Homosexuality (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Cite this entry Search the SEP • Advanced Search • Tools • RSS FeedTable of Contents• What's New• Archives• Projected ContentsEditorial Information• About the SEP• Editorial Board• How to Cite the SEP• Special CharactersSupport the SEPContact the SEP ©Metaphysics Research Lab,CSLI,Stanford University  Open access to the SEP is made possible by a world-wide funding initiative. Please Read How You Can Help Keep the Encyclopedia FreeHomosexualityFirst published Tue Aug 6, 2002; substantive revision Wed Nov 29, 2006The term ‘homosexuality’ was coined in the late19th century by a German psychologist, Karoly Maria Benkert.Although the term is new, discussions about sexuality in general, andsame-sex attraction in particular, have occasioned philosophicaldiscussion ranging from Plato's Symposium to contemporaryqueer theory. Since the history of cultural understandings of same-sexattraction is relevant to the philosophical issues raised by thoseunderstandings, it is necessary to review briefly some of the socialhistory of homosexuality. Arising out of this history, at least in theWest, is the idea of natural law and some interpretations of that lawas forbidding homosexual sex. References to natural law still play animportant role in contemporary debates about homosexuality in religion,politics, and even courtrooms. Finally, perhaps the most significantrecent social change involving homosexuality is the emergence of thegay liberation movement in the West. In philosophical circles thismovement is, in part, represented through a rather diverse group ofthinkers who are grouped under the label of queer theory. A centralissue raised by queer theory, which will be discussed below, is whetherhomosexuality, and hence also heterosexuality and bisexuality, issocially constructed or purely driven by biological forces.1. History2. Natural Law3. Queer Theory and the Social Construction of Sexuality4. ConclusionBibliographyOther Internet ResourcesRelated Entries1. HistoryAs has been frequently noted, the ancient Greeks did not have termsor concepts that correspond to the contemporary dichotomy of‘heterosexual’ and ‘homosexual’. There is awealth of material from ancient Greece pertinent to issues ofsexuality, ranging from dialogues of Plato, such as theSymposium, to plays by Aristophanes, and Greek artwork andvases. What follows is a brief description of ancient Greek attitudes,but it is important to recognize that there was regional variation. Forexample, in parts of Ionia there were general strictures againstsame-sex eros, while in Elis and Boiotia (e.g., Thebes), itwas approved of and even celebrated (cf. Dover, 1989; Halperin,1990).Probably the most frequent assumption of sexual orientation is thatpersons can respond erotically to beauty in either sex. DiogenesLaeurtius, for example, wrote of Alcibiades, the Athenian general andpolitician of the 5th century B.C., “in hisadolescence he drew away the husbands from their wives, and as a youngman the wives from their husbands.” (Quoted in Greenberg, 1988,144) Some persons were noted for their exclusive interests in personsof one gender. For example, Alexander the Great and the founder ofStoicism, Zeno of Citium, were known for their exclusive interest inboys and other men. Such persons, however, are generally portrayed asthe exception. Furthermore, the issue of what gender one is attractedto is seen as an issue of taste or preference, rather than as a moralissue. A character in Plutarch's Erotikos (Dialogue onLove) argues that “the noble lover of beauty engages in lovewherever he sees excellence and splendid natural endowment withoutregard for any difference in physiological detail.”(Ibid., 146) Gender just becomes irrelevant“detail” and instead the excellence in character and beautyis what is most important.Even though the gender that one was erotically attracted to (at anyspecific time, given the assumption that persons will likely beattracted to persons of both sexes) was not important, other issueswere salient, such as whether one exercised moderation. Status concernswere also of the highest importance. Given that only free men had fullstatus, women and male slaves were not problematic sexual partners. Sexbetween freemen, however, was problematic for status. The centraldistinction in ancient Greek sexual relations was between taking anactive or insertive role, versus a passive or penetrated one. Thepassive role was acceptable only for inferiors, such as women, slaves,or male youths who were not yet citizens. Hence the cultural ideal of asame-sex relationship was between an older man, probably in his 20's or30's, known as the erastes, and a boy whose beard had not yetbegun to grow, the eromenos or paidika. In thisrelationship there was courtship ritual, involving gifts (such as arooster), and other norms. The erastes had to show that he hadnobler interests in the boy, rather than a purely sexual concern. Theboy was not to submit too easily, and if pursued by more than one man,was to show discretion and pick the more noble one. There is alsoevidence that penetration was often avoided by having theerastes face his beloved and place his penis between thethighs of the eromenos, which is known as intercrural sex. Therelationship was to be temporary and should end upon the boy reachingadulthood (Dover, 1989). To continue in a