Qualia: The Knowledge Argument (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Cite this entry Search the SEP • Advanced Search • Tools • RSS FeedTable of Contents• What's New• Archives• Projected ContentsEditorial Information• About the SEP• Editorial Board• How to Cite the SEP• Special CharactersSupport the SEPContact the SEP ©Metaphysics Research Lab,CSLI,Stanford University  Open access to the SEP is made possible by a world-wide funding initiative. Please Read How You Can Help Keep the Encyclopedia FreeQualia: The Knowledge ArgumentFirst published Tue Sep 3, 2002The knowledge argument aims to establish that conscious experienceinvolves non-physical properties. It rests on the idea that someone whohas complete physical knowledge about another conscious being might yetlack knowledge about how it feels to have the experiences of thatbeing. It is one of the most discussed arguments againstphysicalism.1. Remarks About the History of the Underlying Intuition2. The Basic Idea3. Some Clarifications 3.1 Two Versions of the Argument3.2 Physical and Non-physical3.3 Knowing what it is like4. Objections 4.1 Doubts about the Thought Experiment4.2 Complete Physical Knowledge without Knowledge of all the Physical Facts4.3 No Propositional Knowledge 1: the Ability Hypothesis4.4 Objections Against the Ability Hypothesis4.5 No Propositional Knowledge 2: the Acquaintance Hypothesis4.6 The New Knowledge/Old Fact-View4.7 Variants of the New Knowledge/Old Fact View4.8 Objections Against the New Knowledge/Old Fact View5. The Dualist View About the Knowledge Argument6. Concluding RemarkBibliographyOther Internet ResourcesRelated Entries1. Historical RemarksIn the context of his explanation of the difference betweenmechanistic and emergentist theories, C.D. Broad (1925) argues thateven if the mechanistic theory of chemistry were true there still wouldbe a property of ammonia that a mathematical archangel endowed withunlimited mathematical skills and “gifted with the further powerof perceiving the microscopic structure of atoms” could notpredict, namely its smell:He [the archangel] would know exactly what the microscopicstructure of ammonia must be; but he would be totally unable to predictthat a substance with this structure must smell as ammonia does when itgets into the human nose. The utmost that he could predict on thissubject would be that certain changes would take place in the mucousmembrane, the olfactory nerves and so on. But he could not possiblyknow that theses changes would be accompanied by the appearance of asmell in general or of the peculiar smell of ammonia in particular,unless someone told him so or he had smelled it for himself. (Broad,1925, p. 71)Under the title “The Cognitive Role of Acquaintance,” H.Feigl (1958) briefly discusses the epistemic limitations of a Martianwho studies human behavior but does not share human sentiments:The first question I wish to discuss concerns the cognitive‘plus’, i.e., the alleged advantages of knowledge byacquaintance over knowledge by description. We may ask, for example,what does the seeing person know that the congenitally blind personcould not know. Or, to take two examples from Eddington, what could asomeone know about the effects of jokes if he had no sense of humor?Could a Martian, entirely without sentiments of compassion and piety,know about what is going on during a commemoration of the armistice?For the sake of argument, we assume compete physical (1 or 2)predictability and explainability of the behavior of humans equippedwith vision, a sense of humor, and sentiments of piety. The Martiancould then predict all responses, including the linguistic utterancesof the earthlings in the situations which involve their visualperceptions, their laughter about jokes, or their (solemn) behavior atthe commemoration. But ex hypothesi, the Martian would belacking completely in the sort of imagery and empathywhich depends on familiarity (direct acquaintance) with the kinds ofqualia to be imaged or empathized. (Feigl, 1958, p.431)T. Nagel (1974) argues that some facts can only be captured‘from a subjective perspective’ and uses his famous exampleof bats to illustrate the point: Even if we knew everything there is toknow ‘from an objective perspective’ about a bat's sonarsystem, certain factual questions concerning bats would remainunanswered. We still would not know ‘what it is like’ toperceive a given object with a bat's sonar system.As these examples suggest, the idea that complete physical knowledgeisn't sufficient for complete knowledge of phenomenal states has beenaround for a while. In many of these cases, the idea is not used toargue directly against physicalism, although such a use is arguablypresent in Broad (1925). The current debate was initiated by Jackson(1982) who used the idea to develop a more explicit anti-physicalistargument, the knowledge argument.2. The Basic IdeaFrank Jackson (1982) formulates the intuition underlying hisKnowledge Argument in a much cited passage using his famous example ofthe neurophysiologist Mary:Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason,forced to investigate the world from a black and white room via a blackand white television monitor. She specializes in the neurophysiology ofvision and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information thereis to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky,and use terms like ‘red’, ‘blue’, and so on.She discovers, for example, just which wavelength combinations from thesky stimulate the retina, and exactly how this produces viathe central nervous system the contraction of the vocal chords andexpulsion of air from the lungs that results in the uttering of thesentence ‘The sky is blue’. (…) What will happenwhen Mary is released from her black and white room or is given a colortelevision monitor? Will she learn anything or not? It seemsjust obvious that she will learn something about the world and ourvisual experience of it. But then is it inescapable that her previousknowledge was incomplete. But she had all the physicalinformation. Ergo there is more to have than that, andPhysicalism is false.The argument contained in this passage may be put like this:(1) Mary has all the physical information concerning humancolor vision before her release. (2) But there is some information about human color vision that shedoes not have before her release.Therefore(3) Not all information is physical information.Most authors who discuss the knowledge argument cite the case ofMary, but Frank Jackson used a further example in his seminal article:the case of a person, Fred, who sees a color unknown to normal humanperceivers. We might want to know what color Fred experiences whenlooking at things that appear to him in that particular way. It seemsclear that no amount of knowledge about what happens in his brain andabout how color information is processed in his visual system will helpus to find an answer to that question. In both cases cited by Jackson,an epistemic subject A appears to have no access to particularitems of knowledge about a subject B: A cannot knowthat B has an experience of a particular quality Q oncertain occasions. This particular item of knowledge about Bis inaccessible to A because A never hadexperiences of Q herself.3. Some Clarifications3.1 Two Versions of the ArgumentAs Horgan (1984) points out, talk of ‘physicalinformation’ in the context of the knowledge argument isambiguous between an epistemological and an ontological reading.