Libertarianism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Cite this entry Search the SEP • Advanced Search • Tools • RSS FeedTable of Contents• What's New• Archives• Projected ContentsEditorial Information• About the SEP• Editorial Board• How to Cite the SEP• Special CharactersSupport the SEPContact the SEP ©Metaphysics Research Lab,CSLI,Stanford University  Open access to the SEP is made possible by a world-wide funding initiative. Please Read How You Can Help Keep the Encyclopedia FreeLibertarianismFirst published Thu Sep 5, 2002; substantive revision Mon Jul 24, 2006Libertarianism holds that agents initially fully own themselves andhave moral powers to acquire property rights in external things undercertain conditions. It is normally advocated as a theory of justice inthe sense of the duties that we owe each other. So understood, it issilent about any impersonal duties (i.e., duties owed to no one) thatwe may have. Libertarianism can be understood as a basic principle or as aderivative one. For example, one might defend libertarianism on thebasis of rule utilitarianism or rule contractarianism (see, e.g.,Narveson 1988). Here, however, we shall focus on libertarianism as anatural rights doctrine.Libertarianism is often thought of as “right-wing”doctrine. This, however, is mistaken for at least two reasons. First,on social—rather than economic—issues, libertarianismtends to be “left-wing”. It opposes laws that restrictconsensual and private sexual relationships between adults (e.g., gaysex, non-marital sex, and deviant sex), laws that restrict drug use,laws that impose religious views or practices on individuals, andcompulsory military service. Second, in addition to the better-knownversion of libertarianism—right-libertarianism—there isalso a version known as “left-libertarianism”. Both endorsefull self-ownership, but they differ with respect to the powers agentshave to appropriate unappropriated natural resources (land, air,water, etc.). Right-libertarianism holds that typically such resourcesmay be appropriated by the first person who discovers them, mixes herlabor with them, or merely claims them—without the consent ofothers, and with little or no payment to them. Left-libertarianism, bycontrast, holds that unappropriated natural resources belong toeveryone in some egalitarian manner. It can, for example, requirethose who claim rights over natural resources to make a payment toothers for the value of those rights. This can provide the basis for akind of egalitarian redistribution.The best known early statement of (something close to) libertarianismis Locke (1690). The most influential contemporary work is Nozick(1974).1. Self-Ownership2. The Power to Appropriate Natural Resources: Libertarianism, Left and Right3. Enforcement Rights: Prior Restraint and Rectification4. Anarchism and the Minimal State5. Some Miscellaneous Issues 5.1 Non-Autonomous Sentient Beings5.2 Historical Principles and the Real World6. ConclusionBibliographyOther Internet ResourcesRelated Entries1. Self-OwnershipLibertarianism holds that agents are, at least initially, fullself-owners. Agents are (moral) full self-owners just in casethey morally own themselves in just the same way that they can morallyfully own inanimate objects. Full ownership of an entity consists of afull set of the following ownership rights: (1) controlrights over the use of the entity: both a liberty-right to use itand a claim-right that others not use it, (2) rights tocompensation if someone uses the entity without one's permission,(3) enforcement rights (of prior restraint if someone isabout to violate these rights), (4) rights to transfer theserights to others (by sale, rental, gift, or loan), and (5)immunities to the non-consensual loss of these rights. Fullownership is simply a logically strongest set of ownershiprights over a thing.[1] There is some indeterminacy in this notion (since there can be morethan one strongest set of such rights), but there is a determinatecore set of rights (see below).At the core of full self-ownership, then, is full controlself-ownership, the full right to control the use of one'sperson. Something like control self-ownership is arguably needed torecognize the fact there are some things (e.g., various forms ofphysical contact) that may not be done to a person without herconsent, but which may be done with that consent.Full-self ownership is sometimes thought to guarantee that the agenthas a certain basic liberty of action, but this is notso. For if the rest of the world (natural resources and artifacts) isfully (“maximally”) owned by others, one is not permitted todo anything without their consent—since that would involve theuse of their property. The protection that self-ownership affords is abasic protection against others doing certain things to one, but not aguarantee of liberty. Even this protection, however, may be merelyformal. A plausible thesis of self-ownership must allow that somerights (e.g., against imprisonment) may be lost if one violates therights of others. Hence, if the rest of world is owned