submissive role even whileone should be an equal citizen was considered troubling, although therecertainly were many adult male same-sex relationships that were notedand not strongly stigmatized. While the passive role was thus seen asproblematic, to be attracted to men was often taken as a sign ofmasculinity. Greek gods, such as Zeus, had stories of same-sex exploitsattributed to them, as did other key figures in Greek myth andliterature, such as Achilles and Hercules. Plato, in theSymposium, argues for an army to be comprised of same-sexlovers. Thebes did form such a regiment, the Sacred Band of Thebes,formed of 500 soldiers. They were renowned in the ancient world fortheir valor in battle.Ancient Rome had many parallels in its understanding of same-sexattraction, and sexual issues more generally, to ancient Greece. Thisis especially true under the Republic. Yet under the Empire, Romansociety slowly became more negative in its views towards sexuality,probably due to social and economic turmoil, even before Christianitybecame influential.Exactly what attitude the New Testament has towards sexuality ingeneral, and same-sex attraction in particular, is a matter of sharpdebate. John Boswell argues, in his fascinating Christianity,Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality, that many passages takentoday as condemnations of homosexuality are more concerned withprostitution, or where same-sex acts are described as“unnatural” the meaning is more akin to ‘out of theordinary’ rather than as immoral (Boswell, 1980, ch.4; see alsoBoswell, 1994). Yet others have criticized, sometimes persuasively,Boswell's scholarship (see Greenberg, 1988, ch.5). What is clear,however, is that while condemnation of same-sex attraction is marginalto the Gospels and only an intermittent focus in the rest of the NewTestament, early Christian church fathers were much more outspoken. Intheir writings there is a horror at any sort of sex, but in a fewgenerations these views eased, in part due no doubt to practicalconcerns of recruiting converts. By the fourth and fifth centuries themainstream Christian view allowed for procreative sex.This viewpoint, that procreative sex within marriage is allowed,while every other expression of sexuality is sinful, can be found, forexample, in St. Augustine. This understanding leads to a concern withthe gender of one's partner that is not found in previous Greek orRoman views, and it clearly forbids homosexual acts. Soon thisattitude, especially towards homosexual sex, came to be reflected inRoman Law. In Justinian's Code, promulgated in 529, persons who engagedin homosexual sex were to be executed, although those who wererepentant could be spared. Historians agree that the late Roman Empiresaw a rise in intolerance towards sexuality, although there were againimportant regional variations.With the decline of the Roman Empire, and its replacement by variousbarbarian kingdoms, a general tolerance (with the sole exception ofVisigothic Spain) of homosexual acts prevailed. As one prominentscholar puts it, “European secular law contained few measuresagainst homosexuality until the middle of the thirteenthcentury.” (Greenberg, 1988, 260) Even while some Christiantheologians continued to denounce nonprocreative sexuality, includingsame-sex acts, a genre of homophilic literature, especially among theclergy, developed in the eleventh and twelfth centuries (Boswell, 1980,chapters 8 and 9).The latter part of the twelfth through the fourteenth centuries,however, saw a sharp rise in intolerance towards homosexual sex,alongside persecution of Jews, Muslims, heretics, and others. While thecauses of this are somewhat unclear, it is likely that increased classconflict alongside the Gregorian reform movement in the Catholic Churchwere two important factors. The Church itself started to appeal to aconception of “nature” as the standard of morality, anddrew it in such a way so as to forbid homosexual sex (as well asextramarital sex, nonprocreative sex within marriage, and oftenmasturbation). For example, the first ecumenical council to condemnhomosexual sex, Lateran III of 1179, stated that “Whoever shallbe found to have committed that incontinence which is againstnature” shall be punished, the severity of which depended uponwhether the transgressor was a cleric or layperson (quoted in Boswell,1980, 277). This appeal to natural law (discussed below) became veryinfluential in the Western tradition. An important point to note,however, is that the key category here is the ‘sodomite,’which differs from the contemporary idea of ‘homosexual’. Asodomite was understood as act-defined, rather than as a type ofperson. Someone who had desires to engage in sodomy, yet did not actupon them, was not a sodomite. Also, persons who engaged inheterosexual sodomy were also sodomites. There are reports of personsbeing burned to death or beheaded for sodomy with a spouse (Greenberg,1988, 277). Finally, a person who had engaged in sodomy, yet who hadrepented of his sin and vowed to never do it again, was no longer asodomite. The gender of one's partner is again not of decisiveimportance, although some medieval theologians single out same-sexsodomy as the worst type of sexual crime.For the next several centuries in Europe, the laws againsthomosexual sex were severe in their penalties. Enforcement, however,was episodic. In some regions, decades would