David Hume (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Cite this entry Search the SEP • Advanced Search • Tools • RSS FeedTable of Contents• What's New• Archives• Projected ContentsEditorial Information• About the SEP• Editorial Board• How to Cite the SEP• Special CharactersSupport the SEPContact the SEP ©Metaphysics Research Lab,CSLI,Stanford University  Open access to the SEP is made possible by a world-wide funding initiative. Please Read How You Can Help Keep the Encyclopedia FreeDavid HumeFirst published Mon Feb 26, 2001; substantive revision Wed Jul 4, 2007The most important philosopher ever to write in English, David Hume(1711-1776) — the last of the great triumvirate of “Britishempiricists” — was also well-known in his own time as anhistorian and essayist. A master stylist in any genre, Hume's majorphilosophical works — A Treatise of Human Nature(1739-1740), the Enquiries concerning Human Understanding(1748) and concerning the Principles of Morals (1751), aswell as the posthumously published Dialogues concerning NaturalReligion (1779) — remain widely and deeplyinfluential. Although many of Hume's contemporaries denounced hiswritings as works of scepticism and atheism, his influence is evidentin the moral philosophy and economic writings of his close friend AdamSmith. Hume also awakened Immanuel Kant from his “dogmatic slumbers”and “caused the scales to fall” from Jeremy Bentham's eyes. CharlesDarwin counted Hume as a central influence, as did “Darwin's bulldog,”Thomas Henry Huxley. The diverse directions in which these writerstook what they gleaned from reading Hume reflect not only the richnessof their sources but also the wide range of his empiricism. Today,philosophers recognize Hume as a precursor of contemporary cognitivescience, as well as one of the most thoroughgoing exponents ofphilosophical naturalism. 1. Life and Works2. Some Interpretive Questions3. The Treatise and the Enquiries4. A Third Species of Philosophy5. Empiricism6. Hume's Account of Definition 7. Association8. The Universe of the Imagination 9. Interpretive Questions Resolved10. Causation and Inductive Inference: The Negative Phase11. Causation and Inductive Inference: The Positive Phase12. Necessary Connection and the Definition of Cause13. Moral Philosophy14. Politics, Criticism, History, and ReligionBibliography Hume's Works Bibliographical Studies Works on Hume Other Internet ResourcesRelated Entries1. Life and WorksBorn in Edinburgh, Hume spent his childhood at Ninewells, the family'smodest estate on the Whitadder River in the border lowlands nearBerwick. His father died just after David's second birthday, “leavingme, with an elder brother and a sister under the care of our Mother, awoman of singular Merit, who, though young and handsome, devotedherself to the rearing and educating of her Children.” (All quotationsin this section are from Hume's autobiographical essay, “My Own life”,reprinted in HL.) Katherine Falconer Home realized that young David was “uncommonlywake-minded” — precocious, in her lowland dialect — sowhen his brother went up to Edinburgh University, David, not yettwelve, joined him. He read widely in history and literature, as wellas ancient and modern philosophy, and also studied some mathematicsand contemporary science. Hume's family thought him suited for a career in the law, but hepreferred reading classical authors, especially Cicero, whoseOffices became his secular substitute for The Whole Dutyof Man and his family's strict Calvinism. Pursuing the goal ofbecoming “a Scholar & Philosopher,” he followed a rigorous programof reading and reflection for three years until “there seem'd to beopen'd up to me a New Scene of Thought.”The intensity of developing this philosophical vision precipitated apsychological crisis in the isolated scholar. Believing that “a moreactive scene of life” might improve his condition, Hume made “a veryfeeble trial” in the world of commerce, as a clerk for a Bristol sugarimporter. The crisis passed and he remained intent on articulating his“new scene of thought.” He moved to France, where he could livefrugally, and finally settled in La Flèche, a sleepy village inAnjou best known for its Jesuit college. Here, where Descartes andMersenne studied a century before, Hume read French and othercontinental authors, especially Malebranche, Dubos, and Bayle; heoccasionally baited the Jesuits with iconoclastic arguments; and,between 1734 and 1737, he drafted A Treatise of HumanNature.Hume returned to England in 1737 to ready the Treatise forthe press. To curry favor with Bishop Butler, he “castrated” hismanuscript, deleting his controversial discussion of miracles, alongwith other “nobler parts.” Book I, Of the Understanding, andBook II, Of the Passions, was published anonymously in 1739.Book III, Of Morals, appeared in 1740, as well as ananonymous Abstract of the first two books. Although othercandidates, especially Adam Smith, have occasionally been proposed asthe Abstract's author, scholars now agree that it is Hume'swork. The Abstract features a clear, succinct account of “onesimple argument” concerning causation and the formation ofbelief. Hume's elegant summary presages his “recasting” of thatargument in the first Enquiry.The Treatise was no literary sensation, but it didn't “falldead-born from the press,” as Hume disappointedly described itsreception. And despite his surgical deletions, the Treatiseattracted enough of a “murmour among the zealots” to fuel his life-longreputation as an atheist and a sceptic.Back at Ninewells, Hume published two modestly successful volumes ofEssays, Moral and Political in 1741 and 1742. When the Chairof Ethics and Pneumatical (“Mental”) Philosophy at Edinburgh becamevacant in 1745, Hume hoped to fill it, but his reputation provokedvocal and ultimately successful opposition. Six years later, he stoodfor the Chair of Logic at Glasgow, only to be turned down again. Humenever held an academic post.In the wake of the Edinburgh debacle, Hume made the unfortunatedecision to accept a position as tutor to the Marquess of Annandale,only to find that the young man was insane and his estate managerdishonest. With considerable difficulty, Hume managed to extricatehimself from this situation, accepting the invitation of his cousin,Lieutenant-General James St. Clair, to be his Secretary on a militaryexpedition against the French in Quebec. Contrary winds delayedSt. Clair's fleet until the Ministry canceled the plan, only to spawna new expedition that ended as an abortive raid on the coastal town ofL'Orient in Brittany.Hume also accompanied St. Clair on an extended diplomatic mission tothe courts of Vienna and Turin in 1748. (“I wore the uniform of anofficer.”) While he was in Italy, the Philosophical Essaysconcerning Human Understanding appeared. A recasting of thecentral ideas of Book I of the Treatise, thePhilosophical Essays were read and reprinted, eventuallybecoming part of Hume's Essays and Treatises under the titleby which they are known today, An Enquiry concerning HumanUnderstanding. In 1751, this Enquiry was joined by asecond, An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals. Humedescribed the second Enquiry, a substantially rewrittenversion of Book III of the Treatise, as “incomparably thebest” of all his works. More essays, the PoliticalDiscourses, appeared in 1752, and Hume's correspondence revealsthat a draft of the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion wasalso well underway at this time.An offer to serve as Librarian to the Edinburgh Faculty of Advocatesgave Hume the opportunity to work steadily on another project, aHistory of England, which was published in six volumes in1754, 1756, 1759, and 1762. His History became a best-seller,finally giving him the financial independence he had longsought. (Both the British Library and the Cambridge University Librarystill list him as “David Hume, the historian.”)But even as a librarian, Hume managed to arouse the ire of the“zealots.” In 1754, his order for several “indecent Books unworthy ofa place in a learned Library” prompted a move for his dismissal, andin 1756, an unsuccessful attempt to excommunicate him. The Library'sTrustees canceled his order for the offending volumes, which Humeregarded as a personal insult. Since he needed the Library's resourcesfor his History, Hume remained at his post, but he did turnover his salary to Thomas Blacklock, a blind poet he befriended andsponsored. Hume finished his research for the History in1757, and quickly resigned to make the position available for AdamFerguson.Despite his resignation from the Advocates' Library and the success ofhis History, Hume's work continued to be surrounded bycontroversy. In 1755, he was ready to publish a volume that includedThe Natural History of Religion and A Dissertation on thePassions as well as the essays “Of Suicide” and “Of theImmortality of the Soul.” When his publisher, Andrew Millar, wasthreatened with legal action through the machinations of the minortheologian, William Warburton, Hume suppressed the offensive essays,substituting “Of Tragedy” and “Of the Standard of Taste” to round outhis Four Dissertations, which was finally published in1757.In 1763, Hume accepted an invitation from Lord Hertford, theAmbassador to France, to serve as his Private Secretary. During histhree years in Paris, Hume became Secretary to the Embassy andeventually its Chargè d'Affaires. He also become the rage ofthe Parisian salons, enjoying the conversation and company of Diderot,D'Alembert, and d'Holbach, as well as the attentions and affections ofthe salonnières, especially the Comtesse deBoufflers. (“As I took a particular pleasure in the company of modestwomen, I had no reason to be displeased with the reception I met withfrom them.”)Hume returned to England in 1766, accompanied by Jean-JacquesRousseau, who was then fleeing persecution in Switzerland. Theirfriendship ended quickly and miserably when the paranoid Rousseaubecame convinced that Hume was masterminding an internationalconspiracy against him.After a year (1767-68) in London as an Under-Secretary of State, Humereturned to Edinburgh to stay in August, 1769. He built a house inEdinburgh's New Town, and spent his autumnal years quietly andcomfortably, dining and conversing with friends, not all of whom were“studious and literary,” for Hume also found that his “company was notunacceptable to the young and careless.” One young person who foundhis company particularly “acceptable” was an attractive, vivacious,and highly intelligent woman in her twenties — Nancy Orde, thedaughter of Chief Baron Orde of the Scottish Exchequer. One of Hume'sfriends described her as “one of the most agreeable and accomplishedwomen I ever knew.” Also noted for her impish