Lord Shaftesbury [Anthony Ashley Cooper, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury] (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Cite this entry Search the SEP • Advanced Search • Tools • RSS FeedTable of Contents• What's New• Archives• Projected ContentsEditorial Information• About the SEP• Editorial Board• How to Cite the SEP• Special CharactersSupport the SEPContact the SEP ©Metaphysics Research Lab,CSLI,Stanford University  Open access to the SEP is made possible by a world-wide funding initiative. Please Read How You Can Help Keep the Encyclopedia FreeLord Shaftesbury [Anthony Ashley Cooper, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury]First published Wed Mar 13, 2002; substantive revision Thu Oct 12, 2006Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, lived from 1671to 1713. He was one of the most important philosophers of his day, andexerted an enormous influence throughout the eighteenth and nineteenthcenturies on British and European discussions of morality, aesthetics,and religion.Shaftesbury's philosophy combined a powerfully teleological approach,according to which all things are part of a harmonious cosmic order,with sharp observations of human nature (see section 2 below).Shaftesbury is often credited with originating the moral sense theory,although his own views of virtue are a mixture of rationalism andsentimentalism (section 3). While he argued that virtue leads tohappiness (section 4), Shaftesbury was a fierce opponent ofpsychological and ethical egoism (section 5) and of the egoisticsocial contract theory of Hobbes (section 6). Shaftesbury advanced aview of aesthetic judgment that was non-egoistic and objectivist, inthat he thought that correct aesthetic judgment was disinterested andreflected accurately the harmonious cosmic order (section7). Shaftesbury's belief in an harmonious cosmic order also dominatedhis view of religion, which was based on the idea that the universeclearly exhibits signs of perfect divine design (section 8). Accordingto Shaftesbury, the ultimate end of religion, as well as of virtue,beauty, and philosophical understanding (all of which are turn out tobe one and the same thing), is to identify completely with theuniversal system of which one is a part.1. Shaftesbury's Life and Works2. Shaftesbury's View of Human Nature: Teleology and Observation3. Shaftesbury's View of Virtue: Moral Sentimentalism and Moral Rationalism4. Virtue and Happiness5. Attacks on Egoism6. Attacks on Social Contract Theory and Defense of Political Liberty7. Aesthetics8. ReligionBibliography Shaftesbury's Works Secondary Literature Other Internet ResourcesRelated Entries1. Shaftesbury's Life and WorksShaftesbury lived from 1671 to 1713. His grandfather, the first Earlof Shaftesbury, oversaw Shaftesbury's early upbringing, and put JohnLocke in charge of his education. Shaftesbury would eventually come todisagree with many aspects of Locke's philosophy (such as the latter'sempiricism, his social contract theory, and what Shaftesbury perceivedto be his egoism), but Locke was clearly a crucially importantinfluence on Shaftesbury's philosophical development, and the tworemained friends until Locke's death.Shaftesbury served in Parliament and the House of Lords, but illhealth curtailed his political career when he was 30 years old. Fromthen on, he concentrated his energies on his philosophical and literarywritings.The first work Shaftesbury published was an edited collection ofsermons by Benjamin Whichcote, which came out in 1698. Shaftesburywrote an unsigned preface to the sermons in which he praisedWhichcote's belief in the goodness of human beings and urged hisreaders to use Whichcote's “good nature” as an antidote tothe poisonous egoism of Hobbes and the pessimistic supralapsarianismof the Calvinists.In 1699, John Toland published an early version of Shaftesbury'sInquiry concerning Virtue or Merit (IVM). But Shaftesburyrenounced this version of the Virtue or Merit, claiming thatit was produced without his authorization.Most of the works for which Shaftesbury is famous were written between1705-1710. It was during this period that he rewrote the Inquiryconcerning Virtue or Merit and completed versions of A Letterconcerning Enthusiasm (LCE), Sensus Communis: An Essay on theFreedom of Wit and Humour (SC), The Moralists (M) andSoliloquy, or Advice to an Author (SA).In 1711, he collected his mature works into a single volume and addedto them extensive notes and commentary, naming the bookCharacteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times (C). Herevised the Characteristics over the course of the next twoyears, up until his death in 1713. A revised edition came out in1714.The Characteristics is a remarkable volume. It covers agreat many topics, ranging freely over morality, art, politics,religion, aesthetics, culture