pass without anyprosecutions. Yet the Dutch, in the 1730's, mounted a harsh anti-sodomycampaign (alongside an anti-Gypsy pogrom), even using torture to obtainconfessions. As many as one hundred men and boys were executed anddenied burial (Greenberg, 1988, 313-4). Also, the degree to whichsodomy and same-sex attraction were accepted varied by class, with themiddle class taking the narrowest view, while the aristocracy andnobility often accepted public expressions of alternative sexualities.At times, even with the risk of severe punishment, same-sex orientedsubcultures would flourish in cities, sometimes only to be suppressedby the authorities. In the 19th century there was asignificant reduction in the legal penalties for sodomy. The Napoleoniccode decriminalized sodomy, and with Napoleon's conquests that Codespread. Furthermore, in many countries where homosexual sex remained acrime, the general movement at this time away from the death penaltyusually meant that sodomy was removed from the list of capitaloffenses.In the 18th and 19th centuries an overtlytheological framework no longer dominated the discourse about same-sexattraction. Instead, secular arguments and interpretations becameincreasingly common. Probably the most important secular domain fordiscussions of homosexuality was in medicine, including psychology.This discourse, in turn, linked up with considerations about the stateand its need for a growing population, good soldiers, and intactfamilies marked by clearly defined gender roles. Doctors were called inby courts to examine sex crime defendants (Foucault, 1980; Greenberg,1988). At the same time, the dramatic increase in school attendancerates and the average length of time spent in school, reducedtransgenerational contact, and hence also the frequency oftransgenerational sex. Same-sex relations between persons of roughlythe same age became the norm.Clearly the rise in the prestige of medicine resulted in part fromthe increasing ability of science to account for natural phenomena onthe basis of mechanistic causation. The application of this viewpointto humans led to accounts of sexuality as innate or biologicallydriven. The voluntarism of the medieval understanding of sodomy, thatsodomites chose sin, gave way to the modern notion of homosexuality asa deep, unchosen characteristic of persons, regardless of whether theyact upon that orientation. The idea of a ‘latent sodomite’would not have made sense, yet under this new view it does make senseto speak of a person as a ‘latent homosexual.’ Instead ofspecific acts defining a person, as in the medieval view, an entirephysical and mental makeup, usually portrayed as somehow defective orpathological, is ascribed to the modern category of‘homosexual.’ Although there are historical precursors tothese ideas (e.g., Aristotle gave a physiological explanation ofpassive homosexuality), medicine gave them greater public exposure andcredibility (Greenberg, 1988, ch.15). The effects of these ideas cut inconflicting ways. Since homosexuality is, by this view, not chosen, itmakes less sense to criminalize it. Persons are not choosing evil acts.Yet persons may be expressing a diseased or pathological mental state,and hence medical intervention for a cure is appropriate. Hencedoctors, especially psychiatrists, campaigned for the repeal orreduction of criminal penalties for consensual homosexual sodomy, yetintervened to “rehabilitate” homosexuals. They also soughtto develop techniques to prevent children from becoming homosexual, forexample by arguing that childhood masturbation caused homosexuality,hence it must be closely guarded against.In the 20th century sexual roles were redefined onceagain. For a variety of reasons, premarital intercourse slowly becamemore common and eventually acceptable. With the decline of prohibitionsagainst sex for the sake of pleasure even outside of marriage, itbecame more difficult to argue against gay sex. These trends wereespecially strong in the 1960's, and it was in this context that thegay liberation movement took off. Although gay and lesbian rightsgroups had been around for decades, the low-key approach of theMattachine Society (named after a medieval secret society) and theDaughters of Bilitis had not gained much ground. This changed in theearly morning hours of June 28, 1969, when the patrons of the StonewallInn, a gay bar in Greenwich Village, rioted after a police raid. In theaftermath of that event, gay and lesbian groups began to organizearound the country. Gay Democratic clubs were created in every majorcity, and one fourth of all college campuses had gay and lesbian groups(Shilts, 1993, ch.28). Large gay urban communities in cities from coastto coast became the norm. The American Psychiatric Association removedhomosexuality from its official listing of mental disorders. Theincreased visibility of gays and lesbians has become a permanentfeature of American life despite the two critical setbacks of the AIDSepidemic and an anti-gay backlash (see Berman, 1993, for a goodsurvey). The post-Stonewall era has also seen marked changes in WesternEurope, where the repeal of anti-sodomy laws and legal equality forgays and lesbians has become common.2. Natural LawToday natural law theory offers the most common intellectual defensefor differential treatment of gays and lesbians, and as such it meritsattention. The development of natural law is a