“Physical information” may be interpreted (a) in the senseof what Horgan calls ‘explicit physical information’(according to Horgan's proposal a sentence S expressesexplicit physical information about certain processes just in caseS belongs to, or follows from, a theoretically adequatephysical account of those processes) or (b) in the sense of‘ontologically physical information’ which is explicated inHorgan, 1984, p. 150 as follows: a sentence S “expressesontologically physical information about certain processes just in case(i) all entities referred to or quantified over in S arephysical entities, and (ii) all the properties and relations expressedby the predicates in S are physical properties andrelations.” Presupposing a distinction along these lines one mayreplace ‘to have all explicit physical information aboutx’ by ‘to have complete physical knowledge aboutx’ and one may replace ‘to have all ontologicallyphysical information about x’ by ‘to know all thephysical facts about x’. The argument may thus bereformulated in two different ways:(V1) The weaker version of the knowledgeargument: (1a) Mary has complete physical knowledge concerning factsabout human color vision before her release.(2a) But there is some kind of knowledge concerning factsabout human color vision that she does not have before her release.Therefore(3a) There is some kind of knowledge concerning facts abouthuman color vision that is non-physical knowledge.(V2) The stronger version of the knowledgeargument:(1b) Mary knows all the physical facts concerning humancolor vision before her release.(2b) But there are some facts about human color vision thatMary does not know before her release.Therefore(3b) There are non-physical facts concerning human colorvision.The conclusion of the stronger version of the argument (3b) is anontological claim that the physicalist must reject. Theconclusion of the weaker version of the argument is merely anepistemological claim that is compatible with denying the existence ofnon-physical facts. Although Jackson's original formulation in terms ofinformation is open to both interpretations it is clear that the secondstronger version is what he had in mind.As many have pointed out, the result of the weaker version (3a) doesnot imply the result of the stronger version (3b). That a person hasincomplete knowledge about a certain topic does not imply withoutfurther assumptions that there is some specific fact she does not haveknowledge of. The example of knowledge about oneself (de seknowledge) may illustrate the general point. Let us suppose that John,who is at t in Amsterdam, does not know that he is now inAmsterdam (if asked about his present location he would assert “Iam now in Venice”). John's knowledge concerning the presentlocation of people is incomplete. He lacks a specific locating piece ofde se knowledge. Still, there need not be any fact concerningthe location of people that John does not have knowledge of. It doesnot follow from the description of the case that John does not haveknowledge of the fact that John is in Amsterdam. John may well knowthat John is in Amsterdam but, having forgotten that he is himselfJohn, he may fail to conclude that he is now in Amsterdam. If Johnfinally learns that he is in Amsterdam, he does not thereby learn a newfact—or so many philosophers would insist—he gains newknowledge of a fact that he already knew in a different way.If—in analogy to the de se case—some physicalfacts about color vision can be known in two different ways,—in a‘physical way’ (under ‘physical concepts’) andin some other, non-physical way (under ‘non-physicalconcepts’), then it is possible to acquire new (non-physical)knowledge about a (physical) fact without thereby acquiring knowledgeof a new fact (the very same fact may have been known before under itsphysical conceptualization). Many authors accept the weaker version ofthe argument but reject the stronger one for the reason just sketched:they admit that Mary gains new propositional knowledge but deny thatshe thereby comes to know facts that she did not know before in someother way. (These authors accept the first premise of both versions ofthe argument and the second premise of the first version as well, butthey deny the second premise of the second version and insist that (2a)does not imply (2b)). Their position with respect to the knowledgeargument will be called the New Knowledge/Old Fact-View (see Section 4.6 below). Others deny even the weakerversion V1 and claim that Mary does not gain any new propositionalknowledge (no new knowledge about something that is the case, nofactual knowledge). Their position will be called the NoPropositional Knowledge View (see Sections 4.3and 4.5 below).To locate the different points of disagreement it is helpful toformulate the stronger version of the argument more explicitly.(V3) Explicit formulation of the knowledge argument(stronger version) : Premise P1Mary has complete physical knowledge about human colorvision before her release. ThereforeConsequence C1Mary knows all the physical facts about human colorvision before her release.Premise P2 There is some (kind of) knowledge concerning factsabout human color vision that Mary does not have before her release. Therefore (from (P2)):Consequence C2There are some facts about human color vision thatMary does not know before her release. Therefore (from (C1) and (C2)):Consequence C3There are non-physical facts about human colorvision.Once C1 and C2 are accepted, there is obviously no way to avoid C3(which follows logically from the former two). Moreover, is seems hardto deny that it is in principle possible to have completephysical knowledge about human color vision (or about an appropriatelychosen part thereof). If so, premise P1 should be accepted as anappropriate description of a legitimate thought experiment. To avoidthe antimaterialist conclusion C3 the physicalist can (a) objectagainst the inference from P1 to C1 (a minority of philosophers havechosen this strategy, see Section 4.2 below) or heor she can avoid C2 by (b) denying premise P2 (this is the strategychosen by proponents of the No Propositional Knowledge View,see Sections 4.3 and 4.5 below)or by (c) blocking the inference from premise P2 to C2 (this is thestrategy chosen by a majority of physicalist philosophers who subscribeto some version of the New Knowledge/Old Fact View, see Section 4.6 below).3.2 Physical and Non-physicalThe knowledge argument is often cited as one of thoseanti-physicalist qualia-based arguments that are supposed to justifyproperty dualism. The above formulation, however, does not explicitlymention non-physical properties but only non-physical facts. But therelation between the two claims is obvious. Friends of the knowledgeargument will say that the facts at issue are non-physicalbecause they involve the exemplification of non-physicalproperties (e.g. of the property of having