and politeness, and it is written in manydifferent styles, including epistles, soliloquies, dialogues andtreatises. The overarching goal of the book, as Klein has put it in hisvery helpful introduction, is to make its readers “effectiveparticipants in the world” (C viii). Shaftesbury saw theCharacteristics as an exercise in practical (and not merelyspeculative) philosophy — as a work that would make people bothhappier and more virtuous. (See M part 1, section 1.)The Characteristics was extremely popular in Britain andEurope throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It was abook that was closely studied by numerous philosophers and artists, aswell as widely read by educated people in general.In addition to the Characteristics, there are two otherposthumous collections of Shaftesbury's writings: the SecondCharacteristics, which is concerned chiefly with the visual arts,and Shaftesbury's philosophical notebooks, which Rand collectedin The Life, Unpublished Letters and Philosophical Regimen ofAnthony, Earl of Shaftesbury (LUP). The notebooks are particularlyinteresting, as they offer a view of Shaftesbury's private ruminationsand his profound commitment to elements of Stoicism.2. Shaftesbury's View of Human Nature: Teleology and ObservationShaftesbury's view of human nature was both teleological andobservation-based. Indeed, he believed that teleology and observationmust go hand-in-hand — that accurate observation of humanpsychology requires a teleological conception of humanity, and that oneneeds to observe human beings to learn about the human telos. He wasvery critical of philosophers who examined human beings without placingtheir findings within a teleological context, comparing them to someonewho examines the individual parts of a watch without taking intoaccount the purpose for which the watch was designed: just as thelatter person will never come to a proper understanding of the watch,Shaftesbury argued, so too the former will never come to a properunderstanding of human nature. Shaftesbury thought that Descartes andLocke were guilty of this narrow, non-teleological type ofphilosophizing. (See SA part 2, section 1; IVM book 1, part 2,section 1; M part 2, section 4.)3. Shaftesbury's View of Virtue: Moral Sentimentalism and Moral RationalismShaftesbury, like most teleologically-minded philosophers, held thatthe end or telos of human nature is virtue, and much of his writing isdevoted to an explication of his conception of virtue. The account ofvirtue Shaftesbury proposes has often been taken to be the origin ofmoral sentimentalism, which Hutcheson and Hume would later develop. Butwhile there are parts of Shaftesbury's account of virtue that areundeniably sentimentalist, there are also rationalist elements thatdefy the sentimentalist label.To understand Shaftesbury's account of virtue, we must firstexamine his account of goodness. Something is good, according toShaftesbury, if it contributes to the “existence orwell-being” of the system of which it is a part (C168). Every animal, for instance, is a part of itsspecies. So a particular animal, say a tiger, is a good member ofits species — it's a good tiger — if it contributesto the well-being of the tiger species as a whole. There is also“a system of all animals,” which consists of the“order” or “economy” of all the differentanimal species (C 169). So a good animal is one thatcontributes to the well-being of “animal affairs” ingeneral (Ibid). The system of all animals, moreover, works withthe system “of vegetables and all other things in this inferiorworld” to constitute “one system of a globe or earth”(Ibid). So something is a good earthly thing if it contributes tothe existence of earthly things in general. And the system ofthis earth is itself part of a “universal system” or“a system of all things” (Ibid). So to be“wholly and really” good a thing must contribute to theexistence of the universe as a whole (Ibid). This progression ofever-larger systems is a bit dazzling, and we might wonder how we canever know (or even make sense of) whether something is contributing tothe well-being of the universe as a whole. But Shaftesbury avoidsthis problem by discussing in detail only that which makes “asensible creature” a good member of its species — byfocusing on whether an individual creature is promoting the well-beingof its species (C 169). Perhaps Shaftesbury believed that acreature that contributes to the well-being of its species will alsoalways contribute to the well-being of the universe as a whole, inwhich case being a good member of one's species would beequivalent to being “wholly and really” good. (SeeIVM book 1, part 2, section 1)Shaftesbury goes on to say that the goodness or evilness of asensible creature is based on the creature's motives, and notsimply on the results of the creature's actions (C169). Andhe then makes a crucial claim: every motive to action involvesaffection or passion (C 173, 177-79, 193). Reason alone,Shaftesbury maintains, cannot motivate. This claim clearly anticipatessome of the most influential anti-rationalist arguments of Hutchesonand Hume. (See IVM book 1, part 2, section 3; IVM book 1, part 2,section 4; IVM book 1, part 3, section 1; IVM book 2, part 1, section1.)Also crucial is the distinction Shaftesbury draws between goodness andvirtue. Goodness is something that is within the reach of all sensiblecreatures, not only humans but also non-human animals, such astigers. This is because a creature is good if its affections promotethe well-being of the system of which it is a part, and non-humananimals are just as capable of possessing this type of affection ashumans. “Virtue or merit,” on the other hand, is withinthe reach of “man only” (C 172). And that is becausevirtue or merit is tied to a special kind of affection that onlyhumans possess. This special kind of affection is a second-orderaffection, an affection that has as its object another affection. Wehumans experience these second-order affections because we, unlikenon-human animals, are conscious of our own passions. Not only do wepossess passions, but we also reflect on or become aware of thepassions we have. And when we reflect on our own passions, we developfeelings about them. Imagine, for instance, you feel the desire tohelp a person in distress. In addition to simply feeling that desire,you may also become aware that you are feeling that desire. And whenyou become aware of that, you may experience a positive feeling (or“liking”) towards your desire to help. Or imagine you feelthe desire to harm a person who has bested you in a faircompetition. In addition to simply feeling the desire to harm, you mayalso become aware that you are feeling that desire. And when youbecome aware of that, you may experience a negative feeling (or“dislike”) towards your desire to harm. These are thekinds of phenomena Shaftesbury has in mind when he says that“the affections of pity, kindness, gratitude and theircontraries, being brought into the mind by reflection, becomeobjects. So that, by means of this reflected sense, there arisesanother kind of affection towards those very affections themselves,which have been already felt, and are now become the subject of a newliking or dislike” (C 172). (See IVM book 1, part 2, section3.)Shaftesbury calls this capacity to feel second-order affections the“sense of right and wrong” or the “moralsense” (C 179-80). The moral sense is that which produces in usfeelings of “like” or “dislike” for our own(first-order) affections. When the moral sense is operating properly,it produces positive feelings towards affections that promote thewell-being of humanity and negative feelings towards affections thatdetract from the well-being of humanity. The second-order feelingsthat the moral sense produces can themselves motivate one toaction. And people are virtuous if they act from those second-orderfeelings. In contrast, non-human animals, because they lack the powersof reflection necessary for consciousness of their own affections, donot possess a moral sense. So non-human animals are incapable ofachieving virtue (C 175). (See IVM book 1, part 2, section 3.)Also in line with sentimentalist moral theory is Shaftesbury'sdiscussion of how a person can come to lose his or her sense of rightand wrong. He argues (in a manner that anticipates Hume) that becauseour sense of morality is a sentiment, it can be opposed only by anothersentiment, and not by reason or belief. “Sense of right andwrong,” he writes, “therefore being as natural to usas natural affection itself, and being a first Principle in ourconstitution and make, there is no speculative opinion, persuasion orbelief which is capable immediately or directly to exclude or destroyit… [T]his affection being an original one of earliest rise inthe soul or affectionate part, nothing beside contrary affection, byfrequent check and control, can operate upon it, so as either todiminish it in part, or destroy it in the whole” (C 179). (SeeIVM book 1, part 3, section 1.)But while Shaftesbury claims that human moral judgment and humanvirtue essentially involve affection, he does not believe that allvalue depends on human affections. Goodness, which is the basis ofmorality and virtue, is an objective property, one that is independentof all human minds, and it is reason that can inform us of what thatproperty consists. Goodness is real eternal and immutable, notsomething created by will, command, opinion, custom, or socialcontract. So even if every member of society were to approve ofsomething harmful to humanity, it would still be vicious. For thatwhich is destructive of the species can never be “virtue of anykind or in any sense but