long and verycomplicated story, but a reasonable place to begin is with thedialogues of Plato, for this is where some of the central ideas arefirst articulated, and, significantly enough, are immediately appliedto the sexual domain. For the Sophists, the human world is a realm ofconvention and change, rather than of unchanging moral truth. Plato, incontrast, argued that unchanging truths underpin the flux of thematerial world. Reality, including eternal moral truths, is a matter ofphusis. Even though there is clearly a great degree of varietyin conventions from one city to another (something ancient Greeksbecame increasingly aware of), there is still an unwritten standard, orlaw, that humans should live under.In the Laws, Plato applies the idea of a fixed, natural lawto sex, and takes a much harsher line than he does in theSymposium or the Phraedrus. In Book One he writesabout how opposite-sex sex acts cause pleasure by nature, whilesame-sex sexuality is “unnatural” (636c). In Book Eight,the Athenian speaker considers how to have legislation banninghomosexual acts, masturbation, and illegitimate procreative sex widelyaccepted. He then states that this law is according to nature(838-839d). Probably the best way of understanding Plato's discussionhere is in the context of his overall concerns with the appetitive partof the soul and how best to control it. Plato clearly sees same-sexpassions as especially strong, and hence particularly problematic,although in the Symposium that erotic attraction could be thecatalyst for a life of philosophy, rather than base sensuality (Cf.Dover, 1989, 153-170; Nussbaum, 1999, esp. chapter 12).Other figures played important roles in the development of naturallaw theory. Aristotle, with his emphasis upon reason as the distinctivehuman function, and the Stoics, with their emphasis upon human beingsas a part of the natural order of the cosmos, both helped to shape thenatural law perspective which says that “True law is right reasonin agreement with nature,” as Cicero put it. Aristotle, in hisapproach, did allow for change to occur according to nature, andtherefore the way that natural law is embodied could itself change withtime, which was an idea Aquinas later incorporated into his own naturallaw theory. Aristotle did not write extensively about sexual issues,since he was less concerned with the appetites than Plato. Probably thebest reconstruction of his views places him in mainstream Greek societyas outlined above; the main issue is that of active versus a passiverole, with only the latter problematic for those who either are or willbecome citizens. Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, was, according to hiscontemporaries, only attracted to men, and his thought had noprohibitions against same-sex sexuality. In contrast, Cicero, a laterStoic, was dismissive about sexuality in general, with some harsherremarks towards same-sex pursuits (Cicero, 1966, 407-415).The most influential formulation of natural law theory was made byThomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century. Integrating an Aristotelianapproach with Christian theology, Aquinas emphasized the centrality ofcertain human goods, including marriage and procreation. While Aquinasdid not write much about same-sex sexual relations, he did write atlength about various sex acts as sins. For Aquinas, sexuality that waswithin the bounds of marriage and which helped to further whathe saw as the distinctive goods of marriage, mainly love,companionship, and legitimate offspring, was permissible, and evengood. Aquinas did not argue that procreation was a necessary part ofmoral or just sex; married couples could enjoy sex without the motiveof having children, and sex in marriages where one or both partners issterile (perhaps because the woman is postmenopausal) is alsopotentially just (given a motive of expressing love). So far Aquinas'view actually need not rule out homosexual sex. For example, a Thomistcould embrace same-sex marriage, and then apply the same reasoning,simply seeing the couple as a reproductively sterile, yet still fullyloving and companionate union.Aquinas, in a significant move, adds a requirement that for anygiven sex act to be moral it must be of a generative kind. The only waythat this can be achieved is via vaginal intercourse. That is, sinceonly the emission of semen in a vagina can result in naturalreproduction, only sex acts of that type are generative, even if agiven sex act does not lead to reproduction, and even if it isimpossible due to infertility. The consequence of this addition is torule out the possibility, of course, that homosexual sex could ever bemoral (even if done within a loving marriage), in addition toforbidding any non-vaginal sex for opposite-sex married couples. Whatis the justification for this important addition? This question is madeall the more pressing in that Aquinas does allow that how broad moralrules apply to individuals may vary considerably, since the nature ofpersons also varies to some extent. That is, since Aquinas allows thatindividual natures vary, one could simply argue that one is, by nature,emotionally and physically attracted to persons of one's own gender,and hence to pursue same-sex relationships is ‘natural’(Sullivan, 1995). Unfortunately, Aquinas does not spell out ajustification for this generative requirement.More recent natural law