sense of humor, shechalked “St. David's Street” on the side of Hume's house one night;the street still bears that name today. The two were close enough thatshe advised Hume in choosing wallpaper for his new home, and rumorsthat they were engaged even reached the ears of thesalonnières in Paris. Just before his death, Humeadded a codicil to his will, which included a gift to her of “tenGuineas to buy a Ring, as a Memorial of my Friendship and Attachmentto so amiable and accomplished a Person.” Hume also spent considerable time in his final years revising hisworks for new editions of his Essays and Treatises, whichcontained his collected essays, the two Enquiries, ADissertation on the Passions, and The Natural History ofReligion, but — significantly — not A Treatise ofHuman Nature. In 1775, he added an “Advertisement” to thesevolumes, in which he appeared to disavow the Treatise. Thoughhe regarded this note as “a compleat Answer” to his critics,especially “Dr. Reid and that biggotted, silly fellow, Beattie,”subsequent readers have wisely chosen to ignore Hume's admonition toignore his greatest philosophical work.Upon finding that he had intestinal cancer, Hume prepared for hisdeath with the same peaceful cheer that characterized his life. Hearranged for the posthumous publication of his most controversialwork, the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion; it was seenthrough the press by his nephew and namesake in 1779, three yearsafter his uncle's death.2. Some Interpretive Questions At the beginning of the first Enquiry, Hume maintains that we“must cultivate true metaphysics with some care, in order to destroythe false and adulterate” (EHU 12). But when he explains what “truemetaphysics” is, it turns out not to be metaphysics at all. Hume isurging nothing less than the total reform of philosophy. A centralpart of his program is the profoundly anti-metaphysical aim ofabandoning the a priori search for theoretical explanations thatsupposedly give us insight into the ultimate nature of reality,replacing these “hypothes[es], which can never be made intelligible”with an empirical, descriptive inquiry that answers questions about“the science of human nature” in the only way they can be intelligiblyanswered.Understanding how and why Hume repudiates metaphysics will help usbetter understand the shape of his philosophical project. The best wayto do that is to look at the places where Hume sets out his programfor the reform of philosophy: the “Introduction” and the openingsections of A Treatise of Human Nature, and Section I of thefirst Enquiry. Looking afresh at these passages will not onlyclarify the nature of Hume's project, it will also help resolveseveral currently debated questions about it, including: the relation between the Treatise and the firstEnquiry, and whether one work should be regarded as havinginterpretive priority over the other; the relation between the negative and positive aspects of his project; the nature of, and the proper relations among, his empiricism, his scepticism, and his naturalism.These questions, especially the last, have generated increasingly complex responses in recent Hume scholarship.3. The Treatise and the EnquiriesHume's apparent disavowal of the Treatise in his“Advertisement” raises a question as to how we should read hisworks. Should we take his “Advertisement” literally and letthe Enquiries represent his considered view? Or should wetake him seriously and conclude — whatever hemay have said or thought — that the Treatise is thebest statement of his position?Both responses presuppose that there are substantial enoughdifferences between the two works to warrant our reading themdisjointly. This is highly dubious. Even in the “Advertisement,” Humesays that “most of the principles, and reasonings, contained in thisvolume, were published” in the Treatise, and that he has“cast the whole anew in the following pieces, where some negligencesin his former reasoning and more in the expression, are…corrected”(EHU, “Advertisement”). Despite his protests, this hardly sounds likethe claims of one who has genuinely repudiated his earlier work.Hume reinforced this perspective when he wrote his friend GilbertElliot of Minto that “the philosophical principles are the same inboth…by shortening and simplifying the questions, I really renderthem much more complete” (HL, I:158). And in “My Own Life,” he addedthat the Treatise's lack of success “proceeded more from themanner than the matter.” It is not unreasonable to conclude thatHume's “recasting” of the Treatise was primarily designed toaddress this point. The following brief overview of Hume's centralviews on method, epistemology, and ethics therefore follows thestructure — “the manner” — of theEnquiries and emphasizes the content — “thematter” — they have in common with the Treatise.4. A Third Species of PhilosophyIn his “Introduction” to the Treatise, Hume bemoans the sorrystate of philosophy, evident even to “the rabble without doors,” whichhas given rise to “that common prejudice against metaphysicalreasonings of all kinds,” that is, “every kind of argument which is inany way abstruse, and requires some attention to be comprehended” (T,xiv).Hume intends to correct this miserable situation. In An Enquiryconcerning the Principles of Morals, he says that he will “followa very simple method” that will nonetheless bring about “a reformationin moral disquisitions” similar to that recently achieved in naturalphilosophy, where we have been cured of “a common source of illusionand mistake” — our “passion for hypotheses and systems.” To makeparallel progress in the moral sciences, we should “reject everysystem…however subtle or ingenious, which is not founded on fact andobservation,” and “hearken to no arguments but those which are derivedfrom experience” (EPM, 173-175).The “hypotheses and systems” Hume has in mind cover a wide range ofphilosophical and theological views. These theories were tooentrenched, too influential, and too different from his proposedscience of human nature for him just to present his “new scene ofthought” as their replacement. He needed to show why we should rejectthese theories, in order to make space to develop his own.Hume outlines his strategy in the first section of An Enquiryconcerning Human Understanding. Beginning by defining “moralphilosophy” as “the science of human nature,” and thereby identifyinghis project with that of the Treatise, Hume distinguishes two“species,” or “two different manners” in which moral philosophy may betreated. Although seemingly encouraging us to regard them as mutuallyexclusive and jointly exhaustive, it is clear by the end of thesection that Hume has rejected both species in favor of whathe considers the proper way to pursue the science of human nature— a third species of philosophy.The first species of philosophy looks at humans as active creatures,driven by desires and feelings and “influenced…by taste andsentiment,” seeking some things and avoiding others according to theirperceived value. Since they regard virtue as the most valuable thinghumans can pursue, these philosophers attempt “to excite and regulateour sentiments” in order to “bend our hearts to the love of probityand true honor.” They paint a flattering picture of human nature, easyto understand and even easier to accept. They make us feelwhat they say about our feelings, and what they say is souseful and agreeable that ordinary people are readily inclined toaccept their views. This species of philosophy is easily recognizableas a generic characterization of positions defended in Hume's time byShaftesbury and Francis Hutcheson.In sharp contrast, the second species of philosophy seeks more to formour understandings than to cultivate our manners. These philosophersregard humans as reasonable rather than active creatures, and studyhuman nature “to find those principles, which regulate ourunderstanding, excite our sentiments, and make us approve or blame anyparticular object, action, or behaviour.” They seek to discoverhidden truths that will “fix, beyond controversy, the foundations ofmorals, reasoning, and criticism.” In framing their theories, theymove from particular cases to general principles, and continue to“push on their enquiries to principles more general,” until theyarrive at “those original principles, by which, in every science, allhuman curiousity must be bounded” (EHU, 6). This view not onlyglorifies reason, but also appeals to it in its emphasis on rarefiedspeculation and abstract argument. Hume is clear that “the generality of mankind” will always prefer the“easy and obvious philosophy” — his first species — overthe “accurate and abstruse” second species. If they did so without“throwing any blame or contempt on the latter,” then perhaps no harmwould be done. But repeating almost verbatim his point from the“Introduction” to the Treatise, Hume notes that “the matteris often carried farther, even to the absolute rejecting of allprofound reasonings, or what is commonly called metaphysics” (EHU,9).Hostility to metaphysics, however, isn't entirely unjustified. Itisn't merely obscure; it is also “the inevitable source of uncertaintyand error.” This is “the justest and most plausible objection againsta considerable part of metaphysics, that they are not properly ascience.” Instead, these theories “arise either from the fruitlessefforts of human vanity, which would penetrate into subjects utterlyinaccessible to the understanding, or from the craft of popularsuperstitions, which, being unable to defend themselves on fairground, raise these entangling branches to cover and protet theirweakness” (EHU, 11).Metaphysics not only indulges in speculation that goes well beyond thebounds of sense, and so loses its claim to be a science, it also aidsand abets the construction of metaphysical smoke screens as cover for“popular superstitions.” Since this garbage won't degrade by itself,philosophers should “perceive the necessity of carrying the war intothe most secret recesses of the enemy.” And the only way toconvincingly reject the “abstruse questions” of traditionalmetaphysics is to “enquire seriously into the human understanding, andshow, from an exact analysis of its powers and capacity, that it is byno means fitted for such remote and abstruse subjects…[We] mustcultivate true metaphysics with some care, to destroy the false andadulterate” (EHU, 12). Thus a prominent part of Hume's approach to discovering “the properprovince of human reason” is essentially negative and critical. Theonly way of ridding ourselves of speculative metaphysicians and theirreligious camp followers is to engage with them, which demands that wealso engage in difficult and sometimes very abstract arguments: Accurate and just reasoning