates may be accidentally thin, since he can change, that is, gainand lose weight, three cannot fail to be odd nor, if Plato is correct,can the soul fail to be immortal. The metaphysician, then, considersphysical or material things as well as immaterial items such as souls,god and numbers in order to study notions like property, subject,change, being essentially or accidentally.1. The Background to Plato's Metaphysics2. The Metaphysics of the Phaedo3. The Nature of Forms: Self-Predication4. The Simplicity of Forms5. The Separation of Forms6. The Range of Forms7. The Deficiency of Particulars8. Being and Partaking9. Introduction to Plato's Epistemology10. The Meno11. Recollection in the Phaedo12. The Epistemology of the Republic: The Two Worlds Doctrine13. Sun, Line and Cave14. The Development of Mind15. The Method of Hypothesis16. ConclusionBibliographyOther Internet ResourcesRelated Entries1. The Background to Plato's MetaphysicsThree predecessors heavily influenced Plato's thoughts onmetaphysics and epistemology, Heraclitus (c. 540 B.C.-480-70),Parmenides (c.515 B.C.-449-40), and Socrates (470 B.C.-399). Onlyfragments remain of the writings of Parmenides and Heraclitus,including some contained in the dialogues of Plato. Socrates wrotenothing. Plato's depiction of his teacher is our primary source ofevidence for his philosophy. Parmenides argued that there is and couldbe only one thing, Being. One could not even think or say whatis not. Moreover, since change implies that something comes to be whatit was not -- I change from not being tan tobeing tan, nothing can change. Reality is static. Theappearance of change is just that, a deceptive appearance.Unfortunately, what little we have left of Parmenides does not allow usto decide whether he argued that there is just one item,Being, in his universe -- strict numerical monism -- orwhether there is just one kind of thing, beings or things thatare. Parmenides' account of Being seems to have contributed to Plato'sdoctrine of Forms.Heraclitus is the apostle of change. For Heraclitus, the ordinaryobjects of the physical world seem to be continually changing. The onlyconstant, the underlying commonality, is the pattern of change itself.That there are entities that do not change is, for Heraclitus, anillusion. Heraclitus' notion of ‘flux’ seems to haveinfluenced Plato's thinking about ordinary material objects.In the opinion of most scholars, the seminal influence on all ofPlato's thinking was Socrates. However, it appears from the writings ofPlato, as well as those of the historian Xenophon and the comic poetAristophanes, that Socrates was almost exclusively interested inethics. This is not to say that metaphysical or epistemological issueswere of no concern to him. Rather, these sources convey the impressionthat Socrates was not particularly interested in articulating ametaphysical or epistemological theory.[1] Rather, concerned withcaring for the soul so that one might live happily (Apology29d-30b), he uses both epistemological and metaphysical theses insearch of answers to his ethical questions. However, it is not easy todistinguish when one is engaged in metaphysical theorizing from when ismerely using metaphysical notions. The claim that Socrates was not ametaphysician or epistemologist is particularly hard to evaluate, forwe have basically only Plato's dialogues as evidence. Since Plato usesSocrates as a mouthpiece in many of his writings, readers are forced toask when or whether one is reading the doctrines of Socrates, or Plato,or neither. This ‘Socratic question’ is intimately involvedwith the question of Plato's development and the chronology of hisdialogues.In all likelihood, Plato wrote different dialogues at differenttimes. We typically divide his writings into three periods. In theearly ‘Socratic’ period, we find Apology,Crito, Euthyphro, Charmides, Ion,Lysis, Laches, Hippias Minor,Menexenus, Euthydemus and the Protagoras.The Hippias Major, Gorgias and perhaps theMeno belong to the end of this period, maybe with theGorgias and more likely the Meno verging into themiddle period. The middle period works include the Cratylus,Symposium, Phaedo, Republic and perhaps thePhaedrus. In the post-Republic phase we then find theParmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist,Politicus, Timaeus, Philebus andLaws, along with the Critias.[2] The Socratic dialogues,so-called because Socrates is always the chief interlocutor, arethought to present doctrines of Socrates himself. These are dialoguesdevoted to ethical inquiries into the virtues, e.g., what is courage,or what is justice? In contrast, the middle period dialogues arethought to present the views of Plato, though nonetheless Socratesremains the speaker. Here for the first time we find remarks about theimmortality of the soul, about special entities called‘Forms’ that exist outside of space and time and that areboth the objects of knowledge and somehow the cause of whatevertranspires in the physical world, and the doctrine of recollection, thethesis that the immortal soul, in a disembodied state prior to itsincarceration in a body, viewed these Forms, knowledge of which is thenrecalled by incarcerated souls through a laborious process. Socrates,in the early Apology, is non-committal about the immortalityof the soul. Similarly, in the early dialogues we find that Socrates,in keeping with the claim that he is neither a metaphysician norepistemologist, has nothing to say about recollection and neverexplicitly appeals to Forms. It is thus in the middle period works thatone locates Plato's first thoughts about epistemological andmetaphysical issues. To those topics we shall turn shortly. But theseare, in the eyes of many, just first thoughts; for the dialogues in thelate period suggest changes to key ethical, epistemological andmetaphysical doctrines found in these middle period works. Over thecourse of the last fifty years, scholars have debated whether and towhat extent Plato changed his views. The debate has grown so involvedthat it is perhaps best not to worry whether anyone believes theextreme positions that, on the one hand, Plato conceived of every oneof his major doctrines before he ever wrote, or, on the other hand,that he changed his mind on central theses from one dialogue to thenext. Broadly speaking, those who maintain that Plato keeps to hiscentral theses from one period to the next are Unitarians.[3] Those whobelieve that he changes his views from one period to the next areDevelopmentalists.[4] The most plausible position, and the perhapsthe dominant position in the contemporary scholarship, is somewhere inthe middle. About some theses, Plato, over the course of his writings,expands his thoughts, recognizes difficulties, and even changes hismind. About other theses he stands by his fundamental insights.A prime example of the interpretative problems facing the student ofPlato is the development of his most distinctive doctrine, the theoryof Forms. Aristotle, in recounting Plato's intellectual development,reports that “Socrates was the first to seek the universal inethical matters but that he did not separate it. Plato, marryingSocrates' philosophy with that of Heraclitus, separated the universal,on the grounds that the sensible order, where Socrates had focused, wasin flux.” Plato, Aristotle tells us, called these separateduniversals ‘Forms’ (Metaphysics1078b12-34).Universal is a technical notion in metaphysics: a universal is thatwhich is predicable of many. It is meant to capture the intuition thata variety of things can all have the same feature or property. Forinstance, a bowling bowl, a basketball, and a figure drawn on ablackboard can all be round. What many things have in common, or afeature they share, is a universal or, in Plato's terms, a Form. Ofcourse there seems to be a huge number of properties. Many differentthings are white. Many different things are animals. Each (shared)property is a universal -- a ‘one over many instances,’whiteness over the many white things, roundness over the many roundthings, and so on. Thus, for Plato, Roundness and Whiteness areForms. Following the lead of Aristotle, scholars have focused onwhat it means for Plato, in contrast to Socrates, to have separated hisuniversals, the Forms. The starting point, then, for the study ofPlato's metaphysics, is the Socratic dialogues and Socrates'investigation into universals of the ethical variety, namely Justice,Piety, Courage and others.In the early dialogues, Socrates seeks these ethical universalsthrough a distinctive mode of inquiry, the‘elenchus’.[5] Elenctic inquiry is fundamentally a form ofcross-examination, where Socrates tries to elicit from others theirbeliefs about matters of justice or piety, etc. Typically the result isthat his interlocutors turn out to have an inconsistent set of beliefsabout the virtues. At the heart of the Socratic elenchus is the‘What is X’ question (where‘X’ typically names an ethical property). Theanswers offered to these questions fail usually because they are toonarrow or too wide. An answer is too narrow if it fails to include allcases. An answer is too wide if, while it includes all cases of, forinstance, piety, it also includes other things, cases of justice orimpiety. We can infer from these failed definitions a set of conditionsSocrates places on an adequate answer to his ‘What isX’ questions. He is seeking an answer which picks out aSocratic Property, e.g., Piety, that is a universal such that: it isfound whenever and wherever there is an instance of Piety; and it‘causes’ or ‘makes’ the instance to be such asit is. Piety's power to make, e.g., Socrates, pious derives fromPiety's itself being pious. Piety self-predicates: Piety is pious.Because it is pious, when Piety is present to/in Socrates, Piety causesSocrates to be pious. In the Socratic dialogues Plato does notdistinguish the (metaphysical) way in which Socrates is pious from theway in which Piety is pious -- in these dialogues there appears to bejust one ontological predication relation. One has knowledge of aSocratic Property when she can give an account (logos) thatsays what X is, that is, when she can give the definition ofthe property under investigation. Treating a definition as a linguisticitem, we can say that the definition specifies or picks out theessence (ousia) of the property, and a definitionalstatement predicates the essence of the property whose essence it is.It is unclear from the Socratic dialogues whether any other property ispredicated of a Socratic Property: arguably Piety is pious and onlypious. In contrast, the things that are pious, e.g., Socrates or sayinga prayer, have many properties. From what we can infer from Plato'sremarks in these early dialogues, and from Aristotle's remarks, aSocratic property is inthe sensibles -- It is animmanent universal. In this respect, the essence of Piety isalso found in Socrates (and thus the linguistic definition of Piety isalso linguistically predicable of Socrates). Plato's distinctive‘separation of the universal’ might then be viewed as hisrejection of Socrates' assumption that the universal (and/or itsessence) is in the sensibles, (and accordingly a rejection of Socrates'assumption that the definition is predicable, or predicable in the sameway, of the sensible instances as well as the universal.) If Aristotleis right, Plato's problem with sensibles is that they change.2. The Metaphysics of the PhaedoThe Phaedo is Plato's eulogy to Socrates. It recounts thelast hours of Plato's teacher. Socrates/Plato wants to convince us thatwe should care about our souls and that the best way to care for thesoul is to live philosophically. Towards that end we find a series ofarguments whose aim is to prove the immortality of the soul. At leastthree of these arguments, the Argument from Recollection and itsprelude (65a-67a and 72e-78b), the Affinity Argument (78b-84b), and theFinal Argument (102a-107a) and its prelude (95a-102a), are crucial forunderstanding Plato's initial thoughts on metaphysics and epistemology.Here Plato draws a contrast between unchanging Forms and changingmaterial particulars. Unfortunately, neither in the Phaedonorin any other dialogue do we find Plato giving a detailed description ofthe nature of Forms, or particulars, or their interaction. What isreferred to as Plato's theory of Forms is thus a rationalreconstruction of Plato's doctrine. In such a reconstruction scholarstry to determine a set of principles or theses which, taken together,allow us to show why Plato says what he does about Forms, souls, andother metaphysical items. In the attempt to make more precise whatPlato is after, one risks attributing to Plato notions that are eithernot his or not as well developed in Plato as scholars would hope.Perhaps the notion of a particular is such a case. Intuitively,particulars are things like my dog Ajax, Venus, my computer, and so on,the ordinary material things of the everyday spatio-temporal world.