by others, thenanything one does without their consent violates their propertyrights, and, as a result of such violations, one may lose some or allof one's rights of self-ownership. This point shows that, becauseagents must use natural resources (occupy space, breathe air, etc.),self-ownership on its own has no substantive implications. It is onlywhen combined with assumptions about how the rest of the world isowned (and the consequences of violating those property rights) thatsubstantive implications follow.Let us now consider four important objections to fullself-ownership. One objection is that it permits voluntaryenslavement. For agents have, it claims, not only the right to controlthe use of their person, but also the right to transfer thatright (e.g., by sale or gift) to others. Some libertarians—suchas Rothbard (1982)—deny that such transfer is even possible,since others cannot control one's will. This, however, seems to be amistake, since what is at issue is the moral right to controlpermissible use (by giving or denying permission), not thepsychological capacity to control. Many authors—such as Locke(1690) and Grunebaum (1987)—deny that the rights over oneselfare so transferable, typically on the ground that such transfersundermine one's autonomy. These authors thus reject fullself-ownership, although they endorse a partial form. Those who defendthe right of self-enslavement—Steiner (1994), forexample—typically defend it on the ground (roughly) that theright to exercise one's autonomy is more fundamental than theprotection or promotion of one's autonomy.A second objection to full self-ownership is that it denies thatindividuals have an obligation to perform actions thathelp others, except through voluntary commitment. Some authors whoendorse a form of self-ownership—such as Locke (1690) andGrunebaum (1987)—hold that one's rights of self-control arelimited by an obligation to provide aid to others when the aid isnecessary for their basic survival. Such authors thus reject fullself-ownership. Those who reject the obligation to helpthe needy typically do so on the ground that it induces a form ofpartial slavery.A third substantive objection to full self-ownership is that itincludes a right to make gifts of one's services, and that such gifts,when given from members of an older generation to members of a youngergeneration, can significantly disrupt the conditions of equality ofopportunity. (Note that the right to make gifts of external things isnot at issue here, since it does not follow from full self-ownershipalone.) Those who defend the right of gifts of personal servicesemphasize how gifts of personal services are an essential part ofintimate personal relationships. They also insist that, if a personhas the right to perform an action for his/her own benefit, then shealso has the right to perform it for someone else's benefit. Apossible reply here is that, although the donor may well have thepower to make gifts of her services, others may not have a right tothe full benefit of those services (e.g., the benefits may not beimmune to taxation).A fourth objection to full self-ownership is that it (like rights ingeneral) can lead to inefficient outcomes. Where there areexternalities or public goods (such as police protection), each personmay be better off if some of each person's rights are infringed (e.g.,if each person is required to provide service each week on a policepatrol). Given the problems generated by prisoners' dilemmas and otherkinds of market failure, in large societies it will typically beimpossible to obtain everyone's consent to perform suchservices. Many, however, would argue that it is nonethelesspermissible to force them into providing services (in violation offull self-ownership) as long as everyone benefits appropriately.2. The Power to Appropriate Natural Resources: Libertarianism, Left and RightLibertarianism is committed to full self-ownership. A distinction canbe made, however, between right-libertarianism andleft-libertarianism, depending on the stance taken on hownatural resources can be owned.One possible—but crazy—view holds that initially no onehas any liberty right to use, or any moral power to appropriate,natural resources. A radical (and crazy) version ofjoint-ownership left-libertarianism, for example, holds thatindividuals may use natural resources only with the collective consent(e.g., majority or unanimous) of the members of society. Given thatall action requires the use of some natural resources (land, air,etc.), this leaves agents no freedom of action (except with thepermission of others), and this is clearly implausible. A less radicalversion of joint-ownership left-libertarianism allows that agents mayuse natural resources, but holds that they have no moral power toappropriate natural resources without the collective consent of themembers of society (e.g., Grunebaum 1987). Although this leaves agentsa significant range of freedom of action, it leaves them inadequatesecurity in their plans of action. They have the security that othersare not permitted to use