is the only catholic remedy, fitted forall persons and all dispositions, and is alone able to subvert thatabstruse philosophy and metaphysical jargon, which being mixed up withpopular superstition, renders it in a manner impenetrable to carelessreasoners, and gives it the air of science and wisdom (EHU,12-3).But “besides this advantage of rejecting…[this] uncertain anddisagreeable part of learning,” engaging in “accurate and justreasoning” is not just a negative activity: “there are many positiveadvantages, which result from accurate scrutiny into the powers andfaculties of human nature” (EHU, 13).Hume proposes to replace the “airy sciences” of the metaphysicianswith a descriptive “delineation of the parts and powers of the mind.”Traditional metaphysics went wrong in attempting to speculate aboutthe “ultimate original principles” governing human nature, for indoing so, they went beyond anything that could have legitimatecognitive content, which is why their “hypotheses and systems” weren'tproperly sciences.Hume makes the same point in the “Introduction” to theTreatise: “any hypothesis, that pretends to discover theultimate original qualities of human nature ought to be rejected aspresumptuous and chimerical.” Once we see the “impossibility ofexplaining ultimate principles,” we can reject theories that pretendto provide them. And once we do, we can get clear about the proper wayto study human nature: “The essence of the mind being equally unknownto us with that of external bodies, it must be equally impossible toform any notion of its powers and qualities otherwise than fromcareful and exact experiments, and the observation of particulareffects, which result from different circumstances and situations.” Sothe Treatise also recommends the repudiation of metaphysics,and outlines a positive program whereby “the only solid foundation”for the science of human nature “must be laid on experience andobservation” (T, xvi-xvii).When Hume spells out this same positive program in theEnquiry, he first calls his project “true metaphysics,” tomark the contrast with the “false metaphysics” he has rejected. Butwhen he explains what “true metaphysics” is, it isn't metaphysics atall. It is an empirical inquiry, not an a priori one, and as such, isa genuine alternative to the contentless speculations of previousphilosophies. His preferred terms for his project, “mental geography”and “anatomy of the mind,” are better characterizations of how heconceives of his descriptive anti-metaphysical alternative totraditional ways of theorizing about human nature.Hume's program for reform in philosophy thus has two related aspects:the elimination of metaphysics and the establishment of an empiricalexperimental science of human nature. He shifts the focus of inquiryaway from the traditional search for “ultimate original principles” inorder to concentrate on describing the “original principles” that infact govern human nature. He does so because claims to have found“ultimate principles” are not just false, they are incoherent, becausethey go beyond anything that can be experienced.5. Empiricism This combination of negative and positive aims is a distinguishingfeature of Hume's particular brand of empiricism, and the strategy hedevised to achieve these aims is revelatory of his philosophicalgenius. For Hume, all the materials of thinking —perceptions — are derived either fromsensation (“outward sentiment”) or from reflection(“inward sentiment”) (EHU, 19). He divides perceptions into twocategories, distinguished by their different degrees of force andvivacity. Our “more feeble” perceptions, ideas, areultimately derived from our livelier impressions (EHU,Section II; T, I.i.1-2).Hume begins both the Treatise and the Enquiry withan account of impressions and ideas because he thinks that allcontentful philosophical questions can be asked and answered in thoseterms. Trying to go beyond perceptions, as metaphysics must,inevitably involves going beyond anything that can have cognitivecontent. No wonder the “hypotheses” that purport to give us the“ultimate original principles” that constitute traditional metaphysicsturn out not to be incoherent.Although we permute and combine ideas in the imagination to formcomplex ideas of things we haven't experienced, Hume is adamant thatour creative powers extend no farther than “the materials afforded usby the senses and experience.” Complex ideas are composed ofsimple ideas, which are fainter copies of the simpleimpressions from which they are ultimately derived, to which theycorrespond and exactly resemble. Hume offers this “generalproposition” as his “first principle…in the science of humannature” (T, 7). Usually called the “Copy Principle,” Hume'sdistinctive brand of empiricism is often identified with hiscommitment to it.Hume presents the Copy Principle as an empirical thesis. He emphasizesthis point by offering “one contradictory phenomenon” (T, 5-6; EHU,20-21) — the infamous missing shade of blue — as anempirical counterexample to the Copy Principle. Hume asks us toconsider “a person to have enjoyed his sight for thirty years, and tohave become perfectly well acquainted with colours of all kinds,excepting one particular shade of blue…”(T, 6). Then“Let all the different shades of that colour, except that singleone, be plac'd before him, descending gradually from the deepest to thelightest; ‘tis plain, that he will perceive a blank, where that shadeis wanting, and will be sensible, that there is a greater distance inthat place betwixt the contiguous colours, than in any other. Now Iask, whether ‘tis possible for him, from his own imagination, to supplythis deficiency, and raise up to himself the idea of that particularshade, tho’ it had never been conveyed to him by his senses? I believethere are few but will be of the opinion that he can; and this mayserve as a proof, that the simple ideas are not always derived from thecorrespondent impressions; tho’ the instance is so particular andsingular, that ‘tis scarce worth our observing, and does not merit thatfor it alone we should alter our general maxim” (T 6).Hume's critics have objected that in offering this counterexample, heeither unwittingly destroys the generality of the Copy Principle,which he needs, given the uses to which he will put it, or else hisdismissive attitude toward the counterexample reflects hisdisingenuous willingness to apply the Copy Principle arbitrarily,while pretending that it really possesses the generality his uses ofit require.Hume's defenders, on the other hand, maintain either that he shouldhave granted that the imaginative construction of the missing shadereally produces a complex idea, or that he should haveinsisted that such counterexamples are exceedingly rare, and that thecontentious metaphysical ideas, the cognitive content of which he usesthe Copy Principle to critique, are not possibly ideas that could begenerated by the imagination in the way the idea of the missing shadeis supposedly generated.Maintaining that the imaginatively constructed shade is a complex idearuns counter to what Hume actually says, however, and without somereason to convince us that philosophically contentious ideas couldn'talso be constructed in similar ways by the imagination, the claimremains unsupported and therefore unsatisfying.Fortunately, there is a more satisfying resolution of the issue raisedby the missing shade available to Hume. Once arranged in the way Humedescribes, the simple ideas of the shades of blue that we haveexperienced bear a close mental resemblance to a paint store'sfamiliar physical chips of the various shades, displayed on cardboardordered by shade. Hume plausibly maintains that we would first noticethat there is a gap where the shade is missing from our mentalordering of the shades of blue, just as we would also easily noticewhen a chip was missing from the physical array. Even though each physical chip presents us with what for Hume is asimple impression of that shade, the paint store also has a formulafor mixing paint of that shade. The formula gives the proportions ofthe component color pigments that are needed to create paint of thatexact shade. Once mixed, however, when we perceive the newly mixedpaint, we are now having a simple impression (ignoring the fact thatthe paint is spatially extended and therefore gives us a compleximpression of many simple impressions of the shade) of the previouslymissing shade. We can't decompose the paint, once mixed, in the waythat (say) we can take apart a car. In Humean terms, our idea of theshade of blue is simple, while our idea of the car is complex.Now consider creating the missing physical shade by simply mixing the appropriate proportions of the shades on either side of the space where it should be. When we perceive the result of the mixing, we again have a simple impression of the no-longer missing physical shade of blue. So now imagine doing an analogous kind of “mental mixing” in the imagination: although the missing shade is now mentally mixed from two simple ideas, the result is a single shade of blue, and so should also be a simple idea, just like the ideas of each individual shade on either side of it in the array.Although the missing shade has no direct antecedent in impressions, itis not totally independent of them, either. The two shades that wereused to mentally mix the the formerly missing shade were caused by andresemble simple impressions in the usual way. We can also immediatelysee that there is an extremely limited number of ideas that could becaused in this or any other closely related manner, so the fear thatadmitting the creation of the missing shade would open the floodgatesto a range of philosophical suspect ideas is not a realisticone. Besides, most of these theoretical notions would be complex,anyway. So Hume can retain the Copy Principle as an empiricalprinciple, admit this harmless counterexample to it as genuine, andstill use the Copy Principle as a way of determining cognitivecontent, or lack of it.6. Hume's Account of Definition While Hume's empiricism is usually identified with the Copy Principle,it is his use of its reverse in his account ofdefinition that is really the most distinctive and innovativeelement of his system.As his diagnosis of traditional metaphysics indicates, Hume believesthat “the chief obstacle…to our improvement in the moral ormetaphysical sciences is the obscurity of the ideas, and ambiguity ofthe terms” (EHU, 61). However, Hume argues that conventionaldefinitions — defining terms in terms of other terms —replicate philosophical confusions by substituting synonyms for theoriginal and thus never break out of a narrow “definitional circle.”Determining the cognitive content of an idea or term requiressomething else.To make