theorists, however, have tried a coupledifferent lines of defense for Aquinas' ‘generative type’requirement. The first is that sex acts that involve eitherhomosexuality, heterosexual sodomy, or which use contraception,frustrate the purpose of the sex organs, which is reproductive. Thisargument, often called the ‘perverted faculty argument’, isperhaps implicit in Aquinas. It has, however, come in for sharp attack(see Weitham, 1997), and the best recent defenders of a Thomisticnatural law approach are attempting to move beyond it (e.g., George,1999, dismisses the argument). If their arguments fail, of course, theymust allow that some homosexual sex acts are morally permissible (evenpositively good), although they would still have resources with whichto argue against casual gay (and straight) sex.Although the specifics of the second sort of argument offered byvarious contemporary natural law theorists vary, the common elementsare strong (Finnis, 1994; George, 1999). As Thomists, their argumentrests largely upon an account of human goods. The two most importantfor the argument against homosexual sex (though not againsthomosexuality as an orientation which is not acted upon, and hence inthis they follow official Catholic doctrine; see George, 1999, ch.15)are personal integration and marriage. Personal integration, in thisview, is the idea that humans, as agents, need to have integrationbetween their intentions as agents and their embodied selves. Thus, touse one's or another's body as a mere means to one's own pleasure, asthey argue happens with masturbation, causes‘dis-integration’ of the self. That is, one's intentionthen is just to use a body (one's own or another's) as a mere means tothe end of pleasure, and this detracts from personal integration. Yetone could easily reply that two persons of the same sex engaging insexual union does not necessarily imply any sort of ‘use’of the other as a mere means to one's own pleasure. Hence, natural lawtheorists respond that sexual union in the context of the realizationof marriage as an important human good is the only permissibleexpression of sexuality. Yet this argument requires drawing howmarriage is an important good in a very particular way, since it putsprocreation at the center of marriage as its “naturalfulfillment” (George, 1999, 168). Natural law theorists, if theywant to support their objection to homosexual sex, have to emphasizeprocreation. If, for example, they were to place love and mutualsupport for human flourishing at the center, it is clear that manysame-sex couples would meet this standard. Hence their sexual actswould be morally just.There are, however, several objections that are made against thisaccount of marriage as a central human good. One is that by placingprocreation as the ‘natural fulfillment’ of marriage,sterile marriages are thereby denigrated. Sex in an opposite-sexmarriage where the partners know that one or both of them are sterileis not done for procreation. Yet surely it is not wrong. Why, then, ishomosexual sex in the same context (a long-term companionate union)wrong (Macedo, 1995)? The natural law rejoinder is that while vaginalintercourse is a potentially procreative sex act, considered in itself(though admitting the possibility that it may be impossible for aparticular couple), oral and anal sex acts are never potentiallyprocreative, whether heterosexual or homosexual (George, 1999). But isthis biological distinction also morally relevant, and in the mannerthat natural law theorists assume? Natural law theorists, in theirdiscussions of these issues, seem to waver. On the one hand, they wantto defend an ideal of marriage as a loving union wherein two personsare committed to their mutual flourishing, and where sex is acomplement to that ideal. Yet that opens the possibility of permissiblegay sex, or heterosexual sodomy, both of which they want to oppose. Sothey then defend an account of sexuality which seems crudely reductive,emphasizing procreation to the point where literally a male orgasmanywhere except in the vagina of one's loving spouse is impermissible.Then, when accused of being reductive, they move back to the broaderideal of marriage.Natural law theory, at present, has made significant concessions tomainstream liberal thought. In contrast certainly to its medievalformulation, most contemporary natural law theorists argue for limitedgovernmental power, and do not believe that the state has an interestin attempting to prevent all moral wrongdoing. Still, they do argueagainst homosexuality, and against legal protections for gays andlesbians in terms of employment and housing, even to the point ofserving as expert witnesses in court cases or helping in the writing ofamicus curae briefs. They also argue against same sex marriage(Bradley, 2001; George, 2001).3. Queer Theory and the Social Construction of SexualityWith the rise of the gay liberation movement in the post-Stonewallera, overtly gay and lesbian perspectives began to be put forward inpolitics, philosophy and literary theory. Initially these often wereovertly linked to feminist analyses of patriarchy (e.g., Rich, 1980) orother, earlier approaches to theory. Yet in the late 1980's and early1990's queer theory was developed, although there are obviouslyimportant antecedents which make it difficult to date it precisely.There are a number of ways in which queer theory differed from earliergay liberation theory, but an important initial difference can begotten at by examining the reasons for opting for the term‘queer’ as opposed to ‘gay and lesbian.’ Someversions of, for example, lesbian theory portrayed the essence oflesbian identity and sexuality in very specific terms:non-hierarchical, consensual, and, specifically in terms of sexuality,as not necessarily focused upon genitalia (e.g., Faderman, 1985).Lesbians arguing from this framework, for example, could very wellcriticize natural law theorists as inscribing into the very “lawof nature” an essentially masculine sexuality, focused upon thegenitals, penetration, and the status of the male orgasm (natural lawtheorists never mention female orgasms).This approach, based upon characterizations of ‘lesbian’and ‘gay’ identity and sexuality, however, suffered fromthree difficulties. First, it appeared even though the goal was tocritique a heterosexist regime for its exclusion and marginalization ofthose whose sexuality is different, any specific or“essentialist” account of gay or lesbian sexuality had thesame effect. Sticking with the example used above, of a specificconceptualization of lesbian identity, it denigrates women who aresexually and emotionally attracted to other women, yet who do not fitthe description. Sado-masochists and butch/fem lesbians arguably do notfit this ideal of ‘equality’ offered. A second problem wasthat by placing such an emphasis upon the gender of one's sexualpartner(s), other possible important sources of identity aremarginalized, such as race and ethnicity. What is of utmost importance,for example, for a black lesbian is her lesbianism, rather than herrace. Many gays and lesbians of color attacked this approach, accusingit of re-inscribing an essentially white identity into the heart of gayor lesbian identity (Jagose, 1996).The third and final problem for the gay liberationist approach wasthat it often took this category of ‘identity’ itself asunproblematic and unhistorical. Such a view, however, largely becauseof arguments developed within poststructuralism, seemed increasinglyuntenable. The key figure in the attack upon identity as an ahistoricalthing is Michel Foucault. In a series of works he set out to analyzethe history of sexuality from ancient Greece to the modern era (1980,1985, 1986). Although the project was tragically cut short by his deathin 1984, from complications arising from AIDS, Foucault articulated howprofoundly understandings of sexuality can vary across time and space,and his arguments have proven very influential in gay and lesbiantheorizing in general, and queer theory in particular (Spargo,1999; Stychin, 2005).One of the reasons for the historical review above is that it helpsto give some background for understanding the claim that sexuality issocially constructed, rather than given by nature. Moreover, in orderto not prejudge the issue of social constructionism versusessentialism, I avoided applying the term ‘homosexual’ tothe ancient or medieval eras. In ancient Greece the gender of one'spartner(s) was not important, but instead whether one took the activeor passive role. In the medieval view, a ‘sodomite’ was aperson who succumbed to temptation and engaged in certainnon-procreative sex acts. Although the gender of the partner was moreimportant than in the ancient view, the broader theological frameworkplaced the emphasis upon a sin versus refraining-from-sin dichotomy.With the rise of the notion of ‘homosexuality’ in themodern era, a person is placed into a specific category even if onedoes not act upon those inclinations. What is the common, naturalsexuality expressed across these three very different cultures? Thesocial constructionist answer is that there is no ‘natural’sexuality; all sexual understandings are constructed within andmediated by cultural understandings. The examples can be pushed muchfurther by incorporating anthropological data outside of the Westerntradition (Halperin, 1990; Greenberg, 1988). Yet even within thenarrower context offered here, the differences between them arestriking. The assumption in ancient Greece is that men (less is knownabout women) can respond erotically to either sex, and the vastmajority of men who engaged in same-sex relationships were also married(or would later become married). Yet the contemporary understanding ofhomosexuality divides the sexual domain in two, heterosexual andhomosexual, and most heterosexuals cannot respond erotically to theirown sex.In saying that sexuality is a social construct, these theorists arenot saying that these understandings are not real. Since persons arealso constructs of their culture (in this view), we are made into thosecategories. Hence today persons of course understand themselves asstraight or gay (or perhaps bisexual), and it is very difficult to stepoutside of these categories, even once one comes to seem them as thehistorical constructs they are.Gay and lesbian theory was thus faced with three significantproblems, all of which involved difficulties with the notion of‘identity.’ Queer theory thus arose in large part as anattempt to overcome them. How queer theory does so can be seen bylooking at the term ‘queer’ itself. In contrast to gay orlesbian, ‘queer,’ it is argued, does not refer to anessence, whether of a sexual nature or not. Instead it is purelyrelational, standing as an undefined term that gets its meaningprecisely by being that which is outside of the norm, however that normitself may be defined. As one of the most articulate queer theoristsputs it: “Queer is … whatever is at odds with thenormal, the legitimate, the dominant. There is nothing inparticular to which it necessarily refers. It is an identitywithout an essence” (Halperin, 1995, 62, original emphasis). Bylacking any essence, queer does not marginalize those whose sexualityis outside of any gay or lesbian norm, such as sado-masochists. Sincespecific conceptualizations of sexuality are avoided, and hence not putat the center of any definition of queer, it allows more freedom forself-identification for, say, black lesbians to identify as much ormore with their race (or any other trait, such as involvement in an S& M subculture) than with lesbianism. Finally, it incorporates theinsights of poststructuralism about the difficulties in ascribing anyessence or non-historical aspect to identity.This central move by queer theorists, the claim that the categoriesthrough which identity is understood are all social constructs ratherthan given to us by nature, opens up a number of analyticalpossibilities. For example, queer theorists examine how fundamentalnotions of gender and sex which seem so natural and self-evident topersons in the modern West are in fact constructed and reinforcedthrough everyday actions, and that this occurs in ways that privilegeheterosexuality (Butler, 1990, 1993). Also examined are medicalcategories which are themselves socially constructed (Fausto-Sterling,2000, is an erudite example of this, although she is not ultimately aqueer theorist). Others examine how language and especially divisionsbetween what is said and what is not said, corresponding to thedichotomy between ‘closeted’ and ‘out,’especially in regards to the modern division ofheterosexual/homosexual, structure much of modern thought. That is, itis argued that when we look at dichotomies such as natural/artificial,or masculine/feminine, we find in the background an implicit relianceupon a very recent, and arbitrary, understanding of the sexual worldas split into two species (Sedgwick, 1990). The fluidity ofcategories created through queer theory even opens the possibility ofnew sorts of histories that examine previously silent types ofaffections and relationships (Carter, 2005).Another critical perspective opened up by a queer approach, althoughcertainly implicit in those just referred to, is especially important.Since most anti-gay and lesbian arguments rely upon the allegednaturalness of heterosexuality, queer theorists attempt to show howthese categories are themselves deeply social constructs. An examplehelps to illustrate the approach. In an essay against gay marriage,chosen because it is very representative, James Q. Wilson (1996)contends that gay men have a “great tendency” to bepromiscuous. In contrast, he puts forward loving, monogamous marriageas the natural condition of heterosexuality. Heterosexuality, in hisargument, is an odd combination of something completely natural yetsimultaneously endangered. One is born straight, yet this naturalcondition can be subverted by such things as the presence of gaycouples, gay teachers, or even excessive talk about homosexuality.Wilson's argument requires a radical disjunction betweenheterosexuality and homosexuality. If gayness is radically different,it is legitimate to suppress it. Wilson has the courage to beforthright about this element of his argument; he comes out against“the political imposition of tolerance” towards gays andlesbians (Wilson, 1996, 35).It is a common move in queer theory to bracket, at leasttemporarily, issues of truth and falsity (Halperin, 1995). Instead, theanalysis focuses upon the social function of discourse. Questions ofwho counts as an expert and why, and concerns about the effects of theexpert's discourse are given equal status to questions of the verity ofwhat is said. This approach reveals that hidden underneath Wilson's(and other anti-gay) work is an important epistemological move. Sinceheterosexuality is the natural condition, it is a place that is spokenfrom but not inquired into. In contrast, homosexuality is theaberration and hence it needs to be studied but it is not anauthoritative place from which one can speak. By virtue of thisheterosexual privilege, Wilson is allowed the voice of the impartial,fair-minded expert. Yet, as the history section above shows, there arestriking discontinuities in understandings of sexuality, and this istrue to the point that, according to queer theorists, we should notthink of sexuality as having any particular nature at all. Throughundoing our infatuation with any specific conception of sexuality, thequeer theorist opens space for marginalized forms.Queer theory, however, has been criticized in a myriad of ways(Jagose, 1996). One set of criticisms comes from theorists who aresympathetic to gay liberation conceived as a project of radical socialchange. An initial criticism is that precisely because‘queer’ does not refer to any specific sexual status orgender object choice, for example Halperin (1995) allows that straightpersons may be ‘queer,’ it robs gays and lesbians of thedistinctiveness of what makes them marginal. It desexualizes identity,when the issue is precisely about a sexual identity (Jagose, 1996). Arelated criticism is that queer theory, since it refuses