(But we also speak of particular actions, particular events, particularsouls, and much else.) In a rational reconstruction, we can bemore precise by stipulating, for instance, that a particular is that ofwhich properties are predicated and which is never predicated ofanything (or anything other than itself). This ‘stipulateddefinition’ is nowhere in Plato, though it may well capture histhinking about ordinary particulars. For the sake of exposition, I willassume that in the Phaedo Plato is appealing to ournaïve, intuitive understanding of what it is for something to be amaterial particular. In the author's opinion, the metaphysics of thePhaedo and other middle period works is devoted to developingthe account of Forms; perhaps because while most of us think thatincluded in what there is are the various, e.g., dogs, people,mountains and trees, few of us ever think about whether there is someuniversal/Form, Justice Itself, The Large Itself, and so on, thatexists outside of space and time. (In the late dialogues, especiallythe Timaeus and Philebus, Plato attempts to give asystematic account of material particulars.)The argument of the Phaedo begins from Plato's assertionthat the soul seeks freedom from the body so that it may best grasptruth, because the body hinders and distracts it: the soul comes to beseparate (choris) from the body, itself by itself ((autekath auten) (64c5-8)). The senses furnish no truth; those sensesabout the body are neither accurate nor clear. The soul reckons bestwhen it is itself by itself, i.e., not in contact with body (65a-65d3).At this juncture, Socrates changes course:What about these things? Do we say that justice itself issomething? Of course. And the fair and the good? Surely. Then have youever seen any of these sorts of things with your eyes? In no way. Butthen have you grasped them with any other sense through the body. I amtalking about all (of them), for instance about size, health, strength,in a word about the essence (ousia) of all of them, what eachhappens to be. Is it through the body then that what is most true ofthese things is contemplated? Or does it hold thus? Whoever of usshould prepare himself to consider most accurately each thing itselfabout which he inquires, that one would come closest to knowing eachthing. … he would do this must cleanly …who using hisintellect itself by itself, unmixed would undertake to hunt down eachof the beings, itself by itself unmixed (65d4-66a3).This is the first passage in the dialogues widely agreed tointroduce Forms. First, Forms are marked as auto kath autobeings, beings that are what they are in virtue of themselves.In subsequent arguments we learn other features of these Forms. Fromthe next argument concerning Recollection (see §11), Forms are said tobe perfect and what particulars strive to be like but fall short of.Then in the Affinity Argument we discover that Forms are simple orincomposite, of one form (monoeidetic), whereas particulars arecomplex, divisible and of many forms. In the crucial Final Argument,Plato finally presents the hypothesis of Forms to explain coming intobeing and destruction, in general, i.e., change. Once Cebes accepts thehypothesis, a novel implication is announced (100c3-7):Well then, consider what then follows if you also accept myhypothesis. For it seems to me that if anything else is beautifulbesides Beauty Itself, it is beautiful on account of nothing else thanbecause it partakes of Beauty Itself. And I speak in the same way abouteverything else. Do you accept this sort of cause orexplanation?[6]In this passage, Plato introduces two predication relations, Beingand Partaking. Understanding how Being and Partaking function to‘tie’ together the various subjects and propertiesmentioned in his metaphysical discussions is crucial to reconstructinghis metaphysics and epistemology. At first blush, it seems that thereare two kinds of subjects of which properties are predicated,namely Forms and material particulars. (I exempt souls from this list).Similarly, at first blush it seems that there are Forms for everyproperty involved in the changes afflicting materialparticulars.[7] For instance, since particulars, e.g. Helenof Troy, change from being not-beautiful to being beautiful, there isthe Form Beauty Itself. In this passage, Plato asserts that particularslike Helen, because she is not the Form but rather is a materialparticular, is related to, or ‘tied to’ Beauty in virtue ofwhat he calls ‘partaking.’ Beauty Itself, on the otherhand, not being something ‘other than Beauty’, does notpartake of Beauty -- it simply is beautiful. Generalizing from what issaid here about Beauty Itself, it seems that Forms inherit from theSocratic Properties their self-predicational status: Beauty isbeautiful; Justice is just; Equality is equal. Partaking in Beautymakes Helen beautiful because Beauty Itself is beautiful. Call this wayin which a Form is related to the property it is ‘Being’.Understanding Being, the way in which Beauty is beautiful, that is,determining what it is for a Form to self-predicate, is central tounderstanding Plato's Theory of Forms and his middle periodmetaphysics.3. The Nature of Forms: Self-PredicationThe debate over self-predication involves both statements and whatthe statements are about, i.e., the ontological correlates of thosestatements. (Thus at times it may be important to distinguishlinguistic predication from ontological predication.) In investigatingself-predication statements, perhaps it is again easiest to distinguishthree factors, the subject or subject term, ‘The Just’, thelinking verb, ‘is’, and the predicate adjective‘just’. Apparently both the subject and the predicateadjective, ‘The Just’ and ‘just’, refer to thesame thing, namely the Form of Justice. One question then concerns thecopula, or linking verb: in what manner is the predicate related to thesubject, or how is the Form related to itself? There are three basicapproaches to consider. In his seminal discussion of self-predication,Vlastos maintained that we should understand the relation between theForm and itself to be the same as that between a particular and theForm.[8] This is to say that Justice is just in thesame was as Socrates is just, or that Beauty is beautiful in the sameway as Helen is beautiful, or that the Circle Itself is circular in thesame way as my basketball: both are round. Let us label this way ofunderstanding the copula in self-predication statements‘characterization’. Then Beauty is a beautiful thing, anitem to be included in an inventory of beautiful things right alongwith Helen.Some scholars, e.g., John Malcolm,[9] while accepting thischaracterizing reading of the ‘is’, deny that the propertypredicated of the Form and the particular are exactly the same.According to the Approximationist, the Form is the perfectinstance of the property it stands for. A particular that participatesin the Form is an imperfect or deficient instance in that it has aproperty that approximates the perfect nature of the Form. Forinstance, the Circle Itself is perfectly circular. A drawn circle, or around ball, is deficient in that it is not perfectly circular, notexactly 360 degrees in circumference. It follows that the veryproperties particulars possess will differ from the property‘of the same name’ possessed by the Form. If Beauty Itselfis characterized by perfect beauty, then Helen has imperfect beauty andshe does not have perfect beauty. Since nothing rules out that thereare numerous kinds of imperfect beauty, perhaps as many as there arebeautiful participants, it seems either that there is no one kind ofbeauty that particulars have in common, or that there are one or more(commonly shared) imperfect kinds of beauty. In the former case, therewill be no need to posit a ‘one’ over the many beauties. Inthe latter case, there is every reason to posit a Form(s) of ImperfectBeauty in which the commonly qualified imperfect particularsparticipate. Neither alternative is a happy one. While the appeal tothe perfection of the mathematical properties is great, even in thesecases it is doubtful that Plato adopts an approximationiststrategy.[10]An alternative is to allow that while both Beauty Itself and otheritems are characterized by beauty, Beauty Itself is simply and solelybeautiful. This characterizing variant emphasizes the Phaedo'sclaims that a Form is monoeides and one (Phaedo78b4ff). Beauty is nothing but beautiful and thus is completelybeautiful, differing from other beautiful things in that they are muchelse besides beautiful. Helen is a woman and unfaithful andbeautiful.[11]According to the second approach,[12] self-predicationstatements assert identity between the Form and its essence. The‘is’ is an ‘is’ of identity. We should not thenunderstand ‘Beauty Itself is beautiful’ to assert that (theForm) Beauty is characterized by beauty. (Indeed, typically backers ofthis approach exclude the possibility that a Form is characterized bythe property it is, thus, e.g., eliminating Beauty from a list ofbeautiful objects.[13]) Since Identity accounts treatself-predications as asserting that a Form and its essence areidentical, with respect to Forms, Being and Identity can be viewed asthe same relation in the middle period dialogues.[14]The third approach, the Predicationalist,[15] joins with theIdentity approach in denying that self-predication statements signalthat the Form is characterized by the property it constitutes. Andwhile ultimately it allows that a Form and its essence are identical,it does not regard the self-predication statement itself as an identityclaim.[16] Rather, a self-predication claim assertsthat there is a special primitive kind of ontological relation betweena Form (subject) and its essence (predicate). This approachbegins from the two relations of Partaking and Being introduced in thelast argument of the Phaedo. An intuitive first approximationof their respective functions is to treat Partaking as a relationbetween material particulars and Forms, the result of which is that theparticular is characterized by the Form of which it partakes. So,Helen, by partaking of Beauty, is characterized by beauty; Helen, invirtue of partaking, is (or, as we might say, becomes) beautiful. Allparticulars are characterized by the Forms in which each participates,and whatever each is, it is by partaking in the appropriateForm. On this account, then, there can be Forms for each and everyproperty had by particulars (Phaedo 100-101, esp. 100c6). Incontrast to the characterizing relation of Partaking, the relation ofBeing is always non-characterizing. Each Form, F, is itsessence (ousia), which is to say that the relation of Beinglinks the essence of beauty to the subject, Beauty Itself.[17] Being,then, is a primitive ontological relation designed exclusively tocapture the special tie between that which possesses an essence and theessence possessed. Put differently, whenever essence is predicated ofsomething, the relation of Being is at work. (By‘primitive’ I do not mean to suggest that Plato does notstudy (what) Being (is). Nor do I mean to suggest that everything elsein the metaphysics can somehow be deduced from it. Rather, I mean toindicate that the relation of Being is not explained by appeal toanother more basic relation or principle. Its nature, and the nature ofother primitives in the theory, such as Participating, is displayed inthe ways in which the theory attempts to save various phenomena.)4. The Simplicity of FormsThroughout the dialogues, Forms are said to be one, hen, ormonoeides. (See especially the Affinity Argument in thePhaedo, 78b-84b.) These passages suggest that theself-predicational nature of Forms implies that the only propertypredicable of a Form is itself: i.e., Justice is just and the onlything Justice is is just. (There are epistemological reasons thatsupport this reading: See §11 infra.) But other passagessuggest that Forms cannot be simple in this strict sense. From theRepublic we know that all Forms are related to the Good. Whileit is difficult to be certain, Plato seems committed to the claim thateach Form is good, that is, that each Form is a good thing or ischaracterized by goodness.[18]More doubts about the strict simplicity of Forms emerge fromreflection on the nature of definition in Plato's middle period.Ontologically, all definitions predicate the essence of the Form whoseessence it is. Plato is attempting to discover through scientificinvestigation, or (inclusive or) through an analysis of what wordsmean, or through any other method, what the nature of, say, Justice is-- Compare the ways in which philosophers and scientists work todiscover what, e.g., gold, or red, or justice, is. Ultimately, then,the answer to any ‘what is X?’ question will besome specific formula unearthed at the end of much study. According tothis line of reasoning, the self-predication statements in the textsare promissory notes, shorthand for what will turn out to be the fullyarticulated definition. Plato is thus committed to there being Formswhose nature or essence will ultimately be discovered. To say that‘Justice is just’ is then to stake a claim to the ultimatediscovery of the nature of Justice. The problem is that the fullyarticulated linguistic definition, when it is ultimately discovered,will turn out to be complex. For instance, Heat, one thing, is meanmolecular kinetic energy, a seemingly complex notion. So in Plato wefind (Republic, 441d) that Justice is Doing One'sOwn, that a Name is (Cratylus, 388b) a tool that isinformative and separates nature, or, though Plato never says it,that Human is rational bipedal animal. Since philosophical and(scientific progress) is supposed to teach not that Justice is just butwhat Justice is, at some level at least Forms cannot be considered tobe utterly and strictly simple. The problem is that given just twopredication relations, it is unclear whether Plato thinks that Formspartake of the properties to which they are related or whether they arethose properties.5. The Separation of FormsThe best guide to the separation of Forms is the claim that eachForm is what it is in its own right, each is an auto kath autobeing. In asking ‘What is (the Form) F?’, Platoseeks what F is in a particular and special way: Heseeks what F is independent from any of its materialinstances, and in some sense independent of anything else, whetheranother Form or the soul. What each Form is, what each Form is in itsown right, it is in virtue of its essence, ousia. Theconnection between the Form and the essence being predicated of it isexhibited in the Republic's formula that a given on(being) is completely or perfectly (477ff), as well as the so-calledself-predication statements. According to the predicationalist reading,the relation connecting an essence with that Form of which it is theessence is Being.