must remain still horrid depravity,notwithstanding any fashion, law, custom or religion which may be illand vicious itself but can never alter the eternalmeasures and immutable independent nature of worth andvirtue” (C 175). Fashion, law, custom, and religion cancause people to develop positive affections towards things harmful tohumanity. But the development of such affections will never make suchthings right. The “eternal Measures” of right andwrong are not constituted by human affections. Right and wrong have an“immutable independent nature.” And we are virtuousjust to the extent that our affections lead us to act in accord withthese eternal and immutable moral truths. (See LCE section 4; SC part1, section 6; SC part 2, section 1; SC part 3, section 1; SC part 3,section 2; SA part 3; IVM book 1, part 2, section 1; IVM book 1, part3, section 2; M part 2, section 2; M part 2, section 3; M part 2,section 4.)In Shaftesbury's account of virtue, then, reason and sentimentboth play essential roles. A person is virtuous if and only ifher actions flow from the properly functioning moral sentiments. And reason tells us that moral sentiments are functioning properly ifand only if they promote the well-being of the species as a whole. Shaftesbury's “sense of right and wrong” is truly asentiment, but it is a sentiment that accurately represents anobjective reality — i.e., a reality that is independent of humansentiments.4. Virtue and HappinessShaftesbury maintained that virtue promotes the good of allhumankind. As he says, “To love the public, to study universalgood, and to promote the interest of the whole world, as far as lieswithin our power, is surely the height of goodness” (C 20). Oras he puts it elsewhere, the virtuous person is the one who strives todevelop an “equal, just and universal friendship” with allhumankind (C 256). This view of the content of virtue — that tobe virtuous is to promote the good of all humankind — fits wellwith Shaftesbury's teleological approach. For he believes thateverything is designed to promote the good of the system of which itis a part. And he also believes that every human being is a part ofthe system that is the human species as a whole. It is natural for himto think, therefore, that every human being is designed to promote thegood of the human species as a whole. (It is important to remember,however, that this view of a system and its parts explains onlyShaftesbury's view of the content of goodness, which is something thatnon-humans can also attain. Virtue or merit, which humans alone canattain, involves not merely acting for the good of the system butperforming such actions in a self-aware or reflective manner.) Shaftesbury also consistently maintains that in addition to promotingthe good of humanity, virtue promotes the happiness of the virtuousperson him or herself, and that vice harms not only humanity as awhole but also the vicious person. As Shaftesbury puts it,“virtue and interest may be found at last to agree” (C167). Or as he says in the conclusion of the Inquiry,“And thus virtue is the good and vice the ill of everyone”(C 229-330). (See SC section 3; IVM book 2; M part 2).This coincidence of virtue and happiness is just what Shaftesbury'steleological approach should lead us to expect. For teleologicalthinking generally involves the idea that the best life for a being isone that fulfills the being's natural end or purpose, and beingvirtuous is the end or purpose for which humans were designed. Shaftesbury corroborates this teleological connection between virtueand happiness by investigating the pleasures and pains of which humanhappiness and unhappiness consist. He begins this investigation bydrawing a broad distinction between pleasures of the body andpleasures of the mind. He next contends that a person's happinessdepends more on mental pleasures than on bodily pleasures. And he thenseeks to show that living virtuously is by far the best way to gainthe crucially important mental pleasures. Shaftesbury bases much ofhis argument for the connection between virtue and happiness on theidea that the mental pleasures are within one's own control, insulatedfrom the vicissitudes of “fortune, age, circumstances andhumour” (C 334). As one of Shaftesbury's characters rhetoricallyasks, “How can we better praise the goodness of Providence thanin this, ‘That it has placed our happiness and good in things wecan bestow upon ourselves’?” (C 335). The importanceShaftesbury places on our control over our mental pleasures growsdirectly out of his appreciation for the Stoics. Indeed, it can beplausibly maintained that Stoicism is one of the strongest and mostfundamental commitments of Shaftesbury's thought overall. (See SA part3, section 2; IVM book 2; M part 3, section 3.)5. Attacks on EgoismBut although Shaftesbury believed that being virtuous makes a