Albert of Saxony (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Cite this entry Search the SEP • Advanced Search • Tools • RSS FeedTable of Contents• What's New• Archives• Projected ContentsEditorial Information• About the SEP• Editorial Board• How to Cite the SEP• Special CharactersSupport the SEPContact the SEP ©Metaphysics Research Lab,CSLI,Stanford University  Open access to the SEP is made possible by a world-wide funding initiative. Please Read How You Can Help Keep the Encyclopedia FreeAlbert of SaxonyFirst published Mon Jan 29, 2001; substantive revision Thu Feb 5, 2004Albert of Saxony (ca. 1316-1390), Master of Arts at Paris, then Rectorof the University of Vienna, and finally Bishop of Halberstadt(Germany). As a logician, he was at the forefront of the movement thatexpanded the analysis of language based on the properties of terms,especially their reference (in Latin: suppositio), but also inthe exploration of new fields of logic, especially the theory ofconsequences. As a natural philosopher, he worked in the tradition ofJohn Buridan and contributed to the spread of Parisian naturalphilosophy throughout Italy and central Europe. 1. Life and Works2. Logic3. Natural Philosophy4. Impact and InfluenceBibliographyOther Internet ResourcesRelated Entries1. Life and WorksIn the later Middle Ages Albert of Saxony (Albertus deSaxonia) was sometimes called Albertucius (LittleAlbert), to distinguish him from the thirteenth-century theologianAlbert the Great. He was born at Rickensdorf, in the region ofHelmstedt (Lower Saxony) in present-day Germany around 1316. Afterinitial schooling in his native area, and possibly a sojourn at Erfurt,he made his way to Prague and then on to Paris. He was member of theEnglish-German Nation and became a master of arts in 1351. He wasRector of the University of Paris in 1353. He remained in Paris until1362, during which time he taught arts and studied theology at theSorbonne, apparently without obtaining a degree in the latterdiscipline. His logical and philosophical works were composed duringthis period. After two years of carrying out diplomatic missionsbetween the Pope and the Duke of Austria, he was charged with foundingthe University of Vienna, of which he became the first Rector in 1365.Appointed canon of Hildesheim in 1366, he was also named Bishop ofHalberstadt the same year, serving in that office until his death onJuly 8, 1390. Not having left any theological writings or a commentary onAristotle's Metaphysics (at least none that we know of),Albert is primarily known for his works on logic and naturalphilosophy, though he also wrote commentaries on Aristotle'sNicomachean Ethics and Economics, as well as severalshort mathematical texts (the Treatise on Proportions andQuestion on the Squaring of the Circle).Albert's masterwork in logic is a summa entitled thePerutilis logica (Very Useful Logic). He also composed avoluminous collection of Sophismata, which examines numeroussentences that raise difficulties of interpretation due to the presenceof syncategorematic words -- i.e., terms such as quantifiers andcertain prepositions, which, according to medieval logicians, do nothave a proper and determinate signification but rather modify thesignification of the other terms in the propositions in which theyoccur. He also wrote several question commentaries:Quaestiones on the Ars Vetus or Old Logic (i.e., theIsagoge of Porphyry and Aristotle's Categories andDe Interpretatione), Quaestiones on the PosteriorAnalytics, and a series of 25 Quaestiones logicales(Logical Questions), addressed to semantic problems and the status oflogic. Of dubious authenticity are the treatises Deconsequentiis (On Consequences) and De locis dialecticis(On Dialectical Topics), which have been attributed to him in aParisian manuscript.The most renowned philosopher when Albert studied and taught in theFaculty of Arts at Paris was John Buridan. Albert belonged to the firstgeneration of masters who in one form or other carried on the traditionof Buridan in logic and natural philosophy. For a long time he wasthought to have been a pupil or follower of Buridan, but this idea hasrecently been questioned, especially in connection with his logicalwritings. Albert's work differs from Buridan's in many respects and,unlike Buridan, he seems to have been influenced by certain ideas andmethods imported from England. His logic depends very much on Ockham's,but also evident is the influence of William Heytesbury on hisSophismata and Thomas Bradwardine on his treatment of motion.Walter Burley was another important influence on Albert, though this issomewhat puzzling in view of the fact that they had opposing views onthe nature of universals. In any case, Burley seems to have been onAlbert's mind when he wrote his commentary on the NicomacheanEthics as well as when we was developing his theory ofconsequences. It has also been suggested (though the evidence here ismore sparse) that Albert was acquainted with and made reference to theviews of Thomas