[19] (I capitalize the ‘is’ used torepresent the predication relation of Being, e.g., Justice Is just.)The predicate in such self-predication statements stands for the (real)definition of the Form, conveniently captured by Nehamas' ‘whatit is to be F’.[20] Each Form, then Isits essence.The special relationship between a Form and its essence is capturedin two principlesEach essence is the essence of exactly oneForm.Each Form has (or is) exactly one essence;[21]II captures the ontological force of the expression that each Formis monoeides: of one essence. In light of theseprinciples, and in keeping with the account of the ontological relationof Being, it follows that each Form self-predicates, in so faras each Form Is its essence. Self-predication statements are thusrequired of Forms, since every Form must Be its respective essence.Self-predication, then, is a constitutional principle of the verytheory of Forms. A Form, then, is what it is in its own right inthat it Is its essence, and since the only thing it Is is its essence,each Form is monoeides, ‘of one essence’. Invirtue of Being its essence, each Form Is something regardless ofwhether any particular does or even may participate in it. Thus eachForm is separate from every particular instance of it.Moreover, since its essence is predicated of the Form independentlyfrom our knowledge of the Form or from its relation to another Form, aForm is not dependent on anything else. On this definitionalinterpretation of separation, an item is separate just in case thedefinition (essence) is predicable of it and not of what it is allegedto be separate from. So, a Form is separate from particulars thatpartake of it, or any particular, if the essence is predicable of theForm and not predicable of the particular/s. Whether or not a Form isexistentially separate, i.e., whether it existsseparate from everything else, turns on whether one thinks that beingan essence qualifies the Form as existing. To the extent that Platorecognizes the notion of existence, since being an essence seems, byPlato's lights, to be the superlative way to be, it is likely thatForms are both definitionally and existentially separate.6. The Range of FormsThe middle period dialogues contain few arguments whose conclusionis that such and such a Form therefore exists. Even when‘argument’ is given a very broad reading, the dialoguestend to address themselves to a limited number of Forms. These includethe moral properties familiar from Socrates' ethical inquiries andproperties such as Beauty, Equality, Hot and Cold, or Largeness. Whilethese are not the only properties mentioned in the course ofdiscussion, the Argument from Recollection, the arguments about theobjects of knowledge and the ‘summoners’ from Books V(477ff) and VII (523ff), respectively, of the Republic, aswell as the final ascent to Beauty in the Symposium and theFinal Argument of the Phaedoall point to a particular kind ofproperty, what scholars have labeled ‘incompleteproperties’.[22] There is no precise way to specify whatcounts as an incomplete property. Roughly, the idea is that anincomplete property is one which, when serving as a predicate, yields astatement that cannot be understood on its own, because they must beadded on to, or completed in some sense, typically with a prepositionalphrase. For instance, the predicate ‘large’, functioning ina statement such as ‘Shaquille O'Neal is large’ must becompleted with ‘for a human’; for while Shaq is large for ahuman he is not large compared with a tree. For some readers, then,while the Plato of the middle period may believe in a wide range ofproperties, he is theoretically committed only to a limited number orrange of Forms, namely Forms of incomplete properties.Forms are limited to these incomplete properties because, on thisline of reasoning, these properties present special problems when theyare instantiated in particulars. Chief among these problems is‘the compresence of opposites’. This is the phenomenonwhere, with respect to any incomplete property, F, everysensible particular that is F is, in some sense, alsonot-F. So, if Elsie the cow is large, she is also not-large;for Elsie is large in comparison to her calf but not-large incomparison to Elmer the bull. Thus Elsie is large and not-large. Since,according to this approach, Plato is seeking a large that is theunqualified bearer of largeness, and since every particular isdisqualified in light of compresence, Plato postulates a Form,Largeness Itself, to be the unqualified bearer. By way of contrast,properties such as being brown or being a cow do not suffer compresencewhen instantiated by particulars. That is, Elsie is a cow and is notnot-a-cow; she is brown (imagine she is brown all over) and is notnot-brown. (In the modern parlance, being a cow is classified as anessential property of Elsie whereas being brown is an accidentalproperty. Thus the proponent of Forms only for incomplete propertieslooks to a special subset of the accidental properties, namely thosewhere there is no unqualified possessor.)In order to appreciate fully the rationale for this account, oneneeds to consider Plato's account of particulars, for the compresenceof opposites is meant to capture in what sense particulars aredeficient with respect to Forms. Before turning to particulars, notethat it is left open by proponents of this position how we are to thinkof the nature of Forms and the self-predication statements involvingForms, whether, for instance, ‘Largeness is Largeness' signals thatLargeness is what it is to be largeness, identical with largeness, or alarge item, maybe the largest thing there is. Rather, we are told thatthe key notion is being completely. So, just as Elsie is completely acow, so Largeness is completely large: Largeness is a complete bearerof an incomplete property.7. The Deficiency of ParticularsMetaphors dominate Plato's remarks about the relation of particularsto Forms. Of special importance are the metaphors of image andoriginal, copy and model, example and paradigm. The physical world andall of its constituents are, according to Plato, a copy or image of theForms, and since all copies are dependent on the original, the physicalworld is dependent on Forms. In so far as Platonic Forms are notdependent on particulars, i.e., they are not immanent universals, thedependence is only ‘one way’. A second important metaphorfrom the Phaedo also suggests that particulars are dependenton Forms whereas Forms are not dependent on them. Particularsstrive to be such as the Forms are and thus in comparison toForms are imperfect or deficient. Forms, then, are independent, whereasparticulars are dependent on Forms and thus deficient with respect tothem.The Phaedo (especially the Affinity Argument, 78b-84b) alsopoints up a host of features, usually found in pairs, whichdifferentiate particulars from Forms. Forms are immaterial, non-spatialand atemporal. Particulars are material and extended in space and intime. Forms do not change and may not even be subject toCambridge-change, i.e. relational changes involving, for instance, asoul cognizing them at various moments. Particulars change, may even besubject to change in any respect, and may even be subject tochange in every respect at any given moment, i.e., totalHeraclitean flux. Particulars are complex or multi-form(polyeidetic) composites (suntheton), whereas Formsare pure, simple or uniform (monoeidetic, hen). Particularsare the objects of the senses and of belief. Forms are the objects ofknowledge, grasped by the intellect through definitions, dialectic, orotherwise. Particulars appear, and perhaps are, both F andnot-F for some property F: particulars suffer fromthe compresence of opposites. The Form of F cannot beconceived to be not-F (and perhaps is never not-F).Hence the Form, The F Itself, does not suffer compresence (atleast with respect to being F).Aristotle's account of Plato's reasons for introducing Formsindicates that change and essence are critical to Plato's thinkingabout the deficiency of material particulars. “…Socratessought the universal in them and turned to definitions. Plato,accepting this, thought that this (defining) comes to be aboutdifferent things, and not about sensibles. For it is impossible thatthe common definition be about any of the sensibles, for these arealways changing.” (Metaphysics987b1-7) At the verybeginning, then, the search for knowledge leads to definitions. Thequestion is where one can find definitions or definables. Aristotleasserts that Plato thought that definitions could not be found in thesensibles because they were always changing.Following Aristotle's lead, a most economical way to account for thecognitive superiority of Forms and the inferiority of sensibles wouldbe to allot essences only to the Forms. Since we know from the earlyand the middle dialogues that knowledge is of essence, it is temptingto think that the absence of essence is responsible for the deficiencyof the particulars. Particulars are deficient because they can or dochange. They change because their properties are contingent. Theirproperties are contingent because they lack any essences (or anyessential properties). But this is too quick. First, Plato'sparticulars may not change with respect to all of their properties.Perhaps some have essential properties along with a host of contingentproperties. Then Aristotle might be taken to imply that only withrespect to a certain number of contingent properties did Plato positdefinable Forms. Moreover, Aristotle seems to allude only to anepistemological difficulty arising from changing particulars. It ispossible that this difficulty arises independently of whether someparticulars have essential properties. For instance, particulars mightbe epistemologically problematic because they have many properties,only some of which are changing.Certain passages (e.g., Phaedo 74ff., 78ff.,Republic 476e-479, 523aff) suggest that particulars arecognitively deficient because they are complex. Suppose that aparticular is F. Complexity entails that a particular has atleast two properties, F and G. Since the Gis not-F, every complex particular can be said to beF and not-F. Our inability to grasp the property(F) in the particular is then grounded not in the compresenceof an opposite property, but in the compresence of anotherproperty. The inquiring mind is unable to isolate the desiredproperty from any other. This suggests that a fundamental contrastbetween the particulars and the Form F is that the latter issimple, or monoeidetic, in that it possesses just itself -- It is justF.[23]At other times, the cognitive reliability of the Forms seemsgrounded in the analyticity, or logical certainty, or necessity, thatholds between the essence of a Form and various properties‘discernible in its nature.’ Looked at in this light, thefactor responsible for the deficiency of sensibles is that theirproperties are contingently related to them, in contrast to the Formswhose properties are necessarily stuck to them with ‘logicalglue’. [24]If we emphasize the contingency of all of its properties, aparticular cannot have any essential properties. On the other hand, ifwe emphasize the complexity of the particular, then we are free toascribe essences to (some) particulars. Hence, there could be knowledgeof these particulars, i.e., knowledge that Socrates is a man.Conversely, if complexity is the cause of cognitive deficiency, thenwith respect to Forms, the fact that all their properties are necessaryproperties would not suffice to render Forms knowable. For ifa Form has many properties, then in the broad sense the Form FItself, since it is F and G, will be F andnot-F. Thus Forms, too, might not be knowable.There is reason to doubt that the compresence of opposites or themere complexity of particulars is responsible for theirdeficiency.[25] According to Aristotle, change iscritical, especially in so far as it precludes definability and thusknowledge. Given that knowledge requires essence, and essence excludeschange (in the case of the essential properties), Aristotle would haveus deny that essence is predicable of particulars for the Plato of themiddle period. Particulars will be epistemologically deficient in thatthere can be no knowledge of them, unless we abandon the thesis thatknowledge is of essence. And particulars will be metaphysicallydeficient, at least to the extent that possessing an essence is abetter state than lacking one. But more can be said about the peculiarcontingent manner in which particulars have their properties and why itis that one cannot look to the particular beauties to obtain knowledgeof, e.g., Beauty.From the outset of the Phaedo, particulars are branded asmaterial and, as a result, spoken of in the pejorative. Indeed, matterseems to be at the root of the other features that characterizeparticulars. What is extended in space (and through, or in, time) isbody. The composite is also linked with the material. Because amaterial particular is composite, it is also multi-form or complex(Phaedo80b4). Complex material particulars are subject tochange in so far as their composite nature invites dissolution orconstruction, or more generally coming-to-be or perishing.