progress, we need “to pass from words to the true and realsubject of the controversy” (EHU 80) — the ideas involved. Humebelieves he has found a mechanism that permits us to do so — hisaccount of definition, which he touts as “a new microscope or speciesof optics” (EHU 62), predicting that it will produce as dramaticresults in the moral sciences as its hardware counterparts haveproduced in natural philosophy.This account of definition is a device for precisely determining thecognitive content of words and ideas. Hume uses a simple series oftests to determine cognitive content. Begin with a term. Ask what ideais annexed to it. If there is no such idea, then the term has nocognitive content, however prominently it figures in philosophy ortheology. If there is an idea annexed to the term, and it is complex,break it up into the simple ideas that compose it. Then trace thesimple ideas back to their original impressions: “These impressionsare all strong and sensible. They admit not of ambiguity. They are notonly placed in a full light themselves, but may throw light on theircorrespondent ideas, which lie in obscurity” (EHU, 62). If the process fails at any point, the idea in question lackscognitive content. When carried through successfully, however, thetheory yields a “just definition” — a precise account of thetroublesome idea or term. So, whenever we are suspicious that a“philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as is toofrequent), we need but enquire, from what impression is thatsupposed idea derived? And if it be impossible to assign any,this will serve to confirm our suspicion. By bringing ideas into soclear a light we may reasonably hope to remove all dispute, which mayarise, concerning their nature and reality” (EHU, 22;Abstract, T, 648-9).7. AssociationThe Copy Principle accounts for the origins of our ideas. Butour ideas are also regularly connected. As Hume put the pointin his “Abstract” of the Treatise, “there is a secret tie orunion among particular ideas, which causes the mind to conjoin themmore frequently together, and makes the one, upon its appearance,introduce the other” (T, 662). A science of human nature should account for these connections.Otherwise, we are stuck with an eidetic atomism — a setof discrete, independent ideas, unified only in that they are thecontents of a particular mind. Eidetic atomism thus fails to explainhow ideas are “bound together,” and its inadequacy in this regardencourages us, as Hume thought it encouraged Locke, to postulatetheoretical notions — power and substance being the mostnotorious — to account for the connections we find among ourideas. Eidetic atomism is thus a prime source of the philosophical“hypotheses” Hume aims to eliminate.Hume argues that, although “it be too obvious to escape observation,that different ideas are connected together; I do not find that anyphilosopher has attempted to enumerate or class all the principles ofaccociation” (EHU 24). His introduction of these “principles ofassociation” is the other distinctive feature of his empiricism, sodistinctive that in the Abstract he advertises it as his mostoriginal contribution: “If any thing can intitle the author to soglorious a name as that of an inventor, ‘tis the use he makes ofthe principle of the association of ideas” (T, 661-662).The principles required for connecting our ideas aren't theoreticaland rational; they are natural operations of the mind that weexperience in “internal sensation.” Hume identifies “three principlesof connexion” or association: resemblance, contiguity, and cause andeffect. Of the three, causation is the strongest: there is no relation, which produces a stronger connexion in thefancy, and makes one idea more readily recall another, than therelation of cause and effect betwixt their objects. (T,11) Causation is also the only associative principle that takes us “beyondthe evidence of our memory and senses.” It establishes a link orconnection between past and present experiences with events that wepredict or explain, so that “all reasonings concerning matter of factseem to be founded on the relation of cause and effect.” Causation isalso the least understood of the associative principles, but “we shallhave occasion afterwards to examine it to the bottom, and thereforeshall not at present insist upon it” (T, 11).Hume suggests that his identification of the principles of associationis the equivalent, for the science of human nature, of Newton'sdiscovery of the Law of Gravitation for the physical world, and likethe inverse square law, the associative principles are “original.”Trying to account further for them takes one illegitimately beyond thebounds of experience: Here is a kind of Attraction, which in the mental world will be foundto have as extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to shew itselfin as many and as various forms. Its effects are every whereconspicuous; but as to its causes, they are mostly unknown, and mustbe resolv'd into original qualities of human nature, which Ipretend not to explain. Nothing is more requisite for a truephilosopher, than to restrain the intemperate desire of searching intocauses, and having establish'd any doctrine upon a sufficient numberof experiments, rest contented with that, when he sees a fartherexamination would lead him into obscure and uncertain speculations.(T, 13) 8. The Universe of the Imagination Hume believes that the science of human nature can only beintelligibly and successfully pursued in terms of the “originalprinciples” he has identified: impressions and the associativemechanisms: Since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and sinceall ideas are deriv'd from something antecedently present to the mind,it follows, that 'tis impossible for us so much as to conceive or forman idea of any thing specifically different from ideas andimpressions. Let us fix our attention out of ourselves as much aspossible; let us chase our imagination to the heavens, or to theutmost limits of the universe; we never really advance a step beyondourselves, nor can conceive any kind of existence, but thoseperceptions, which have appear'd in that narrow compass. This is theuniverse of the imagination, nor have we any idea but what is thereproduc'd. (T, 67-8) Hume explains more about how “the universe of the imagination” worksin Part iii, Book I, of the Treatise: Belief or assent, which always attends the memoryand senses, is nothing but the vivacity of those perceptions theypresent; and that this alone distinguishes them from theimagination. To believe is in this case to feel an immediateimpression of the senses, or a repetition of that impression in thememory. 'Tis merely the force and liveliness of the perception, whichconstitutes the first act of the judgment, and lays the foundation ofthat reasoning, when we trace the relation of cause and effect. (T,86) “We form a kind of system” of these strong impressions of sense andmemory ,“comprehending whatever we remember to have been present,either to our internal perception or senses; and every particular ofthis system, joined to the present impressions, we are pleas'd to calla reality” (T, 108). So although impressions are not,strictly speaking, capable of truth or falsity, the systematiccharacter of the “universe of the imagination” gives us a means ofaccepting or rejecting impressions. The standard, roughly, iscoherence: As to those impressions, which arise from the senses, theirultimate cause is, in my opinion, perfectly inexplicable by humanreason, and 'twill always be impossible to decide with certainty,whether they arise immediately from the object, or are produc'd by thecreative power of the mind, or are deriv'd from the author of ourbeing. Nor is such a question in any way material to our presentpurpose. We may draw inferences from the coherence of our perceptions,whether they be true or false; whether they represent nature justly,or be mere illusions of the senses. (T, 84) Impressions, like passions, pleasures and pains, are “originalexistences,” which “arise in the soul originally fromunknown causes” (T, 7). Only ideas can represent somethingbeyond themselves; they represent the impressions that caused them,which they copy. Thus they are capable of truth or falsity, ofaccurate representation or misrepresentation. Impressions, however,are not representative and so they are not, strictly speaking, capableof truth or falsity.Impressions are corrigible, however, and they can be measuredby a standard. There is a distinction between thecorrigibility of a perception and its being arepresentation of something external to itself. So denyingthat impressions are representative of something over and above otherperceptions does not commit Hume to some version of subjectivism oridealism. Hume's “system,” however, isn't complete when “the universe of theiamgination” is populated only with impressions of sense andmemories. As he stated earlier, the senses and memory are only “thefirst acts of judgment.” For the mind stops not here. For finding, with this system of perceptionsthere is another connected by custom, or, if you will, by the relationof cause and effect, it proceeds to the consideration of their ideas;and as it feels that 'tis in a manner necessarily determin'd to viewthese particular ideas, and that the custom or relation, by which itis determin'd, admits not of the least change, it forms them into anew system, which it likewise dignifies with the title ofrealities. The first of these systems is the object of thememory and senses; the second of the judgment. (T, 108) With the addition of causation, Hume's “system” now extends beyond theimmediate testimonies of our senses and the records of our memories,providing a much more extensive web of belief, and a more fine-grainedmechanism for accepting or rejecting impressions on the basis of theircoherence, or lack of it, with the whole. Causal inference, Humemaintains peoples the world, and brings us acquainted with such existences as,by their removal in time and place, lie beyond the reach of my sensesand memory. By means of it I paint the universe in my imagination, andfix my attention on any part of it I please. (T, 108) Hume's “system” now incorporates all his beliefs: All this, and every thing else which I believe, are nothing butideas, tho', by their force and settlled order, arising from customand the relation of cause and effect, they distinguish themselves fromthe other ideas, which are merely the offspring of the imagination.