any essence orreference to standard ideas of normality, cannot make crucialdistinctions. For example, queer theorists usually argue that one ofthe advantages of the term ‘queer’ is that it therebyincludes transsexuals, sado-masochists, and other marginalizedsexualities. How far does this extend? Is transgenerational sex (e.g.,pedophilia) permissible? Are there any limits upon the forms ofacceptable sado-masochism or fetishism? While some queer theoristsspecifically disallow pedophilia, it is an open question whether thetheory has the resources to support such a distinction. Furthermore,some queer theorists overtly refuse to rule out pedophiles as‘queer’ (Halperin, 1995, 62) Another criticism is thatqueer theory, in part because it typically has recourse to a verytechnical jargon, is written by a narrow elite for that narrow elite.It is therefore class biased and also, in practice, only reallyreferred to at universities and colleges (Malinowitz, 1993).Queer theory is also criticized by those who reject the desirabilityof radical social change. For example, centrist and conservative gaysand lesbians have criticized a queer approach by arguing that it willbe “disastrously counter-productive” (Bawer, 1996, xii). If‘queer’ keeps its connotation of something perverse and atodds with mainstream society, which is precisely what most queertheorists want, it would seem to only validate the attacks upon gaysand lesbians made by conservatives. Sullivan (1996) also criticizesqueer theorists for relying upon Foucault's account of power, which heargues does not allow for meaningful resistance. It seems likely,however, that Sullivan's understanding of Foucault's notions of powerand resistance are misguided.4. ConclusionThe debates about homosexuality, in part because they often involvepublic policy and legal issues, tend to be sharply polarized. Thosemost concerned with homosexuality, positively or negatively, are alsothose most engaged, with natural law theorists arguing for gays andlesbians having a reduced legal status, and queer theorists engaged incritique and deconstruction of what they see as a heterosexist regime.Yet the two do not talk much to one another, but rather ignore or talkpast one another. There are some theorists in the middle. For example,Michael Sandel takes an Aristotelian approach from which he argues thatgay and lesbian relationships can realize the same goods thatheterosexual relationships do (Sandel, 1995). He largely shares theaccount of important human goods that natural law theorists have, yetin his evaluation of the worth of same-sex relationships, he is clearlysympathetic to gay and lesbian concerns. Similarly, Bruce Bawer (1993)and Andrew Sullivan (1995) have written eloquent defenses of full legalequality for gays and lesbians, including marriage rights. Yet neitherargue for any systematic reform of broader American culture orpolitics. In this they are essentially conservative. Therefore, ratherunsurprisingly, these centrists are attacked from both sides. Sullivan,for example, has been criticized at length both by queer theorists(e.g., Phelan, 2001) and natural law theorists (e.g., George,1999).Yet as the foregoing also clearly shows, the policy and legaldebates surrounding homosexuality involve fundamental issues ofmorality and justice. Perhaps most centrally of all, they cut to issuesof personal identity and self-definition. Hence there is another, andeven deeper, set of reasons for the polarization that marks thesedebates.BibliographyBawer, Bruce, 1993, A Place at the Table: The Gay Individual inAmerican Society. New York: Poseidon Press.–––, 1996. Beyond Queer: Challenging GayLeft Orthodoxy. New York: The Free Press.Berman, Paul, 1993, “Democracy and Homosexuality” inThe New Republic. 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NewYork: Penguin Books.Rich, Adrienne, 1980, “Compulsory Heterosexuality and LesbianExistence” in Women, Sex, and Sexuality. Edited byCatharine Stimpson and Ethel Spector Person. Chicago: University ofChicago Press.Sandel, Michael J., 1995, “Moral Argument and LiberalToleration: Abortion and Homosexuality” in New CommunitarianThinking: Persons, Virtues, Institutions, and Communities. Editedby Amitai Etzioni. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky, 1990, Epistemology of the Closet.Berkeley: University of California Press.Shilts, Randy, 1993, Conduct Unbecoming: Gays and Lesbians inthe U.S. Military. New York: St. Martin's Press.Spargo, Tasmin, 1999, Foucault and Queer Theory. New York:Totem Books.Stychin, Carl F., 2005, "Being Gay" Government andOpposition", Vol.40: 90-109.Sullivan, Andrew, 1995, Virtually Normal: An Argument aboutHomosexuality. New York: Knopf.Weitham, Paul J., 1997, “Natural Law, Morality, and SexualComplementarity” in Sex, Preference, and Family: Essay on Lawand Nature. Edited by David M. Estlund and Martha C. Nussbaum. NewYork: Oxford University Press.Wilson, James Q., 1996, “Against Homosexual Marriage”Commentary, Vol.101, No.3 (March): 34-39.Other Internet ResourcesLesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgendered Philosophy Web SiteRelated Entries Aquinas, Saint Thomas | ethics: natural law tradition | feminist (topics): perspectives on sexuality | feminist (topics): perspectives on the self | Foucault, Michel Copyright © 2006 byBrent Pickett<bpick@uwyo.edu> |
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