[26] Whentaken broadly, as it is at Phaedo 100ff (or in the analogiesof the middle books of the Republic), generation anddestruction includes the exchange of properties. And since compresencerequires complexity, the material nature of particulars is one of theroots of each material, sensible particular being both F andnot-F.The spatio-temporal, material character of particulars alsocontributes directly to the explanation of their suffering, and seemingto suffer, the compresence of opposites. In the middle period, Platoseems to accept an account of perception that has as a necessarycomponent the interaction of material elements. There may besubsequent or simultaneous psychic activity,[27] the judgment part of‘perceptual judgment’, but there is at least some materialintercourse between the body of the perceived object and the sensefaculty whose sensory object it is. The qualifications needed toaccount for a particular's being F and not-F aretemporal, or a function of being comparable to other extended materialobjects, or standing in different relations to perceivers.[28] Sincematerial extension is a necessary condition for their perceptibility,no particular could appear to have compresent propertiesunless it were material.In virtue of their material nature, particulars are extended,mutable, and subject to generation and destruction. How then is themateriality of the particular related to the characterization for whichparticipation is responsible? What materiality induces is that aproperty be manifested in a specific way. So, when we considera particular stick to ask what is its length, we expect to be told aspecific quantity: the stick is five inches long. The same is true ofits weight: it is six ounces. If we are concerned to explain why thestick is that long, one answer is that the matter of the particularcompels it to have determinate length.[29] Only when we shift tothe question ‘What is length?’, do we begin to reflect uponthe relations between length and the fact that each of these materialparticulars has a specific length. In the Meno (74ff), Platodevelops the notion of determinable and determinate. There theproperties themselves are determinates falling under a determinable,e.g., crimson and scarlet under red, red under color. Now, theproperties under consideration are all generic ordeterminable, but when present in the particular they take on aspecific, determinate character. Consider, for instance, mathematicalfigures. The Triangle itself will be a three-sided figure whose lineslack breadth and whose angles have no determinate degree. But allparticular triangles will have lines with some breadth and angles withcertain degrees.[30] There is, then, a gap between thenon-specific and non-determinate property and the way it is manifestedin the particular. The immaterial Form of Triangle is abstract and canhave no particular dimension. The property in the particular,on the other hand, must be specific and determinate -- the property inthe particular is always a specific, determinate length, or color(hue), or size, or so on -- because the particular is concrete, andbecause the property in the particular is itself a particular instanceof the non-determinate property.The determinacy of the material particular is set against thenon-determinacy of the Form. This determinacy of property is only oneaspect of the difference. A second is the contingent way in which theparticular has this determinate property. The material aspect is, inthe case of particulars, partly responsible for the contingency of itsproperty possession. Matter is a sufficient condition for contingencybut not necessary, since souls are in many respects contingently whatthey are, e.g., desirous of money. (Matter is also a sufficientcondition for complexity, though again not necessary, if souls, orForms, can be complex.)8. Being and PartakingThe rigid separation of Forms from sensible particulars, Plato'sidea that there are ‘Two Worlds’, is embodied in Plato'sisolation of the two ways of being, Being and Partaking. The criteriaand the properties which differentiate Forms and particulars arerelated to their respective ways of being, but mutability,extendedness, etc., are not equivalent to Partaking and they do notexplain it nor are they explained by it. Still, the deficiency of thesensible is aptly viewed in terms of its way of being, i.e., in virtueof the fact that every sensible acquires all of its properties throughparticipation. The deficiency of the sensible is its deficient wayof being. Lacking any essence, it can only fail to Be.This notion of deficiency has a long pedigree. In one sense it is anew way of cashing out the idea that Forms and particulars aredifferent kinds or types of entities.[31] It clearly is not anApproximation view or a view according to which Forms are treated asparadigmatic particulars. The very same property, Beauty, is related,via Being, to the Form Beauty Itself that is related to the sensibleparticular via Partaking. The beauty of Helen is not itself deficient,her way of having it is. And since beauty does not characterize Beauty,there is no case to be made that Beauty Itself could be aparadigmatically beautiful object. It would appear, then, that onlyForms are definable, since essence is not predicated of particulars.But it is not so simple. Based on the Phaedo's account ofBeing and Participating (cf. Principles I and II, supra), wecan conclude that:Each Form, F, Is its essence,Y.and thatFor all particulars, P, and for all propertiesY, if Y is predicated (able) of P, thenP Has Y.Furthermore, since the Phaedo asserts that particulars arewhat they are in virtue of the Form's being what it Is, it followsthatIf P has Y, then P has somethingwhich Is Y.The motivation for this claim is our understanding of the thesis at100c that Beauty Itself alone Is beautiful and that other thingsacquire their beauty in virtue of partaking in what Is beautiful. Thetraditional and obvious way to parse this claim is to allow that it isthe Form Itself which the particular has, for it seems that only theForm whose essence is Y, Is Y. But if this is true,then if, as the Identity view maintains, the Form and its essence areidentical, it follows that the essence must also be predicable ofthe particular. In which case it seems that the particulars dohave essences, albeit via Partaking, for they have something which isidentical with an essence.Form-copies, the-large-in-Socrates, the hot-in-fire, and such,provide a way out of this predicament. There is no consensus as towhether they are bona fide members of the ontology of thePhaedo(102bff). Many have argued that the so-calledform-copies are nothing more than the Forms conceived of as inherentin, or immanent in, particulars, the particularization of the Form, orForms as they function in the participation relation.[32] But ifPlato wishes to avoid the consequence of predicating Forms and, thus,essences directly of particulars, then there is a compelling reason forhim to admit form-copies into his ontology. They differ from theirparent Form in that they are singular or unit-properties, whereas theForm is general and abstract.The relation of the form-copy to the particular is a real problem.The crucial issue is whether form-copies are dependent on particulars,especially whether their claim to be individual or unit-properties isonly as good as the company they keep. Part of the difficulty resultsfrom the metaphor Plato's uses throughout the last stage of the FinalArgument in the Phaedo. In anticipation of what will be hisultimate ‘proof’ of the immortality of the soul, Platocontends that when something possessed of an essential property, as forinstance snow possesses cold, is confronted by the‘opposite’, heat, then the-cold-in-the snow must withdrawor perish. (The soul, because it cannot perish, must thereforewithdraw.) Which of the two possibilities developed in the militarymetaphor does Plato envisage for form-copies: do they ‘withdrawor perish’? It is a struggle to understand just what the militarymetaphors amount to, but if the form-copies perish at the approach oftheir opposite, this suggests that form-copies are dependent on theparticulars to which they belong.[33] Those who deny thatform-copies are bona fide beings cite their perishing as aprincipal reason to take them as nothing more than a metaphor for theparticular's (temporary) participation in the Form. Conversely, if theyare able to withdraw, they are in some sense independent from theparticulars. In this fashion they are akin to individual souls, sinceneither souls nor form-copies will be dependent for their existence onthe particular to which they temporarily belong.But even if they withdraw and thus exist apart from the particulars,their individuality seems to be determined by the company they keep,e.g., Socrates, or this bit of snow.‘Belonging-to-Socrates’ is a relational property and seemsto require that there be something, namely Socrates, to which theform-copy can belong. However, if form-copies are thus dependent onparticulars, there is a problem with respect to the nature ofparticulars lurking in the Phaedo. For it seems thatparticulars have all of their properties in virtue of participating inthe relevant Forms. Particulars, then, are ultimately to be identifiedin terms of the properties they have, namely their form-copies. But ifthese form-copies, in turn, are themselves individuated by theparticulars whose form-copies they are, we are confronted with acircle.Plato may be able to avoid this circle of individuation by notmaking form-copies depend on particulars for either their being ortheir individuation. If their status as individuals is primitive,form-copies will not be individuated by the particulars to which theybelong. In this respect they are like the individual souls, which,since they pre-exist and postdate the particulars they inhabit, are notand cannot be individuated by them. A form-copy is, in the strictsense, a simple individual, incapable of possessing anything besides(the essence of) the Form of which it is a copy. Finally, they are notdependent on particulars, even for their individuation, because theycan withdraw when necessary and thus continue to be what they are whenthe particular has perished. They can be said to perish, butonly in the sense that the particular to which they temporarily attachcan itself perish or change. (Were they dependent on the particular,form-copies would in fact perish.) The reason they survive is that aform-copy Is what it is. In so far as anything Is what it is, it cannotcease to be, i.e., cease to be what it Is. In this respect, too, theyare like souls. Both souls and form-copies are then individuals intheir own rights, apart from any particulars in which they inhere.Form-copies belong to particulars and derive or emanate, to borrow aneo-Platonic term, from Forms. Form-copies allow Plato to respond to athreat posed by the metaphysics of Forms: to wit, that particularsmight be indiscernible. If particulars are nothing in their own right,and in the absence of both matter and form-copies, then particulars aremerely bundles of Forms;[34] but if they are bundles, then twoparticulars composed of the same Forms would be indiscernible andidentical. If we admit form-copies, particulars are not bundles ofForms. Particulars will be bundles of form-copies. And unlike a Form,which would seem to have to be numerically the same in each particular,the form-copies will differ from one another since they are distinctindividual property-instances, not universals. However, while theparticulars are no longer identical, this still allows that two bundlesof form-copies could be indiscernible, since the form-copiesof any one Form differ, it seems, solo numero. Helen'sform-copy of Beauty cannot differ in quality from Andromache's, buttheir form-copies are distinct. If we allow that Helen and Andromacheare presumed to be distinct particulars in virtue of their matter, wecan further distinguish the particulars and the form-copies, i.e.the-beautiful-in-Helen versus the beautiful-in-Andromache. Here again,then, the assumption of the material particular is relevant. When Platorecognizes that he has yet to account for matter, and thus theindividuation of particulars, he has to compose theTimaeus.Particulars, then, have the properties they have because they haveForm-copies derived from the Forms, which Are those properties. Andwhen they inhere in the material particular, the particular has adefinite, determinate property instance of Largeness or Beauty. Theparticular is assumed to be a combination of matter and form-copies(and in some cases, soul). All the form-copies can be lost, for theparticular has no essential properties or essence, and so too the soulcan be lost. In fact, since Plato seems to think that the body alsodissipates, the particular can totally disappear. Not so the Form,which Is what it is, an auto kath auto being, precisely inthat its essence is predicated via Being of it, and it is the only Formof which that essence is predicated.A particular, x, is what it is in virtue of Partaking. Whatmakes x beautiful, for instance, is its having something whichIs beautiful. This something can either be a Form or form-copy, forthese alone Are beautiful. It might seem, however, that the qualitativeaspect of property possession is being explained in terms of items thatare not qualified or characterized in the appropriate manner. Thiswould be the result were Partaking analyzed in terms of, or reduced to,the relationship of Being. But in the middle period at least, Partakingis itself a primitive relation alongside Being. Moreover, at thisjuncture the participating subject is assumed to be a materialparticular, whose material nature goes without analysis. The primitiverelation of Partaking, along with the effects of matter, are thusresponsible for the characterization of the particulars: in virtue ofhaving something, which Is beautiful, Helen is a beautifulwoman. The form-copy is not responsible for the concrete, determinatecharacter of her beauty. Her being a material object, and herhaving of the form-copy cause her to be so characterized. Thather determinate character is the character of Beauty, on theother hand, is due to the form-copy that she has, and this form-copy,in turn, causes her to be beautiful in virtue of being a form-copy ofBeauty Itself. In this respect, Plato sustains the Socratic notion thatForms are logical causes. The Form, Beauty Itself, makes possible thefact that Helen is beautiful, in so far as a form-copy of Beauty issomething she has. Since she has all of her properties in this fashion,and since we seem to be able to identify her, and any particular, onlythrough descriptions that refer to her properties, form-copies andtheir respective Forms are responsible for our epistemic access toparticulars.