personhappy, it would be wrong to label him an egoist. In fact, he launchedmany attacks on both psychological egoism and ethical egoism, attacksthat had as their main target Hobbes and which clearly anticipated theinfluential anti-egoist arguments in Butler, Hutcheson, and Hume.Shaftesbury argues that psychological egoism does a simply terriblejob of explaining the wide spectrum of observable activities humansengage in. He ridicules, for instance, egoistic interpretations ofthings as “civility, hospitality, humanity towards strangers orpeople in distress,” maintaining that it is much easier toexplain such phenomena simply by positing real sociability andbenevolence (C 55). He points out that humans are often motivated by“passion, humour, caprice, zeal, faction and a thousand othersprings, which are counter to self-interest” (C 54) And hemaintains that the only way psychological egoism can be plausiblymaintained is at the expense of becoming tautologous. (See SC section2; SC section 3; M part 2, section 1.)Against ethical egoism, Shaftesbury argues that virtue can exist onlyif it's possible for people to be motivated by something other thanself-interest. For persons’ virtue, according to Shaftesbury,consists not of the actions they perform but of the motives they havefor performing them. And the motive with which we identify virtue isbenevolence, not self-interest. Shaftesbury emphasizes this point bydrawing attention to the difference between a knave and a saint. Wejudge the saint virtuous, he explains, because we think he ismotivated by something other than the selfishness of the knave. And ifwe came to believe that the saint were motivated solely byself-interest, we would no longer judge him to be virtuous. As he putsit, “If the love of doing good be not of itself a good and rightinclination, I know not how there can possibly be such a thing asgoodness or virtue” (C 46). (See SC part 2, section 3, part 3;SC section 4, part 4, Section 1; SA part 1, section 2; IVM book 2,part 2, section 2; IVM book 2, part 2, section 4.)Shaftesbury's belief that true virtue must flow from non-egoisticmotives leads him to criticize sharply the emphasis many religiousmoralists place on reward and punishment in the afterlife. As one ofhis characters explains when summarizing the goal of the Inquiry,“[The author of the Inquiry] endeavors chiefly toestablish virtue on principles by which he is able to argue with thosewho are not as yet induced to own a god or future state. If he cannotdo thus much, he reckons he does nothing” (C 266). Shaftesburyeschews considerations of the afterlife in his case for virtue becausehe believes that persons who perform virtuous actions only becausethey desire reward and fear punishment have no real virtue in them atall. And persons who are constantly made to dwell on reward andpunishment are likely to become overly concerned with their own“self-good and private interest,” which must“insensibly diminish the affections towards public good or theinterest of society and introduce a certain narrowness ofspirit” (C 184). So an emphasis on reward and punishment cannotmake people more virtuous, and it may very well make them less so (C45-46). (See SC part 3, section 3; IVM book 1, part 3, section 3; Mpart 3, section 3.)Shaftesbury's anti-egoistic view also leads him to an interestingconsideration of what we should say to someone who asks for a reasonto be virtuous when he knows he will not be punished for vice, or, asShaftesbury puts the question, “Why should a man be honest inthe dark?” (C 58). At times Shaftesbury suggests that a personwho asks this question is already lost to virtue — that someonewho cares about virtue for its own sake won't need another reason toact virtuously, and that someone who needs another reason doesn't havewhat it takes to be truly virtuous in the first place. At other times,Shaftesbury suggests that we should be honest even in the dark (i.e.,virtuous even when we will not be punished for vice) because suchconduct is a necessary condition for having an identity or unifiedself at all (C 127). These suggestions of how to deal with thequestion “Why be moral?” are almost certainly antecedentsof Hume's response to the sensible knave at the end of his Enquiryconcerning Morals. (See SC part 3, section 4; SA part 3, section1).It is noteworthy that despite his anti-egoism, Shaftesbury goes togreat lengths to show that the virtuous person will be happier thanthe vicious person (IVM book II). At one point, he justifies thisprocedure by contending that while it is best to act for entirelydisinterested motives, we sometimes might have to rely on interestedconsiderations to induce to morally correct action those people(including ourselves) who are not yet capable of achieving the heightsof virtue. As he puts it, “[W]e ought all of us to aspire, so asto