an experience with qualityQ).In the assumption that Mary has all physical knowledge (firstversion) or knows all the physical facts (second version)“physical” is meant in a very broad sense that includesknowledge about (or facts concerning) the functioning of the receptorsand neurons involved in color vision (biological and physiologicalknowledge/facts) as well as knowledge about (or facts concerning) thewhole network of causal relations between processes underlying colorvision, external stimuli and behavior (functional knowledge/ functionalfacts). “Physical” knowledge in the broad sense at issueeven includes psychological knowledge (e.g. knowledge about the resultof psychophysical experiments) in so far as they can be formulatedwithout use of phenomenal terminology. One might try to explicate“physical knowledge” in the sense at issue in roughly thefollowing way: physical knowledge includes all knowledge that isexpressible in a terminology that does not contain irreducibly mentalterms. It would be natural to define physical facts as those facts thatcan be expressed in this way. But note that this definition of‘physical facts’ begs the question against an objectionthat has been raised against the knowledge argument (see Section 4.2 below). It is certainly not easy toformulate a precise, adequate and non question-begging account of“physical knowledge” and “physical facts”suited for the discussion of the knowledge argument. It is, however,quite common to assume that our intuitive understanding of“physical knowledge” in the broad sense at issue is clearenough for the purposes of the debate, though some argue that talk of“physical facts” needs clarification (see Alter(1998)).3.3 Knowing what it is likeIt is common to formulate Mary's new knowledge in terms of ThomasNagel's famous locution of knowing what it's like: Mary does not know(while living in her black-and-white environment) what it is like tosee colors and she learns what it is like to see colors only after herrelease. But this common way to put the point may lead to a confusionof (a) mere acquaintance with kinds of color experiences by having andremembering them and (b) knowledge about what kind of color experienceother subjects have at a given occasion, and it may thereby lead to afailure to distinguish two steps of epistemic progress that Jackson'sMary takes at once. To see the two steps involved one may consider anexample used in Nida-Rümelin (1996) and (1998): Like Mary,Marianna first (at t1) lives in a black and whiteenvironment. Contrary to Mary (at a later momentt2) she gets acquainted with colors by seeingarbitrarily colored objects (abstract paintings, red chairs, bluetables, etc. but no yellow bananas, no pictures of landscapes with ablue sky etc.). Marianna is therefore unable to relate the kinds ofcolor experiences she now is acquainted with to what she already knewabout them at t1. At t2,Marianna may wonder which of four slides (a red, a blue, a green and ayellow slide) appears to her in the color normal people experience whenlooking at the cloudless sky. At t2 Marianna knows,in a sense, what it is like to have experiences of red, blue, etc. Butshe still lacks the relevant items of knowledge about what other peopleexperience: there is a clear sense in which she still may not knowthat the sky appears blue to normal perceivers, she may evenhave the false believe that it appears to normal perceivers like thered slide appears to her and thus believe, in a sense, that the skyappears red to normal perceivers. Only at t3, whenMarianna is finally released and sees the sky, does she gain this itemof knowledge. One way to describe the two steps of epistemic progressis this: At t2, by having color experiences,Marianna can form new concepts, she now has what has been called‘phenomenal concepts’ of kinds of color experiences. Byacquiring these concepts she acquires the capacity to ask newquestions, and to form new (eventually false) hypotheses (e.g. aboutthe appearance of the sky to normal perceivers). Only att3 does she acquire the kind of knowledge that theknowledge argument is concerned with (knowledge that involves theapplication of phenomenal concepts) about experiences of otherpeople.Once these two steps are clearly distinguished one may conclude thatMarianna's relevant epistemic progress at t3 (andMary's relevant progress after release) is not happily described bytalk of knowing what it's like. Rather, or so one may argue, Mary andMarianna acquire a particular kind of belief that the skyappears blue to normal perceivers, namely the phenomenal belief that itappears blue to normal perceivers, where phenomenal belief involves theapplication of the appropriate phenomenal concept. Both may havebelieved, in a sense (the non-phenomenal sense that does not requireuse of phenomenal concepts) that the sky appears blue to normalperceivers while still in their black-and-white environment (they mayhave been told so by their friends). (For the distinction betweenphenomenal and non-phenomenal belief see Nida-Rumelin 1996 and1998).4. Objections4.1 Doubts about the Thought ExperimentSome authors have raised doubts about the thought experiment itself.It is sometimes pointed out, for example, that merely confining Mary toa monochromatic environment would not prevent her from having colorexperiences (see Thompson (1995), p. 264) or that, after release, shewould not be able to see colors. But the example can be refined to meetthese objections. Mary might be monochromatic from birth and changedinto a normal perceiver by some medical procedure. It is sometimesobjected that already accepted or future results of visual science areor might be incompatible with the existence of a Mary-case (a personwith monochromatic experience who becomes a normal color perceiverlater) or that such results might require (to preserve consistence withvisual science) the introduction of so many additional assumptions thatthe conceivability of the example becomes doubtful. To this one mightreply that the thought experiment need not be compatible with visualscience. If the case of a person with monochromatic vision who turnsinto a normal perceiver really does involve serious difficulties formaterialism, then the mere fact (if it were one) that our visualapparatus excludes the actual existence of such a case does not seem toprovide a convincing reply for the materialist. But this point (therelevance or irrelevance of visual science in this context) has notreceived much discussion in the literature. It has, however, beenpointed out (see Graham and Horgan, 2000, footnote 4 with its referenceto Shepard (1993)) that at least presently available results of colorvision science do not exclude a Mary-case. (The psychologist KnutNordby is a real life case of a color vision specialist who is also acomplete achromat. See his paper ‘Vision in a Complete Achromat: APersonal Account’, linked into in the Other Internet Resourcessection.)Another doubt about the thought experiment is raised by the claimthat a person who is confined to a monochromatic environment but knowseverything physical there is to know about visual color experiencewould be able to figure out what colored things look like