(T, 108) In saying that everything he believes is “nothing but ideas,” Hume issaying that everything he beieves can be traced back toperceptions. But the buck stops there. Speculating about the causes ofperceptions, where those causes are supposed to be something over andabove perceptions, is to engage in the kind of search for “ultimateprinciples” that he has rejected, along with traditional metaphysics,as incoherent. That is what he means by saying that perceptions are“original existences.”This should not be read as claiming that Hume thinks of theobservations a Humean scientist of human nature is supposed to carryout as a matter of “observing his Lockean ideas by introspection.”Rather, as Janet Broughton stresses, we ought to think of the scientist of man as being perfectly entitledto observe people seeing, hearing (etc.) thingds, and perfectlyentitled to discriminate between perceptions that are sensations(seeing, hearing, etc., something) and those that are not. (“What Doesthe Scientist of Man Observe?” Hume Studies 18.2 (1992):155-68) The testimony of others can lead me to revise my “system,” butreceiving their testimony is a latter of my having certainexperiences. These experiences consist of various complex perceptions,but constitute my experience of books, papers, table, chairs, andother people.Here is a sketch of how Hume's “system” works: When I wake up and hear certain familiar sounds, I come to believethat it is raining. My judgment is a representation becausethere are perceptions of the sight and feel of rain, perceptions thatI will have if I go to the window and look, or if I go outside andfeel the rain. These perceptions are the “facts” my judgmentis about. My judgment is the result of a causal process: given my pastassociations between a certain kind of soud and the presence of rain,plus a present impression of that certain kind of sound, Iexpect that if I go to the window I will see it raining on myroses. My expectation is representative, and capable of truth orfalsity. So if I go to the window to look at my roses, and see thatCharlotte is hosing off the screen on our bedroom window, then mybelief misrepresented the facts, and what I believed was false. Butthe facts that lead me to regard my judgment as true or false, asaccurately representing or as misrepresenting those facts, arethemelves perceptions — impressions, and they are notrepresentative of anything beyond themselves. Just as individual impressions are corrigible, the system as a wholeis fallible, and thus fallibility is at the heart of what Hume in thefirst Enquiry calls “mitigated scepticism.” Modifying and— it is to be hoped — improving the system is a processbest described by Neurath's metaphor of the sailors who must repairtheir boat while keeping it afloat. Hume has shown that a systemallegedly built on more secure “foundations” — “principles” thatgo beyond perceptions and are somehow supposed to validate them— is a metaphysical pipe-dream, not the legitimate basis of acoherent account of human nature, judgment, and belief.But in rejecting the “ultimate principles” of traditonal metaphysicsas incoherent, isn't Hume committing himself to an equallyquestionable picture of the ultimate nature of reality, one that saysthat there are only impressions, ideas, and the inferences wemake from them? No. In choosing to restrict his discussion ofquestions about the nature of human nature in terms of perceptions,Hume is answering what he takes to be empirical questions in the onlycoherent way that they can be answered. Metaphysics tempts us toregard these answers as making claims about the ultimate nature ofreality. Hume shows us how to resist that temptation. It is in thisthat the depth and originality of his project for the reform ofphilosophy consists.9. Interpretive Questions ResolvedThe account we now have before us of the methodology and the basicelements of Hume's philosophy will go a long way toward resolving thequestions of interpretation raised earlier. In particular, thisaccount has shown that:Whatever the differences between the Treatise and thefirst Enquiry, the project Hume proposes is substantially thesame in both works;Hume's project clearly involves both a negative orcritical phase, the elimination of metaphysics, as well as apositive or constructive phase of developing anempirical, descriptive science of human nature. The two aspects of hisproject are brought to together by the device he employs to carry outeach phase — his account of definition as a way of accuratelydetermining cognitive content, or the lack of it;Hume's empiricism is defined by his treatment of thescience of human nature as an empirical inquiry, rooted in experienceand observation, and his naturalism is also closely relatedto his conception of his project as an empirical inquiry, to hislimitation of investigation to “original principles,” and hisrepudiation of any attempt to discover “ultimate original qualities”in the study of human nature. Hume's scepticism has twoaspects: the first is scepticism about the possibility of metaphysicaltheories, or any “hypothesis or system” that attempts to go beyondexperience and observation.(This kind of scepticism about certainways of doing philosophy shouldn't be confused withphilosophical scepticism.) The second aspect of hisscepticism is what Hume calls “mitigated or moderate scepticism,”which we might more naturally today call “fallibilism”: it consists ofthe recognition of our cognitive limitations and proneness otcognitive errors, as well as an injunction to limit inquiry “to suchsubjects as are best adapted to the narrow limits of humanunderstanding” (EHU, 162), by which he means those to which we cangive clear cognitive content, which dovetails nicely with the otheraspects of his program. 10. Causation and Inductive Inference: The Negative Phase Causation is not only the strongest associative relation, it is alsothe most important, since “by means of that relation alone we can gobeyond the evidence of our memory and senses.” So causation is thebasis of all our reasoning concerning matters of fact, and in our“reasonings … it is constantly supposed that there is aconnexion between the present fact and that which is inferred from it”(EHU, 26-7).The next question, then, is: What is the nature of this “connexion”and how is it established? Hume proceeds first negatively, to show that our causal inferences arenot due to reason, or any operation of the understanding. Reasoningconcerns either relations of ideas or matters offact. Hume quickly establishes that, whatever assures us that acausal relation obtains, it is not reasoning concerning relationsbetween ideas. Effects are distinct events from their causes: we canalways conceive of one such event occurring and the other not. Socausal reasoning can't be a priori reasoning.Causes and effects are discovered, not by reason but throughexperience, when we find that particular objects are constantlyconjoined with one another. We tend to overlook this because mostordinary causal judgments are so familiar; we've made them so manytimes that our judgment seems immediate. But when we consider thematter, we realize that “an (absolutely) unexperienced reasoner couldbe no reasoner at all” (EHU, 45n). Even in applied mathematics, wherewe use abstract reasoning and geometrical methods to apply principleswe regard as laws to particular cases in order to derive furtherprinciples as consequences of these laws, the discovery of theoriginal law itself was due to experience and observation, not toa priori reasoning.Even after we have experience of causal connections, our conclusionsfrom those experiences aren't based on any reasoning or on any otherprocess of the understanding. They are based on our past experiencesof similar cases, without which we could draw no conclusions atall.But this leaves us without any link between the past and the future.How can we justify extending our conclusions from past observation andexperience to the future? The connection between a proposition thatsummarizes past experience and one that predicts what will occur atsome future time is surely not an intuitive connection; it needs to beestablished by reasoning or argument. The reasoning involved musteither be demonstrative, concerning relations of ideas, orprobable, concerning matters of fact and existence.There is no room for demonstrative reasoning here. We can alwaysconceive of a change in the course of nature. However unlikely it mayseem, such a supposition is intelligible and can be distinctlyconceived. It therefore implies no contradiction, so it can't beproven false by a priori demonstrative reasoning.Probable reasoning can't establish the connection, either, since it isbased on the relation of cause and effect. What we understand of thatrelation is based on experience and any inference from experience isbased on the supposition that nature is uniform — that thefuture will be like the past.The connection could be established by adding a premise stating thatnature is uniform. But how could we justify such a claim? Appeal toexperience will either be circular or question-begging. For any suchappeal must be founded on some version of the uniformity principleitself — the very principle we need to justify.This argument exhausts the ways reason might establish a connectionbetween cause and effect, and so completes the negative phase ofHume's project. The explanatory model of human nature which makesreason prominent and dominant in thought and action is indefensible.Scepticism about it is well-founded: the model must go.Hume insists that he offers his “sceptical doubts about the operationsof the understanding,” not as “discouragement, but rather anincitement…to attempt something more full and satisfactory”(EHU, 26). Having cleared a space for his own account, Hume is nowready to do just that.11. Causation and Inductive Inference: The Positive PhaseHume's negative argument showed that our causal expectations aren'tformed on the basis of reason. But we do form them, and “if the mindbe not engaged by argument…it must be induced by some otherprinciple of equal weight and authority” (EHU, 41).This principle can't be some “intricate or profound” metaphysicalargument Hume overlooked. For all of us — ordinary people,infants, even animals — “improve by experience,” forming causalexpectations and refining them in the light of experience. Hume's“sceptical solution” limits our inquiries to common life, where nosophisticated metaphysical arguments are available and none arerequired.When we examine experience to see how expectations are actuallyproduced, we discover that they arise after we have experienced “theconstant conjunction of two objects;” only then do we “expect the onefrom the appearance of the other.” But when “repetition of anyparticular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the sameact or operation…we always say, that this propensity is theeffect of Custom” (EHU, 43).So the process that produces our causal expectations is itselfcausal. Custom