endeavour that the excellence of the object, not the reward orpunishment, should be our motive, but … where, through thecorruption of our nature, the former of these motives is foundinsufficient to excite to virtue, there the latter should be broughtin aid and on no account be undervalued or neglected” (C269). (See IVM book 2; M part 2, section 3.)6. Attacks on Social Contract Theory and Defense of Political LibertyAnother point on which Hume was probably indebted to Shaftesbury wascriticism of social contract theory. Shaftesbury argued that theselfish beings Hobbes described in his state of nature bear noresemblance to humans as they actually are. For naturally, Shaftesburycontended, humans are sociable. And society is thus humankind'snatural condition. “In short, if generation be natural, ifnatural affection and the care and nurture of the offspring benatural, things standing as they do with man and the creature being ofthat form and constitution he now is, it follows that society must bealso natural to him and that out of society and community he neverdid, nor ever can, subsist” (C 287). Shaftesbury also arguedthat if Hobbes's description of an amoral state of nature werecorrect, then it would be impossible for Hobbes ever to establish aduty to obey the laws of society. For if there had been no duty tokeep one's promises in the state of nature, then the original contractcould not have created a duty. And if the original contract did giverise to a duty, then there must have been a duty to keep one'spromises even in the state of nature (C 51). Shaftesbury was not thefirst to criticize social contract theories in this way, but hisversion of this criticism is stated very clearly and was probablyamong the most influential. (See SC part 3, section 1; M part 3,section 4.)Shaftesbury's positive political views emphasized the importance ofliberty. He believed that totalitarianism made citizens less civil andincreased the chances of violent conflict, while greater liberty madecitizens more “polite” and peaceful. He thought,consequently, that government should grant its citizens broad freedomto publish what they wish and practice religion in the way theychoose. (See SC passim; M part 2, Section 3.)7. AestheticsShaftesbury's aesthetic theory was one of the first and mostinfluential produced by an English-speaking philosopher. Beauty, forShaftesbury, is a kind of harmony, proportion, or order. Thereis a sense in which it can be said that Shaftesbury believed thatbeauty is mind-dependent, in that he thought beauty is dependent onthe mind of God, the artist-creator of the universe. But it is clearthat Shaftesbury also thought that beauty is independent of humanminds. The human responses that are the origin of human judgments ofbeauty are not the origin of beauty itself. (See SC part 4, section 3;M part 3, Section 2.)Shaftesbury held that all beauty can be placed in a three-parthierarchy. The lowest order of beauty belongs to “the deadforms” — physical things such as manmade works of artand natural objects (C 323). The second order of beauty belongs tohuman minds, or “the forms which form, that is, whichhave intelligence, action, and operation” (Ibid). Thethird order of beauty belongs to that “which formsnot only such as we call mere forms but even the forms whichform” (Ibid). This highest, most supreme and sovereignbeauty, belongs to God, who has created everything in the world,including human minds. (See M part 1, section 3; M part 2, section 4;M part 3, section 2.)Shaftesbury held that aesthetic appreciation is essentiallydisinterested. There has been some controversy about the sense inwhich Shaftesburean aesthetic judgment can be said to bedisinterested. But it is clear enough that he thought that trueaesthetic appreciation of an object (like the motivation underlyingtrue moral conduct) is independent of any ideas of how the objectmight promote one's own interests. Establishing this non-egoisticposition on aesthetic judgment would also be the main goal ofHutcheson in his Inquiry concerning Beauty. (See M part 3,section 2.)Shaftesbury sometimes maintained that virtue is a species of beauty,or that virtue and beauty are “one and the same.” Hesuggested that the positive reaction we have when observing a moralaction or character is the same as (or one example of) the positivereaction we have when observing the beauty of nature or works of art,and that the motive to act virtuously is the same as (or one exampleof) an artist's motive to create beauty. Shaftesbury also said thatthe virtuous person is one who attempts to make her life a thing ofmoral beauty in the same way that an artist tries to make beautifulworks of art. (See SC part 4, section 3; SA part 3, Section 3; IVMbook 1, part 2, section 3; M part 2, section 1; M part 3, section2.)It is not entirely clear whether Shaftesbury thought