and thuswould e.g. be able to imagine the kind of color experience produced innormal perceivers when looking at the cloudless sky during the day (seee.g. Dennett (1991), Churchland (1989) and Maloney (1985) p. 36).Probably the most common reaction to this is simply to doubt the claim.But it is not clear that the claim, if correct, would undermine theknowledge argument. The opponent would have to show that completephysical knowledge necessarily involves the capacity toimagine blue. One may doubt that this claim is compatible with thewidely accepted assumption that physical knowledge can be acquiredindependently of one's particular perceptual apparatus. (Arguably asubject whose visual apparatus is not suited for visual experiences atall will not be able to develop the capacity to imagine colors on thebasis of physical knowledge alone, even if this were true forMary).Some have argued that Mary would recognize the colors when firstseeing them on the basis of her complete physical knowledge about colorvision (see Hardin (1992)). According to this claim she would thinksomething like “oh, so this is red” when first confrontedwith a red patch and she could not be fooled by what Dennett calls‘the blue banana trick’: when shown a blue banana shewould know that it has the wrong color (see Dennett (1991)). A possibleand common response is to simply doubt these claims. But, in any case,it is not clear that these claims undermine the knowledge argument. Onemay respond along the following lines: If Mary when first confrontedwith red were able to conclude that she is now seeing what people callred, she thereby acquires a large set of new beliefsabout red experiences (that they are produced by roses, such-and-suchwavelength combinations and so on). On the basis of seeing red she (a)acquires a new phenomenal concept of red and (b) she forms new beliefsinvolving that new concept using her previously acquired physicalknowledge. But if this description is correct, then her previousknowledge was incomplete (for a detailed discussion of Dennett'sargument involving the blue banana trick see Dale (1995)).4.2 Complete Physical Knowledge without Knowledge of all the Physical FactsIt may appear obvious that premise P1 (Mary has complete physicalknowledge about human color vision) implies C1 (Mary knows all thephysical facts about human color vision). If all physical facts can beknown under some physical conceptualization, then a person who hascomplete physical knowledge about a topic knows all the relevantphysical facts. But a few philosophers can be understood as objectingagainst precisely this apparently unproblematic step. Harman (1990)argues that Mary does not know all the functional facts concerninghuman color vision because she lacks the concept of what it is for anobject to be red, blue, etc. Flanagan (1992) distinguishesmetaphysical physicalism from linguistic physicalism.While metaphysical physicalism is the ontological claim that there areno non-physical individuals, properties or relations and nonon-physical facts, linguistic physicalism says that “everythingphysical can be expressed or captured in the languages of the physicalsciences.” According to Flanagan Mary's case may refutelinguistic physicalism but does not refute metaphysical physicalism.Alter (1998) points out that the knowledge argument needs the premisethat all physical facts can be learned discursively and argues thatthis assumption has not been established. It may be argued against thisview that it becomes hard to understand what it is for a property or afact to be physical once we drop the assumption that physicalproperties and physical facts are just those properties and facts thatcan be expressed in physical terminology.4.3 No Propositional Knowledge 1: the Ability HypothesisTwo different versions of the No PropositionalKnowledge-View have been proposed. According to the AbilityHypothesis (most prominently defended in Lewis (1983) and (1988)and in Nemirow (1980) and (1990)), Mary does not acquire any newpropositional knowledge after release (no knowledge about somethingthat is the case, no factual knowledge), but only a bundle of abilities(like the ability to imagine, remember and recognize colors or colorexperiences). According to the Acquaintance Hypothesisproposed by Conee (1994), Mary's new knowledge after release is what hecalls “acquaintance knowledge” which is neitherpropositional knowledge nor identical to a bundle of abilities.Lewis and Nemirow presuppose that Mary's epistemic progress afterrelease consists in the acquisition of knowing what it is like (e.g. tohave an experience of blue) and they both claim that knowing what it islike is to have certain practical abilities. According toNemirow “knowing what an experience is like is the same asknowing how to imagine having the experience” (Nemirow (1990), p.495). According to Lewis,…knowing what it is like is the possession ofabilities: abilities to recognize, abilities to imagine, abilities topredict one's behavior by imaginative experiments. (Lewis (1983), p.131).A few years later he writes: The Ability Hypothesis says that knowing what an experienceis like just is the possession of these abilities to remember,imagine, and recognize. … It isn't knowing-that. It'sknowing-how. (Lewis (1990), p. 516)Lewis's main argument for the Ability Hypothesis can be summarizedlike this. (1) The only alternative to the Ability Hypothesis is whathe calls the Hypothesis of Phenomenal Information (HPI).(According to the HPI knowing what it is like is propositional in thefollowing sense: coming to know what it is like involves theelimination of hitherto open possibilities). (2) The HPI isincompatible with physicalism. (3) The Ability Hypothesis is compatiblewith physicalism and explains everything that may be explained by theHPI. Therefore: The Ability Hypothesis should be preferred.Note that the Ability Hypothesis is compatible with the view that wedo sometimes acquire propositional knowledge on the basis of gettingacquainted with a new kind of experience from the first personperspective. The following remarks by Levin are hard to deny:…it would be perverse to claim that bare experiencecan provide us only with practical abilities…. By being shown anunfamiliar color, I acquire information about its similarities andcompatibilities with other colors, and its effects on other mentalstates: surely I seem to be acquiring certain facts about color and thevisual experience of it. (Levin (1986), p.246)But, as pointed out by Tye (forthcoming), this does not underminethe Ability Hypothesis. The Ability hypothesis implies that there issome knowledge that can only be acquired by having experiencesof a particular kind and that this knowledge is nothing butknowing-how. This of course does not exclude that there alsois propositional knowledge that can be acquired bygetting acquainted with kinds of experiences from the first personperspective. The proponent of the Ability Hypothesis only has to insistthat, if there is such propositional knowledge, then itneed not be acquired on that particular basis but isaccessible in other ways as well.4.4 Objections Against the Ability HypothesisIt has been argued against Nemirow