their person (e.g., assault them) withouttheir consent, but they have only limited security in theirpossessions of external things (except with the consent ofothers). Agents are permitted to cultivate and gather apples, butothers are permitted to take them when this violates no rights ofself-ownership (e.g., when they can simply take them from thecollected pile).Given the central importance of security of some external resources,it is implausible that agents have no power to appropriate without theconsent of others. More specifically, it is most implausible to holdthat the consent of others is required for appropriation whencommunication with others is impossible, extremely difficult, orexpensive (as it almost always is). And even when communication isrelatively easy and costless, there is no need for the consent ofothers as long as one appropriates no more than one's fairshare. Joint-ownership left-libertarianism is thus implausible.A plausible account of liberty rights and powers of appropriation overnatural resources must, I claim, be unilateralist in thesense that, under a broad range of conditions (although perhapssubject to various conditions), (1) agents are initially permitted touse natural resources without anyone's consent, and (2) agentsinitially have the power to appropriate (acquire rights over)natural resources without anyone's consent. This is just to say thatinitially natural resources are not protected by a property rule(requiring consent for permissible use or appropriation).According to a unilateralist conception of the power to appropriate,agents who first claim rights over a natural resource acquire thoserights—perhaps provided that certain other conditions aremet. These additional conditions may include some kind of aninteraction constraint (such as that the agent “mixed herlabor” with the resource or that she was the first to discoverthe resource) and some kind of “fair share” constraint. Inwhat follows, for simplicity, I shall ignore the interactionconstraint and focus on the fair share constraint.Let us, then, consider some unilateralist versions oflibertarianism. Radical right libertarianism—such asthat of Rothbard (1978, 1982), Narveson (1988, ch. 7; 1999), and Feser(2005)—holds that that there are no fair share constraints onuse or appropriation.[2] Agents may destroy whatever natural resources they want (as long asthey violate no one's self-ownership) and they have the power toappropriate whatever natural resources they first claim. On this view,natural resources are initially not merely unprotected by a propertyrule (i.e., permissible use does not require anyone's permission);they are also unprotected by a compensation liability rule (i.e., nocompensation is owed if one uses). A main objection to this view isthat no human agent created natural resources, and there is no reasonthat the lucky person who first claims rights over a natural resourceshould reap all the benefit that the resource provides. Nor is thereany reason to think the individuals are morally permitted to ruin ormonopolize natural resources as they please. Some sort of fair sharecondition restricts use and appropriation.Consider Lockean libertarianism, which allows unilateral useand appropriation but requires the satisfaction of some version of theLockean proviso that “enough and as good” be left forothers. Lockean libertarianism views natural resources as initiallyunprotected by any property rule (no consent is needed for use orappropriation) but as protected by a compensation liabilityrule. Those who use natural resources, or claim rights over them, owecompensation to others for any costs imposed.Nozickean right-libertarianism—such as that of Nozick(1974)—interprets the Lockean proviso as requiring that noindividual be made worse off by the use or appropriation of a naturalresource compared with non-use or non-appropriation.[3] Many would object that this sets the compensation payment too low. Itbases compensation on each person's reservation price, whichis the lowest payment that would leave the individualindifferent with non-use or non-appropriation. Use or appropriation ofnatural resources typically brings significant benefits even afterproviding such compensation. There is little reason, many would argue,to hold that those who first use or claim rights over a naturalresource should reap all the excess benefits that those resourcesprovide.Sufficientarian (centrist) libertarianism—such assomething in the spirit of the quasi-libertarian Simmons (1992,1993)—interprets the Lockean proviso as requiring that others beleft an adequate share of natural resources (on some conception of adequacy).