that ouraesthetic judgments originated in sentiment or in reason alone. At certain points he suggested the former (C 172-3) and at otherpoints he suggested the latter (C 330-332). It's possible that hisviews on this matter changed over time. However that may be, it'sclear that Shaftesbury thought that our aesthetic judgments originatedin a tendency that is instinctive or natural to all humans. Herefrained from insisting on the “innateness” of thisnatural human tendency because he did not want to become entangled inthe epistemological debate over innate ideas, although there can belittle doubt that his own sympathies were with the anti-empiricistside of this debate. (See M part 3, section 2; LUP 404, 415)But while Shaftesbury held that aesthetic judgment originated in aninstinctive, natural human tendency, he also maintained that oneneeded training in order to make correct aesthetic judgments. A greatdeal of practice and study are needed in order to develop truediscernment or “taste.” The judgment of anaccomplished critic is thus likely to be more natural than thejudgment of an uneducated rustic. (See SA part 1, section 3; SA part2, section 2; SA part 2, section 3; M part 3, section 2;Miscellaneous Reflections (MR) 3.)8. ReligionShaftesbury believed that everything in the world was created by amorally perfect God and that the world God created is the best of allpossible ones. Any evil we observe, according to Shaftesbury, is onlyapparent or subordinate, not real or ultimate. It's no surprise,therefore, that Leibniz said of Shaftesbury's work, “I found init almost all of my Theodicy before it saw the light ofday…. If I had seen this work before my Theodicy waspublished, I should have profited as I ought and should have borrowedits great passages.” (See LCE section 5; M part 1,sections 2; M part 1, section 3; M part 2, section 3; M part 2,section 4.) Shaftesbury based his belief in the existence of God on the argumentfor design (although at one point, C 306, he suggests that it ispossible to give an a priori argument for the existence of God aswell). He emphasized what he took to be the systematic nature of theuniverse. Everything in the universe fits together and works inperfect order, he argued, and so we can only conclude that theuniverse was created by a perfectly ordered, rational mind. Laterversions of the argument from design, such as Paley's, are muchindebted to Shaftesbury, and Hume's attack on the argument in hisDialogues concerning Natural Religion could have been aimedat Shaftesbury's Moralists just as easily as it could havebeen aimed at Butler's Analogy of Religion. (See M part 2,section 4; M part 2, section 5; M part 3, section 1.) Shaftesbury's emphasis on the orderly functioning of theuniverse led him to reject the traditional Christian view ofmiracles. He certainly did not think that miracles were needed toprove the existence of God. And he probably did not think that aperfectly ordered, rational mind, such as God's, wouldcountenance miracles at all, as they constituted a violation of thenatural order. Shaftesbury was somewhat circumspect, however,about issuing an outright denial of the miracles reported in theBible. (See M part 2, section 5.)Shaftesbury was a proponent of natural religion. He denied that humansneed supernatural revelation in order to discover and realize whatconstitutes true religion. And he claimed that the Scriptures are notself-verifying and that we ought to accept only those parts that canwithstand rational scrutiny. (See LCE section 4; SA part 3, section 1;M part 2; M part 2, section 5.)It is difficult to find anything distinctively Christian inShaftesbury's religious views. His theology seems to have more incommon with ancient Greek philosophy than with any specificallyChristian teaching. Shaftesbury was also highly critical of what hetook to be the pernicious moral influence of certain Christian sects(such as Calvinism and other kinds of Puritanism) that emphasized thedepravity of human nature and the jealousy of God. Hemaintained that such religions were a worse moral influence thanatheism, as the former corrupted humans’ moral sentiments whilethe latter neither helped nor harmed the cause of virtue. (See LCEsection 4; LCE section 5; IVM book 1, part 3.)Shaftesbury's natural religion had much in common with the views ofthe English Deists. But he differed from them in holding that theessence of religion is not merely dispassionate belief in a fewrationally-established tenets but a feeling of expansive love for theuniverse as a whole. The truly religious frame of mind, forShaftesbury, is that of reasonable enthusiasm. Shaftesbury took greatpains to distinguish this kind of enthusiasm from false, non-rationalenthusiasm, which leads to superstition, zealotry, fanaticism, andsectarian violence. Shaftesbury's reasonable enthusiasm is