Maulfelt, who probably taught at Paris around 1330.These different influences have sometimes made Albert seem no morethan an eclectic compiler of the views of others. But, in addition toproviding the context for some of his own contributions, Albert'sfluency with the views of his contemporaries gives him a unique placein the development of logic and philosophy at the University of Parisin the fourteenth century.2. LogicOn most topics the Perutilis logica is influenced by Ockham'sSumma logicae, though it offers an independent approach in thetreatises on obligations, insolubles, and consequences, which hadassumed greater importance during this period. As has been known forsome time, this work is a remarkable handbook organized into sixtreatises: the first defines the elements of propositions; the secondtreats of the properties of terms; the third of the truth conditions ofdifferent types of proposition; the fourth of consequences (includingsyllogisms, and in fact adding to it the theory of topics); the fifthof fallacies; and the sixth of insolubles and obligations. In the first part of the Perutilis logica, which sets outthe terminology of the entire text, Albert returns to the Ockhamistconception of the sign in so doing distances himself from the positiondefended by Buridan. After clearly including the term (an element ofthe proposition) in the genus of signs -- by which he provides, in thetradition of Ockham, a semiotic approach to logico-linguistic analysis-- he establishes signification through a referential relation to asingular thing, defining the relation of spoken to conceptual signs asa relation of subordination. He is also Ockhamist in his conception ofuniversals, which he regards as spoken or conceptual signs, and in histheory of supposition, which essentially restates the Ockhamistdivisions of supposition. In particular, he restores the notion ofsimple supposition -- i.e., the reference of a term to the concept towhich it is subordinated, when it signifies an extra-mental thing --which had been criticized and rejected by Buridan. Finally, Albert isclose to the Venerabilis Inceptor in his theory of thecategories, where, in contrast to Buridan, he refuses to considerquantity as something absolutely real, reducing it instead to adisposition of substance and quality. Albert in fact contributed asmuch as Ockham to the spread of this conception of the relation betweensubstance and quantity in natural philosophy in Paris and Italy.Albert's treatment of relations is, on the other hand, highlyoriginal. Although (like Ockham) he refuses to make relations intothings distinct from absolute entities, he clearly ascribes them to anact of the soul by which absolute entities are compared and placed inrelation to each other (an act of the referring soul [actus animaereferentis]). This leads him to reject completely certainpropositions Ockham had admitted as reasonable, even if he did notconstrue them in quite the same way, e.g., ‘Socrates is arelation’. Both Ockham and Buridan had allowed that the term‘relation’ could refer to the things related (whetherconnoted or signified) by concrete relative terms (whether collectivelyor not).So Albert was not content with merely repeating Ockhamist arguments.More often than not, he developed and deepened them, e.g., inconnection with the notion of the appellation of form. This property ofpredicates, which had previously been used by the VenerabilisInceptor, was employed by Albert in an original manner when headopted it instead of Buridan's appellation of reason (appellatiorationis) to analyze verbs expressing propositional attitudes.Every proposition following a verb such as ‘believe’ or‘know’ appellates its form. In other words, it must bepossible to designate the object of the belief via the expressionunderstood as identical to itself in its material signification andwithout reformulation. Another area in which Albert deviates fromOckham is his rejection of the idea that any distinction with multiplesenses must have an equivocal proposition as its object. According toAlbert, equivocal propositions can only be conceded, rejected, or leftin doubt.Albert's semantics becomes innovative when he admits thatpropositions have their own proper significate, which is not identicalto that of their terms (see especially his Questions on thePosterior Analytics I, qq. 2, 7, 33). Like syncategorematic terms(see his Questions on the Categories, qu. 1 ‘OnNames’), propositions signify the “mode of a thing[modus rei]”. This position is not repeated in theLogical Questions. In any case, Albert avoids hypostatizingthese modes by explaining them as relations between the things to whichthe terms refer. It cannot be said here that Albert is moving towardsthe “complexly signifiable [complexesignificabile]” of Gregory of Rimini, although his remarksare reminiscent of the latter theory. Still, he uses the idea of thesignification of a proposition to define truth and to explain‘insolubles’, i.e., propositions expressing paradoxes ofself-reference. On