that the ability to imaginehaving an experience of a particular kind is neither necessary norsufficient for knowing what it is like to have that kind of experience.To show that imaginative abilities are not necessary for knowing whatit is like, Conee (1994) and Alter (1998) cite the example of a personwho has no capacity to imagine having color experiences. They claimthat despite this defect she would know what it is like to have anexperience of e.g. green while attentively staring at something thatlooks green to her. To show that imaginative abilities are notsufficient for knowing what it is like Conee introduces the followingexample: A person, Martha, “who is highly skilled at visualizingan intermediate shade that she has not experienced between pairs ofshades that she has experienced…happens not to have anyfamiliarity with the shade known as cherry red.” Martha is toldthat cherry red is midway between burgundy red and fire red (she hasexperienced the latter two shades of red). Given this information andher extraordinary capacity, Martha has the ability to imagine cherryred, but as long as she does not exercise this ability shedoes not know what it is like to see cherry red. (A similar example isused for the same purpose and discussed in more detail by Raymont(1999)). Raymont (1999) argues that mnemic, recognitional andimaginative abilities neither separately nor conjointly amount toknowing of what it is like to have a particular kind of experience. Hefirst argues that none of these abilities is necessary and sufficientfor knowing what it is like: (a) Mnemic abilities are not necessary,since someone can learn what an experience is like when first having itwithout already remembering an experience of the relevant kind. (b)Imaginative abilities are not sufficient since someone can have theability to imagine a particular kind of experience without exercisingit (see the example cited above). (c) To show that recognitionalabilities are not sufficient either, Raymont cites empirical data“in support of the view that one can have the ability tononinferentially recognize a certain type of visual experience withoutever having had it, and thus without knowing what it is like to haveit”. But then these three kinds of abilities cannot conjointlyamount to knowing what it is like either: if they did,then—contrary to (a)—each of them would have to be anecessary condition for knowing what it is like.Gertler (1999) argues that the best candidate for an analysis in thespirit of the Ability Hypothesis is to identify knowing what it is liketo have an experience of red with the ability to recognize seeing-redexperiences by their phenomenal quality and then goes on to attack thiscandidate: she points out that the ability to recognize seeing-redexperiences by their phenomenal quality can be explained by the factthat I know what it is like to see red but not vice versa.Michael Tye (forthcoming) concedes that none of the abilitiesconsidered by Lewis is necessary for knowing what it is like and hediscusses the following possible revision of the Ability Hypothesis:knowing what it is like to have an experience of red is the ability toapply an indexical concept to an experience of red (while having it)via introspection. But, he goes on to argue, this revised version canagain be rejected by a counterexample that shows that the ability atissue is not sufficient for knowing what it is like: If Mary isdistracted and does not attend to her experience when she first sees ared object, then she need not apply any concept to her experience atall. In this case, she still does not know what it is like to have redexperiences although she has the ability to apply an indexicalconcept to her present experience (she has the ability, but, beingdistracted, she does not exercise it). Tye concedes that the revisedversion of the Ability Hypothesis could not, anyway, be used againstthe knowledge argument in the way that was originally intended. Thereason is that the revised version is compatible with the view thatMary does acquire knowing-that if she is not distracted when firstseeing something red: she learns that this is a red experience(where “this” refers introspectively to her presentexperience) and so acquires knowing-that. According to Tye to haveindexical knowledge of this kind is sufficient but not necessary forknowing what it is like to have a red experience. After all, it isimpossible to introspectively refer to a red experience withoutpresently having that kind of experience, but Tye wishes to concedethat a person can know what it is like to have a red experience whilenot presently having a red experience. This reasoning motivates hisdisjunctive account of knowing what it is like: “S knowswhat it is like to undergo experience E iff either Snow has indexical knowledge-that with respect to E obtainedvia current introspection or S has the Lewis abilities withrespect to E.” (Tye (forthcoming), p.*) Tye thus defendsthe physicalist view against the knowledge argument by a combination ofthe two strategies mentioned above: he applies the NewKnowledge/Old Fact-strategy to the person who knows what it islike to have an experience in the sense of the first conjunct (theindexical thought at issue is made true by a physical fact) and heapplies the No Propositional Knowledge-strategy to the case ofsomeone who has knowing what it is like in the sense of the seconddisjunct.Lycan (1996) argues against the Ability Hypothesis and for the viewthat Mary acquires new knowledge-that after release by claiming that“S knows what it is like to see blue” meanssomething like “S knows that it is like Q tosee blue” where Q names the phenomenal quality at issue.It has been objected by Tye (*) that the use of the qualia name“Q” within a propositional attitude contextcreates the well-known problems: Replacing “Q” byanother name “R” for the same quale may change thetruth value of the belief ascription (Tye (*), p.*). A proponent ofLycan's view could however respond along the following lines: In thecase of qualia names within belief contexts it does not matter whichname is used to refer to the quale at issue as long as the belief ismeant in the sense of a phenomenal belief ascription. “Sbelieves that it is like Q to see blue” means, on thephenomenal reading, that S has the relevant belief aboutQ under a phenomenal concept of Q. Under theassumption that it is impossible to have two different phenomenalconcepts of one and the same quale, the objection is met: As long astwo qualia names Q and R refer to the same quale,replacing Q by R in an ascription of phenomenalbelief cannot change the truth value of the belief ascription.4.5 No Propositional Knowledge 2: The Acquaintance HypothesisEarl Conee (1994) proposes another variant of the NoPropositional Knowledge-View. According to Conee acquaintanceconstitutes a third category of knowledge that is neither reducible tofactual knowledge nor to knowing-how and he argues that Mary acquiresafter release only acquaintance knowledge. According to Conee knowingsomething by acquaintance “requires the person to be familiarwith the known entity in the most direct way that it is possible for aperson to be aware of that thing” (Conee (1994), p. 144). Since“experiencing a quality is the most direct way to apprehend aquality” (Conee (1994), p. 144), Mary gains acquaintance withcolor qualia only after release. According to the view proposed byConee the physicalist can defend himself against the knowledge argumentin the following way: (1) Qualia are physical properties of experiences(and experiences are physical processes). Let Q be such aproperty. (2) Mary can know all about Q and she can know thata given experience has Q before release, although—beforerelease—she is not acquainted with Q. (3) After releaseMary gets acquainted with Q, but she does not acquire any newitem of propositional knowledge by getting acquainted with Q(in particular she already knew under what conditions normal perceivershave experiences with the property Q).A friend of the knowledge argument might concede that a person isacquainted with Q only if she has or had an experience withproperty Q but he would have to insist that being acquaintedwith Q in that sense is a necessary condition for being ableto know (in the relevant sense) that an experience has Q.Another kind of criticism of the Acquaintance Hypothesis is developedin Gertler (1999). She argues that the property dualist can explain whythe most direct way to get familiar with a quale is by having anexperience of the relevant kind while the physicalist does not have anyexplanation for this particular feature of qualia.It is interesting to see that a proposal clearly falling into thecategory “New Knowledge/Old Fact View” is very similar inspirit to the Acquaintance Hypothesis: Bigelow and Pargetter (1990)argue that Mary's progress after release consists in the fact that shenow stands in a new acquaintance relation to color qualia, but theirtheory about the individuation of beliefs implies that she therebyacquires new factual knowledge. Different beliefs, according to Bigelowand Pargetter, can be distinguished appropriately only if one takesinto consideration the way the subject is acquainted with theindividuals and properties her belief is about (they use the technicalterm “modes of acquaintance” in that context).4.6 The New Knowledge/Old Fact ViewSeveral positive arguments for the view that Mary's new knowledgeafter release constitutes propositional knowledge (genuine information)have been formulated in the literature. Lycan argues, for example, thatMary's new knowledge goes along with the elimination of epistemicpossibilities and that her new abilities are best explained by herhaving new information (for further arguments see Lycan (1996), pp.92). Loar (1990) points out that the embedded occurrence of“feels like such and such” in sentences like“if pains feel like such and such then Q”cannot be accounted for in a model that treats knowing of what it islike as mere know-how. McConnell (1994) defends the more radical viewthat the acquisition of knowing-how is normally accompanied by theacquisition of a particular new item of knowing-that.Many philosophers find it hard to deny that Mary gains new factualknowledge after release and for that reason (if they are physicalists)feel attracted by the New Knowledge/Old Fact View. Positions thatclearly fall into that category are defended in Horgan (1984),Churchland (1985), Tye (1986) and (1995), Bigelow and Pargetter (1990),Loar (1990), Lycan (1990) and (1995), Pereboom (1994) and Perry(2001).The basic ideas common to the New Knowledge/Old Fact View may besummarized as follows:(1) Phenomenal character, e.g. phenomenal blueness, is aphysical property of experiences (but see Lycan (1990) for anexception who construes qualia as properties of external objects). (2) To gain knowledge of what it is like to have an experience of aparticular phenomenal character requires the acquisition ofphenomenal concepts of phenomenal character.(3) What it is for an organism to acquire and possess a phenomenalconcept can be fully described in broadly physical terms.(4) A subject can acquire and possess phenomenal concepts only if ithas or has had experiences of the relevant phenomenal kind.(5) After release Mary gains knowledge about phenomenal charactersunder phenomenal concepts.But the facts that make these new items of knowledge true arephysical facts that Mary knew before release under anotherconceptualization.The differences between variants of the New Knowledge/Old Fact Viewconcern the theoretical (physicalist) account of (a) phenomenalcharacter, (b) phenomenal concepts of phenomenal characters and (c) therelation between phenomenal characters and the corresponding phenomenalconcepts. All proponents of the view point out that, according to theirproposal, physical concepts and phenomenal concepts are cognitivelyindependent: it is impossible to see a priori that somethingthat falls under a physical concept of a particular phenomenalcharacter also falls under the corresponding phenomenalconcept of that phenomenal character. This is why it is possibleto have (like Mary) complete physical knowledge about e.g. phenomenalblueness (you know everything there is to know about phenomenalblueness under its physical conceptualization) without having aphenomenal concept of blueness and without knowing any of these factsunder a phenomenal concept of blueness.In general, if a philosopher A claims that the argument ofphilosopher B does not go through, it is a point in favor ofhis view if he can provide an error theory, that is if he can explainwhy the argument may appear correct in the first place. TheNew Knowledge/Old Fact View can claim to have an error theory withrespect to the knowledge argument. Given the cognitive independence ofphysical and phenomenal concepts of blueness it appears as ifwe could imagine a situation where everything Mary knew before releasewere fulfilled but not what she came to know after release (and thiscan be taken to imply that she does come to know new facts).But, according to the New Knowledge/Old Fact View this is an illusion.There is no such possible situation. What Mary learns after release ismade true by a physical fact that she already knew before her release.Some versions of the New Knowledge/Old Fact-View will be brieflydescribed in what follows.4.7 Variants of the New Knowledge/Old Fact ViewHorgan (1984) does not provide a developed theoretical account ofphenomenal concepts but is one of the first to formulate the basicintuition shared by most or all proponents of the New Knowledge/OldFact View: By having experiences of blue, Mary gets acquainted withphenomenal blueness (which is in fact a physical property ofexperiences) “from the experiential perspective,” she gainswhat he calls “the first person ostensive perspective on thatproperty” (Horgan, 1984, p. 151): she now can refer to phenomenalblueness by thinking or saying “that kind ofproperty” while having, remembering or imagining a blueexperience and while attending to its particular quality. She thus hasacquired a new concept of phenomenal blueness. Using this newconcept she can form new beliefs (and acquire new knowledge) aboutphenomenal blueness. Formulated in this way, the view may appearsimilar to Conee's acquaintance account. According to both views,Mary's progress consists primarily in getting