exemplifiedby Theocles, the hero of The Moralists, and it unitesShaftesbury's views of aesthetics, religion, and virtue. To trulyappreciate the beauty of the world, for Shaftesbury, is to revere theworld's Creator, which reverence also gives rise to love for all theCreator's creatures. (See LCE, passim; M part 1, section 3; M part 2,section 3; M part 3, section 2.)BibliographyShaftesbury's WorksCCharacteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, edited byLawrence E. Klein, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.LCELetter Concerning Enthusiasm (in C, pp. 4–28).SC Sensus Communis: An Essay on the Freedom of Wit andHumour (in C, pp. 29–69). SASoliloquy, or Advice to an Author (in C, pp. 70–162).IVMInquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit (in C, pp. 163–230).MThe Moralists, a Philosophical Rhapsody (in C, pp. 231–338).MRMiscellaneous Reflections (in C, pp. 339–483).LUPTheLife, Unpublished Letters and Philosophical Regimen of Anthony, Earl ofShaftesbury, edited by Benjamin Rand, London: Swan Sonnenschein,1900.* Second Characters or the Language of Forms by the RightHonourable Anthony, Early of Shaftesbury, edited by BenjaminRand, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1914; reprinted, NewYork: Greenwood Press, 1969.*Preface to Benjamin Whichcote, TheWorks, Volume III, New York & London: Garland Publishing, Inc.,1977.Secondary LiteratureBiography of Shaftesbury with extensive discussion of his thought asa whole:Voitle, Robert, The Third Earl of Shaftesbury 1671-1713,Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 1984.Book length treatment of Shaftesbury's thought as a whole:Grean, Stanley, Shaftesbury's Philosophy of Religion andEthics, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1967.Detailed discussions of many aspects of Shaftesbury's philosophy andits historical context:Darwall, Stephen, The British Moralists and the Internal Ought:1640-1740, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.Schneewind, J. B., The Invention of Autonomy: A History ofModern Moral Philosophy, New York: Cambridge University Press,1998.Gill, Michael B., The British Moralists on Human Nature and theBirth of Secular Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2006.On Shaftesbury's account of morality:Grean, Stanley, “Self-Interest and Public Interest inShaftesbury's Philosophy,” Journal of the History ofPhilosophy, 2 (1964): 37-46.Gill, Michael B., “Shaftesbury's Two Accounts of the Reasonto Be Virtuous,” Journal of the History of Philosophy,38/4 (2000): 529-548.Trianosky, Gregory W., “On the Obligation to be Virtuous:Shaftesbury and the Question, Why be Moral?” Journal of theHistory of Philosophy, 16 (1978): 289-300.On Shaftesbury's view of innate ideas:Carey, Daniel, “Locke, Shaftesbury, and Innateness,”Locke Studies, 4 (2004): 13-45.On Shaftesbury's religious views:Bernstein, John A., “Shaftesbury's Reformation of theReformation: Reflections on the Relation between Deism and PaulineChristianity,” Journal of Religious Ethics, 6 (1978):257-278.Toole, Robert, “Shaftesbury on God and His Relationships to theWorld,” International Studies in Philosophy, 8 (1976):81-100.On Shaftesbury's aesthetics:Glauser, Richard, “Aesthetic Experience inShaftesbury,” Proceedings of the Aristotelians Society,Supplement, 76 (2002): 25-54.McAllister, James W., “Scientists' Aesthetic Judgments,”British Journal of Aesthetics, 31/4 (1991): 332-341.Rind, Miles, “The Concept of Disinterestedness inEighteenth-Century British Aesthetics,” Journal of theHistory of Philosophy, 40 (2002): 67-87.Townsend, Dabney, “Shaftesbury's Aesthetic Theory,”Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 41/2 (1982):205-213.On Shaftesbury's views of personal identity:Winkler, Kenneth P., “‘All Is Revolution in Us’:Personal Identity in Shaftesbury and Hume,” Hume Studies,26/1 (2000): 3-40.Other Internet ResourcesEarl of Shaftesbury entry by , in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (good general account of Shaftesbury's thought).Deism, entry by Francis Aveling in the Catholic Encyclopedia, (on contains paragraphs and subsections on Shaftesbury's relationship to Deism).Francis Hutcheson, first of two sections on Hutcheson in the entry "Scottish Philosophy inthe 18th Century", by Alexander Broadie (University of Glasgow), in this encyclopedia. Benjamin Whichcote, section on Whichcote in the entry "Cambridge Platonists", by Sarah Hutton (Middlesex University), in this encyclopedia. Related Entries aesthetics: British, in the 18th century | contractarianism | creationism | deism | egoism | emotion: 17th and 18th century theories of | Hobbes, Thomas | Hume, David | Locke, John | Stoicism | teleology: teleological arguments for God's existence Copyright © 2006 byMichael B. Gill<gillm@u.arizona.edu> |
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