Albert's view, every proposition signifies that itis true by virtue of its form. Thus, an insoluble proposition is alwaysfalse because it signifies at the same time that it is true and that itis false.The Questiones circa logicam (Questions on Logic)were written at roughly the same time as the Perutilis logicaand the Questiones circa artem veterem, that is to say about1356. They explore in a series of disputed questions the status oflogic and semantics (on topics such as the relation of words toconcepts, the difference between natural and conventionalsignification, etc.) as well as the theory of reference and truth.Albert defines signification by representation. Hedisinguishes two ways of understanding suppositio, the firstas the act the mind itself; the second as an operation constituting oneof the properties of terms.In his Sophismata, Albert usually follows Heytesbury. Thedistinction between compounded and divided senses, which is presentedin a highly systematic way in Heytesbury's Tractatus de sensucomposito et diviso, is the primary instrument (besides theappellation of form) for resolving difficulties connected withepistemic verbs and with propositional attitudes more generally. Thisis abundantly clear in his discussion of infinity. Rather thanappealing to the increasingly common distinction between thecategorematic and syncategorematic uses of the term‘infinite’ and then indicating the different senses it canhave depending on where it occurs in a proposition, he treats theinfinite itself as a term. Albert's approach involves analyzing thelogical and linguistic conditions of every proposition involving theterm ‘infinite’ that is significant and capable of beingtrue. This leads him to sketch a certain number of possible definitions(where he appears to take into account the teachings of Gregory ofRimini), as well as to raise other questions, e.g., on the relationbetween finite and infinite beings (in propositions such as‘Infinite things are finite [infinita suntfinita]’), on the divisibility of the continuum, and onqualitative infinity. There are echoes in Albert not only of theapproach Buridan had systematically implemented in hisPhysics, but also of the analyses of English authors -- again,especially Heytesbury. As is often the case, although the treatmentproposed by Albert in the Sophismata is quick and somewhateclectic, it provides good evidence of the extent to which philosopherswere gripped by questions about infinity at that time.Finally, one of the fields in which Albert is considered a majorcontributor is the theory of consequences. In the treatise of thePerutilis Logica devoted to consequences, Albert often seemsto follow Buridan. But whereas Buridan maintained the central role ofAristotelian syllogistic, Albert, like Burley, integrated syllogisticand the study of conversions into the theory of consequences.Consequence is defined as the impossibility of the antecedent's beingtrue without the consequent's also being true -- truth itself beingsuch that howsoever the proposition signifies things to be, so theyare. The primary division is between formal and material consequences,the latter being subdivided into consequences simpliciter andut nunc. A syllogistic consequence is a formal consequencewhose antecedent is a conjunction of two quantified propositions andwhose consequent is a third quantified proposition. Albert is thus ledto present a highly systematized theory of the forms of inference,which represents a major step forward in the medieval theory of logicaldeduction.3. Natural PhilosophyIt is this analysis of language together with a particularist ontologythat places Albert in the tradition of nominalism. This is combinedwith an epistemological realism that emerges, e.g., in his analysis ofthe vacuum. In certain respects, Albert's work is an extension ofphysical analysis to imaginary cases. Distinguishing, as Buridan did,between what is absolutely impossible or contradictory and what isimpossible “in the common course of nature” (Questionson De Caelo I, qu. 15), he considers hypotheses undercircumstances that are not naturally possible but imaginable givenGod's absolute power (e.g., the existence of a vacuum and the pluralityof worlds). However, even if we can imagine a vacuum existing by divineomnipotence, no vacuum can occur naturally (Questions on thePhysics IV, qu. 8). Albert refuses to extend the reference ofphysical terms to supernatural, purely imaginary possibilities. In thesame way, one can certainly use the concept of a point, although thiswould only be an abbreviation of a connotative and negative expression.There is no simple concept of a point, a vacuum, or the infinite, andalthough imaginary hypotheses provide an interesting detour, physicsmust in the end provide an account of the natural order of things. Historically, Albert does not enjoy the kind of reputation innatural philosophy he has in logic. His commentaries on thePhysics and De caelo are close to Buridan's, and heappeals to the authority of his “revered masters from the Facultyof Arts at Paris” at the beginning of his questions on Decaelo. Even so, it should be noted that his Physics waswritten before the final version of Buridan's Questions on thePhysics (between 1355 and 1358), which means that he could nothave benefited from the final version of Buridan's lectures.We have already seen that on the question of the status of thecategory of quantity, then at the forefront of logic and physics,Albert followed Ockham and distanced himself from Buridan by reducingquantity to a disposition of substance or quality. This move becomesevident in certain physical questions, e.g., in the study ofcondensation and rarefaction, where Albert openly disagrees with hisParisian master by arguing that condensation and rarefaction arepossible only through the local motion of the parts of a body, andwithout needing to assume some quantity that would have a distinctreality on its own. Nevertheless, he defines the concept of a“lump of matter [materie massa]” without giving itany autonomous reality, although it does help fill out the idea of a‘quantity of matter’, which Giles of Rome had alreadydistinguished from simple extension.Similarly, Albert is sometimes seen as standing alongside Ockham onthe nature of motion, rejecting the idea of motion as a flux(fluxus), which is the position Buridan had adopted. Incontrast to his Buridan, Albert treats locomotion in the same way asalteration (movement according to quality): in neither case is itnecessary to imagine local motion as a res successiva distinctfrom permanent things, at least if the common course of nature holdsand one does not take into account the possibility of divineintervention.Concerning the motion of projectiles, gravitational acceleration,and the motion of celestial bodies, Albert adopts Buridan's majorinnovation, i.e., the theory of impetus, a quality acquired bya moving body (see Buridan's Questions on the Physics VIII,qu. 13, on projectile motion). Like Buridan, he extends this approachto celestial bodies in his commentary on De caelo, clearlyfollowing its consequences in rejecting intelligences as agents ofmotion and in treating celestial and terrestrial bodies using the sameprinciples. Nevertheless, he formulates the idea of impetus inmore classical terms as a virtus impressa (impressed force)and virtus motiva (motive force). Albert makes nopronouncements about the nature of this force, claiming that this is aquestion for the metaphysician. His work also mentions the mean speedtheorem, a method of finding the total velocity of a uniformlyaccelerated (or decelerated) body, which had been stated (thoughwithout being demonstrated) in Heytesbury's Tractatus de motu,and also adopted by Nicole Oresme. Albert was part of a generalscientific trend which sought the first formulations of the principlesof dynamics. He explained a number of curious natural phenomena, takingparticular interest in earthquakes, tidal phenomena, and geologyAlbert explains in a synthetic way the elements of the theory ofproportions, applying this theory to different motions (local motion,alteration, augmentation and diminution). Motion is to be studied "fromthe point of view of the cause" and from the point of view of theeffect. Like Oresme, Albert adopts the idea that motion variesaccording to a geometrical progression when the relation of motiveforces to resistances varies arithmetically. His treatise is lessinnovative than Oresme's, but it is a clear exposition that was verywidely read.Like Buridan his predecessor, Albert was interested in certainmathematical problems. To this end, he wrote a question on the squaringof the circle as well as questions on John of Sacrobosco's Treatiseon the Sphere. In addition to authoritative arguments and purelyempirical justifications, his question on the squaring of the circleuses properly mathematical arguments appealing to both Euclid (in theversion of Campanus of Novarra) and Archimedes (translated by Gerard ofCremona). His most original contribution is a proposal to dispense withEuclid's proposition X.1, replacing it with a postulate stating that ifA is less than B, then there exists a quantity C such thatA<C<B.4. Impact and InfluenceAlbert of Saxony's teachings on logic and metaphysics were extremelyinfluential. Although Buridan remained the predominant figure in logic,Albert's Perutilis logica was destined to serve as a populartext because of its systematic nature and also because it takes up anddevelops essential aspects of the Ockhamist position. But it was hiscommentary on Aristotle's Physics that was especially widelyread. Many manuscripts of it can be found in France and Italy, inErfurt and Prague. Albert's Physics, much more than Oresme'sand even Buridan's, basically guaranteed the transmission of theParisian tradition in Italy, where it was authoritative along with theworks of Heytesbury and John Dumbleton. His commentary on Aristotle'sDe caelo was also influential, eventually eclipsing Buridan'scommentary on this text. Blasius