acquainted withphenomenal blueness from an inner perspective. But contrary to Conee'sthesis, according to the New Knowledge/Old Fact View, acquaintance withphenomenal blueness form an experiential perspective enables thesubject to form a new concept of phenomenal blueness andthereby implies the capacity to acquire new beliefs.An example of a more explicit theoretical account of phenomenalcharacter, phenomenal content and their relation can be found in Tye(1995). He proposes a representationalist account of phenomenalcharacter. For a state to have phenomenal character is to representinternal or external physical items in an ‘abstract’ andnonconceptual way that is “appropriately poised for use by thecognitive system” (see Tye, 1996, 137-144). According to Tye,there are two kinds of phenomenal concepts: indexical concepts (anexample is the concept applied when thinking of a particular shade ofred as “this particular hue” while having a red experience)and what he calls “predicative phenomenal concepts” thatare based on the capacity to make certain discriminations. Tye wishesto accommodate the natural intuition that Mary before release cannotfully understand the nature of phenomenal blueness (she doesn't reallyknow what it is to have a blue experience). One might think that hisview is incompatible with the intuition at issue. Phenomenal blueness,according to his view, has a physical nature and one might expect thatphysical natures are fully describable in physical terms and fullyunderstandable under a physical conceptualization. But Tye has asurprising response: Although phenomenal blueness has a physicalnature, a person cannot fully understand its nature unless she thinksof phenomenal blueness under a phenomenal concept.Another representationalist view about phenomenal character iscombined with the New Knowledge/Old Fact View in Lycan (1990) and(1996). Lycan's account of Mary's epistemic progress can be put,roughly, like this: Only after release Mary can form“introspective second order representations” of her owncolor experiences. One may think of an introspective representation asof “a token in one of the subject's languages of thought, his orher Introspectorese”. It has often been said that what Marylearns is in some sense “ineffable”, that it cannot becommunicated in public language. Lycan is led to a similar conclusionwithin his computational theory. In his view, when Mary finally has anexperience of blue she “tokens a semantically primitive mentalword for the type of first-order state being inwardly sensed.”where this word in Mary's language of thought has an “inferentialand/or conceptual role” that is “unique to its subject, inthat no other subject could deploy a functionally similarrepresentation whose designatum was that (the subject's) very samefirst-order state-token,(…).” And he concludes that“the introspective word would certainly not be synonymous withany primitive or composite expression of public English,…”(Lycan (1996), p. 101).Papineau (1996) distinguishes third person and first person thoughtsabout experiences. First person thoughts involve the imagination of anexperience of the relevant kind. The basic idea may be put like this:When Mary is finally released and after some time sufficientlyacquainted with color experiences she can ‘reproduce’ blueexperiences in her imagination. These imaginations of experiences of aparticular kind can be used to refer to experiences of the kind atissue and to think about them. Obviously, Mary could not have firstperson thoughts about color experiences (she could not use imaginedblue experiences in order to refer and to think about blue experiences)before she ever had blue experiences. After release, Mary can acquirenew beliefs: first person beliefs about blue experiences. But for everysuch new first person belief about a given kind of experience,there will be one of her old third person beliefs which refersto the same kind of experience and has the same factual content.Perry (2001) argues that Mary's new knowledge after release does notpose a problem to physicalism any more than indexical thoughts like“I am a philosopher” or “today is Sunday” (fora defense of this claim see also McMullen, 1985). He treats Mary's newknowledge as a particular case of demonstrative belief (and he proposesan account of Mary's new beliefs after release in terms of his theoryof token-reflexive thoughts). After release, when seeing the sky, Marymay think “Oh, so having blue experiences is likethis” where “this” refers to a physicalproperty (the phenomenal character) of her present color experience.She could not have had a demonstrative belief of this kind beforerelease. But, again, the fact that makes the thought true is simply thefact that blue experiences have the particular physical property atissue. Therefore, she does not learn any new fact.Doubts about Perry's proposal have been raised along the followinglines. In normal cases of demonstrative reference the demonstratedobject is in some way given to the epistemic subject (when pointing toa table and referring to it by “this table”, the object maybe given as “the next table left to me”). But what is theway the kind of experience is given to Mary when she thinks ofphenomenal blueness under the demonstrative concept “this kind ofexperience?” It cannot be the way it feels to have an experiencewith that property, since this solution, so one may argue, introducesphenomenal characters of phenomenal characters and thus reintroducesthe original problem. Maybe “the kind of experience I am nowhaving” is the appropriate candidate. But there are problems withthis proposal too (see Chalmers, 2002).Loar (1996) develops a view similar to Perry's that is, however,immune to the kind of objection just mentioned: Phenomenal concepts arerecognitional concepts. To have the phenomenal concept of blueness isto be able to recognize experiences of blueness while having them. Therecognitional concept of blueness refers directly to itsreferent (the physical property of blueness) where this means (inLoar's terminology): there is no other property (no property of thatproperty) involved in the reference fixing. According to Loar's viewthe recognitional concept of phenomenal blueness refers to the physicalproperty phenomenal blueness in virtue of being ‘triggered’by that property.4.8. Objections Against the New Knowledge/Old Fact ViewAn objection to the New Knowledge/Old Fact View can be made asfollows. In standard cases, if a subject does not know a given fact inone way that it does know in some other way, this can be explained bytwo modes of presentation: the subject knows the fact under one mode ofpresentation and does not know it under some other mode ofpresentation. So, for example, a person may know the fact that Venus isa planet under the mode of presentation associated with “themorning star is a planet” and fail to know the very same factunder the mode of presentation associated with “the evening staris a planet.” In this particular case, as in many others, thedifference in the mode of presentation involves two differentproperties that are used to fix the referent. In one mode ofpresentation Venus is given as the heavenly body visible