[35]9. Introduction to Plato's EpistemologyEpistemology, for Plato, is best thought of as the account of whatknowledge is. A reader who has some familiarity with philosophy sinceDescartes may well think that epistemology must address the questionwhether there is any knowledge. Plato never considers the globalskeptical challenge. He assumes that there is knowledge, or at leastthat it is possible, and he inquires into the conditions that make itpossible. These conditions, broadly conceived, concern, on the onehand, the rational capacities of humans, or more accurately souls, and,on the other hand, the objects of knowledge. With respect to objects,Forms certainly are objects of knowledge. However, there is muchdispute as to whether anything in the material world is a suitableobject. The physical world is an image, an imperfect world of change.Many passages in the Phaedo and, most dramatically, theRepublic's great metaphors of Sun, Line and Cave, imply thatPlato is a skeptic about knowledge of the physical, sensible world.Humans can have only beliefs about it. But many recoil at the prospectthat Plato is such a skeptic. Citing the thrust of other discussions,these readers argue that while all knowledge for Plato must be based,in some sense, on Forms, one who knows Forms can also acquire knowledgeof the physical world.[36]Concerns about the inherent intelligibility, or lack thereof, of thephysical world, prompt Plato to propose the doctrine of recollection,i.e., the thesis that our disembodied, immortal souls have seen theForms prior to their incarceration in the body. If Forms are the(basic) objects of knowledge, and Forms are not in the physical world,then we must have acquired that knowledge at some point prior to ourcommerce with that world. But metaphysical issues about thesimplicity of Forms also affect how we are to conceive ofkinstance, no matterwhere one is situated, the round penny will appear to the eye, we mightsay, somewhat elliptical. Or, to use Plato's example from Book Ten, thestraight stick in water will seem bent (owing to the laws ofrefraction), even though an experienced person will believe that it isstraight (602c-603a).[48]15. The Method of HypothesisHowever we account for the inadequacy of perception the task remainsto explore how we get from perception, which stimulates therecollective process, to belief and eventually to recollect orotherwise know Forms. Plato is less than forthcoming about how onemoves from one stage to the next. The elenctic method probably playssome role in advancing one's understanding, especially the step fromperception to belief. At a certain point, we naturally begin to offerreasons for our beliefs. The elenchus questions our reasons, typicallyby revealing an inconsistency in our accounts of why we believe what wedo. But we can also place Plato in a tradition that seeks a systematicexplanation of the natural phenomena. One aim of the Presocratics, asSocrates narrates in the Phaedo (95a4ff), is to find a singleexplanation, or a single kind of explanation, to save the phenomena.Socrates complains that the Presocratics had mistakenly looked tomaterial causes. Such explanations fail to meet minimal standards: thesame explanation (aitia) accounts for opposite phenomena,e.g., ‘by a head’ explains both why something is tall andsomething else is short; or sometimes the same phenomenon is subject toexplanations by opposite causes, being two by ‘division andaddition.’ However, Socrates reports, Anaxagoras' nod towardsMind was at least a step in the right direction (though Anaxagorasfailed to follow the path). The best account is teleological in nature,in terms of the Good. Thus the Phaedogestures at the criticalrole assigned to this Form in the Republic. In thePhaedo Plato begs off from directly investigating the natureof the good or teleological explanations. Instead he turns to what hedescribes as a method of hypothesis, the first of which is thehypothesis of Forms as causes (see §2 supra), and its‘first corollary’, that particulars are/come-to-be whateach is in virtd answer with a slaveabout how to find the diagonal of a given square, Socrates argues thatlatent within the slave is an understanding of how to determine thediagonal (81-86b). The slave has various beliefs, some false and sometrue, about the way to discover the length of the diagonal. What isneeded is only a set of prompts, here a set of questions, to elicitfrom the boy the knowledge that is latent within him. Socrates contendsthat he is leading the slave to recollect what he already knows. In thesubsequent stages of the argument, Socrates distinguishes the sense inwhich a person can be said to merely have a belief about something(into which one might inquire), from the sense in which he can be saidto know the same thing (97ff). For instance, suppose that Jones haslooked at a map and determined how to drive from New York City toChicago though he has not done so: just get on Interstate 80 and gowest. On the other hand, suppose that Smith has actually drivennumerous times from NYC to Chicago by getting on 80 and heading west.Both Jones and Smith have the same belief about how to get from NYC toChicago and both will get there by acting on their belief. But onlySmith has knowledge of the road, whereas Jones has a true belief. Thetruth of the belief is then not at issue. Rather, Smith has somethingmore, some kind of justification, here based on experience, thatdistinguishes her from Jones: Jones has only a true belief about how toget there; Smith actually knows. Thus in the Meno, we haveperhaps the first attempt to offer a justified true belief account ofknowledge: Knowledge is a true belief tied down with an account(aitias logismos, 98a). The Meno, then, with itsdiscussion of recollection, knowledge and belief sets the stage for themiddle Platonic epistemology.11. Recollection in the PhaedoThe Phaedo's discussion of recollection begins with aremark by Cebes in support of the claim that our souls preexist theirincarceration in the body: “Such is also the case if that theoryis true that you are accustomed to mention frequently, that for uslearning is no other than recollection. According to this, we must atsome previous time have learned what we now recollect. This is possibleonly if our soul existed somewhere before it took on this humanshape” (72e-73).Of special importance in this initial description is the ‘forus’ and the identification of learning (mathesis) withrecollection. There is no way to determine whether ‘we’here are the close, philosophical confidants of Socrates, or the humanrace. Part of the solution to the problem of who recollects will hingeon how we understand the claim that learning is nothing other thanrecollection. On the broad reading, recollection concerns theapplication of concepts in all thought.[37] That is, sincelearning is a dynamic process whose termini are roughly our firstthoughts and talk about the world, on the one hand, and knowledge ofForms on the other, and since in thinking and talking about the worldwe must apply concepts, recollection is viewed as a doctrine of innateideas whose effects are felt almost immediately in the consciousmind.Those who would limit the kind of learning that is recollectionisolate the last stage(s) of learning, namely those concerned with themove from beliefs about the (properties of) the material world toknowledge of Forms.[38] Since only philosophers will engage inthese late stages, the ‘us’ for whom learning isrecollection are only philosophers, and what is learned/recollected isjust Forms. On this narrow reading Plato would have to offer an accountof ordinary thought and talk, i.e., an account of concept acquisitionand application, which claims that the concepts so deployed by most ofus are derived from ordinary particulars and acquired through ourconversations with one another and our sense-perceptions and beliefsabout physical objects. In sum, both readings agree that Plato isconcerned to explain the distinctive capacity of humans to classifysense-perception under universals. According to the broad reading,Plato thinks that this cannot be done unless one appeals to one'sprior, latent knowledge of the Forms under which one rangesperceptions. According to the narrow reading, there is no need toappeal to prior knowledge of Forms to explain the ordinaryclassificatory activities of humans. Rather, prior knowledge of Formsis needed only to explain the philosophical understanding of Forms.Innate Forms thus need not contribute anything to the formation ofconcepts in ordinary thought and talk. Precisely what the relation isbetween the concepts garnered from ordinary perception and used inordinary thought and talk and the innate Forms or concepts used inphilosophical thinking remains to be determined.Concepts are, roughly, the units or elements of thoughts. In theTheaetetus(189e), a dialogue written after theRepublic and Phaedo, Plato contends that thought isthe silent dialogue of the soul with itself. If we can read back fromthis dialogue to the epistemology of the middle period, concepts areconceptual analogues to the subjects and predicates of spokenstatements: corresponding to the predicate ‘equal’ of astatement such as ‘The sticks are equal’ is the concept[equality]. To debate whether there are ordinary versus philosophicalconcepts of [equality] thus invites consideration of how to distinguishconcepts from one another. Basic in the Phaedois that we haveknowledge of Equality; that we perceive sensible equal objects, that wecompare these sensible equals with the Form, and that in order to dothis we must have had prior knowledge of Equality. Now, one question iswhether the same concept applies both to the Form and the particulars.Whereas we moderns often focus on synonymy to distinguishco-referential concepts, issues of reference dominate Plato's thoughts.By the end of the Final Argument, it is clear that in a strict orprimary fashion the concept/term is applied to the Form and in anindirect manner it is applied to the many instances that fall under theForm. (Using the language of names, ‘equal’ is the name ofEquality and the eponym of the many particular equal things. (Cf.102bff) With respect to the concept of Equality, it is individuated byits relation to the Form of Equality and, at best, derivatively to themany equals.[39] What individuates concepts or names, isnot what is in the head of speakers, but rather just their relation toForms.This privileging of reference over meaning with respect to what aconcept is lends credence to the broad or innatist interpretation ofwhat it is to acquire or even to have a concept. One has the conceptfrom birth. One is not aware of having it. As you mature, learn tospeak and make your way in the world, you may and in all likelihoodwill associate many beliefs or things with this concept, though stillyou might not think of it as a concept. (That is, nothing in Plato'saccount suggests that people need be aware of having a concept quaconcept in order to have or even use concepts.) Conversely, lacking theindividuation condition for concepts provided by Forms and Innatism,the narrow reading must provide an account of how one acquires anyconcept. There is little in the primary or secondary literature tosuggest how concepts are acquired. Though it is a controversialdialogue with respect to doctrine and period, the Cratylus’rejection of the Protagorean/Heraclitean account of names (383-387c,434e-435d), strongly suggests that Plato thinks that no empiricist orabstractionist account is workable. One problem, then, with the narrowinterpretation is its picture of (ordinary) concepts and theircontents. Concepts are treated as hollow shells to be filled withvarying beliefs or ideas, contents gleaned from conversations with oneanother or contact with the world. Into my concept of beauty goes paleskinned, into yours bright color, into a third, some other filling. Theproblem is that if the concept itself is identified with itscontents, then there is no reason to think that any of us have the sameconcept. There are just too many different beliefs associated with aconcept by different individuals to think that anyone could ever meanthe same as another. Empiricism with respect to concept acquisition isliable to lead to private languages at best. Moreover, it would seemthat our concept changes anytime we add or subtract from itscontents.Of course, the fact that there are philosophical objections to thenarrow reading should not dictate that we reject it. The broad readingmay also have problems. Indeed, Plato's account of Recollection,whatever it is, is liable to suffer difficulties. So what is theaccount?At the outset (73c-74a), Socrates places certain conditions on whatis to count as recollection. If x reminds one of y,thenone