of Parma read it in Bologna between1379 and 1382. A little later, it enjoyed a wide audience at Vienna.His Treatise on Proportions was often quoted in Italy where,in addition to the texts of Bradwardine and Oresme, it influenced theapplication of the theory of proportions to motion. Albert played an essential role in the diffusion throughout Italyand central Europe of Parisian ideas which bore the mark of Buridan'steachings, but which were also clearly shaped by Albert's own grasp ofEnglish innovations. At the same time, Albert was not merely a compilerof the work of others. He knew how to construct proofs of undeniableoriginality on many topics in logic and physics.BibliographyPrimary TextsA. Muñoz García, 1990: “Albert of Saxony,Bibliography”, Bulletin de Philosophiemédiévale 32, pp.161-190. [complete listing oftexts, manuscripts, and editions]_____, 1991: “Cinco nuevos fragmentos anónimos deAlberto de Sajonia,” Bulletin de philosophiemédiévale 33, pp.162-176.Perutilis logica, in the incunabular edition of Venice1522, with a Spanish translation by A. Muñoz García,Univ. del Zulia, Maracaibo, 1988.Perutilis logica, Tractatus Secundus (De proprietatibusterminorum): cf. infra, Kann: 1993.Quaestiones in artem veterem, ed. A. MuñozGarcía, Univ. del Zulia, Maracaibo, 1988Questiones circa logicam, in Albert of Saxony'sTwenty-Five Disputed Questions on Logic. A critical edition of hisQuestiones circa logicam by Michael J. Fitzgerald, Brill,Leiden-Boston-Köln, 2002.Expositio et Questiones in Aristotelis libros Physicorum adAlbertus de Saxonia attributae, 3 vols., ed. B. Patar,“Philosophes médiévaux” 39-41, Peeters,Louvain-la-Neuve, 1999.Selected Studies and Critical DiscussionsBerger, Harald, 1994: “Albert von Sachsen (1316? -1390).Bibliographie der Sekundärlitteratur,” in Bulletin dePhilosophie médiévale 36, pp. 148-185, 27, pp.175-196, 38, pp. 143-152, 40, pp. 103-116. [exhaustive listing ofthe secondary literature]_____, 2000: “Albert von Sachsen,” in B. Wachingeret alii (ed.), Die deutsche Literatur des Mittelalters.Verfasserlexikon, 2. Aufl., Bd. 11, Lfg. 1, Berlin-New-York, 2000,pp. 39-56.Biard, Joël, 1989: “Les sophismes du savoir: Albert deSaxe entre Jean Buridan et Guillaume Heytesbury,”Vivarium XXVII, pp. 36-50._____, (éd.), 1991: Paris-Vienne au XIVesiècle. Itinéraires d'Albert de Saxe (Actes de latable ronde internationale, Paris, 19-22 juin 1990), Vrin, Paris [21articles representing the state of research on Albert's logic andnatural philosophy]_____, 1993: “Albert de Saxe et les sophismes del'infini,” in Stephen Read (ed.), Sophisms in Medieval Logicand Grammar, Kluwer, Dordrecht-Boston-London,pp. 288-303.Celeyrette, Jean, et Mazet, Edmond, 2003: “Le mouvement dupoint de vue de la cause et le mouvement du point de vue de l'effetedans le Traité des rapports d'Albert de Saxe,” inRevue d'Histoire des Sciences, t. 56/2, numérospécial La réception des Élémentsd'Euclide au Moyen Age et à la Renaissance, pp.402-419.Drake, Stillman, 1975: “Free Fall from Albert of Saxony toHonoré Fabri,” Studies in History and Philosophy ofScience 5 (4), pp. 347-366.Gonzales, A., 1958: “The Theory of Assertoric Consequences inAlbert of Saxony,” Franciscan Studies XVIII,pp. 290-354; XIX, pp. 13-114.Heidingsfelder, G., 1927: Albert von Sachsen. Sein Lebensgangund sein Kommentar zur Nikomachischen Ethik des Aristoteles, inBeiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters XXII/3-4,Münster.Kann, Christoph, 1993a: “Die Behandlung der dialektischenÖrter bei Albert von Sachsen,” in Klaus Jakobi (ed.),Argumentationsheorie. Schoslastischen Forschungen zu den logischenund semantischen Regeln korrekten Folgerns, Brill, Leiden-NewYork-Köln._____, 1993b: Die Eigenschaften der Termini. EineUntersuchung zur ‘Perutilis Logica’ des Alberts vonSachsen, Brill, Amsterdam. [Study of the theory of the property ofterms, including the theory of supposition, with an edition of thesecond treatise of the Perutilis logica]Sarnowsky, Jürgen, 1989: Die aristotelisch-scholastischeTheorie der Bewegung. Studien zum Kommentar Alberts von Sachsen zurPhysik des Aristoteles, in Beiträge zur Geschichte derPhilosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, N. F. XXXII, Aschendorff,Münster._____,1999: “Place and Space in Albert of Saxony's Commentaryon the Physics,” in Arabic Sciences andPhilosophy, 9, pp. 25-45._____,1999: “Albert von Sachsen und die Physik des ensmobile ad formam,” in H. Thijssen and H. Braakhuis (ed.),The Commentary Tradition on Aristotle's De generatione etcorruptione. Ancient, Medieval and Early Modern, “StudiaArtistarium” 7, Turnhout, pp. 163-181Other Internet ResourcesInformations sur le lieu de naissance d'Albert de Saxe. [Please contact the author with other suggestions.]Related Entries Bradwardine, Thomas | Buridan, John [Jean] | Burley [Burleigh], Walter | Heytesbury, William | Ockham [Occam], WilliamAcknowledgmentsThe author gratefully acknowledges Jack Zupko for translating thisentry into English. Copyright © 2004 byJoél Biard<jbiard@univ-tours.fr> |
|