late in themorning (or some similar property), whereas in the other mode ofpresentation the object is given as the heavenly body visble early inthe evening.If the New Knowledge/Old Fact View involves two modes ofpresentation of this sort, then it cannot be used to defend physicalismbecause this kind of explanation of the supposed double epistemicaccess to facts concerning phenomenal types would reintroducenon-physical properties at a higher level: the subject would have to bedecribed as referring to the phenomenal type at issue by some physicalproperty in case it believes the relevant fact under its physical modeof presentation and as referring to that phenomenal type by somenon-physical property in case it believes the relevant fact under itsphenomenal mode of presentation.It has been argued by several authors that the different modes ofpresentation at issue in the case of beliefs about phenomenal states doinvolve the introduction of different reference-fixing properties andthat therefore the proposal is unsuccessful.Arguments of that kind arefound in Lockwood (1989), chapt. 8, McConnell (1994) and White(forthcoming). Chalmers (1996) and (2002) makes a similar point usinghis framework of primary and secondary intensions. In that framework,primary intensions describe the way a concept picks out its referent inthe actual world and the cognitive independence of phenomenal andphysical concepts is explained by their different primary intensions.If one singular fact can be known under a physical mode of presentationas well as under a phenomenal mode of presentation, then the two itemsof knowledge involve two concepts (a phenomenal and a physical concept)with different primary intensions and these different primaryintensions correspond to different properties.Anyone who wishes to argue in the way just mentioned, that the twomodes of presentation do involve the introduction of two differentreference-fixing properties, must deal with Loar's proposal (see 4.7.).Loar avoids the problem of two reference fixing properties by his claimthat phenomenal concepts refer directly to their referent. It has beenargued against Loar that his causal account of how phenomenal conceptsmanage to directly refer to their referent (namely by being triggeredby them) cannot appropriately describe the particular cognitive role ofphenomenal concepts (see White, forthcoming and Connell (1994)).5. The Dualist View About the Knowledge ArgumentThere has not been much discussion of the knowledge argument from adualist perspective. This is unsurprising given the small number ofcontemporary philosophers who defend a dualist position (for aprominent exception see Chalmers (1996); the knowledge argument isdiscussed on pp. 140-146). There are two possible strategies for adualist to take who wishes to defend the knowledge argument. The firstis merely defensive or ‘destructive’ in that it tries torefute the positive theoretical proposals one by one that have beenused by physicalists in their objections against the knowledgeargument. The second is more ‘constructive’ in that it aimsat developing an alternative positive dualist account of phenomenalconcepts, phenomenal properties and their relations such that on thataccount Mary does learn new and nonphysical facts upon release.Examples (or partial examples) for the first strategy may occasionallybe found in the literature (compare Warner (1986), Gertler (1999),Raymont (1995) and (1999) and Connell (1994)). Examples for the secondare hard to find, but Chalmers (1996) and (2002) exemplify the secondstrategy. Using his framework of primary and secondary intensions hedevelops a positive account of what he calls “pure phenomenalconcepts” that can be described as incorporating the old andnatural intuition that in the case of qualia (phenomenal characters)there is no distinction between appearance and reality, in other words:qualia ‘reveal their nature’ in experience.The intuitive idea just mentioned has been expressed in differentways. Some say that qualia ‘have no hidden sides’. Otherssay that qualia are not natural kind terms in that it is notup to the sciences to tell us what having an experience of a particularkind amounts to (we know what it amounts to by having them andattending to the quality at issue). It is quite clear that an accountof this intuitive idea has to be one of the ingredients of a dualistdefense of the knowledge argument.According to mainstream opinion the most serious problem forproperty dualism is the danger of being driven into epiphenomenalism.If phenomenal characters are non-physical properties and if everyphysical event has a physical cause and if we exclude the possibilityof overdetermination (where something is caused by two different causesthat are both sufficient), then, arguably, whether or not a state has aparticular phenomenal character cannot have any causal relevance. Butif qualia are causally impotent, how can a person know that she has anexperience with a particular phenomenal character? Many take it to beobvious that a person cannot know that she now has a blue experienceunless her blue experience plays a prominent causal role in theformation of her belief at issue. This particular problem has beenformulated as an objection against the knowledge argument in Watkins(1989). Until recently Jackson was one of the very few philosophers whoembraced epiphenomenalism. But Jackson changed his mind. Jackson (1995)argues that knowledge about qualia is impossible if qualia areepiphenomenal and he concludes that something must be wrong with theknowledge argument. Other possible reactions would be either to doubtthat a property dualist must embrace epiphenomenalism or to develop anaccount of knowledge about one's own phenomenal states that does notimply a causal relation between qualia and phenomenal knowledge aboutqualia (see Chalmers (2002)).6. Concluding RemarkThe appropriate evaluation of the knowledge argument remainscontroversial. The acceptability of its second premise P2 (Mary lacksfactual knowledge before release) and of the inferences from P1 (Maryhas complete physical knowledge before release) to C1 (Mary knows allthe physical facts) and from P2 to C2 (Mary does not know some factsbefore release) depend on quite technical and controversial issuesabout (a) the appropriate theory of property concepts and theirrelation to the properties they express and (b) the appropriate theoryof belief content. 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(1986): “A Challenge to Physicalism,” In:Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64, 249-265.Watkins, M., (1989): “The Knowledge Argument Against theKnowledge Argument”, Analysis 49: 158-160.White, St. (forthcoming): “ Why The Property Dualism ArgumentWon't Go Away” [Preprint available]Other Internet ResourcesNordby, Knut, ‘Vision in a Complete Achromat: A Personal Account’, online paper.Online Papers on Consciousness, maintained by DavidChalmers (University of Arizona)Related Entries dualism | materialism | physicalism | propositional attitude reports | qualia | self-knowledge Copyright © 2002 byMartine Nida-Rümelin <martine.nida-ruemelin@unifr.ch> |
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