must have known y beforehandone must, in having any sense-perception of something (x),recognize x and take y in mind (think ofy)y must not be the object of the same knowledge asx.Since recollection can be occasioned by objects that are similarand by objects that are dissimilar (Simmias and a picture of Simmiasversus Simmias and his lyre), when the recollection is caused bysimilar things, one must also of necessity experience this: one musthave in mind whether or not x is lacking in some way withrespect to similarity vis à vis y.It is not clear how these conditions can be satisfied. In order torecollect Simmias upon seeing his picture, (1) I must have knownSimmias beforehand and (2) I must be somehow cognizant of the pictureand of Simmias. (3) And were Simmias and his picture not theobjects of different knowledge, that is, were they the object of thesame knowledge, it seems that I would not realize that they aredifferent objects. The picture would not remind me of Simmias, it wouldjust be thought of as a picture (or as Simmias). But, recognizing thepicture cannot involve recognizing Simmias, lest we already bethinking of Simmias (y) in thinking about the picture(x): that is, we cannot be reminded of what we areoccurrently thinking about. There must then be a way ofcognizing the picture apart from what it is a picture of. Condition 3is more transparent when we consider recollection fromunlikes: we can recognize a lyre as a lyre or as a musicalinstrument, a piece of wood with strings, etc., easily enough withoutintroducing Simmias in order to think about it. Condition 4 then spellsout the peculiar way in which recollection from likes occurs;e.g., we realize that a picture or image is different from what it is apicture of: images fall short or are lacking in some respect withregard to what they are an image of. We recognize this perhaps becausewe recognize that it is an image and that images always are deficientwith respect to what they are images of. But we need not be thinking ofthe very thing the image is an image of in order to recognize thesefacts.The argument to this point is a preliminary sketch of recollection.The next stage attempts to prove that one can and must recollect Forms,since only with that proof will Socrates have demonstrated thepre-existence of the soul. So Plato turns to showing that we cannothave acquired knowledge of the Form Equality from perceptualencounters. But 2, 3 and 4, when applied to the example of the equalsticks, appear to land the doctrine in difficulties. For it seems thatif, according to 4, we need to be comparing the equal sticks to theForm of Equality, then we need to be aware of the Form in thinking ofthe sticks. But if we must be aware of the Form even to think about theequal sticks then we must already have the Form in mind inconducting the comparison. We cannot then be in the process of formingthe concept of Equality nor recollecting the Form.The next stage finds Socrates getting Simmias' rapid agreement thatthere is an Equal that they know besides the equal sticks and stones.(74ab). The question is whence they acquired this knowledge. It cannothave been from the sticks and stones from which it differs; for theycan sometimes appear equal and sometimes unequal, whereas EqualityItself, on the other hand, never appears unequal. Socrates concludesthat we cannot have derived our knowledge of Equality from these manyequals because we realize that they are deficient or lacking withrespect to Equality. He does not specify in what way they are lacking,save for the aforementioned fact that they can and do appear unequalwhereas Equality does not and apparently cannot do so.Plato provides little guidance in this argument or elsewhere as towhy the Form cannot appear to be unequal.[40] Perhaps the easiestway to parse the Form's insusceptibility to appearing unequal is totreat the claim as implying that the Form cannot appear other thanitself, i.e., equal. This fact, in turn, would then be explained byciting the Form's incomposite, or simple, nature (See §4,supra). Equality could then have no other property (or be noother property). Thus, to be aware of it at all would be to recognizeit as equal. Of course there remains the problem of distinguishingbeing aware of the Form from thinking one is aware of the Form when oneis not. In this circumstance, one could perhaps mistakenly think allsorts of things about the Form. A related but distinct consideration isto determine whether it is possible in some sense to have the Form inmind without being aware of it. Certainly the broad or innatist readingmust allow for this possibility, since Forms are regarded as latent inone's mind.If Forms are not utterly simple, then this explanation of theirimmunity to appearing other than they are is weakened. Suppose thatEquality is also beautiful. Then in some fashion, it would seem that byattending to its beauty Equality could seem other than Equality andthus seem unequal. In order to avoid this outcome, while allowing forsome complexity in the Form, those emphasizing the compresence ofopposites can insist that it is the strict opposite, Inequality orbeing unequal, that Plato excludes from the Form, not another property,e.g., beauty, which happens not to be identical with Equality.Alternatively, the predicationalist (See §4 supra.), whoemphasizes the special relation between a Form and its essence,maintains that in knowing Equality, one knows what it is, that is, oneknows its essence. This essence is itself simple or a unity, despitethe apparent complexity of the linguistic definition that picks it out.One is not aware, or at least one is not knowingly aware, of Equalityunless one knows this definition. Whatever else may be predicable ofEquality, one cannot be aware of Equality without realizing that it iswhatever it is, namely this essence. Regardless of how we understandthe difference between the Form and the sticks, Plato seems only tohave shown that the Form and the particulars are not identical. How weare to conclude that one cannot derive the knowledge of the Form fromthe sensibles is not revealed.12. The Epistemology of the Republic: The Two Worlds DoctrineThe Republic is unquestionably Plato's most elaboratedefense of his central ethical doctrines in the middle period. Itexplores the question what is Justice over the course of ten books,with the aim of demonstrating that the best life for a human is thelife devoted to virtue and knowledge, for such a life will result inhappiness for the individual. The virtuous person will be one who hasall three parts of her soul working in a harmonious fashion, i.e., herreason, cognizant of the Form of the Good and the other Forms, willwith the support and consent of her appetite and spirit govern all ofher pursuits. The analogue of the virtuous individual with hertripartite soul is the ideal state, the Republic, with its three partsor classes, rulers, warriors and laborers, all working in harmony withone another under the auspices of the ruler, i.e., reason. Havingestablished that justice is psychic harmony at the end of Book Four,Plato next turns to show what it is that the philosopher ruler (orreason in the individual) knows that licenses his claim that they willrule for the benefit of the respective parts and the whole state orpersonAt the end of Book V (474bff), Socrates begins his defense of therule of the philosopher by contrasting his epistemological conditionwith that of a group of sightlovers. The philosopher, who accepts thatthere are Forms, e.g., Beauty Itself, has knowledge. The sightlover,who denies that there is Beauty Itself but rather insists that thereare just the many (different) beautiful plays, paintings and such,lacks knowledge. He has only belief. In support of this contention,Socrates distinguishes three different kinds of mental states orcapacities and three generic ‘objects’ for thesecapacities. Knowledge is set over ‘what completely is’;ignorance is set over ‘what completely is not’; and,belief, being intermediate between knowledge and ignorance, is set overwhat is intermediate between the other two generic objects, namely‘what is and is not’. Capacities are distinguished,Socrates contends, by two criteria: 1) difference in objects; and 2)difference in what they do (with/to their objects). Examples of 1)include colors and sounds, and of course what completely is and what isand is not. The second criterion is seemingly satisfied by thedifference between being true versus being true and false. Thus,knowledge is always true, whereas belief admits of both truth andfalsehood.Much turns on how one understands the ‘is’ (es)of ‘what completely is’ and ‘what is andis-not’, and, concomitantly, whether one treats what belief andknowledge are ‘set over’ as propositions or objects. Threedifferent readings of the ‘is’ seem possible: a) theexistential; b) the veridical; and c) the predicative.On the existential reading, knowledge is set over what exists;belief is set over what exists and does not exist. On the predicativereading, knowledge is set over Forms, what is F, for anyproperty F (or some privileged kinds of properties, e.g.incomplete properties); belief is set over what is F andnot-F, the material particulars. The existential andpredicative readings typically are committed to objects as whatknowledge and belief are set over. Since it is hard to make sense ofwhat it could be for an object to exist and not exist, the existentialreading has found little support. (There are other objections to anexistential reading, principally that many think that Plato never workswith an ‘is’ of existence.[41])The predicative reading, on the other hand, lends itself to adefense of the Two Worlds account of Plato's metaphysics. The objectsof belief and knowledge are distinct. Accordingly, one can have onlybeliefs about the particulars and about particulars only beliefs, andonly knowledge of Forms and of Forms one can only have knowledge. Itfollows that knowledge cannot be any kind of justified true belief, noteven one ‘tied down’ by the account of the appropriatecause. (See Meno98a). Moreover, since one can have onlyknowledge of Forms, one cannot have any false beliefs about Forms.Given that in Book I of the Republic the interlocutors seem tohave many false beliefs about Justice, e.g., that Justice is returningwhat is due, this consequence may be more worrisome than that whichproscribes knowledge of the affairs of actual cities.According to the veridical reading,[42] the‘objects’ of belief and knowledge are best treated aspropositions. Knowledge is set over what is true, i.e., the set of truepropositions; belief is set over what is true and not true, or false,namely the set of all propositions. The veridical reading regards theoverlap between the objects of the distinct faculties -- the set oftrue propositions -- as a virtue, since it allows one to give ajustified true belief interpretation to knowledge and allows one tohave both beliefs about and knowledge of Forms and of sensibleobjects.13. Sun, Line and CaveThe argument at the end of Book Five is a prelude to the argumentand analogies of Sun, Line and Cave in Books Six and Seven. The pointof Sun is to contrast the visible and intelligible realms. The formeris generated, nurtured and governed by the sun, which also provides thelight required by the eye to gain access to the physical world.Corresponding to the sun in the intelligible realm is the Good:“What gives truth to the things known and the power to know tothe knower is the Form of the Good. And though it is the cause ofknowledge and truth, it is also an object of knowledge.” (508e).Indeed, the Good is responsible for the very ‘being’ of theknowable objects, though Plato never says in what sense the Good isresponsible for the knowability and being of the objects ofknowledge.[43]Line starts from the broad division stipulated by Sun: there is theintelligible realm and the visible realm. Each of these is againdivided into two (unequal) parts. At the bottom of the visible onefinds images, shadows and such. The ordinary physical objects of whichthe images are images occupy the upper portion. Set over the images isthe faculty of eikasia, imagination. Set over the physicalworld is the faculty of pistis, literally faith or conviction,but generally regarded as belief. Plato next turns to the lower segmentof the intelligible portion of Line:In (this) subsection, the soul, using as images the thingsthat were imitated before, is forced to investigate from hypotheses,proceeding not to a first principle, but to a conclusion. In the othersubsection, however, it makes its way to a first principle that is nota hypothesis, proceeding from a hypothesis, but without the images usedin the previous subsection, using Forms themselves and making itsinvestigation through the (510b).The top-most segment of Line is clear enough. The objects are Formsand the faculty set over Forms is Nous, Knowledge or Understanding.Included in this group is the Good itself, best regarded as having thestatus of first among equals. Precisely what to make of the objects inthe third section, the faculty of dianoia, and the nature ofhypotheses are matters of great controversy. Given Plato's examples,the capacity of dianoiaseems distinctive of scientific ormathematical reasoning. (On the question of hypotheses and the relationof this passage to the hypothetical method of the Phaedo, see§15 supra.) The objects of dianoia are then, roughly,the objects of the sciences. There appear to be two basicapproaches to the ‘objects’ of dianoia, dependingon how one understands the participial phrase “using as imagesthe things that were imitated before”: 1) The objects of thissegment are some kind of ‘abstract’ image of ordinarymaterial things - a kind of image different from the kind that areshadows and reflections; or 2) the objects are either the materialobjects themselves though now treated (abverbially, as it were) in aspecial, different way, or they are Forms, though treated in a waydifferent from that way in which noûs treatsForms.