[4] There are different criteria that might be invoked for adequacy, butthe most plausible ones are based on the quality of one's lifeprospects: enough for life prospects worth living, enough for basicsubsistence life prospects, or enough for “minimally decent”life prospects. Depending on the nature of the world and theconception of adequacy, the sufficientarian proviso may be more, orless, demanding than the Nozickean proviso. If natural resources aresufficiently abundant relative to the individuals, then Nozickeanproviso will be more demanding (since many individuals would get morethan an adequate share without the use or appropriation), but ifnatural resources are sufficiently scarce, then the sufficientarianproviso will be more demanding than the Nozickian one.Although sufficientarian libertarianism may be an improvement overNozickean libertarianism by being sensitive to the quality of lifeprospects left to others, it nevertheless fails, many would argue, torecognize the extent to which natural resources belong to all of us insome egalitarian manner. Suppose that there are enough naturalresources to give everyone fabulous life prospects, and someoneappropriates (or uses) natural resources leaving others only minimallyadequate life prospects and generating ultra fabulously life prospectsfor herself. It seems implausible to hold that those who use or firstclaim a natural resource are entitled to reap all the benefits inexcess of what is needed to leave others adequate lifeprospects. Natural resources were not created by any human agent andtheir value, some would argue, belongs to all of us in someegalitarian manner.Let us now consider left-libertarianism. It holds thatnatural resources initially belong to everyone in some egalitarianmanner. We have already rejected one version—joint-ownershipleft-libertarianism—for failing to be unilateralist (i.e.,because it requires the permission of others for use or appropriationof unowned natural resources). We shall now focus on Lockean (andhence unilateralist) versions of left-libertarianism.Equal share left-libertarianism—such as that of HenryGeorge (1879) and Hillel Steiner (1994)—interprets the Lockeanproviso as requiring that one leave an equally valuable per capitashare of the value of natural resources for others. Individuals aremorally free to use or appropriate natural resources, but those whouse or appropriate more than their per capita share—based on thecompetitive value (based on demand and supply; e.g., marketclearing price or auction price) under morally relevantconditions—owe others compensation for their excess share.Equal share libertarianism, many would argue, is not sufficientlyegalitarian. Although it requires that the competitive value ofnatural resources be distributed equally, it does nothing to offsetdisadvantages in unchosen internal endowments (e.g., the effects ofgenes or childhood environment). Equal share libertarianism is thuscompatible with radically unequal life prospects.[5] Consider, then, equal opportunity left-libertarianism such asthat of Otsuka (2003).[6] It interprets the Lockean proviso as requiring that one leave enoughfor others to have an opportunity for wellbeing that is at least asgood as the opportunity for wellbeing that one obtained in using orappropriating natural resources. Individuals who leave less than thisare required to pay the full competitive value of their excess shareto those deprived of their fair share. Unlike the equal share view,those whose initial internal endowments provide less favorableeffective opportunities for wellbeing are entitled to larger shares ofnatural resources. Most libertarians would, of course, reject thisview as too egalitarian and most egalitarians would reject it forbeing too libertarian. Still, some think that it is a promising“middle way”.3. Enforcement Rights: Prior Restraint and RectificationSo far, we have addressed the core libertarian rights of fullself-ownership and the right to appropriate natural resources. Acomplete libertarian theory must also specify what enforcement rightsindividuals have when others violate their rights. The idea offull self-ownership does not include a specification ofenforcement rights. This is because the relevant idea isuniversal full self-ownership (i.e., every agent being a fullself-owner), and this notion is indeterminate with respect toenforcement rights (as well as compensation rights). For a givenindividual, a maximal set of self-ownership rights would include botha full immunity against loss even if the agent violates the rights ofothers (and hence others would not be permitted to use non-consensualforce against her ever) and maximal enforcement rights against others(which would permit the agent to use force against others in order toprevent their violation of her rights). This set of rights, however,is not universalizable. If one agent has the strong immunity to lossof rights, then other agents cannot have the strong enforcement rights(which require the offending agent to have lost some of her rights ofself-ownership). Thus, full (universalizable) self-ownership caninclude no enforcement rights (but a full immunity to loss), or fullenforcement rights (but no immunity to loss for rights violations), oranything in between. (On the issue of indeterminacy, see Fried (2004,2005) and Vallentyne, Steiner, and Otsuka (2005).One possible position is extreme pacificism, according to whichindividuals are never permitted to use non-consensual force againstothers. Another