or habit “determines the mind…to suppose thefuture conformable to the past.” But if this background of experiencedconstant conjunctions was all that was involved, then our “reasonings”would be merely hypothetical. Expecting that fire will warm, however,isn't just conceiving of its warming, it is believingthat it will warm. Belief requires that there also be some fact present to the senses ormemory, which gives “strength and solidity to the related idea.” Inthese circumstances, belief is as unavoidable as is the feeling of apassion; it is “a species of natural instinct,” “the necessary resultof placing the mind” in this situation.Belief is “a peculiar sentiment, or lively conception produced byhabit” that results from the manner in which ideas areconceived, and “in their feeling to the mind.” It is “nothing but amore vivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady conception of an object,than what the imagination alone is ever able to attain” (EHU, 49).Belief is thus “more an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitativepart of our natures” (T, 183), so that “all probable reasoning isnothing but a species of sensation” (T, 103). This should not besurprising, given that belief is “so essential to the subsistence ofall human creatures.” “It is more conformable to the ordinary wisdomof nature to secure so necessary an act of the mind, by some instinctor mechanical tendency” than to trust it “to the fallacious deductionsof our reason” (EHU, 55). Hume's “sceptical solution” thus gives adescriptive alternative, appropriately “independent of all thelaboured deductions of the understanding,” to philosophers' attemptsto account for our causal “reasonings” by appeal to reason andargument. For the other notions in the definitional circle, “either wehave no idea of force or energy, and these words are altogetherinsignificant, or they can mean nothing but that determination of thethought, acquir'd by habit, to pass from the cause to its usualeffect” (T, 657).12. Necessary Connection and the Definition of Cause Although causation is the strongest associative relation, as well asthe most important, our philosophical understanding of causation andthe ideas closely related to it is seriously deficient: “there are noideas, which occur in metaphysics, more obscure and uncertain, thanthose of power, force, energy or necessary connexion” (EHU,61-2). Hume wants to “fix, if possible, the precise meaning of theseterms, and thereby remove some part of that obscurity, which is somuch complained of in this species of philosophy” (EHU, 62). Thisproject provides a crucial experiment for Hume's account ofdefinition, one designed to prove the worth of his method, to providea paradigm for investigating problematic philosophical and theologicalnotions, and to supply valuable material for these inquiries. In doingso, he accounts in his own terms for the necessary connectionso many philosophers have taken to be an essential component of theidea of causation.As we should expect from the preceding discussion, when we examine asingle case of two events we regard as causally related, ourimpressions are only of their conjunction; the single case,taken by itself, yields no notion of their connection. Whenwe go beyond the single case to examine the background of experiencedconstant conjunctions of similar pairs of events, we find little toadd, for “there is nothing in a number of instances, different fromevery single instance, which is supposed to be exactly similar” (EHU,75). How can the mere repetition of conjunctions produce aconnection?While there is indeed nothing added to our external senses bythis exercise, something does happen: “after a repetition of similarinstances, the mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of oneevent, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it willexist.” We feel this transition as an impression ofreflection, or internal sensation, and it isthis feeling of determination that is “the sentiment orimpression from which we form the idea of power or necessaryconnexion. Nothing farther is in the case” (EHU, 75).Although the impression of reflection — the internal sensation— is the source of our idea of the connection, that experiencewouldn't have occurred if we hadn't had the requisite impressions ofsensation — the external impressions — of the currentsituation, together with the background of memories of our pastimpressions of relevant similar instances.All the impressions involved are relevant to a completeaccount of the origin of the idea, even though they seem, strictlyspeaking, to be “drawn from objects foreign to the cause.” Hume sums up all of the relevant impressions in not one but twodefinitions of cause. The relation — or the lack of it— between these definitions has been a matter of considerablecontroversy. If we follow his account of definition, however, thefirst definition, which defines a cause as “an object, followed byanother, and where all objects similar to the first are followed byobjects similar to the second” (EHU, 76), accounts for all theexternal impressions involved in the case. His second definition,which defines a cause as “an object followed by another, and whoseappearance always conveys the thought to that other” (EHU, 77)captures the internal sensation — the feeling of determination— involved. Both are definitions, by Hume's account,but the “just definition” of cause he claims to provide isexpressed only by the conjunction of the two: only together do thedefinitions capture all the relevant impressions involved.Hume's account of causation provides a paradigm of how philosophy, ashe conceives it, should be done. He goes on to apply his method toother thorny traditional problems of philosophy and theology: libertyand necessity, miracles, design. In each case, the moral is that apriori reasoning and argument gets us nowhere: “it is onlyexperience which teaches us the nature and bounds of cause and effect,and enables us to infer the existence of one object from that ofanother. Such is the foundation of moral reasoning, which forms thegreater part of human knowledge, and is the source of all human actionand behaviour” (EHU, 164). Since we all have limited experience, ourconclusions should always be tentative, modest, reserved, cautious.This conservative, fallibilist position, which Hume callsmitigated scepticism, is the proper epistemic attitude foranyone “sensible of the strange infirmities of human understanding”(EHU, 161).13. Moral PhilosophyThe cautious attitude Hume recommends is noticeably absent in moralphilosophy, where “systems and hypotheses” have also “perverted ournatural understanding,” the most prominent being the views of themoral rationalists — Samuel Clarke, Locke, and WilliamWollaston, the theories of “the selfish schools” — Hobbes andMandeville — and the pernicious theological ethics of “theschools,” whose promotion of the dismal “monkish virtues” frame acatalogue of virtues diametrically opposed to Hume's. Although heoffers arguments against the “systems” he opposes, Hume thinks thestrongest case against them is to be made descriptively: all thesetheories offer accounts of human nature that experience andobservation prove false.Against the moral rationalists — the intellectualists of moralphilosophy — who hold that moral judgments are based on reason,Hume maintains that it is difficult even to make their hypothesisintelligible (T, 455-470; EPM, Appendix I). Reason, Hume argues,judges either of matters of fact or of relations. Morality neverconsists in any single matter of fact that could be immediatelyperceived, intuited, or grasped by reason alone; morality forrationalists must therefore involve the perception of relations. Butinanimate objects and animals can bear the same relations to oneanother that humans can, though we don't draw the same moralconclusions from determining that objects or animals are in a givenrelation as we do when humans are in that samerelation. Distinguishing these cases requires more than reason alonecan provide. Even if we could determine an appropriate subject-matterfor the moral rationalist, it would still be the case that, afterdetermining that a matter of fact or a relation obtains, theunderstanding has no more room to operate, so the praise or blame thatfollows can't be the work of reason.Reason, Hume maintains, can at most inform us of the tendencies ofactions. It can recommend means for attaining a given end, but itcan't recommend ultimate ends. Reason can provide no motive to action,for reason alone is insufficient to produce moral blame orapprobation. We need sentiment to give a preference to the usefultendencies of actions.Finally, the moral rationalists' account of justice fares no better.Justice can't be determined by examining a single case, since theadvantage to society of a rule of justice depends on how it works ingeneral under the circumstances in which it is introduced.Thus the views of the moral rationalists on the role of reason inethics, even if they can be made coherent, are false.Hume then turns to the claims of “the selfish schools,” thatmorality is either altogether illusory (Mandeville) or can be reducedto considerations of self-interest (Hobbes). He argues that an accuratedescription of the social virtues, benevolence and justice, will showthat their views are false.There has been much discussion over the differences between Hume'spresentation of these arguments in the Treatise and thesecond Enquiry. “Sympathy” is the key term in theTreatise, while benevolence does the work in theEnquiry. But this need not reflect any substantial shift indoctrine. If we look closely, we see that benevolence plays much thesame functional role in the Enquiry that sympathy plays inthe Treatise. Hume sometimes describes benevolence as amanifestation of our “natural” or “social sympathy.” In both texts,Hume's central point is that we experience this “feeling for humanity”in ourselves and observe it in others, so “the selfish hypothesis” is“contrary both to common feeling and to our most unprejudiced notions”(EPM, 298).Borrowing from Butler and Hutcheson, Hume argues that, howeverprominent considerations of self-interest may be, we do find caseswhere, when self-interest is not at stake, we respond withbenevolence, not indifference. We approve of benevolence in others,even when their benevolence is not, and never will be, directed towardus. We even observe benevolence in animals. Haggling over how muchbenevolence is found in human nature is pointless; that there is anybenevolence at all refutes the selfish hypothesis.Against Hobbes, Hume argues that our benevolent sentiments can't bereduced to self-interest. It is true that, when we desire thehappiness of others, and try to make them happy, we