[44]Cave, arguably the most famous analogy in the history of philosophy,reinforces the message of line. Seated prisoners, chained so that theycannot move their heads, stare at a cave wall on which are projectedimages. These images are cast from carved figures illuminated by a fireand carried by people on a parapet above and behind the prisoners. Aprisoner is loosed from his chains. First he sees the carved images andthe fire. Then he is led out of the cave into ‘real’ world.Blinded by the light of the sun, he cannot look at the trees, rocks andanimals around him, but instead looks at the shadows and reflections(in water) cast by those objects. As he becomes acclimatized, he turnshis gaze to those objects and finally, fully acclimatized, he looks tothe source of illumination, the sun itself.In the analogy of Cave, corresponding to the physical objects overwhich belief is set are the carved statues in the cave. Correspondingto the ‘using as images what before were imitated’ are thereflections in the pond. If, however, Cave is our guide, thesedematerialized images are generated not from the carved statues butfrom the animals, i.e., the Forms themselves.14. The Development of MindThe Seventh Book continues with the kinds of study conducive to theeducation of the philosopher-ruler (521cff). The goal of intellectualdevelopment is knowledge of Forms, ultimately acquired throughdialectic. Dialectic, however, is practiced late in life by a selectfew with the requisite memory and quickness of mind, after they havestudied various, essentially mathematical disciplines. The winnowingprocess eliminates most people from ever developing the necessities forphilosophical thought. The first steps (523a-525a) in the turn towardsabstract thinking are occasioned by the need for the mind to settlequestions arising from ordinary perception; that is, the mind ofeveryman is liable to be summoned to reflect upon the confused, andconfusing, reports of perception. About a host of perceptual qualities,thick, thin, hard, soft, large and small, the senses report that theyare the same, at least in certain perceptual circumstances. Lumped inwith these properties is also number. The mind is summoned to settlewhat is large and what is small, and what is one.The brief discussion of the summoners raises suspicions about thefaculty psychology presented in the final argument of Book V and inLine and Cave. It seems at times that Plato thinks that belonging toeach part of the soul are capacities or faculties capable of issuingjudgments (cf. 602c-603a).[45] So, for instance, there are the judgmentsof sense that can and often do conflict with the judgments of reason.But taken literally, if each faculty has its own objects such that noother faculty can be set over them, then there can be no conflict injudgments. The case of perception poses a special difficulty.Perception, unlike discursive thought or belief, is aligned not withthe so-called rational part of the soul, but with the desiderativepart. As we saw in the Phaedo, as well as in the passagesabout the sightlovers and the summoners, the senses are disparaged as asource of confusion and falsehood. The senses mislead us. One ofPlato's complaints seems to be that people rely on perception, orbelief relying on perception, with the result that they come to thinkthat what is real is the physical, sensible world. And, perhaps evenworse, they come to think that one can understand (know) things aboutthe world such as what makes (for example) a temple beautiful or astick equal or a person large by appealing to properties that areperceptual or observational or sensible.Proponents of the thesis that Plato posits Forms only for incompleteproperties locate the problem for the sensible world not in the objectsthemselves, but in the kinds of explanations that sightlovers andnon-philosophers rely on to justify their claim to know (propositionsabout) the sensible, material world.[46] It need not be thecase, as the predicative reading in terms of objects would have it,that a given temple is and is not- beautiful. In their view, theproblem is the sensible property types cited by the sight-lovers intheir accounts of what makes something beautiful. For example, there isthe sensible property type, bright-color, that allegedly explains whythe temple at Bassae is beautiful. But, bright-color itself, theproperty type, is and is not-beautiful, for it accounts for beauty insome things but accounts for ugliness (not-beauty) in others. Thecrucial text for this reading is 479d3-5: “So we have discovered,apparently, that most people's varying standards (nomima) ofbeauty and things like that are rattling around somewhere in themiddle, between what is not something and what purely and simply issomething” (Ferrari/Griffith trans.) The veridical readingtranslates nomima as ‘beliefs’ and contends thatbecause most people rely on sensible property types as thejustification for their beliefs, they are condemned to live in therealm of belief. For, according to this reading, every sensibleproperty type suffers from this compresence of opposites, i.e., isF and not-F. In appealing to such properties in theiraccounts, the sight lover can never be justified in any of his beliefsabout the many beautifuls, because their accounts or reasons for theirbeliefs about the world must be false. Hence, the sightlover can haveonly beliefs about the many beautifuls, or equals, or for anyincomplete property F, the many fs. The sight-lovercan never achieve knowledge so long as he relies on sensible propertiesin his accounts. And since Plato thinks that there is knowledge, heinfers, says the veridical reading, that there must be non-sensibleobjects, or rather there must be accounts or explanations availablewhich can be phrased in terms of ‘non-sensible’ properties,i.e., must appeal to properties which are not both Fand not-F, or more precisely, do not make some things, saybeautiful, and others ugly.The veridical reading, combined with the account that limits Formsto incomplete properties (See §6, supra), allows for thepossibility that the philosopher can have knowledge of the visiblerealm. This can come about for at least two reasons. On the one hand,there will be a host of non-sensible properties and propositions aboutordinary particulars and such properties, e.g., ‘Socrates is aman’. Since arguably Plato thinks that Socrates is completely oressentially a man, and since there is no Form of Man, the philosopher(and, perhaps, anyone) can know such a proposition. On the other hand,the philosopher, once he comes to know the Forms of the IncompleteProperties, can then have knowledge of the external world in any andall respects. Not misled by the compresent opposite properties, andable to base all his accounts on the Good and the other Forms, nothingstands in his way of knowing the material world (520c).[47]The predicative reading of the argument of Book V and the analogiesof the central books does not limit the range of Forms and does notcommit itself to the possibility of knowledge of the external world. Ifone treats the physical world as metaphysically defective, asvictimized in any and every respect by its being and not-being, thenthat suffices to preclude one from knowing anything about such a world.The objects of the physical world are simply not the right sorts ofthings to qualify as objects of knowledge, regardless of what sorts ofreasons or justifications or explanations one has at her disposal.Regardless of the epistemic status of the physical world, one taskis to understand how Plato thinks the transition is made from one'sperceptions and beliefs about the physical world to knowledge of theForms. In the Republic, Socrates says that every human beingis capable of becoming a philosopher and thus able to know the Good andall the Forms (518c). On the other hand, the Republic leaveslittle doubt that Plato expects that few will actually achieve theknowledge each is capable of. Most of us will give in to the ordinarybeliefs generated through our perceptual encounters with the sensibleworld, as well as those resulting from the conversations we have withone another. Most will never even begin, it seems, the course of studyoutlined in Book VII, and most of those who begin will not becomedialectically sophisticated so that they can give an account of whatthey know that will ‘destroy the hypotheses’. But despitethe odds, from the Phaedo and Republic we can locatetwo elements of Plato's epistemological program that can lead toknowledge if properly exercised, recollection and the method ofhypothesis. The latter is mentioned explicitly in the Phaedoand seems again to be alluded to in Plato's remarks about thedifferences between the top two sections of line. Since this method,assuming that it is the same in both, appears to be deployed as part ofthe final stages of the pursuit of knowledge, there is reason topostpone consideration of the method until after consideration ofperception and belief, i.e., the first two stages of Line.The Phaedo's discussion of Recollection suggests that thereis something inherently flawed with empiricist or abstractionistaccounts, at least those that attempt to derive any concept from ourcontacts, perceptual or linguistic, with the external world. It seemsthat Plato thinks that the deficiency of the external, sensible,material world vitiates all efforts to build or acquire concepts fromit. The deficiency of the sensible material world makes it anunreliable source of information. Depending on how one accounts forthis deficiency, the trouble for perception, and belief based onperception, is explained in different ways. Aristotle's accountemphasizes that it is changing. Another source of difficulty is thatthe abstract, general Forms are always manifested in a concrete,determinate fashion (See §7, supra). The Affinity Argumentpoints to the complexity of material particulars. Rather than present asingle property, as it were, to perception, perception is required tofocus on some aspect of the complex particular. If it is also true thatat least with respect to some properties, namely the incomplete orrelative properties addressed by the Compresence accounts, every objectis both F and not-F, then no sensible will be anunqualified bearer of these properties. Perception, considered in itsown right, seems to be unable to explain how any feature of an objectis selected for study. It also seems that Plato thinks that thepsychological faculties of perception, or even belief, are incapable ofprocessing the information in a reliable manner, or at least in amanner requisite for knowledge. At times it seems that they distort oralter perceptions (Phaedo, 65ff). At other times, e.g., whenwe emphasize the difference between the faculties, it seems that theyare confined to work on whatever they process in such a manner thatthey do not pass along anything to the rational faculty, or if they do,they pass it along to belief. One problem is that whenever one engagesin perception, and belief based on perceptual reports, one can neverovercome the inherently perspectival situation. For instance, no matterwhere one is situated, the round penny will appear to the eye, we mightsay, somewhat elliptical. Or, to use Plato's example from Book Ten, thestraight stick in water will seem bent (owing to the laws ofrefraction), even though an experienced person will believe that it isstraight (602c-603a).[48]15. The Method of HypothesisHowever we account for the inadequacy of perception the task remainsto explore how we get from perception, which stimulates therecollective process, to belief and eventually to recollect orotherwise know Forms. Plato is less than forthcoming about how onemoves from one stage to the next. The elenctic method probably playssome role in advancing one's understanding, especially the step fromperception to belief. At a certain point, we naturally begin to offerreasons for our beliefs. The elenchus questions our reasons, typicallyby revealing an inconsistency in our accounts of why we believe what wedo. But we can also place Plato in a tradition that seeks a systematicexplanation of the natural phenomena. One aim of the Presocratics, asSocrates narrates in the Phaedo (95a4ff), is to find a singleexplanation, or a single kind of explanation, to save the phenomena.Socrates complains that the Presocratics had mistakenly looked tomaterial causes. Such explanations fail to meet minimal standards: thesame explanation (aitia) accounts for opposite phenomena,e.g., ‘by a head’ explains both why something is tall andsomething else is short; or sometimes the same phenomenon is subject toexplanations by opposite causes, being two by ‘division andaddition.’ However, Socrates reports, Anaxagoras' nod towardsMind was at least a step in the right direction (though Anaxagorasfailed to follow the path). The best account is teleological in nature,in terms of the Good. Thus the Phaedogestures at the criticalrole assigned to this Form in the Republic. In thePhaedo Plato begs off from directly investigating the natureof the good or teleological explanations. Instead he turns to what hedescribes as a method of hypothesis, the first of which is thehypothesis of Forms as causes (see §2 supra), and its‘first corollary’, that particulars are/come-to-be whateach is in virtue of partaking in Forms.Precisely what the connection is between the Phaedo'smethod of hypothesis (99eff) and the Republic's remarks onhypothesis and the ascent to an unhypothetical first principal is asubject of controversy. Equally controversial is its connection withinthe Phaedo to the method of recollection and to philosophicalpractice in general. In attempting to study what there is(onta), Socrates says that he shrinks from things(erga) to concentrate on propositions/accounts(logoi), which he denies are more images (of what there is)than the physical things: “I started in this manner: taking as myhypothesis in each case the theory that seemed to me most compelling, Iwould consider as true, about cause and everything else, whateveragreed with this, and as untrue whatever did not agree.”