is moderate pacificism, according to which individualsare permitted to use non-consensual force against others only whennecessary in self-defense (or the defense of others). This moderateview would allow the use of force against a person to prevent her fromwrongfully using force against others, but it would not allow the useof force to rectify past violations (e.g., punish or extractcompensation from the rights-violator). Most libertarian positionswould allow the use of force for cases of rectification. Many wouldallow the use of force for retributive punishment, butsome—Barnett (1998), for example—reject retributivepunishment and insist that compensation for wrongful harms is the solejustification for the rectificatory use of force.4. Anarchism and the Minimal StateLibertarianism holds that many of the powers of the modern welfarestate are morally illegitimate. Agents of the state violate the rightsof citizens when they punish, or threaten to punish, a person forriding a motorcycle without a helmet, for taking drugs, for refusingto serve in the military, for engaging in consensual sexual relationsin private, or for gambling. Furthermore, agents of the state violatethe rights of citizen when they force, or threaten to force,individuals to transfer their legitimately held wealth to the state inorder to provide for pensions, to help the needy, or to pay for publicgoods (e.g., parks or roads). (Left-libertarians object to suchtransfers to the extent that these are in excess of what is owed forthe appropriation of natural resources.) Some libertarian-leaningtheorists—such as Hayek (1960)—argue that it is legitimateto force people to pay their fair share of the costs of providingbasic police services (i.e., protection of the libertarianrights and prosecution of those who violate them), but it's hard tosee how this could be legitimate on right-libertarian grounds. If onedoes not voluntarily agree to share one's wealth in this way, the merefact that one reaps a benefit from the services does not, onlibertarian grounds, generate an enforceable duty to pay one's fair share.[7]One objection, then, that libertarians raise against the modernwelfare state is that it uses force, or the threat thereof, torestrict people's freedom to engage in activities that do not violateanyone's rights. A second objection is that the modern welfarestate—and most states generally—uses force, or the threatthereof, to restrict people's freedom to use force to protect andenforce their own rights. Although most states recognize a right touse force in self-defense, few states recognize a legal right toforcibly extract compensation from, or punish, a person who hasviolated one's rights. The state may punish those who attempt toimpose the relevant rectification—even if the private citizensimpose the very same rectification that the state wouldimpose. Non-pacifist libertarians, however, deny this. Each individualhas the right to enforce his rights in various ways, and these are notlost unless the individual voluntarily gives them up. The objectionhere, then, is not that agents of the state enforce people's rights(which they are perfectly entitled to do if the protected person sowishes), but rather that the state uses force to prevent citizens fromdirectly enforcing their own rights.The above objections to the modern welfare state would be made both byright-libertarians and left-libertarians. Left-libertarians, however,can endorse certain “state-like” activities thatright-libertarians reject. For on most left-libertarian views,individuals have an enforceable duty to pay others for the value ofthe rights that they claim over natural resources. Individuals seekingeconomic justice could form organizations that, under certainconditions, could force individuals to give them the payment they owefor their rights over natural resources, and could then transfer thepayments to the individuals who are owed payments (after deducting afee for the service, if the person agrees). The organization couldalso provide various public goods such as basic police services,national defense, roads, parks, and so on. By providing such publicgoods, the value of the rights claimed over natural resources byindividuals will increase (e.g., rights over land for which policeprotection is provided are more valuable than rights over that landwithout police protection). Such public goods could be provided whenand only when they would be self-financing based on the increasedrents that they generate.Such “justice-promoting” organizations thus engage in manyof the activities of the modern states, and left-libertarianism canaccept the legitimacy of such activities. There are, however, threeimportant qualifications. First, organizational activities are limitedto enforcing people's libertarian rights and to enhancing people'sopportunities by providing public goods. Force is never used torestrict activities that violate no libertarian rights. Second, nomonopoly on such activities is claimed. There may be manyorganizations providing such services. Third and finally, the agentsof