may enjoy doingso. But benevolence is necessary for our self-enjoyment, and althoughwe may act from the combined motives of benevolence and enjoyment, ourbenevolent sentiments aren't identical with our self-enjoyment.We approve of benevolence in large part because it is useful.Benevolent acts tend to promote social welfare, and those who arebenevolent are motivated to cultivate the other social virtue,justice. But while benevolence is an original principle in humannature, justice is not. Our need for rules of justice isn't universal;it arises only under conditions of relative scarcity, where propertymust be regulated to preserve order in society.The need for rules of justice is also a function of a society'ssize. In very small societies, where the members are more of anextended family, there may be no need for rules of justice,because there is no need for regulating property — noneed, indeed, for our notion of property at all. Only whensociety becomes extensive enough that it is impossible for everyone init to be part of one's “narrow circle” does the need for rules ofjustice arise.The rules of justice in a given society are “the product of artificeand contrivance.” They are constructed by the society to solve theproblem of how to regulate property; other rules might do just aswell. The real need is for some set of “general inflexiblerules…adopted as best to serve public utility” (EPM, 305).Hobbesians try to reduce justice to self-interest, because everyonerecognizes that it is in their interest that there be rules regulatingproperty. But even here, the benefits for each individual result fromthe whole scheme or system being in place, not from the fact that eachjust act benefits each individual directly. As with benevolence, Humeargues that we approve of the system itself even where ourself-interest isn't at stake. We can see this not only from cases inour own society, but also when we consider societies distant in spaceand time.Hume's social virtues are related. Sentiments of benevolence draw usto society, allow us to perceive its advantages, provide a source ofapproval for just acts, and motivate us to do just acts ourselves. Weapprove of both virtues because we recognize their role in promotingthe happiness and prosperity of society. Their functional roles are,nonetheless, distinct. Hume compares the benefits of benevolence to “awall, built by many hands, which still rises by every stone that isheaped upon it, and receives increase proportional to the diligenceand care of each workman,” while the happiness justice produces islike the results of building “a vault, where each individual stonewould, of itself, fall to the ground” (EPM, 305).“Daily observation” confirms that we recognize and approve of theutility of acts of benevolence and justice. While much of theagreeableness of the utility we find in these acts may be due to thefact that they promote our self-interest, it is also true that, inapproving of useful acts, we don't restrict ourselves to those thatserve our particular interests. Similarly, our private interests oftendiffer from the public interest, but, despite our sentiments in favorof our self-interest, we often also retain our sentiment in favor ofthe public interest. Where these interests concur, we observe asensible increase of the sentiment, so it must be the case that theinterests of society are not entirely indifferent to us.With that final nail in Hobbes' coffin, Hume turns to develop hisaccount of the sources of morality. Though we often approve ordisapprove of the actions of those remote from us in space and time,it is nonetheless true that, in considering the acts of (say) anAthenian statesman, the good he produced “affects us with a lesslively sympathy,” even though we judge their “merit to be equallygreat” as the similar acts of our contemporaries. In such cases ourjudgment “corrects the inequalities of our internal emotions andperceptions; in like manner, as it preserves us from error, in theseveral variations of images, presented to our external senses” (EPM,227). Adjustment and correction is necessary in both cases if we areto think and talk consistently and coherently.“The intercourse of sentiments” that conversation produces is thevehicle for these adjustments, for it takes us out of our own peculiarpositions. We begin to employ general language which, since it isformed for general use, “must be moulded on some general views… .” In so doing, we take up a “general” or “common point ofview,” detached from our self-interested perspectives, to form “somegeneral unalterable standard, by which we may approve or disapprove ofcharacters and manners.” We begin to “speak another language” —the language of morals, which “implies some sentiment common to allmankind, which recommends the same object to general approbation, andmakes every man, or most men, agree in the same opinion or decisionconcerning it. It also implies some sentiment, so universal andcomprehensive as to extend to all mankind, and render the actions andconduct, even of the persons the most remote, an object of applause orcensure, according as they agree or disagree with that rule of rightwhich is established. These two requisite circumstances belong aloneto the sentiment of humanity here insisted on” (EPM, 272). It is theextended or extensive sentiment of humanity —benevolence or sympathy — that for Hume is ultimately “thefoundation of morals.”But even if the social virtues move us from a perspective ofself-interest to one more universal and extensive, it might appearthat the individual virtues do not. But since these virtuesalso receive our approbation because of their usefulness, and since“these advantages are enjoyed by the person possessed of thecharacter, it can never be self-love which renders the prospect ofthem agreeable to us, the spectators, and prompts our esteem andapprobation” (EPM, 234).Just as we make judgments about others, we are aware, from infancy,that others make judgments about us. We desire their approval andmodify our behavior in response to their judgments. This love offame gives rise to the habit of reflectively evaluating our ownactions and character traits. We first see ourselves as others see us,but eventually we develop our own standards of evaluation, keeping“alive all the sentiments of right and wrong,” which “begats, in noblenatures, a certain reverence” for ourselves as well as others, “whichis the surest guardian of every virtue” (EPM, 276). The generalcharacter of moral language, produced and promoted by our socialsympathies, permits us to judge ourselves and others from the generalpoint of view, the proper perspective of morality. For Hume, that is“…the most perfect morality with which we are acquainted” (EPM,276).Hume summarizes his account in this definition of virtue, orPersonal Merit: “every quality of the mind, which isuseful or agreeable to the person himselfor to others, communicates a pleasure to the spectator,engages his esteem, and is admitted under the honourable denominationof virtue or merit” (EPM, 277). That is, as observers — ofourselves as well as others — to the extent that we regardcertain acts as manifestations of certain character traits, weconsider the usual tendencies of acts done from those traits, and findthem useful or agreeable, to the agent or to others, and approve ordisapprove of them accordingly. A striking feature of this definitionis its precise parallel to the two definitions of cause thatHume gave as the conclusion of his central argument in the firstEnquiry. Both definitions pick out features of events, andboth record a spectator's reaction or response to those events.14. Politics, Criticism, History, and ReligionHume's “Advertisement” for the first two books of theTreatise promised subsequent works on morals, politics andcriticism, but his Political Discourses, “Of Tragedy,” and“Of the Standard of Taste” are our only hints as to what he might havesaid about those topics.Hume's political essays range widely, covering not only theconstitutional issues one might expect, but also venturing into whatwe now call economics, dealing with issues of commerce, luxury, andtheir implications for society. His treatments of these scatteredtopics exhibit a unity of purpose and method that makes the essaysmuch more than the sum of their parts, and links them, not only withhis more narrowly philosophical concerns, but also with his earliermoral and literary essays.Adopting a causal, descriptive approach to the problems he discusses,Hume stresses that current events and concerns are best understood bytracing them historically to their origins. This approach contrastssharply with contemporary discussions, which treated these events asthe products of chance, or — worse — of providence. Humesubstitutes a concern for the “moral causes” — the human choicesand actions — of the events, conditions, or institutions heconsiders. This thoroughly secular approach is accentuated by hiswillingness to point out the bad effects of superstition andenthusiasm on society, government, and political and social life.“Of the Standard of Taste” is a rich contribution to the then-emergingdiscipline of what we now call aesthetics. This complex essaycontains a lucid statement of Hume's views on what constitutes “justcriticism,” but it is not just about criticism, as somereaders are beginning to realize. Though Hume's account of aestheticjudgment precisely parallels his account of causal and moral judgment,the essay also contains a discussion of how a naturalistic theorymight deal with questions of normativity, and so is important, notjust as a significant contribution to Hume's overall view, but alsofor its immediate relevance for problems in contemporary empiricalnaturalism.Hume's History of England, published in six volumes over asmany years in the 1750s, recalls his characterization, in the firstEnquiry, of history as “so many collections of experiments.”Hume not surprisingly rejects the theoretical commitments of both Toryand Whig accounts of British history, and offers what he believes isan impartial account that looks at political institutions ashistorical developments responsive to Britons' experience of changingconditions, evaluating political decisions in the contexts in whichthey were made, instead of second-guessing them in the light ofsubsequent developments.The Natural History of Religion is also a history ina sense, though it has been described as “philosophical” or“conjectural” history. It is an account of the origins and developmentof religious beliefs, with the thinly-disguised agenda of making clearnot only the nonrational origins of religion, but also of exposing anddescribing the pathology of its current forms. Religion began in thepostulation, by primitive peoples, of “invisible intelligences” toaccount for frightening, uncontrollable natural phenomena, such asdisease and earthquakes. In its original forms, it was polytheistic,which Hume regards as relatively harmless because of its tolerance ofdiversity. But polytheism eventually gives way to monotheism, when thefollowers of one deity hold sway over the others. Monotheism isdogmatic and intolerant; worse, it gives rise to theological systemswhich spread absurdity and intolerance, but which use reason tocorrupt philosophical thought. But since religion is not universal inthe way that our nonrational beliefs in causation or physical objectsare, perhaps it can eventually be dislodged from human thinkingaltogether.Hume's Natural History cemented his reputation as a religioussceptic and an atheist, even before its publication. Prompted by hisown prudence, as well as the pleas of his friends, he resistedpublishing the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, whichhe had worked on since the early 1750s, though he continued revisingthe manuscript until his death. An expansion and dramatic revision ofthe argument previewed in Section XI of the first Enquiry,the Dialogues are so riddled with irony that controversystill rages as to what character, if any, speaks for Hume. But hisdevastating critique of the argument from design leaves no doubt that— scholarly details about its enigmatic final section aside— the conclusions philosophers and theologians have drawn fromthat argument go far beyond any evidence the argument itselfprovides.A fitting conclusion to a philosophical life, the posthumouslypublished Dialogues would alone insure the philosophical andliterary immortality of their author. In this magnificent work, Humedemonstrates his mastery of the dialogue form, while producingthe preeminent work in the philosophy of religion.BibliographyHume's WorksThe abbreviations and texts cited above are as follows: [T]A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge,2nd ed. revised by P.H. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975. [Pagereferences above are to this edition.]A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by David Fate Nortonand Mary J. Norton, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2000[EHU]Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, in Enquiriesconcerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles ofMorals, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd edition revised by P. H.Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975. [Page references above are tothis edition.]An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, edited by TomL. Beauchamp, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1999[EPM]Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd edition revised by P. H. Nidditch, Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1975. [Page references above are to thisedition.]Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, edited by TomL. Beauchamp, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1998[HL]The Letters of David Hume, edited by J.Y.T. Greig, 2volumes, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932. [This edition also containsHume's autobiographical essay, “My Own Life” (HL, I:1-7).]Other works by Hume and editions of Hume's writings are: Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, edited by NormanKemp Smith, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1935The Natural History of Religion, edited by H. E. Root,Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967Essays, Moral, Political, Literary, edited by Eugene F.Miller, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985The History of England, edited by William B. Todd,Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1983In addition to the letters found in [HL], Hume's correspondence may befound in: New Letters of David Hume, edited by Raymond Klibansky andErnest C. Mossner, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954Finally, the closest thing at present to a complete edition remainsthat of Green and Grose: The Philosophical Works of David Hume, edited by T. H.Green and T. H. Grose. 4 volumes, London: Longman, Green, 1874-75Bibliographical StudiesA useful bibliography of work on Hume is: Hall, Roland. Fifty Years of Hume Scholarship: ABibliographical Guide, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,1978Hall also prepared annual bibliographies of the Hume literature forHume Studies, a journal specializing in work on Hume, for theyears 1977-1986; these bibliographies appeared in the November issuesof that journal from 1978 to 1988Hume Studies revived the practice of includingbibliographies with its November 1994 issue, which contained acomprehensive bibliography of the Hume literature from 1986-1993 byWilliam Edward Morris. Subsequent volumes contain annual supplements tothis bibiliography, also by MorrisWorks on HumeÁrdal, Páll S. Passion and Value in Hume'sTreatise, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1966; 2nd edition,revised, 1989Baier, Annette C. A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections onHume's Treatise, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991Beauchamp, Tom L. and Alexander Rosenberg. Hume and the Problemof Causation, New York: Oxford University Press, 1981Bennett, Jonathan. Learning from Six Philosophers, Two Volumes, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001Bennett, Jonathan. Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes,Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971Blackburn, Simon. Essays in Quasi-Realism, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993Bricke, John. Hume's Philosophy of Mind, Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1980Box, Mark A. The Suasive Art of David Hume, Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1990Buckle, Stephen. Hume's Enlightenment Tract: The Unity and Purpose of An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001Capaldi, Nicholas. Hume's Place in Moral Philosophy, NewYork: Peter Lang, 1989Dicker, Georges. Hume's Epistemology and Metaphysics: An Introduction, London and New York: Routledge, 1998Earman, John. Hume's Abject Failure: The Argument Against Miracles, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000Fodor, Jerry A. Hume Variations, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003Fogelin, Robert J. A Defense of Hume on Miracles, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003Fogelin, Robert J. Hume's Scepticism in the Treatise ofHuman Nature, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985Frasca-Spada, Marina. Space and the Self in Hume's Treatise, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998Frasca-Spada, Marina and Peter J. E. Kail (eds.) Impressions of Hume, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005Garrett, Don. Cognition and Commitment in Hume'sPhilosophy, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1996Harris, James A. Of Liberty and Necessity: The Free Will Debate in Eighteenth-Century British Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005Jones, Peter. Hume's Sentiments, Edinburgh: EdinburghUniversity Press, 1982Livingston, Donald W. Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium:Hume's Pathology of Philosophy, Chicago: University of ChicagoPress, 1998Livingston, Donald W. Hume's Philosophy of Common Life,Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984Loeb, Louis E. Stability and Justification in Hume's Treatise, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002Millican, Peter (ed.) Reading Hume on Human Understanding, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002Mossner, Ernest Campbell. The Life of David Hume, London:Nelson, 1954Noonan, Harold W. Hume on Knowledge, London and New York: Routledge, 1999Norton, David Fate (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Hume,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993Norton, David Fate. David Hume, Common Sense Moralist,Sceptical Metaphysician, Princeton: Princeton University Press,1982Noxon, James. Hume's Philosophical Development, Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1973Owen, David. Hume's Reason, Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 2000.Passmore, John. Hume's Intentions, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1952Pears, David. Hume's System, Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1990Penelhum, Terence. Themes in Hume: The Will, The Self,Religion, Oxford Clarendon Press, 2000Penelhum, Terence. Hume, London: Macmillan, 1975Price, H. H. Hume's Theory of the External World, Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1940Radcliffe, Elizabeth S. A Companion to Hume, Oxford:Blackwell, 2007Read, Rupert and Kenneth A. Richman. The New Hume Debate,New York and London: Routledge, 2000Russell, Paul. Freedom and Moral Sentiment, New York:Oxford University Press, 1995Smith, Norman Kemp. The Philosophy of David Hume, London:Macmillan, 1941Stanistreet, Paul. Hume's Scepticism and the Science of HumanNature, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002Stewart, John B. Opinion and Reform in Hume's PoliticalPhilosophy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992Stewart, M. A. and John P. Wright. Hume and Hume'sConnexions, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994Strawson, Galen. The Secret Connexion: Causation, Realism andDavid Hume, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989Stroud, Barry. Hume, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,1977Traiger, Saul. The Blackwell Guide to Hume's Treatise,Oxford: Blackwell, 2006Tweyman, Stanley. David Hume: Critical Assessments, SixVolumes, London and New York: Routledge, 1995Waxman, Wayne. Hume's Theory of Consciousness, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1994Wright, John P. The Sceptical Realism of David Hume,Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983Other Internet ResourcesThe Hume Society, based at the Philosophy Department, University of Iceland David Hume page, by Bill Uzgalis (Philosophy/OregonState University), including links to texts of the Enquiry Ty's Hume Homepage, maintained by D. TyceriumLightnerEntries on Hume in the Internet Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy, by James Fieser, U. Tennessee/Martin Hume's Life and Writings Hume's Metaphysical and Epistemological Theories Hume's Moral Theories Hume's Writing's on Religion Hume's Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary Related Entries Berkeley, George | Hobbes, Thomas | Hume, David: Newtonianism and Anti-Newtonianism | Locke, John | miracles Copyright © 2007 byWilliam Edward Morris<wmorris@iwu.edu> |
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