(99e-100a). Since the hypothesis of Forms is offered next, with itscorollary of participating particulars, it would seem that thelogoiare opinions about Forms. These logoi are to betreated as provisional. Socrates' is the strongest logos andthe safest, in explicit contrast to the wise explanations of others.From the examples provided, it seems that ‘agreement’ hereis not a notion of entailment or logical consequence. Rather, Platodirects us to posit initially a general hypothesis and to determinewhether there are particular cases within the target domain -- here thecause of generation and destruction -- that are inconsistent with,i.e., not adequately explained by, it.[49]Complicating matters is Plato's additional remark that one needsalso to examine the initial hypothesis to see whether there are‘higher’ hypotheses that account for it:But you would cling to the safety of your own hypothesisand give that answer. If someone then attacked your hypothesis itself,you would ignore him and would not answer until you had examinedwhether the consequences that follow from it agree with one another orcontradict one another. And when you must give an account of yourhypothesis itself you will proceed in the same way: You assume anotherhypothesis, the one which seems to you best of the higher ones untilyou come to something acceptable. (101d)Since the initial hypothesis is the theory of Forms, it is uncertainwhat Plato has in mind in mentioning hypotheses ‘higher’than the theory or what sort of test he has in mind. The elencticpractice of Socrates would determine whether other accounts areconsistent with one another. But that still leaves the question ofhigher hypotheses unanswered. One temptation here is to think that theteleological account of the Good is the higher/est hypothesis. Whilethis may well be so, there are perhaps intermediate accounts betweenthe full-blown teleology of the Good -- an account that Platosteadfastly throughout his writings refuses to provide -- and theinitial statement of the theory of Forms and its corollary ofparticipation.[50] These intermediate stages might then beviewed as different accounts of the nature of Forms, the nature ofparticulars and of the participation relation itself. For instance,Aristotle might offer a different account of ‘Forms’ thanPlato, one that espouses an immanent realism wherein some particularsmight be said to have essential properties. Or, looking to the cleverexplanations that follow, where perhaps Forms of Fire and Heat, Coldand Snow or Three and Odd are linked, one might ponder whether Formsare indeed utterly simple or monoeidetic, in contrast to an account ofForms in which they may bear a special relation to their essence --Three is what it is to be three -- and a different relation to anotherproperty, e.g. oddness. Seen in this light, the Theory of Forms in thePhaedo(and Republic) is hypothetical or provisional,awaiting a defense in which the nature of Forms, the role of the Goodand the relations between Forms are examined.When one turns from the Phaedo to the Republic,the notion of hypothesis appears in the two ‘upper’segments of the line. They are distinguished in part by the fact thatthose considering their subject matter dianoetically still make use ofhypotheses, whereas those using nous have arrived at anunhypothetical first principle and descending the line have destroyedthe hypotheses. It seems that the mathematicians, for example, usediscursive thought because they assume the starting points, i.e., theaxioms or definitions, of their sciences. In this respect, they arelike Socrates of the Phaedo positing the Forms to explaingeneration and corruption. In Plato's hands, scientific inquiry seemsto emerge from reflection on the everyday material world. The step fromconviction to dianoia, however, is taken by far fewerindividuals than those who step from eikasia toconviction.The move from the second to the third level crosses the barrierbetween the visible and the intelligible. One derives ‘images'from the objects of pistis or considers them differently,developing different propositions about what one previously took forgranted. Perhaps the scientist describes these images in non-sensibleterms, or perhaps he regards the ‘image of triangle’ apartfrom the particular, determinate angles or lengths that even any imagemust have -- he abstracts away these features, treating the abstractimage as applying to all triangles. Or, similarly, the objects ofdianoiaand nous may be identical: the philosopherthinks about them differently from the scientist. If one assumes thathere Forms are first posited, as seems required if we are to understandthe descent from nousto secure the Forms, then the objects ofdianoia and pistis cannot be the same. For the latterare not Forms but ordinary particulars. We can then explain‘destroying the hypotheses' as similar to what, in thePhaedo, was described as finding the higher logoi.The initial strongest hypothesis, i.e., the Theory of Forms, is thenrendered non-hypothetical when, and only when, the philosopher hasdetermined which of the many accounts of the general nature ofForms, e.g., immanent vs. transcendent realism, simple versus complexForms, the nature of the Good and its relation to others forms, isbest. The same route would secure the hypotheses of the sciences, i.e.,the various interpretations of the objects of the sciences would beeliminated leaving only that one justified by the theory of Forms. Thepeculiar properties or axioms of the individual sciences would remainthe provenance of the scientists. Dialectic or understanding wouldconcern how we are to think about the nature of those properties andthe structure of the sciences.16. ConclusionThe images of the central books do not settle the question ofwhether or not the objects of the different faculties are the same. Inappealing to a contents analysis, fundamentally an analysis that takespropositions to be the contents or ‘objects’ of belief andknowledge, as opposed to the objects themselves, i.e., materialparticulars or Forms, one allows that there is a path from belief toknowledge. The same proposition can be believed or known, depending onone's reasons or justification for holding the belief. But a contentsanalysis is not committed to a justified true belief account ofall knowledge. It is left open that knowledge of Forms issomehow basic. Descending the line furnishes justification for theclaims of the dianoetic sciences and beliefs about the material world,including the states of affairs in actual cities. What to do about thebasic knowledge of Forms is a key issue. Sun, Line and Cave suggest tomany readers that knowledge of Forms is intuitive or acquaintance-like.On the other hand, the refrain that one who knows can give an account(logos) of what he knows suggests knowledge by description ora propositional analysis. To emphasize relations between Forms,starting from the relation of the Good to all Forms, lends credence tothe view that Plato is an epistemological holist. Holism is fueled bythe search for definitions, since in order to know what, for instance,Human is, one must know all the elements of its definition, Animal,Rationality, Bipedality, and thus the definition of these elements, andso on. In order to know a given Form, one must know all the Forms, anextreme version of holism, or at least one must know all the Forms in agiven science. The results of this analysis, the genera and species ofa given science, are then hypostasized as Forms, nodes in a web or theelements of a field. There is a virtuous circle of justification.Holist readings can also be combined with the narrow reading ofrecollection. The same (token) proposition may well be entertained bythe philosopher as by those who still rely on concepts gleaned fromtheir everyday encounters. Whether or not one knows or believes that‘The triangle has three sides’ depends on what one is doingwith that content or how one is justifying one's belief. The problem isthat if somehow knowing that the triangle has three sides makes‘triangle’ in the statement refer to the Form, whilebelieving that (same?) proposition makes it refer to something else,then the content of the two states is different, and the content of thestates is different because, it seems, the objects of the two statesare different. Or one can try to save one's holism by allowing that thedifferent states of mind cause (the contents of) the propositions to bedifferent. Those who see recollection as an act engaged in only byphilosophers maintain that their concept differs from the empiricallygrounded concept of the non-recollector, the occupant apparently of atleast two of the other three stages of Line. But how one gets from theone concept to the other is unspecified. The concepts are linked by the‘external fact’ that the temple, for instance, participatesin Beauty. The holist program seems to entail that one can continue toadd to beliefs about Beauty, where one is deploying the empiricalconcept, until one in a proper justificatory exercise acquiresall the appropriately related beliefs about properties. Oncethat is accomplished, the philosophical concept is recollected. Itremains open on this account, when one has recollected the Form andthen descends, whether the contents of the philosopher's beliefs aboutthe empirical world use the philosophical or empirical concept.Those who read Plato as subscribing to different objects forKnowledge and Belief also need a story about how one gets from onestage to the next. If we assume that Forms are at work throughout thelearning process, then Plato is best viewed as not identifying the Formwith the propositional contents of his states. The same expressionwill, depending on the state of the agent, have different referents:the images; the material objects; some immaterial, abstractintermediary, or a mathematical in the case of dianoia. On theobjects account, Plato has little to say about the status of theconcepts deployed in thought. The Form of Equality is not the concept.The concept is present throughout the developmental life of the human.Because (knowledge of) the Form is latent in the mind, sensation andeveryday talk are capable of ‘triggering’ the concept. Aselect individual will come to disdain the senses and the materialobjects of the sensible world and try to explain what accounts for thesimilarities present in his experience. The first fundamental moment oftransition seems to be a shift from the many particulars to someabstract general notion, an inchoate ‘one-over-many’. Thatshe is able to isolate these ‘ones' at all is, according to thebroad reading of recollection, due to the unconscious operation orinfluence of the Form that allows her to sort the perceptions intokinds. The ontological status of these kinds is not, as yet, clear toher. With the further development of her dialectical capacity, thephilosopher-to-be comes to think that there are Forms; that is, comesto think that there are special entities variously related toparticulars and property-instances. The objects of these beliefs arestill not the Forms themselves, if the state of mind of the scientistor Phaedan hypothesizer is not yet knowledge. At this stage, or evenearlier, one might even be in possession of the definition of the Formand still not have knowledge. Exactly why one lacks knowledge is hardto say. It is not, it seems, because he lacks beliefs about therelation the Forms bear to other mathematical notions. On the one hand,it is doubtful that Plato believes that one can know all of mathematicsor that one can know what a triangle is only if one knows every othershape. On the other hand, the mathematician does seem to know as muchas would be needed to qualify as having knowledge of the mathematicalForms. The philosopher is not said to know more mathematics than themathematician. He secures his knowledge in way the mathematician can'tor doesn't.If ‘more truths’ are added to the truths in thepossession of the mathematician, these can only be truths about thenature of Forms. These higher logoi will then be generalmetaphysical principles about the role of the Good, the simplicity orcomplexity of Forms, the specification of the participation relationand so on (not a trivial ‘and so on’. ) Plato does thenplace fantastically high demands on knowledge. The desire to ensureirrefutability, perhaps the legacy of reflection on the Socraticelenchus, drives him to the conclusion that one really has recollectedthe Form only when one has become a metaphysician. She need (only!)know the general metaphysical theory.There is little reason to think that Plato espouses a holism ofknowledge of the sort discussed above. Plato never says that themathematician or the philosopher needs to know all the truthsof mathematics or ethics to know some Form. Moreover, while Plato doesprescribe a course of study in the Republicdesigned to promoteone's dialectical abilities, and while it is agreed by both holists andintuitionists, those who allow for atomic or acquaintance-likeknowledge of a Form, that t | |