the organization are permitted to use force to make an agent makeher payment for the value of rights over natural resources only ifsuch use is, in some suitable sense, the most reliable way of ensuringthat she discharges her duty. Corrupt or inefficient organizations arenot permitted to use force to collect such payments. Furthermore, evenhonest and efficient organizations are not so permitted when theindividual owing the payment will voluntarily make the paymentdirectly to the relevant parties. (For elaboration, see Vallentyne,2007.)Libertarianism, then, is not only critical of the modern welfarestate, but of states in general. Given that so much of modern lifeseems to require a state, libertarianism's anarchist stance is apowerful objection against it. In reply, libertarians argue that (1)many of the effects of states are quite negative, (2) many of thepositive effects can be obtained without the state through voluntarymechanisms, and (3) even if some positive effects cannot be soobtained, the ends do not justify the means in these cases.5. Some Miscellaneous Issues5.1 Non-Autonomous Sentient BeingsLibertarianism asserts that each autonomous agent initially fully ownsherself and that agents have moral power to acquire property rights innatural resources and artifacts. What is the status of non-autonomousbeings—such as children and many animals—that have moralstanding (e.g., because sentient)? One possible reply is to deny thatthere are any non-autonomous beings wth moral standing (e.g., becauseonly beings capable of having moral duties—agents—are owedany duties). Non-autonomous beings are simply things to be used. Assuch, they can be the full private property of agents. Few people,however, will accept that position. Children are not the full privateproperty of their parents. Dogs may not be tortured for fun. Anotherpossibility is to hold that non-autonomous sentient beings are alsofull self-owners, where the rights involved are understood asprotecting their interests rather than their choices (see, forexample, Vallentyne 2002). This, of course, would have the wildimplication that rats are protected by rights ofself-ownership. Perhaps there is some plausible intermediate position,but if so, it has not yet been developed adequately.5.2 Historical Principles and the Real WorldAccording to libertarianism, the justice of the current distributionof legal rights over resources depends on what the past waslike. Given that the history of the world is full of systematicviolence (genocide, invasion, murder, assault, theft, etc.), we can besure that the current distribution of legal rights over resources didnot come about justly and that adequate reparations have not beenmade. At the same time, however, we have little knowledge of thespecific rights violations that took place in the past (e.g., we havelittle knowledge of all but the most egregious rights violations thattook place more than one hundred years ago). Thus, we have littleknowledge of what justice today requires.The epistemic problem confronting libertarianism is similar to thatconfronting utilitarianism and other consequentialisttheories. Consequentialist theories require knowledge of the entirefuture that will result from each possible action, and we have verylittle such knowledge. Libertarianism requires knowledge of the entirepast, and we also have very little such knowledge. The appropriateanswer in both cases is that the facts determine what is just, and weshould simply make out best judgements about what is just based onwhat we know. Moral reality is complex, and it's not surprising thatit's extremely difficult to know what is permissible.In the case of libertarianism, an additional response is possible. Onecould hold that there is a moral statute of limitations for rightsviolations. After the passage of enough time—or perhaps, afterthe passage of enough time during which no claim for rectification ismade—the right of rectification for a specific pastrights-violation may cease to be valid. If the period of time is shortenough (e.g., 100 years), this would radically reduce the epistemicproblem. It's not clear, however, that there is a plausible principledlibertarian justification (as opposed to a practical one) for such astatute of limitations.6. ConclusionLibertarianism is attractive because (1) it provides significant moralliberty of action, (2) it provides and significant moral protectionagainst interference from others and because it is sensitive to whatthe past was like (e.g., what agreements were made and what rightsviolations took place). It faces, however, the serious objection thatit gives too much protection from interference and not enoughattention to making the future better (e.g., by meeting people's basicneeds, making people's lives go better, or promoting equality). Aswith all prominent moral and political theories, the overallassessment of libertarianism is a matter of on-going debate.BibliographyRight-LibertarianismBarnett, R., 1998, The Structure of Liberty: Justice and theRule of Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press.Feser, E., “There Is No Such Thing As An Unjust InitialAcquisition” Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2005):56-80.Friedman, D., 1989, The Machinery of Freedom: A Guide toRadical Capitalism, New York: Harper and Row.Hayek, F. A., 1960, The Constitution of Liberty, Chicago:Gateway Editions.Hospers, J., 1971, Libertarianism, Los Angeles: Nash.Lomasky, L., 1987, Persons, Rights, and the MoralCommunity, New York: Oxford University Press.Kirzner, I., 1978, “Entrepreneurship, Entitlement, andEconomic Justice,” Eastern Economic Journal 4: 9-25.Reprinted in Vallentyne and Steiner, 2000a.Locke, J., 1690, Two Treatises of Government, ed. by P.Laslett, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960. Extract reprintedin Vallentyne and Steiner, 2000b.Machan, T., (ed.), 1974, The Libertarian Alternative: Essays inSocial and Political Philosophy, Chicago: Nelson-HallCompany.Machan, T., (ed.), 1982, The Libertarian Reader, Totowa:Rowman and Littlefield.Machan, T., 1989, Individuals and Their Rights, La Salle,IL: Open Court.Mack, E., 1990, “Self-Ownership and the Right ofProperty,” Monist, 73: 519-543.Mack, E., 1995, “The Self-Ownership Proviso: A New andImproved Lockean Proviso,” Social Philosophy and Policy,12: 186-218.Narveson, J., 1988, The Libertarian Idea, Philadelphia:Temple University Press.Narveson, J., 1999, “Original Appropriation and LockeanProvisos,” Public Affairs Quarterly 13:205-27. Reprinted in Respecting Persons in Theory andPractice (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002),pp. 111-131.Nozick, R., 1974, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, New York:Basic Books. Extract reprinted in Vallentyne and Steiner, 2000a.Paul J., (ed.), 1982, Reading Nozick: Essays on Anarchy, State,and Utopia, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Rothbard, M., 1978, For a New Liberty, The LibertarianManifesto, revised edition, New York: Libertarian ReviewFoundation.Rothbard, M., 1982, The Ethics of Liberty, AtlanticHighlands: Humanities Press. Extract reprinted in Vallentyne andSteiner, 2000a.Schmidtz, D., 1991, The Limits of Government, Boulder, CO:Westview.Wheeler, S., 1980, “Natural Property Rights as BodyRights,” Nous, 16: 171-193. Reprinted in Vallentyne P.,and H. Steiner, eds., 2000a.Left-LibertarianismFried, B. “Left-Libertarianism: A Review Essay”Philosophy and Public Affairs 32 (2004): 66-92.Fried, B. “Left-Libertarianism, Once More: A Rejoinder toVallentyne, Steiner, and Otsuka” Philosophy and PublicAffairs 33 (2005): 216-222.Cohen, G. A., 1995, Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.George, H., 1879, Progress and Poverty, 5th edition, NewYork, D. Appleton and Company, 1882. Reprinted by Robert SchalkenbachFoundation, 1966. Extract reprinted in Vallentyne and Steiner,2000b.Grunebaum, J., 1987, Private Ownership, New York:Routledge & Kegan Paul. Extract reprinted in Vallentyne andSteiner, 2000a.Otsuka, M., Libertarianism without Inequality (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 2003).Steiner, H., 1994, An Essay on Rights, Cambridge, MA:Blackwell Publishers. Extract reprinted in Vallentyne and Steiner,2000a.Tideman, N., “Global Economic Justice”Geophilos 00 (2000): 134-146. Tideman, N., “Creating Global Economic Justice”Geophilos 01 (2001): 88-94.Vallentyne, P., “Libertarianism and the State”Social Philosophy and Policy, 24 (forthcoming 2007).Vallentyne, P., and H. Steiner, eds., 2000a, LeftLibertarianism and Its Critics: The Contemporary Debate, New York:Palgrave Publishers Ltd.Vallentyne, P. and H. Steiner, eds., 2000b, The Origins of LeftLibertarianism: An Anthology of Historical Writings, New York:Palgrave Publishers Ltd.Vallentyne, P., H. Steiner, and M. Otsuka, 2005, “WhyLeft-Libertarianism Isn't Incoherent, Indeterminate, or Irrelevant: AReply to Fried” Philosophy and Public Affairs 33:201-15.Van Parijs, P., 1995, Real Freedom for All, New York:Oxford University Press. Extract reprinted in Vallentyne P., and H.Steiner (eds.) 2000a.Related TopicsChristman, J., 1994, The Myth of Property, New York:Oxford University Press.Kagan, S., 1994, “The Argument from Liberty,” in InHarm's Way: Essays in honor of Joel Feinberg, J. Coleman and A.Buchanan, eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Simmons, A.J., 1992, The Lockean Theory of Rights,Princeton: Princeton University Press.Simmons, A.J., 1993, On the Edge of Anarchy, Princeton:Princeton University Press.Sreenivasan, G., 1995, The Limits of Lockean Rights inProperty, New York: Oxford University Press.Vallentyne, P., 2002, “Equality and the Duties ofProcreators,” in Children and Political Theory, D.Archard and C. MacLeod, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press.Other Internet Resources[Please contact the author with suggestions.] Related Entries anarchism | liberalism | liberty | Locke, John | property | rightsAcknowledgments For helpful comments, I thank Brad Hooker, Thomas Pogge, HillelSteiner, and Nic Tideman. Copyright © 2006 byPeter Vallentyne<vallentynep@missouri.edu> |
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